Whether These Vices Arise from Covetousness?
Objection 1: It would seem that these vices do not arise from
covetousness. As stated above (Q. 43, A. 6) lust is the chief cause
of lack of rectitude in the reason. Now these vices are opposed to
right reason, i.e. to prudence. Therefore they arise chiefly from
lust; especially since the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that
"Venus is full of guile and her girdle is many colored" and that "he
who is incontinent in desire acts with cunning."
Obj. 2: Further, these vices bear a certain resemblance to prudence,
as stated above (Q. 47, A. 13). Now, since prudence is in the reason,
the more spiritual vices seem to be more akin thereto, such as pride
and vainglory. Therefore the aforesaid vices seem to arise from pride
rather than from covetousness.
Obj. 3: Further, men make use of stratagems not only in laying hold
of other people's goods, but also in plotting murders, the former of
which pertains to covetousness, and the latter to anger. Now the use
of stratagems pertains to craftiness, guile, and fraud. Therefore the
aforesaid vices arise not only from covetousness, but also from anger.
_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) states that fraud is a
daughter of covetousness.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3; Q. 47, A. 13), carnal
prudence and craftiness, as well as guile and fraud, bear a certain
resemblance to prudence in some kind of use of the reason. Now among
all the moral virtues it is justice wherein the use of right reason
appears chiefly, for justice is in the rational appetite. Hence the
undue use of reason appears chiefly in the vices opposed to justice,
the chief of which is covetousness. Therefore the aforesaid vices
arise chiefly from covetousness.
Reply Obj. 1: On account of the vehemence of pleasure and of
concupiscence, lust entirely suppresses the reason from exercising
its act: whereas in the aforesaid vices there is some use of reason,
albeit inordinate. Hence these vices do not arise directly from lust.
When the Philosopher says that "Venus is full of guile," he is
referring to a certain resemblance, in so far as she carries man away
suddenly, just as he is moved in deceitful actions, yet not by means
of craftiness but rather by the vehemence of concupiscence and
pleasure; wherefore he adds that "Venus doth cozen the wits of the
wisest man" [*Cf. Iliad xiv, 214-217].
Reply Obj. 2: To do anything by stratagem seems to be due to
pusillanimity: because a magnanimous man wishes to act openly, as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3). Wherefore, as pride resembles or
apes magnanimity, it follows that the aforesaid vices which make use
of fraud and guile, do not arise directly from pride, but rather from
covetousness, which seeks its own profit and sets little by
excellence.
Reply Obj. 3: Anger's movement is sudden, hence it acts with
precipitation, and without counsel, contrary to the use of the
aforesaid vices, though these use counsel inordinately. That men use
stratagems in plotting murders, arises not from anger but rather from
hatred, because the angry man desires to harm manifestly, as the
Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 2, 3) [*Cf. _Ethic._ vii, 6].
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