THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 3]

Whether Irrational Creatures Also Ought to Be Loved Out of Charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that irrational creatures also ought to be

loved out of charity. For it is chiefly by charity that we are

conformed to God. Now God loves irrational creatures out of charity,

for He loves "all things that are" (Wis. 11:25), and whatever He

loves, He loves by Himself Who is charity. Therefore we also should

love irrational creatures out of charity.

Obj. 2: Further, charity is referred to God principally, and extends

to other things as referable to God. Now just as the rational

creature is referable to God, in as much as it bears the resemblance

of image, so too, are the irrational creatures, in as much as they

bear the resemblance of a trace [*Cf. I, Q. 45, A. 7]. Therefore

charity extends also to irrational creatures.

Obj. 3: Further, just as the object of charity is God. so is the

object of faith. Now faith extends to irrational creatures, since we

believe that heaven and earth were created by God, that the fishes

and birds were brought forth out of the waters, and animals that

walk, and plants, out of the earth. Therefore charity extends also to

irrational creatures.

_On the contrary,_ The love of charity extends to none but God and

our neighbor. But the word neighbor cannot be extended to irrational

creatures, since they have no fellowship with man in the rational

life. Therefore charity does not extend to irrational creatures.

_I answer that,_ According to what has been stated above (Q. 13, A.

1) charity is a kind of friendship. Now the love of friendship is

twofold: first, there is the love for the friend to whom our

friendship is given, secondly, the love for those good things which

we desire for our friend. With regard to the first, no irrational

creature can be loved out of charity; and for three reasons. Two of

these reasons refer in a general way to friendship, which cannot have

an irrational creature for its object: first because friendship is

towards one to whom we wish good things, while, properly speaking, we

cannot wish good things to an irrational creature, because it is not

competent, properly speaking, to possess good, this being proper to

the rational creature which, through its free-will, is the master of

its disposal of the good it possesses. Hence the Philosopher says

(Phys. ii, 6) that we do not speak of good or evil befalling such

like things, except metaphorically. Secondly, because all friendship

is based on some fellowship in life; since "nothing is so proper to

friendship as to live together," as the Philosopher proves (Ethic.

viii, 5). Now irrational creatures can have no fellowship in human

life which is regulated by reason. Hence friendship with irrational

creatures is impossible, except metaphorically speaking. The third

reason is proper to charity, for charity is based on the fellowship

of everlasting happiness, to which the irrational creature cannot

attain. Therefore we cannot have the friendship of charity towards an

irrational creature.

Nevertheless we can love irrational creatures out of charity, if we

regard them as the good things that we desire for others, in so far,

to wit, as we wish for their preservation, to God's honor and man's

use; thus too does God love them out of charity.

Wherefore the Reply to the First Objection is evident.

Reply Obj. 2: The likeness by way of trace does not confer the

capacity for everlasting life, whereas the likeness of image does:

and so the comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 3: Faith can extend to all that is in any way true,

whereas the friendship of charity extends only to such things as have

a natural capacity for everlasting life; wherefore the comparison

fails.

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Summa Theologica, Part II-II (Secunda Secundae) Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province · 第 176 / 1128 题