Whether Justice Is Fittingly Defined As Being the Perpetual and
Constant Will to Render to Each One His Right?
Objection 1: It would seem that lawyers have unfittingly defined
justice as being "the perpetual and constant will to render to each
one his right" [*Digest. i, 1; De Just. et Jure 10]. For, according
to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1), justice is a habit which makes a
man "capable of doing what is just, and of being just in action and
in intention." Now "will" denotes a power, or also an act. Therefore
justice is unfittingly defined as being a will.
Obj. 2: Further, rectitude of the will is not the will; else if the
will were its own rectitude, it would follow that no will is
unrighteous. Yet, according to Anselm (De Veritate xii), justice is
rectitude. Therefore justice is not the will.
Obj. 3: Further, no will is perpetual save God's. If therefore
justice is a perpetual will, in God alone will there be justice.
Obj. 4: Further, whatever is perpetual is constant, since it is
unchangeable. Therefore it is needless in defining justice, to say
that it is both "perpetual" and "constant."
Obj. 5: Further, it belongs to the sovereign to give each one his
right. Therefore, if justice gives each one his right, it follows
that it is in none but the sovereign: which is absurd.
Obj. 6: Further, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) that "justice
is love serving God alone." Therefore it does not render to each one
his right.
_I answer that,_ The aforesaid definition of justice is fitting if
understood aright. For since every virtue is a habit that is the
principle of a good act, a virtue must needs be defined by means of
the good act bearing on the matter proper to that virtue. Now the
proper matter of justice consists of those things that belong to our
intercourse with other men, as shall be shown further on (A. 2).
Hence the act of justice in relation to its proper matter and object
is indicated in the words, "Rendering to each one his right," since,
as Isidore says (Etym. x), "a man is said to be just because he
respects the rights (_jus_) of others."
Now in order that an act bearing upon any matter whatever be
virtuous, it requires to be voluntary, stable, and firm, because the
Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that in order for an act to be
virtuous it needs first of all to be done "knowingly," secondly to be
done "by choice," and "for a due end," thirdly to be done
"immovably." Now the first of these is included in the second, since
"what is done through ignorance is involuntary" (Ethic. iii, 1).
Hence the definition of justice mentions first the "will," in order
to show that the act of justice must be voluntary; and mention is
made afterwards of its "constancy" and "perpetuity" in order to
indicate the firmness of the act.
Accordingly, this is a complete definition of justice; save that the
act is mentioned instead of the habit, which takes its species from
that act, because habit implies relation to act. And if anyone would
reduce it to the proper form of a definition, he might say that
"justice is a habit whereby a man renders to each one his due by a
constant and perpetual will": and this is about the same definition
as that given by the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 5) who says that "justice
is a habit whereby a man is said to be capable of doing just actions
in accordance with his choice."
Reply Obj. 1: Will here denotes the act, not the power: and it is
customary among writers to define habits by their acts: thus
Augustine says (Tract. in Joan. xl) that "faith is to believe what
one sees not."
Reply Obj. 2: Justice is the same as rectitude, not essentially but
causally; for it is a habit which rectifies the deed and the will.
Reply Obj. 3: The will may be called perpetual in two ways. First on
the part of the will's act which endures for ever, and thus God's
will alone is perpetual. Secondly on the part of the subject,
because, to wit, a man wills to do a certain thing always, and this
is a necessary condition of justice. For it does not satisfy the
conditions of justice that one wish to observe justice in some
particular matter for the time being, because one could scarcely find
a man willing to act unjustly in every case; and it is requisite that
one should have the will to observe justice at all times and in all
cases.
Reply Obj. 4: Since "perpetual" does not imply perpetuity of the act
of the will, it is not superfluous to add "constant": for while the
"perpetual will" denotes the purpose of observing justice always,
"constant" signifies a firm perseverance in this purpose.
Reply Obj. 5: A judge renders to each one what belongs to him, by way
of command and direction, because a judge is the "personification of
justice," and "the sovereign is its guardian" (Ethic. v, 4). On the
other hand, the subjects render to each one what belongs to him, by
way of execution.
Reply Obj. 6: Just as love of God includes love of our neighbor, as
stated above (Q. 25, A. 1), so too the service of God includes
rendering to each one his due.
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