Whether an Accusation Is Rendered Unjust by Calumny, Collusion or
Evasion?
Objection 1: It would seem that an accusation is not rendered unjust
by calumny, collusion or evasion. For according to Decret. II, qu.
iii [*Append. Grat. ad can. Si quem poenituerit.], "calumny consists
in falsely charging a person with a crime." Now sometimes one man
falsely accuses another of a crime through ignorance of fact which
excuses him. Therefore it seems that an accusation is not always
rendered unjust through being slanderous.
Obj. 2: Further, it is stated by the same authority that "collusion
consists in hiding the truth about a crime." But seemingly this is
not unlawful, because one is not bound to disclose every crime, as
stated above (A. 1; Q. 33, A. 7). Therefore it seems that an
accusation is not rendered unjust by collusion.
Obj. 3: Further, it is stated by the same authority that "evasion
consists in withdrawing altogether from an accusation." But this can
be done without injustice: for it is stated there also: "If a man
repent of having made a wicked accusation and inscription* in a
matter which he cannot prove, and come to an understanding with the
innocent party whom he has accused, let them acquit one another."
[*The accuser was bound by Roman Law to endorse (se inscribere) the
writ of accusation. The effect of this endorsement or inscription was
that the accuser bound himself, if he failed to prove the accusation,
to suffer the same punishment as the accused would have to suffer if
proved guilty.] Therefore evasion does not render an accusation
unjust.
_On the contrary,_ It is stated by the same authority: "The rashness
of accusers shows itself in three ways. For they are guilty either of
calumny, or of collusion, or of evasion."
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), accusation is ordered for
the common good which it aims at procuring by means of knowledge of
the crime. Now no man ought to injure a person unjustly, in order to
promote the common good. Wherefore a man may sin in two ways when
making an accusation: first through acting unjustly against the
accused, by charging him falsely with the commission of a crime, i.e.
by calumniating him; secondly, on the part of the commonwealth, whose
good is intended chiefly in an accusation, when anyone with wicked
intent hinders a sin being punished. This again happens in two ways:
first by having recourse to fraud in making the accusation. This
belongs to collusion (_prevaricatio_) for "he that is guilty of
collusion is like one who rides astraddle (_varicator_), because he
helps the other party, and betrays his own side" [*Append. Grat. ad
can. Si quem poenituerit.]. Secondly by withdrawing altogether from
the accusation. This is evasion (_tergiversatio_) for by desisting
from what he had begun he seems to turn his back (_tergum vertere_).
Reply Obj. 1: A man ought not to proceed to accuse except of what he
is quite certain about, wherein ignorance of fact has no place. Yet
he who falsely charges another with a crime is not a calumniator
unless he gives utterance to false accusations out of malice. For it
happens sometimes that a man through levity of mind proceeds to
accuse someone, because he believes too readily what he hears, and
this pertains to rashness; while, on the other hand sometimes a man
is led to make an accusation on account of an error for which he is
not to blame. All these things must be weighed according to the
judge's prudence, lest he should declare a man to have been guilty of
calumny, who through levity of mind or an error for which he is not
to be blamed has uttered a false accusation.
Reply Obj. 2: Not everyone who hides the truth about a crime is
guilty of collusion, but only he who deceitfully hides the matter
about which he makes the accusation, by collusion with the defendant,
dissembling his proofs, and admitting false excuses.
Reply Obj. 3: Evasion consists in withdrawing altogether from the
accusation, by renouncing the intention of accusing, not anyhow, but
inordinately. There are two ways, however, in which a man may rightly
desist from accusing without committing a sin--in one way, in the
very process of accusation, if it come to his knowledge that the
matter of his accusation is false, and then by mutual consent the
accuser and the defendant acquit one another--in another way, if the
accusation be quashed by the sovereign to whom belongs the care of
the common good, which it is intended to procure by the accusation.
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