FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 24, Art. 4]

Whether Charity Can Increase?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity cannot increase. For nothing

increases save what has quantity. Now quantity is twofold, namely

dimensive and virtual. The former does not befit charity which is a

spiritual perfection, while virtual quantity regards the objects in

respect of which charity does not increase, since the slightest

charity loves all that is to be loved out of charity. Therefore

charity does not increase.

Obj. 2: Further, that which consists in something extreme receives no

increase. But charity consists in something extreme, being the

greatest of the virtues, and the supreme love of the greatest good.

Therefore charity cannot increase.

Obj. 3: Further, increase is a kind of movement. Therefore wherever

there is increase there is movement, and if there be increase of

essence there is movement of essence. Now there is no movement of

essence save either by corruption or generation. Therefore charity

cannot increase essentially, unless it happen to be generated anew or

corrupted, which is unreasonable.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Tract. lxxiv in Joan.) [*Cf. Ep.

clxxxv.] that "charity merits increase that by increase it may merit

perfection."

_I answer that,_ The charity of a wayfarer can increase. For we are

called wayfarers by reason of our being on the way to God, Who is the

last end of our happiness. In this way we advance as we get nigh to

God, Who is approached, "not by steps of the body but by the

affections of the soul" [*St. Augustine, Tract. in Joan. xxxii]: and

this approach is the result of charity, since it unites man's mind to

God. Consequently it is essential to the charity of a wayfarer that

it can increase, for if it could not, all further advance along the

way would cease. Hence the Apostle calls charity the way, when he

says (1 Cor. 12:31): "I show unto you yet a more excellent way."

Reply Obj. 1: Charity is not subject to dimensive, but only to

virtual quantity: and the latter depends not only on the number of

objects, namely whether they be in greater number or of greater

excellence, but also on the intensity of the act, namely whether a

thing is loved more, or less; it is in this way that the virtual

quantity of charity increases.

Reply Obj. 2: Charity consists in an extreme with regard to its

object, in so far as its object is the Supreme Good, and from this it

follows that charity is the most excellent of the virtues. Yet not

every charity consists in an extreme, as regards the intensity of the

act.

Reply Obj. 3: Some have said that charity does not increase in its

essence, but only as to its radication in its subject, or according

to its fervor.

But these people did not know what they were talking about. For since

charity is an accident, its being is to be in something. So that an

essential increase of charity means nothing else but that it is yet

more in its subject, which implies a greater radication in its

subject. Furthermore, charity is essentially a virtue ordained to

act, so that an essential increase of charity implies ability to

produce an act of more fervent love. Hence charity increases

essentially, not by beginning anew, or ceasing to be in its subject,

as the objection imagines, but by beginning to be more and more in

its subject.

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Summa Theologica, Part II-II (Secunda Secundae) Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province · 第 163 / 1128 题