Whether Servile Fear Is Substantially the Same As Filial Fear?
Objection 1: It would seem that servile fear is substantially the
same as filial fear. For filial fear is to servile fear the same
apparently as living faith is to lifeless faith, since the one is
accompanied by mortal sin and the other not. Now living faith and
lifeless faith are substantially the same. Therefore servile and
filial fear are substantially the same.
Obj. 2: Further, habits are diversified by their objects. Now the
same thing is the object of servile and of filial fear, since they
both fear God. Therefore servile and filial fear are substantially
the same.
Obj. 3: Further, just as man hopes to enjoy God and to obtain favors
from Him, so does he fear to be separated from God and to be punished
by Him. Now it is the same hope whereby we hope to enjoy God, and to
receive other favors from Him, as stated above (Q. 17, A. 2, ad 2).
Therefore filial fear, whereby we fear separation from God, is the
same as servile fear whereby we fear His punishments.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix) says
that there are two fears, one servile, another filial or chaste fear.
_I answer that,_ The proper object of fear is evil. And since acts
and habits are diversified by their objects, as shown above (I-II, Q.
54, A. 2), it follows of necessity that different kinds of fear
correspond to different kinds of evil.
Now the evil of punishment, from which servile fear shrinks, differs
specifically from evil of fault, which filial fear shuns, as shown
above (A. 2). Hence it is evident that servile and filial fear are
not the same substantially but differ specifically.
Reply Obj. 1: Living and lifeless faith differ, not as regards the
object, since each of them believes God and believes in a God, but in
respect of something extrinsic, viz. the presence or absence of
charity, and so they do not differ substantially. On the other hand,
servile and filial fear differ as to their objects: and hence the
comparison fails.
Reply Obj. 2: Servile fear and filial fear do not regard God
in the same light. For servile fear looks upon God as the cause of the
infliction of punishment, whereas filial fear looks upon Him, not as
the active cause of guilt, but rather as the term wherefrom it shrinks
to be separated by guilt. Consequently the identity of object, viz.
God, does not prove a specific identity of fear, since also natural
movements differ specifically according to their different
relationships to some one term, for movement from whiteness is not
specifically the same as movement towards whiteness.
Reply Obj. 3: Hope looks upon God as the principle not only of
the enjoyment of God, but also of any other favor whatever. This
cannot be said of fear; and so there is no comparison.
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