Whether Hope Is a Theological Virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not a theological virtue. For
a theological virtue is one that has God for its object. Now hope has
for its object not only God but also other goods which we hope to
obtain from God. Therefore hope is not a theological virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, a theological virtue is not a mean between two
vices, as stated above (I-II, Q. 64, A. 4). But hope is a mean
between presumption and despair. Therefore hope is not a theological
virtue.
Obj. 3: Further, expectation belongs to longanimity which is a
species of fortitude. Since, then, hope is a kind of expectation, it
seems that hope is not a theological, but a moral virtue.
Obj. 4: Further, the object of hope is something arduous. But it
belongs to magnanimity, which is a moral virtue, to tend to the
arduous. Therefore hope is a moral, and not a theological virtue.
_On the contrary,_ Hope is enumerated (1 Cor. 13) together with faith
and charity, which are theological virtues.
_I answer that,_ Since specific differences, by their very nature,
divide a genus, in order to decide under what division we must place
hope, we must observe whence it derives its character of virtue.
Now it has been stated above (A. 1) that hope has the character of
virtue from the fact that it attains the supreme rule of human
actions: and this it attains both as its first efficient cause, in as
much as it leans on its assistance, and as its last final cause, in
as much as it expects happiness in the enjoyment thereof. Hence it is
evident that God is the principal object of hope, considered as a
virtue. Since, then, the very idea of a theological virtue is one
that has God for its object, as stated above (I-II, Q. 62, A. 1), it
is evident that hope is a theological virtue.
Reply Obj. 1: Whatever else hope expects to obtain, it hopes for it
in reference to God as the last end, or as the first efficient cause,
as stated above (A. 4).
Reply Obj. 2: In things measured and ruled the mean consists in the
measure or rule being attained; if we go beyond the rule, there is
excess, if we fall short of the rule, there is deficiency. But in the
rule or measure itself there is no such thing as a mean or extremes.
Now a moral virtue is concerned with things ruled by reason, and
these things are its proper object; wherefore it is proper to it to
follow the mean as regards its proper object. On the other hand, a
theological virtue is concerned with the First Rule not ruled by
another rule, and that Rule is its proper object. Wherefore it is not
proper for a theological virtue, with regard to its proper object, to
follow the mean, although this may happen to it accidentally with
regard to something that is referred to its principal object. Thus
faith can have no mean or extremes in the point of trusting to the
First Truth, in which it is impossible to trust too much; whereas on
the part of the things believed, it may have a mean and extremes; for
instance one truth is a mean between two falsehoods. So too, hope has
no mean or extremes, as regards its principal object, since it is
impossible to trust too much in the Divine assistance; yet it may
have a mean and extremes, as regards those things a man trusts to
obtain, in so far as he either presumes above his capability, or
despairs of things of which he is capable.
Reply Obj. 3: The expectation which is mentioned in the definition of
hope does not imply delay, as does the expectation which belongs to
longanimity. It implies a reference to the Divine assistance, whether
that which we hope for be delayed or not.
Reply Obj. 4: Magnanimity tends to something arduous in the hope of
obtaining something that is within one's power, wherefore its proper
object is the doing of great things. On the other hand hope, as a
theological virtue, regards something arduous, to be obtained by
another's help, as stated above (A. 1).
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