Whether Prudence About One's Own Good Is Specifically the Same As
That Which Extends to the Common Good?
Objection 1: It seems that prudence about one's own good is the same
specifically as that which extends to the common good. For the
Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8) that "political prudence, and
prudence are the same habit, yet their essence is not the same."
Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 2) that "virtue is
the same in a good man and in a good ruler." Now political prudence
is chiefly in the ruler, in whom it is architectonic, as it were.
Since then prudence is a virtue of a good man, it seems that prudence
and political prudence are the same habit.
Obj. 3: Further, a habit is not diversified in species or essence by
things which are subordinate to one another. But the particular good,
which belongs to prudence simply so called, is subordinate to the
common good, which belongs to political prudence. Therefore prudence
and political prudence differ neither specifically nor essentially.
_On the contrary,_ "Political prudence," which is directed to the
common good of the state, "domestic economy" which is of such things
as relate to the common good of the household or family, and
"monastic economy" which is concerned with things affecting the good
of one person, are all distinct sciences. Therefore in like manner
there are different kinds of prudence, corresponding to the above
differences of matter.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 5; Q. 54, A. 2, ad 1), the
species of habits differ according to the difference of object
considered in its formal aspect. Now the formal aspect of all things
directed to the end, is taken from the end itself, as shown above
(I-II, Prolog.; Q. 102, A. 1), wherefore the species of habits differ
by their relation to different ends. Again the individual good, the
good of the family, and the good of the city and kingdom are
different ends. Wherefore there must needs be different species of
prudence corresponding to these different ends, so that one is
"prudence" simply so called, which is directed to one's own good;
another, "domestic prudence" which is directed to the common good of
the home; and a third, "political prudence," which is directed to the
common good of the state or kingdom.
Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher means, not that political prudence is
substantially the same habit as any kind of prudence, but that it is
the same as the prudence which is directed to the common good. This
is called "prudence" in respect of the common notion of prudence,
i.e. as being right reason applied to action, while it is called
"political," as being directed to the common good.
Reply Obj. 2: As the Philosopher declares (Polit. iii, 2), "it
belongs to a good man to be able to rule well and to obey well,"
wherefore the virtue of a good man includes also that of a good
ruler. Yet the virtue of the ruler and of the subject differs
specifically, even as the virtue of a man and of a woman, as stated
by the same authority (Polit. iii, 2).
Reply Obj. 3: Even different ends, one of which is subordinate to the
other, diversify the species of a habit, thus for instance, habits
directed to riding, soldiering, and civic life, differ specifically
although their ends are subordinate to one another. In like manner,
though the good of the individual is subordinate to the good of the
many, that does not prevent this difference from making the habits
differ specifically; but it follows that the habit which is directed
to the last end is above the other habits and commands them.
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