Whether the Evidence of Two or Three Persons Suffices?
Objection 1: It would seem that the evidence of two or three persons
is not sufficient. For judgment requires certitude. Now certitude of
the truth is not obtained by the assertions of two or three
witnesses, for we read that Naboth was unjustly condemned on the
evidence of two witnesses (3 Kings 21). Therefore the evidence of two
or three witnesses does not suffice.
Obj. 2: Further, in order for evidence to be credible it must agree.
But frequently the evidence of two or three disagrees in some point.
Therefore it is of no use for proving the truth in court.
Obj. 3: Further, it is laid down (Decret. II, qu. iv, can. Praesul.):
"A bishop shall not be condemned save on the evidence of seventy-two
witnesses; nor a cardinal priest of the Roman Church, unless there be
sixty-four witnesses. Nor a cardinal deacon of the Roman Church,
unless there be twenty-seven witnesses; nor a subdeacon, an acolyte,
an exorcist, a reader or a doorkeeper without seven witnesses." Now
the sin of one who is of higher dignity is more grievous, and
consequently should be treated more severely. Therefore neither is
the evidence of two or three witnesses sufficient for the
condemnation of other persons.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 17:6): "By the mouth of two
or three witnesses shall he die that is to be slain," and further on
(Deut. 19:15): "In the mouth of two or three witnesses every word
shall stand."
_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 3), "we must
not expect to find certitude equally in every matter." For in human
acts, on which judgments are passed and evidence required, it is
impossible to have demonstrative certitude, because they are about
things contingent and variable. Hence the certitude of probability
suffices, such as may reach the truth in the greater number of cases,
although it fail in the minority. Now it is probable that the
assertion of several witnesses contains the truth rather than the
assertion of one: and since the accused is the only one who denies,
while several witness affirm the same as the prosecutor, it is
reasonably established both by Divine and by human law, that the
assertion of several witnesses should be upheld. Now all multitude is
comprised of three elements, the beginning, the middle and the end.
Wherefore, according to the Philosopher (De Coelo i, 1), "we reckon
'all' and 'whole' to consist of three parts." Now we have a triple
voucher when two agree with the prosecutor: hence two witnesses are
required; or for the sake of greater certitude three, which is the
perfect number. Wherefore it is written (Eccles. 4:12): "A threefold
cord is not easily broken": and Augustine, commenting on John 8:17,
"The testimony of two men is true," says (Tract. xxxvi) that "there
is here a mystery by which we are given to understand that Trinity
wherein is perpetual stability of truth."
Reply Obj. 1: No matter how great a number of witnesses may be
determined, the evidence might sometimes be unjust, since is written
(Ex. 23:2): "Thou shalt not follow the multitude to do evil." And yet
the fact that in so many it is not possible to have certitude without
fear of error, is no reason why we should reject the certitude which
can probably be had through two or three witnesses, as stated above.
Reply Obj. 2: If the witnesses disagree in certain principal
circumstances which change the substance of the fact, for instance in
time, place, or persons, which are chiefly in question, their
evidence is of no weight, because if they disagree in such things,
each one would seem to be giving distinct evidence and to be speaking
of different facts. For instance, one say that a certain thing
happened at such and such a time or place, while another says it
happened at another time or place, they seem not to be speaking of
the same event. The evidence is not weakened if one witness says that
he does not remember, while the other attests to a determinate time
or place. And if on such points as these the witness for prosecution
and defense disagree altogether, and if they be equal in number on
either side, and of equal standing, the accused should have the
benefit of the doubt, because the judge ought to be more inclined to
acquit than to condemn, except perhaps in favorable suits, such as a
pleading for liberty and the like. If, however, the witnesses for the
same side disagree, the judge ought to use his own discretion in
discerning which side to favor, by considering either the number of
witnesses, or their standing, or the favorableness of the suit, or
the nature of the business and of the evidence.
Much more ought the evidence of one witness to be rejected if he
contradict himself when questioned about what he has seen and about
what he knows; not, however, if he contradict himself when questioned
about matters of opinion and report, since he may be moved to answer
differently according to the different things he has seen and heard.
On the other hand if there be discrepancy of evidence in
circumstances not touching the substance of the fact, for instance,
whether the weather were cloudy or fine, whether the house were
painted or not, or such like matters, such discrepancy does not
weaken the evidence, because men are not wont to take much notice of
such things, wherefore they easily forget them. Indeed, a discrepancy
of this kind renders the evidence more credible, as Chrysostom states
(Hom. i in Matth.), because if the witnesses agreed in every point,
even in the minutest of details, they would seem to have conspired
together to say the same thing: but this must be left to the prudent
discernment of the judge.
Reply Obj. 3: This passage refers specially to the bishops, priests,
deacons and clerics of the Roman Church, on account of its dignity:
and this for three reasons. First because in that Church those men
ought to be promoted whose sanctity makes their evidence of more
weight than that of many witnesses. Secondly, because those who have
to judge other men, often have many opponents on account of their
justice, wherefore those who give evidence against them should not be
believed indiscriminately, unless they be very numerous. Thirdly,
because the condemnation of any one of them would detract in public
opinion from the dignity and authority of that Church, a result which
would be more fraught with danger than if one were to tolerate a
sinner in that same Church, unless he were very notorious and
manifest, so that a grave scandal would arise if he were tolerated.
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