Whether Offering a Sacrifice to God Is of the Law of Nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that offering a sacrifice to God is not of
the natural law. Things that are of the natural law are common among
all men. Yet this is not the case with sacrifices: for we read of
some, e.g. Melchisedech (Gen. 14:18), offering bread and wine in
sacrifice, and of certain animals being offered by some, and others
by others. Therefore the offering of sacrifices is not of the natural
law.
Obj. 2: Further, things that are of the natural law were observed by
all just men. Yet we do not read that Isaac offered sacrifice; nor
that Adam did so, of whom nevertheless it is written (Wis. 10:2) that
wisdom "brought him out of his sin." Therefore the offering of
sacrifice is not of the natural law.
Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 5, 19) that
sacrifices are offered in signification of something. Now words which
are chief among signs, as he again says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 3),
"signify, not by nature but by convention," according to the
Philosopher (Peri Herm. i, 2). Therefore sacrifices are not of the
natural law.
_On the contrary,_ At all times and among all nations there has
always been the offering of sacrifices. Now that which is observed by
all is seemingly natural. Therefore the offering of sacrifices is of
the natural law.
_I answer that,_ Natural reason tells man that he is subject to a
higher being, on account of the defects which he perceives in
himself, and in which he needs help and direction from someone above
him: and whatever this superior being may be, it is known to all
under the name of God. Now just as in natural things the lower are
naturally subject to the higher, so too it is a dictate of natural
reason in accordance with man's natural inclination that he should
tender submission and honor, according to his mode, to that which is
above man. Now the mode befitting to man is that he should employ
sensible signs in order to signify anything, because he derives his
knowledge from sensibles. Hence it is a dictate of natural reason
that man should use certain sensibles, by offering them to God in
sign of the subjection and honor due to Him, like those who make
certain offerings to their lord in recognition of his authority. Now
this is what we mean by a sacrifice, and consequently the offering of
sacrifice is of the natural law.
Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (I-II, Q. 95, A. 2), certain things
belong generically to the natural law, while their determination
belongs to the positive law; thus the natural law requires that
evildoers should be punished; but that this or that punishment should
be inflicted on them is a matter determined by God or by man. In like
manner the offering of sacrifice belongs generically to the natural
law, and consequently all are agreed on this point, but the
determination of sacrifices is established by God or by man, and this
is the reason for their difference.
Reply Obj. 2: Adam, Isaac and other just men offered sacrifice to God
in a manner befitting the times in which they lived, according to
Gregory, who says (Moral. iv, 3) that in olden times original sin was
remitted through the offering of sacrifices. Nor does Scripture
mention all the sacrifices of the just, but only those that have
something special connected with them. Perhaps the reason why we read
of no sacrifice being offered by Adam may be that, as the origin of
sin is ascribed to him, the origin of sanctification ought not to be
represented as typified in him. Isaac was a type of Christ, being
himself offered in sacrifice; and so there was no need that he should
be represented as offering a sacrifice.
Reply Obj. 3: It is natural to man to express his ideas by signs, but
the determination of those signs depends on man's pleasure.
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