FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 51, Art. 4]

Whether _Gnome_ Is a Special Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that _gnome_ is not a special virtue

distinct from _synesis._ For a man is said, in respect of _synesis,_

to have good judgment. Now no man can be said to have good judgment,

unless he judge aright in all things. Therefore _synesis_ extends to

all matters of judgment, and consequently there is no other virtue of

good judgment called _gnome._

Obj. 2: Further, judgment is midway between counsel and precept. Now

there is only one virtue of good counsel, viz. _euboulia,_ and only

one virtue of good command, viz. prudence. Therefore there is only

one virtue of good judgment, viz. _synesis._

Obj. 3: Further, rare occurrences wherein there is need to depart

from the common law, seem for the most part to happen by chance, and

with such things reason is not concerned, as stated in _Phys._ ii, 5.

Now all the intellectual virtues depend on right reason. Therefore

there is no intellectual virtue about such matters.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher concludes (Ethic. vi, 11) that

_gnome_ is a special virtue.

_I answer that_ cognitive habits differ according to higher and lower

principles: thus in speculative matters wisdom considers higher

principles than science does, and consequently is distinguished from

it; and so must it be also in practical matters. Now it is evident

that what is beside the order of a lower principle or cause, is

sometimes reducible to the order of a higher principle; thus

monstrous births of animals are beside the order of the active

seminal force, and yet they come under the order of a higher

principle, namely, of a heavenly body, or higher still, of Divine

Providence. Hence by considering the active seminal force one could

not pronounce a sure judgment on such monstrosities, and yet this is

possible if we consider Divine Providence.

Now it happens sometimes that something has to be done which is not

covered by the common rules of actions, for instance in the case of

the enemy of one's country, when it would be wrong to give him back

his deposit, or in other similar cases. Hence it is necessary to

judge of such matters according to higher principles than the common

laws, according to which _synesis_ judges: and corresponding to such

higher principles it is necessary to have a higher virtue of

judgment, which is called _gnome,_ and which denotes a certain

discrimination in judgment.

Reply Obj. 1: _Synesis_ judges rightly about all actions that are

covered by the common rules: but certain things have to be judged

beside these common rules, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 2: Judgment about a thing should be formed from the proper

principles thereof, whereas research is made by employing also common

principles. Wherefore also in speculative matters, dialectics which

aims at research proceeds from common principles; while demonstration

which tends to judgment, proceeds from proper principles. Hence

_euboulia_ to which the research of counsel belongs is one for all,

but not so _synesis_ whose act is judicial. Command considers in all

matters the one aspect of good, wherefore prudence also is only one.

Reply Obj. 3: It belongs to Divine Providence alone to consider all

things that may happen beside the common course. On the other hand,

among men, he who is most discerning can judge a greater number of

such things by his reason: this belongs to _gnome,_ which denotes a

certain discrimination in judgment.

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Summa Theologica, Part II-II (Secunda Secundae) Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province · 第 357 / 1128 题