Whether It Belongs to Prudence to Find the Mean in Moral Virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that it does not belong to prudence to
find the mean in moral virtues. For the achievement of the mean is
the end of moral virtues. But prudence does not appoint the end to
moral virtues, as shown above (A. 6). Therefore it does not find the
mean in them.
Obj. 2: Further, that which of itself has being, would seem to have
no cause, but its very being is its cause, since a thing is said to
have being by reason of its cause. Now "to follow the mean" belongs
to moral virtue by reason of itself, as part of its definition, as
shown above (A. 5, Obj. 1). Therefore prudence does not cause the
mean in moral virtues.
Obj. 3: Further, prudence works after the manner of reason. But moral
virtue tends to the mean after the manner of nature, because, as
Tully states (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53), "virtue is a habit like a
second nature in accord with reason." Therefore prudence does not
appoint the mean to moral virtues.
_On the contrary,_ In the foregoing definition of moral virtue
(A. 5, Obj. 1) it is stated that it "follows a mean appointed by
reason . . . even as a wise man decides."
_I answer that,_ The proper end of each moral virtue consists
precisely in conformity with right reason. For temperance intends
that man should not stray from reason for the sake of his
concupiscences; fortitude, that he should not stray from the right
judgment of reason through fear or daring. Moreover this end is
appointed to man according to natural reason, since natural reason
dictates to each one that he should act according to reason.
But it belongs to the ruling of prudence to decide in what manner and
by what means man shall obtain the mean of reason in his deeds. For
though the attainment of the mean is the end of a moral virtue, yet
this mean is found by the right disposition of these things that are
directed to the end.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply Obj. 2: Just as a natural agent makes form to be in
matter, yet does not make that which is essential to the form to
belong to it, so too, prudence appoints the mean in passions and
operations, and yet does not make the searching of the mean to belong
to virtue.
Reply Obj. 3: Moral virtue after the manner of nature intends
to attain the mean. Since, however, the mean as such is not found in
all matters after the same manner, it follows that the inclination of
nature which ever works in the same manner, does not suffice for this
purpose, and so the ruling of prudence is required.
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