FOURTEENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 14]

Whether Prudence Is in All Who Have Grace?

Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is not in all who have grace.

Prudence requires diligence, that one may foresee aright what has to

be done. But many who have grace have not this diligence. Therefore

not all who have grace have prudence.

Obj. 2: Further, a prudent man is one who takes good counsel, as

stated above (A. 8, Obj. 2; A. 13, Obj. 3). Yet many have grace who do

not take good counsel, and need to be guided by the counsel of others.

Therefore not all who have grace, have prudence.

Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 2) that "young

people are not obviously prudent." Yet many young people have grace.

Therefore prudence is not to be found in all who have grace.

_On the contrary,_ No man has grace unless he be virtuous. Now no man

can be virtuous without prudence, for Gregory says (Moral. ii, 46)

that "the other virtues cannot be virtues at all unless they effect

prudently what they desire to accomplish." Therefore all who have

grace have prudence.

_I answer that,_ The virtues must needs be connected together, so that

whoever has one has all, as stated above (I-II, Q. 65, A. 1). Now

whoever has grace has charity, so that he must needs have all the

other virtues, and hence, since prudence is a virtue, as shown above

(A. 4), he must, of necessity, have prudence also.

Reply Obj. 1: Diligence is twofold: one is merely sufficient

with regard to things necessary for salvation; and such diligence is

given to all who have grace, whom "His unction teacheth of all things"

(1 John 2:27). There is also another diligence which is more than

sufficient, whereby a man is able to make provision both for himself

and for others, not only in matters necessary for salvation, but also

in all things relating to human life; and such diligence as this is

not in all who have grace.

Reply Obj. 2: Those who require to be guided by the counsel of

others, are able, if they have grace, to take counsel for themselves

in this point at least, that they require the counsel of others and

can discern good from evil counsel.

Reply Obj. 3: Acquired prudence is caused by the exercise of

acts, wherefore "its acquisition demands experience and time" (Ethic.

ii, 1), hence it cannot be in the young, neither in habit nor in act.

On the other hand gratuitous prudence is caused by divine infusion.

Wherefore, in children who have been baptized but have not come to the

use of reason, there is prudence as to habit but not as to act, even

as in idiots; whereas in those who have come to the use of reason, it

is also as to act, with regard to things necessary for salvation. This

by practice merits increase, until it becomes perfect, even as the

other virtues. Hence the Apostle says (Heb. 5:14) that "strong meat is

for the perfect, for them who by custom have their senses exercised to

the discerning of good and evil."

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Summa Theologica, Part II-II (Secunda Secundae) Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province · 第 334 / 1128 题