FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 28, Art. 4]

Whether Joy Is a Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that joy is a virtue. For vice is contrary

to virtue. Now sorrow is set down as a vice, as in the case of sloth

and envy. Therefore joy also should be accounted a virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, as love and hope are passions, the object of which

is _good,_ so also is joy. Now love and hope are reckoned to be

virtues. Therefore joy also should be reckoned a virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, the precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue.

But we are commanded to rejoice in the Lord, according to Phil. 4:4:

"Rejoice in the Lord always." Therefore joy is a virtue.

_On the contrary,_ It is not numbered among the theological virtues,

nor among the moral, nor among the intellectual virtues, as is

evident from what has been said above (I-II, QQ. 57, 60, 62).

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 55, AA. 2, 4), virtue is

an operative habit, wherefore by its very nature it has an

inclination to a certain act. Now it may happen that from the same

habit there proceed several ordinate and homogeneous acts, each of

which follows from another. And since the subsequent acts do not

proceed from the virtuous habit except through the preceding act,

hence it is that the virtue is defined and named in reference to that

preceding act, although those other acts also proceed from the

virtue. Now it is evident from what we have said about the passions

(I-II, Q. 25, AA. 2, 4) that love is the first affection of the

appetitive power, and that desire and joy follow from it. Hence the

same virtuous habit inclines us to love and desire the beloved good,

and to rejoice in it. But in as much as love is the first of these

acts, that virtue takes its name, not from joy, nor from desire, but

from love, and is called charity. Hence joy is not a virtue distinct

from charity, but an act, or effect, of charity: for which reason it

is numbered among the Fruits (Gal. 5:22).

Reply Obj. 1: The sorrow which is a vice is caused by inordinate

self-love, and this is not a special vice, but a general source of

the vices, as stated above (I-II, Q. 77, A. 4); so that it was

necessary to account certain particular sorrows as special vices,

because they do not arise from a special, but from a general vice. On

the other hand love of God is accounted a special virtue, namely

charity, to which joy must be referred, as its proper act, as stated

above (here and A. 2).

Reply Obj. 2: Hope proceeds from love even as joy does, but

hope adds, on the part of the object, a special character, viz.

_difficult,_ and _possible to obtain;_ for which reason it is

accounted a special virtue. On the other hand joy does not add to love

any special aspect, that might cause a special virtue.

Reply Obj. 3: The Law prescribes joy, as being an act of

charity, albeit not its first act.

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Summa Theologica, Part II-II (Secunda Secundae) Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province · 第 214 / 1128 题