SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 65, Art. 2]

Whether It Is Lawful for Parents to Strike Their Children, or

Masters Their Slaves?

Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for parents to strike their

children, or masters their slaves. For the Apostle says (Eph. 6:4):

"You, fathers, provoke not your children to anger"; and further on

(Eph. 9:6): "And you, masters, do the same thing to your slaves

[Vulg.: 'to them'] forbearing threatenings." Now some are provoked to

anger by blows, and become more troublesome when threatened.

Therefore neither should parents strike their children, nor masters

their slaves.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 9) that "a father's

words are admonitory and not coercive." Now blows are a kind of

coercion. Therefore it is unlawful for parents to strike their

children.

Obj. 3: Further, everyone is allowed to impart correction, for this

belongs to the spiritual almsdeeds, as stated above (Q. 32, A. 2).

If, therefore, it is lawful for parents to strike their children for

the sake of correction, for the same reason it will be lawful for any

person to strike anyone, which is clearly false. Therefore the same

conclusion follows.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 13:24): "He that spareth the

rod hateth his son," and further on (Prov. 23:13): "Withhold not

correction from a child, for if thou strike him with the rod, he

shall not die. Thou shalt beat him with the rod, and deliver his soul

from hell." Again it is written (Ecclus. 33:28): "Torture and fetters

are for a malicious slave."

_I answer that,_ Harm is done a body by striking it, yet not so as

when it is maimed: since maiming destroys the body's integrity, while

a blow merely affects the sense with pain, wherefore it causes much

less harm than cutting off a member. Now it is unlawful to do a

person a harm, except by way of punishment in the cause of justice.

Again, no man justly punishes another, except one who is subject to

his jurisdiction. Therefore it is not lawful for a man to strike

another, unless he have some power over the one whom he strikes. And

since the child is subject to the power of the parent, and the slave

to the power of his master, a parent can lawfully strike his child,

and a master his slave that instruction may be enforced by correction.

Reply Obj. 1: Since anger is a desire for vengeance, it is aroused

chiefly when a man deems himself unjustly injured, as the Philosopher

states (Rhet. ii). Hence when parents are forbidden to provoke their

children to anger, they are not prohibited from striking their

children for the purpose of correction, but from inflicting blows on

them without moderation. The command that masters should forbear from

threatening their slaves may be understood in two ways. First that

they should be slow to threaten, and this pertains to the moderation

of correction; secondly, that they should not always carry out their

threats, that is that they should sometimes by a merciful forgiveness

temper the judgment whereby they threatened punishment.

Reply Obj. 2: The greater power should exercise the greater coercion.

Now just as a city is a perfect community, so the governor of a city

has perfect coercive power: wherefore he can inflict irreparable

punishments such as death and mutilation. On the other hand the

father and the master who preside over the family household, which is

an imperfect community, have imperfect coercive power, which is

exercised by inflicting lesser punishments, for instance by blows,

which do not inflict irreparable harm.

Reply Obj. 3: It is lawful for anyone to impart correction to a

willing subject. But to impart it to an unwilling subject belongs to

those only who have charge over him. To this pertains chastisement by

blows.

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Summa Theologica, Part II-II (Secunda Secundae) Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province · 第 446 / 1128 题