Whether a Sin of Omission Is More Grievous Than a Sin of
Transgression?
Objection 1: It would seem that a sin of omission is more grievous
than a sin of transgression. For _delictum_ would seem to signify the
same as _derelictum_ [*Augustine, QQ. in Levit., qu. xx], and
therefore is seemingly the same as an omission. But _delictum_
denotes a more grievous offence than transgression, because it
deserves more expiation as appears from Lev. 5. Therefore the sin of
omission is more grievous than the sin of transgression.
Obj. 2: Further, the greater evil is opposed to the greater good, as
the Philosopher declares (Ethic. viii, 10). Now to do good is a more
excellent part of justice, than to decline from evil, to which
transgression is opposed, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3). Therefore
omission is a graver sin than transgression.
Obj. 3: Further, sins of transgression may be either venial or
mortal. But sins of omission seem to be always mortal, since they are
opposed to an affirmative precept. Therefore omission would seem to
be a graver sin than transgression.
Obj. 4: Further, the pain of loss which consists in being deprived of
seeing God and is inflicted for the sin of omission, is a greater
punishment than the pain of sense, which is inflicted for the sin of
transgression, as Chrysostom states (Hom. xxiii super Matth.). Now
punishment is proportionate to fault. Therefore the sin of omission
is graver than the sin of transgression.
_On the contrary,_ It is easier to refrain from evil deeds than to
accomplish good deeds. Therefore it is a graver sin not to refrain
from an evil deed, i.e. _to transgress,_ than not to accomplish a
good deed, which is _to omit._
_I answer that,_ The gravity of a sin depends on its remoteness from
virtue. Now contrariety is the greatest remoteness, according to
_Metaph._ x [*Didot. ed. ix, 4]. Wherefore a thing is further removed
from its contrary than from its simple negation; thus black is
further removed from white than not-white is, since every black is
not-white, but not conversely. Now it is evident that transgression
is contrary to an act of virtue, while omission denotes the negation
thereof: for instance it is a sin of omission, if one fail to give
one's parents due reverence, while it is a sin of transgression to
revile them or injure them in any way. Hence it is evident that,
simply and absolutely speaking, transgression is a graver sin than
omission, although a particular omission may be graver than a
particular transgression.
Reply Obj. 1: _Delictum_ in its widest sense denotes any kind of
omission; but sometimes it is taken strictly for the omission of
something concerning God, or for a man's intentional and as it were
contemptuous dereliction of duty: and then it has a certain gravity,
for which reason it demands a greater expiation.
Reply Obj. 2: The opposite of _doing good_ is both _not doing good,_
which is an omission, and _doing evil,_ which is a transgression: but
the first is opposed by contradiction, the second by contrariety,
which implies greater remoteness: wherefore transgression is the more
grievous sin.
Reply Obj. 3: Just as omission is opposed to affirmative precepts, so
is transgression opposed to negative precepts: wherefore both,
strictly speaking, have the character of mortal sin. Transgression
and omission, however, may be taken broadly for any infringement of
an affirmative or negative precept, disposing to the opposite of such
precept: and so taking both in a broad sense they may be venial sins.
Reply Obj. 4: To the sin of transgression there correspond both the
pain of loss on account of the aversion from God, and the pain of
sense, on account of the inordinate conversion to a mutable good. In
like manner omission deserves not only the pain of loss, but also the
pain of sense, according to Matt. 7:19, "Every tree that bringeth not
forth good fruit shall be cut down, and shall be cast into the fire";
and this on account of the root from which it grows, although it does
not necessarily imply conversion to any mutable good.
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