Whether Justice Is Always Towards Another?
Objection 1: It would seem that justice is not always towards
another. For the Apostle says (Rom. 3:22) that "the justice of God is
by faith of Jesus Christ." Now faith does not concern the dealings of
one man with another. Neither therefore does justice.
Obj. 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Moribus Eccl. xv), "it
belongs to justice that man should direct to the service of God his
authority over the things that are subject to him." Now the sensitive
appetite is subject to man, according to Gen. 4:7, where it is
written: "The lust thereof," viz. of sin, "shall be under thee, and
thou shalt have dominion over it." Therefore it belongs to justice to
have dominion over one's own appetite: so that justice is towards
oneself.
Obj. 3: Further, the justice of God is eternal. But nothing else is
co-eternal with God. Therefore justice is not essentially towards
another.
Obj. 4: Further, man's dealings with himself need to be rectified no
less than his dealings with another. Now man's dealings are rectified
by justice, according to Prov. 11:5, "The justice of the upright
shall make his way prosperous." Therefore justice is about our
dealings not only with others, but also with ourselves.
_On the contrary,_ Tully says (De Officiis i, 7) that "the object of
justice is to keep men together in society and mutual intercourse."
Now this implies relationship of one man to another. Therefore
justice is concerned only about our dealings with others.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 57, A. 1) since justice by its
name implies equality, it denotes essentially relation to another,
for a thing is equal, not to itself, but to another. And forasmuch as
it belongs to justice to rectify human acts, as stated above (Q. 57,
A. 1; I-II, Q. 113, A. 1) this otherness which justice demands must
needs be between beings capable of action. Now actions belong to
supposits [*Cf. I, Q. 29, A. 2] and wholes and, properly speaking,
not to parts and forms or powers, for we do not say properly that the
hand strikes, but a man with his hand, nor that heat makes a thing
hot, but fire by heat, although such expressions may be employed
metaphorically. Hence, justice properly speaking demands a
distinction of supposits, and consequently is only in one man towards
another. Nevertheless in one and the same man we may speak
metaphorically of his various principles of action such as the
reason, the irascible, and the concupiscible, as though they were so
many agents: so that metaphorically in one and the same man there is
said to be justice in so far as the reason commands the irascible and
concupiscible, and these obey reason; and in general in so far as to
each part of man is ascribed what is becoming to it. Hence the
Philosopher (Ethic. v, 11) calls this "metaphorical justice."
Reply Obj. 1: The justice which faith works in us, is that whereby
the ungodly is justified: it consists in the due coordination of the
parts of the soul, as stated above (I-II, Q. 113, A. 1) where we were
treating of the justification of the ungodly. Now this belongs to
metaphorical justice, which may be found even in a man who lives all
by himself.
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
Reply Obj. 3: God's justice is from eternity in respect of the
eternal will and purpose (and it is chiefly in this that justice
consists); although it is not eternal as regards its effect, since
nothing is co-eternal with God.
Reply Obj. 4: Man's dealings with himself are sufficiently rectified
by the rectification of the passions by the other moral virtues. But
his dealings with others need a special rectification, not only in
relation to the agent, but also in relation to the person to whom
they are directed. Hence about such dealings there is a special
virtue, and this is justice.
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