Whether Right Is the Object of Justice?
Objection 1: It would seem that right is not the object of justice.
For the jurist Celsus says [*Digest. i, 1; De Just. et Jure 1] that
"right is the art of goodness and equality." Now art is not the
object of justice, but is by itself an intellectual virtue. Therefore
right is not the object of justice.
Obj. 2: Further, "Law," according to Isidore (Etym. v, 3), "is a kind
of right." Now law is the object not of justice but of prudence,
wherefore the Philosopher [*Ethic. vi, 8] reckons "legislative" as
one of the parts of prudence. Therefore right is not the object of
justice.
Obj. 3: Further, justice, before all, subjects man to God: for
Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) that "justice is love serving
God alone, and consequently governing aright all things subject to
man." Now right (_jus_) does not pertain to Divine things, but only
to human affairs, for Isidore says (Etym. v, 2) that "_fas_ is the
Divine law, and _jus,_ the human law." Therefore right is not the
object of justice.
_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. v, 2) that "_jus_ (right) is
so called because it is just." Now the _just_ is the object of
justice, for the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 1) that "all are
agreed in giving the name of justice to the habit which makes men
capable of doing just actions."
_I answer that,_ It is proper to justice, as compared with the other
virtues, to direct man in his relations with others: because it
denotes a kind of equality, as its very name implies; indeed we are
wont to say that things are adjusted when they are made equal, for
equality is in reference of one thing to some other. On the other
hand the other virtues perfect man in those matters only which befit
him in relation to himself. Accordingly that which is right in the
works of the other virtues, and to which the intention of the virtue
tends as to its proper object, depends on its relation to the agent
only, whereas the right in a work of justice, besides its relation to
the agent, is set up by its relation to others. Because a man's work
is said to be just when it is related to some other by way of some
kind of equality, for instance the payment of the wage due for a
service rendered. And so a thing is said to be just, as having the
rectitude of justice, when it is the term of an act of justice,
without taking into account the way in which it is done by the agent:
whereas in the other virtues nothing is declared to be right unless
it is done in a certain way by the agent. For this reason justice has
its own special proper object over and above the other virtues, and
this object is called the just, which is the same as _right._ Hence
it is evident that right is the object of justice.
Reply Obj. 1: It is usual for words to be distorted from their
original signification so as to mean something else: thus the word
"medicine" was first employed to signify a remedy used for curing a
sick person, and then it was drawn to signify the art by which this
is done. In like manner the word _jus_ (right) was first of all used
to denote the just thing itself, but afterwards it was transferred to
designate the art whereby it is known what is just, and further to
denote the place where justice is administered, thus a man is said to
appear _in jure_ [*In English we speak of a court of law, a barrister
at law, etc.], and yet further, we say even that a man, who has the
office of exercising justice, administers the _jus_ even if his
sentence be unjust.
Reply Obj. 2: Just as there pre-exists in the mind of the craftsman
an expression of the things to be made externally by his craft, which
expression is called the rule of his craft, so too there pre-exists
in the mind an expression of the particular just work which the
reason determines, and which is a kind of rule of prudence. If this
rule be expressed in writing it is called a "law," which according to
Isidore (Etym. v, 1) is "a written decree": and so law is not the
same as right, but an expression of right.
Reply Obj. 3: Since justice implies equality, and since we cannot
offer God an equal return, it follows that we cannot make Him a
perfectly just repayment. For this reason the Divine law is not
properly called _jus_ but _fas,_ because, to wit, God is satisfied if
we accomplish what we can. Nevertheless justice tends to make man
repay God as much as he can, by subjecting his mind to Him entirely.
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