Whether Hope Is in the Will As Its Subject?
Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not in the will as its
subject. For the object of hope is an arduous good, as stated above
(Q. 17, A. 1; I-II, Q. 40, A. 1). Now the arduous is the object, not
of the will, but of the irascible. Therefore hope is not in the will
but in the irascible.
Obj. 2: Further, where one suffices it is superfluous to add another.
Now charity suffices for the perfecting of the will, which is the
most perfect of the virtues. Therefore hope is not in the will.
Obj. 3: Further, the one same power cannot exercise two acts at the
same time; thus the intellect cannot understand many things
simultaneously. Now the act of hope can be at the same time as an act
of charity. Since, then, the act of charity evidently belongs to the
will, it follows that the act of hope does not belong to that power:
so that, therefore, hope is not in the will.
_On the contrary,_ The soul is not apprehensive of God save as
regards the mind in which is memory, intellect and will, as Augustine
declares (De Trin. xiv, 3, 6). Now hope is a theological virtue
having God for its object. Since therefore it is neither in the
memory, nor in the intellect, which belong to the cognitive faculty,
it follows that it is in the will as its subject.
_I answer that,_ As shown above (I, Q. 87, A. 2), habits are known by
their acts. Now the act of hope is a movement of the appetitive
faculty, since its object is a good. And, since there is a twofold
appetite in man, namely, the sensitive which is divided into
irascible and concupiscible, and the intellective appetite, called
the will, as stated in the First Part (Q. 82, A. 5), those movements
which occur in the lower appetite, are with passion, while those in
the higher appetite are without passion, as shown above (I, Q. 87, A.
2, ad 1; I-II, Q. 22, A. 3, ad 3). Now the act of the virtue of hope
cannot belong to the sensitive appetite, since the good which is the
principal object of this virtue, is not a sensible but a Divine good.
Therefore hope resides in the higher appetite called the will, and
not in the lower appetite, of which the irascible is a part.
Reply Obj. 1: The object of the irascible is an arduous sensible:
whereas the object of the virtue of hope is an arduous intelligible,
or rather superintelligible.
Reply Obj. 2: Charity perfects the will sufficiently with regard to
one act, which is the act of loving: but another virtue is required
in order to perfect it with regard to its other act, which is that of
hoping.
Reply Obj. 3: The movement of hope and the movement of charity are
mutually related, as was shown above (Q. 17, A. 8). Hence there is no
reason why both movements should not belong at the same time to the
same power: even as the intellect can understand many things at the
same time if they be related to one another, as stated in the First
Part (Q. 85, A. 4).
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