Whether Negligence Is Opposed to Prudence?
Objection 1: It would seem that negligence is not opposed to
prudence. For negligence seems to be the same as idleness or
laziness, which belongs to sloth, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi,
45). Now sloth is not opposed to prudence, but to charity, as stated
above (Q. 35, A. 3). Therefore negligence is not opposed to prudence.
Obj. 2: Further, every sin of omission seems to be due to negligence.
But sins of omission are not opposed to prudence, but to the
executive moral virtues. Therefore negligence is not opposed to
prudence.
Obj. 3: Further, imprudence relates to some act of reason. But
negligence does not imply a defect of counsel, for that is
_precipitation,_ nor a defect of judgment, since that is
_thoughtlessness,_ nor a defect of command, because that is
_inconstancy._ Therefore negligence does not pertain to imprudence.
Obj. 4: Further, it is written (Eccles. 7:19): "He that feareth God,
neglecteth nothing." But every sin is excluded by the opposite
virtue. Therefore negligence is opposed to fear rather than to
prudence.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 20:7): "A babbler and a
fool (_imprudens_) will regard no time." Now this is due to
negligence. Therefore negligence is opposed to prudence.
_I answer that,_ Negligence is directly opposed to solicitude. Now
solicitude pertains to the reason, and rectitude of solicitude to
prudence. Hence, on the other hand, negligence pertains to
imprudence. This appears from its very name, because, as Isidore
observes (Etym. x) "a negligent man is one who fails to choose (_nec
eligens_)": and the right choice of the means belongs to prudence.
Therefore negligence pertains to imprudence.
Reply Obj. 1: Negligence is a defect in the internal act, to
which choice also belongs: whereas idleness and laziness denote
slowness of execution, yet so that idleness denotes slowness in
setting about the execution, while laziness denotes remissness in the
execution itself. Hence it is becoming that laziness should arise from
sloth, which is "an oppressive sorrow," i.e. hindering, the mind from
action [*Cf. Q. 35, A. 1; I-II, Q. 35, A. 8].
Reply Obj. 2: Omission regards the external act, for it
consists in failing to perform an act which is due. Hence it is
opposed to justice, and is an effect of negligence, even as the
execution of a just deed is the effect of right reason.
Reply Obj. 3: Negligence regards the act of command, which
solicitude also regards. Yet the negligent man fails in regard to this
act otherwise than the inconstant man: for the inconstant man fails in
commanding, being hindered as it were, by something, whereas the
negligent man fails through lack of a prompt will.
Reply Obj. 4: The fear of God helps us to avoid all sins, because
according to Prov. 15:27, "by the fear of the Lord everyone declineth
from evil." Hence fear makes us avoid negligence, yet not as though
negligence were directly opposed to fear, but because fear incites
man to acts of reason. Wherefore also it has been stated above (I-II,
Q. 44, A. 2) when we were treating of the passions, that "fear makes
us take counsel."
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