Whether Prudence Is in the Cognitive or in the Appetitive Faculty?
Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is not in the cognitive but
in the appetitive faculty. For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv):
"Prudence is love choosing wisely between the things that help and
those that hinder." Now love is not in the cognitive, but in the
appetitive faculty. Therefore prudence is in the appetitive faculty.
Obj. 2: Further, as appears from the foregoing definition it belongs
to prudence "to choose wisely." But choice is an act of the
appetitive faculty, as stated above (I-II, Q. 13, A. 1). Therefore
prudence is not in the cognitive but in the appetitive faculty.
Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "in art it
is better to err voluntarily than involuntarily, whereas in the case
of prudence, as of the virtues, it is worse." Now the moral virtues,
of which he is treating there, are in the appetitive faculty, whereas
art is in the reason. Therefore prudence is in the appetitive rather
than in the rational faculty.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 61): "Prudence is
the knowledge of what to seek and what to avoid."
_I answer that,_ As Isidore says (Etym. x): "A prudent man is one who
sees as it were from afar, for his sight is keen, and he foresees the
event of uncertainties." Now sight belongs not to the appetitive but
to the cognitive faculty. Wherefore it is manifest that prudence
belongs directly to the cognitive, and not to the sensitive faculty,
because by the latter we know nothing but what is within reach and
offers itself to the senses: while to obtain knowledge of the future
from knowledge of the present or past, which pertains to prudence,
belongs properly to the reason, because this is done by a process of
comparison. It follows therefore that prudence, properly speaking, is
in the reason.
Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (I, Q. 82, A. 4) the will moves all the
faculties to their acts. Now the first act of the appetitive faculty
is love, as stated above (I-II, Q. 25, AA. 1, 2). Accordingly
prudence is said to be love, not indeed essentially, but in so far as
love moves to the act of prudence. Wherefore Augustine goes on to say
that "prudence is love discerning aright that which helps from that
which hinders us in tending to God." Now love is said to discern
because it moves the reason to discern.
Reply Obj. 2: The prudent man considers things afar off, in so far as
they tend to be a help or a hindrance to that which has to be done at
the present time. Hence it is clear that those things which prudence
considers stand in relation to this other, as in relation to the end.
Now of those things that are directed to the end there is counsel in
the reason, and choice in the appetite, of which two, counsel belongs
more properly to prudence, since the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi,
5, 7, 9) that a prudent man "takes good counsel." But as choice
presupposes counsel, since it is "the desire for what has been
already counselled" (Ethic. iii, 2), it follows that choice can also
be ascribed to prudence indirectly, in so far, to wit, as prudence
directs the choice by means of counsel.
Reply Obj. 3: The worth of prudence consists not in thought merely,
but in its application to action, which is the end of the practical
reason. Wherefore if any defect occur in this, it is most contrary to
prudence, since, the end being of most import in everything, it
follows that a defect which touches the end is the worst of all.
Hence the Philosopher goes on to say (Ethic. vi, 5) that prudence is
"something more than a merely rational habit," such as art is, since,
as stated above (I-II, Q. 57, A. 4) it includes application to
action, which application is an act of the will.
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