Whether the Will Is the Subject of Charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not the subject of
charity. For charity is a kind of love. Now, according to the
Philosopher (Topic. ii, 3) love is in the concupiscible part.
Therefore charity is also in the concupiscible and not in the will.
Obj. 2: Further, charity is the foremost of the virtues, as stated
above (Q. 23, A. 6). But the reason is the subject of virtue.
Therefore it seems that charity is in the reason and not in the will.
Obj. 3: Further, charity extends to all human acts, according to 1
Cor. 16:14: "Let all your things be done in charity." Now the
principle of human acts is the free-will. Therefore it seems that
charity is chiefly in the free-will as its subject and not in the
will.
_On the contrary,_ The object of charity is the good, which is also
the object of the will. Therefore charity is in the will as its
subject.
_I answer that,_ Since, as stated in the First Part (Q. 80, A. 2),
the appetite is twofold, namely the sensitive, and the intellective
which is called the will, the object of each is the good, but in
different ways: for the object of the sensitive appetite is a good
apprehended by sense, whereas the object of the intellective appetite
or will is good under the universal aspect of good, according as it
can be apprehended by the intellect. Now the object of charity is not
a sensible good, but the Divine good which is known by the intellect
alone. Therefore the subject of charity is not the sensitive, but the
intellective appetite, i.e. the will.
Reply Obj. 1: The concupiscible is a part of the sensitive, not of
the intellective appetite, as proved in the First Part (Q. 81, A. 2):
wherefore the love which is in the concupiscible, is the love of
sensible good: nor can the concupiscible reach to the Divine good
which is an intelligible good; the will alone can. Consequently the
concupiscible cannot be the subject of charity.
Reply Obj. 2: According to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 9), the
will also is in the reason: wherefore charity is not excluded from
the reason through being in the will. Yet charity is regulated, not
by the reason, as human virtues are, but by God's wisdom, and
transcends the rule of human reason, according to Eph. 3:19: "The
charity of Christ, which surpasseth all knowledge." Hence it is not
in the reason, either as its subject, like prudence is, or as its
rule, like justice and temperance are, but only by a certain kinship
of the will to the reason.
Reply Obj. 3: As stated in the First Part (Q. 83, A. 4), the
free-will is not a distinct power from the will. Yet charity is not
in the will considered as free-will, the act of which is to choose.
For choice is of things directed to the end, whereas the will is of
the end itself (Ethic. iii, 2). Hence charity, whose object is the
last end, should be described as residing in the will rather than in
the free-will.
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