Whether Circumspection Can Be a Part of Prudence?
Objection 1: It would seem that circumspection cannot be a part of
prudence. For circumspection seems to signify looking at one's
surroundings. But these are of infinite number, and cannot be
considered by the reason wherein is prudence. Therefore
circumspection should not be reckoned a part of prudence.
Obj. 2: Further, circumstances seem to be the concern of moral
virtues rather than of prudence. But circumspection seems to denote
nothing but attention to circumstances. Therefore circumspection
apparently belongs to the moral virtues rather than to prudence.
Obj. 3: Further, whoever can see things afar off can much more see
things that are near. Now foresight enables a man to look on distant
things. Therefore there is no need to account circumspection a part
of prudence in addition to foresight.
On the contrary stands the authority of Macrobius, quoted above (Q.
48).
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 6), it belongs to prudence
chiefly to direct something aright to an end; and this is not done
aright unless both the end be good, and the means good and suitable.
Since, however, prudence, as stated above (Q. 47, A. 3) is about
singular matters of action, which contain many combinations of
circumstances, it happens that a thing is good in itself and suitable
to the end, and nevertheless becomes evil or unsuitable to the end,
by reason of some combination of circumstances. Thus to show signs of
love to someone seems, considered in itself, to be a fitting way to
arouse love in his heart, yet if pride or suspicion of flattery arise
in his heart, it will no longer be a means suitable to the end. Hence
the need of circumspection in prudence, viz. of comparing the means
with the circumstances.
Reply Obj. 1: Though the number of possible circumstances be
infinite, the number of actual circumstances is not; and the judgment
of reason in matters of action is influenced by things which are few
in number.
Reply Obj. 2: Circumstances are the concern of prudence, because
prudence has to fix them; on the other hand they are the concern of
moral virtues, in so far as moral virtues are perfected by the fixing
of circumstances.
Reply Obj. 3: Just as it belongs to foresight to look on that
which is by its nature suitable to an end, so it belongs to
circumspection to consider whether it be suitable to the end in view
of the circumstances. Now each of these presents a difficulty of its
own, and therefore each is reckoned a distinct part of prudence.
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