Whether Reason Should Be Reckoned a Part of Prudence?
Objection 1: It would seem that reason should not be reckoned a part
of prudence. For the subject of an accident is not a part thereof.
But prudence is in the reason as its subject (Ethic. vi, 5).
Therefore reason should not be reckoned a part of prudence.
Obj. 2: Further, that which is common to many, should not be reckoned
a part of any one of them; or if it be so reckoned, it should be
reckoned a part of that one to which it chiefly belongs. Now reason
is necessary in all the intellectual virtues, and chiefly in wisdom
and science, which employ a demonstrative reason. Therefore reason
should not be reckoned a part of prudence
Obj. 3: Further, reason as a power does not differ essentially from
the intelligence, as stated above (I, Q. 79, A. 8). If therefore
intelligence be reckoned a part of prudence, it is superfluous to add
reason.
_On the contrary,_ Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i], following the
opinion of Plotinus, numbers reason among the parts of prudence.
_I answer that,_ The work of prudence is to take good counsel, as
stated in _Ethic._ vi, 7. Now counsel is a research proceeding from
certain things to others. But this is the work of reason. Wherefore
it is requisite for prudence that man should be an apt reasoner. And
since the things required for the perfection of prudence are called
requisite or quasi-integral parts of prudence, it follows that reason
should be numbered among these parts.
Reply Obj. 1: Reason denotes here, not the power of reason, but its
good use.
Reply Obj. 2: The certitude of reason comes from the intellect. Yet
the need of reason is from a defect in the intellect, since those
things in which the intellective power is in full vigor, have no need
for reason, for they comprehend the truth by their simple insight, as
do God and the angels. On the other hand particular matters of
action, wherein prudence guides, are very far from the condition of
things intelligible, and so much the farther, as they are less
certain and fixed. Thus matters of art, though they are singular, are
nevertheless more fixed and certain, wherefore in many of them there
is no room for counsel on account of their certitude, as stated in
_Ethic._ iii, 3. Hence, although in certain other intellectual
virtues reason is more certain than in prudence, yet prudence above
all requires that man be an apt reasoner, so that he may rightly
apply universals to particulars, which latter are various and
uncertain.
Reply Obj. 3: Although intelligence and reason are not different
powers, yet they are named after different acts. For intelligence
takes its name from being an intimate penetration of the truth [*Cf.
II-II, Q. 8, A. 1], while reason is so called from being inquisitive
and discursive. Hence each is accounted a part of reason as explained
above (A. 2; Q. 47, A. 2, 3).
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