Whether Command Is the Chief Act of Prudence?
Objection 1: It would seem that command is not the chief act of
prudence. For command regards the good to be ensued. Now Augustine
(De Trin. xiv, 9) states that it is an act of prudence "to avoid
ambushes." Therefore command is not the chief act of prudence.
Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "the
prudent man takes good counsel." Now "to take counsel" and "to
command" seem to be different acts, as appears from what has been
said above (I-II, Q. 57, A. 6). Therefore command is not the chief
act of prudence.
Obj. 3: Further, it seems to belong to the will to command and to
rule, since the will has the end for its object, and moves the other
powers of the soul. Now prudence is not in the will, but in the
reason. Therefore command is not an act of prudence.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 10) that
"prudence commands."
_I answer that,_ Prudence is "right reason applied to action," as
stated above (A. 2). Hence that which is the chief act of reason in
regard to action must needs be the chief act of prudence. Now there
are three such acts. The first is _to take counsel,_ which belongs to
discovery, for counsel is an act of inquiry, as stated above (I-II,
Q. 14, A. 1). The second act is _to judge of what one has
discovered,_ and this is an act of the speculative reason. But the
practical reason, which is directed to action, goes further, and its
third act is _to command,_ which act consists in applying to action
the things counselled and judged. And since this act approaches
nearer to the end of the practical reason, it follows that it is the
chief act of the practical reason, and consequently of prudence.
In confirmation of this we find that the perfection of art consists
in judging and not in commanding: wherefore he who sins voluntarily
against his craft is reputed a better craftsman than he who does so
involuntarily, because the former seems to do so from right judgment,
and the latter from a defective judgment. On the other hand it is the
reverse in prudence, as stated in _Ethic._ vi, 5, for it is more
imprudent to sin voluntarily, since this is to be lacking in the
chief act of prudence, viz. command, than to sin involuntarily.
Reply Obj. 1: The act of command extends both to the ensuing of good
and to the avoidance of evil. Nevertheless Augustine ascribes "the
avoidance of ambushes" to prudence, not as its chief act, but as an
act of prudence that does not continue in heaven.
Reply Obj. 2: Good counsel is required in order that the good things
discovered may be applied to action: wherefore command belongs to
prudence which takes good counsel.
Reply Obj. 3: Simply to move belongs to the will: but command denotes
motion together with a kind of ordering, wherefore it is an act of
the reason, as stated above (I-II, Q. 17, A. 1).
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