Whether _Synesis_ Is a Virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that _synesis_ is not a virtue. Virtues
are not in us by nature, according to _Ethic._ ii, 1. But _synesis_
is natural to some, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 11).
Therefore _synesis_ is not a virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, as stated in the same book (10), _synesis_ is
nothing but "a faculty of judging." But judgment without command can
be even in the wicked. Since then virtue is only in the good, it
seems that _synesis_ is not a virtue.
Obj. 3: Further, there is never a defective command, unless there be
a defective judgment, at least in a particular matter of action; for
it is in this that every wicked man errs. If therefore _synesis_ be
reckoned a virtue directed to good judgment, it seems that there is
no need for any other virtue directed to good command: and
consequently prudence would be superfluous, which is not reasonable.
Therefore _synesis_ is not a virtue.
_On the contrary,_ Judgment is more perfect than counsel. But
_euboulia_, or good counsel, is a virtue. Much more, therefore, is
_synesis_ a virtue, as being good judgment.
_I answer that,_ _synesis_ signifies a right judgment, not indeed
about speculative matters, but about particular practical matters,
about which also is prudence. Hence in Greek some, in respect of
_synesis_ are said to be _synetoi,_ i.e. "persons of sense," or
_eusynetoi,_ i.e. "men of good sense," just as on the other hand,
those who lack this virtue are called _asynetoi,_ i.e. "senseless."
Now, different acts which cannot be ascribed to the same cause, must
correspond to different virtues. And it is evident that goodness of
counsel and goodness of judgment are not reducible to the same cause,
for many can take good counsel, without having good sense so as to
judge well. Even so, in speculative matters some are good at
research, through their reason being quick at arguing from one thing
to another (which seems to be due to a disposition of their power of
imagination, which has a facility in forming phantasms), and yet such
persons sometimes lack good judgment (and this is due to a defect in
the intellect arising chiefly from a defective disposition of the
common sense which fails to judge aright). Hence there is need,
besides _euboulia_, for another virtue, which judges well, and this
is called _synesis._
Reply Obj. 1: Right judgment consists in the cognitive power
apprehending a thing just as it is in reality, and this is due to the
right disposition of the apprehensive power. Thus if a mirror be well
disposed the forms of bodies are reflected in it just as they are,
whereas if it be ill disposed, the images therein appear distorted
and misshapen. Now that the cognitive power be well disposed to
receive things just as they are in reality, is radically due to
nature, but, as to its consummation, is due to practice or to a gift
of grace, and this in two ways. First directly, on the part of the
cognitive power itself, for instance, because it is imbued, not with
distorted, but with true and correct ideas: this belongs to _synesis_
which in this respect is a special virtue. Secondly indirectly,
through the good disposition of the appetitive power, the result
being that one judges well of the objects of appetite: and thus a
good judgment of virtue results from the habits of moral virtue; but
this judgment is about the ends, whereas _synesis_ is rather about
the means.
Reply Obj. 2: In wicked men there may be right judgment of a
universal principle, but their judgment is always corrupt in the
particular matter of action, as stated above (Q. 47, A. 13).
Reply Obj. 3: Sometimes after judging aright we delay to execute or
execute negligently or inordinately. Hence after the virtue which
judges aright there is a further need of a final and principal
virtue, which commands aright, and this is prudence.
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