Whether Charity Is One Virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not one virtue. For habits
are distinct according to their objects. Now there are two objects of
charity--God and our neighbor--which are infinitely distant from one
another. Therefore charity is not one virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, different aspects of the object diversify a habit,
even though that object be one in reality, as shown above (Q. 17, A.
6; I-II, Q. 54, A. 2, ad 1). Now there are many aspects under which
God is an object of love, because we are debtors to His love by
reason of each one of His favors. Therefore charity is not one virtue.
Obj. 3: Further, charity comprises friendship for our neighbor. But
the Philosopher reckons several species of friendship (Ethic. viii,
3, 11, 12). Therefore charity is not one virtue, but is divided into
a number of various species.
_On the contrary,_ Just as God is the object of faith, so is He the
object of charity. Now faith is one virtue by reason of the unity of
the Divine truth, according to Eph. 4:5: "One faith." Therefore
charity also is one virtue by reason of the unity of the Divine
goodness.
_I answer that,_ Charity, as stated above (A. 1) is a kind of
friendship of man for God. Now the different species of friendship
are differentiated, first of all, in respect of a diversity of end,
and in this way there are three species of friendship, namely
friendship for the useful, for the delightful, and for the virtuous;
secondly, in respect of the different kinds of communion on which
friendships are based; thus there is one species of friendship
between kinsmen, and another between fellow citizens or fellow
travellers, the former being based on natural communion, the latter
on civil communion or on the comradeship of the road, as the
Philosopher explains (Ethic. viii, 12).
Now charity cannot be differentiated in either of these ways: for its
end is one, namely, the goodness of God; and the fellowship of
everlasting happiness, on which this friendship is based, is also
one. Hence it follows that charity is simply one virtue, and not
divided into several species.
Reply Obj. 1: This argument would hold, if God and our neighbor were
equally objects of charity. But this is not true: for God is the
principal object of charity, while our neighbor is loved out of
charity for God's sake.
Reply Obj. 2: God is loved by charity for His own sake: wherefore
charity regards principally but one aspect of lovableness, namely
God's goodness, which is His substance, according to Ps. 105:1: "Give
glory to the Lord for He is good." Other reasons that inspire us with
love for Him, or which make it our duty to love Him, are secondary
and result from the first.
Reply Obj. 3: Human friendship of which the Philosopher treats has
various ends and various forms of fellowship. This does not apply to
charity, as stated above: wherefore the comparison fails.
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