Whether Transgression Is a Special Sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that transgression is not a special sin.
For no species is included in the definition of its genus. Now
transgression is included in the definition of sin; because Ambrose
says (De Parad. viii) that sin is "a transgression of the Divine
law." Therefore transgression is not a species of sin.
Obj. 2: Further, no species is more comprehensive than its genus. But
transgression is more comprehensive than sin, because sin is a "word,
deed or desire against the law of God," according to Augustine
(Contra Faust. xxii, 27), while transgression is also against nature,
or custom. Therefore transgression is not a species of sin.
Obj. 3: Further, no species contains all the parts into which its
genus is divided. Now the sin of transgression extends to all the
capital vices, as well as to sins of thought, word and deed.
Therefore transgression is not a special sin.
_On the contrary,_ It is opposed to a special virtue, namely justice.
_I answer that,_ The term transgression is derived from bodily
movement and applied to moral actions. Now a person is said to
transgress in bodily movement, when he steps (_graditur_) beyond
(_trans_) a fixed boundary--and it is a negative precept that fixes
the boundary that man must not exceed in his moral actions. Wherefore
to transgress, properly speaking, is to act against a negative
precept.
Now materially considered this may be common to all the species of
sin, because man transgresses a Divine precept by any species of
mortal sin. But if we consider it formally, namely under its special
aspect of an act against a negative precept, it is a special sin in
two ways. First, in so far as it is opposed to those kinds of sin
that are opposed to the other virtues: for just as it belongs
properly to legal justice to consider a precept as binding, so it
belongs properly to a transgression to consider a precept as an
object of contempt. Secondly, in so far as it is distinct from
omission which is opposed to an affirmative precept.
Reply Obj. 1: Even as legal justice is "all virtue" (Q. 58, A. 5) as
regards its subject and matter, so legal injustice is materially "all
sin." It is in this way that Ambrose defined sin, considering it from
the point of view of legal injustice.
Reply Obj. 2: The natural inclination concerns the precepts of the
natural law. Again, a laudable custom has the force of a precept;
since as Augustine says in an epistle _on the Fast of the Sabbath_
(Ep. xxxvi), "a custom of God's people should be looked upon as law."
Hence both sin and transgression may be against a laudable custom and
against a natural inclination.
Reply Obj. 3: All these species of sin may include transgression, if
we consider them not under their proper aspects, but under a special
aspect, as stated above. The sin of omission, however, is altogether
distinct from the sin of transgression.
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