Whether Solicitude Belongs to Prudence?
Objection 1: It would seem that prudence does not extend to the
governing of many, but only to the government of oneself. For the
Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that virtue directed to the common
good is justice. But prudence differs from justice. Therefore
prudence is not directed to the common good.
Obj. 2: Further, he seems to be prudent, who seeks and does good for
himself. Now those who seek the common good often neglect their own.
Therefore they are not prudent.
Obj. 3: Further, prudence is specifically distinct from temperance
and fortitude. But temperance and fortitude seem to be related only
to a man's own good. Therefore the same applies to prudence.
_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (Matt. 24:45): "Who, thinkest thou,
is a faithful and prudent [Douay: 'wise'] servant whom his lord hath
appointed over his family?"
_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 8) some
have held that prudence does not extend to the common good, but only
to the good of the individual, and this because they thought that man
is not bound to seek other than his own good. But this opinion is
opposed to charity, which "seeketh not her own" (1 Cor. 13:5):
wherefore the Apostle says of himself (1 Cor. 10:33): "Not seeking
that which is profitable to myself, but to many, that they may be
saved." Moreover it is contrary to right reason, which judges the
common good to be better than the good of the individual.
Accordingly, since it belongs to prudence rightly to counsel, judge,
and command concerning the means of obtaining a due end, it is
evident that prudence regards not only the private good of the
individual, but also the common good of the multitude.
Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is speaking there of moral virtue. Now
just as every moral virtue that is directed to the common good is
called "legal" justice, so the prudence that is directed to the
common good is called "political" prudence, for the latter stands in
the same relation to legal justice, as prudence simply so called to
moral virtue.
Reply Obj. 2: He that seeks the good of the many, seeks in
consequence his own good, for two reasons. First, because the
individual good is impossible without the common good of the family,
state, or kingdom. Hence Valerius Maximus says [*Fact. et Dict.
Memor. iv, 6] of the ancient Romans that "they would rather be poor
in a rich empire than rich in a poor empire." Secondly, because,
since man is a part of the home and state, he must needs consider
what is good for him by being prudent about the good of the many. For
the good disposition of parts depends on their relation to the whole;
thus Augustine says (Confess. iii, 8) that "any part which does not
harmonize with its whole, is offensive."
Reply Obj. 3: Even temperance and fortitude can be directed to the
common good, hence there are precepts of law concerning them as
stated in _Ethic._ v, 1: more so, however, prudence and justice,
since these belong to the rational faculty which directly regards the
universal, just as the sensitive part regards singulars.
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