Whether One Man May Hope for Another's Eternal Happiness?
Objection 1: It would seem that one may hope for another's eternal
happiness. For the Apostle says (Phil. 1:6): "Being confident of this
very thing, that He Who hath begun a good work in you, will perfect
it unto the day of Jesus Christ." Now the perfection of that day will
be eternal happiness. Therefore one man may hope for another's
eternal happiness.
Obj. 2: Further, whatever we ask of God, we hope to obtain from Him.
But we ask God to bring others to eternal happiness, according to
James 5:16: "Pray for one another that you may be saved." Therefore
we can hope for another's eternal happiness.
Obj. 3: Further, hope and despair are about the same object. Now it
is possible to despair of another's eternal happiness, else Augustine
would have no reason for saying (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi) that we
should not despair of anyone so long as he lives. Therefore one can
also hope for another's eternal salvation.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Enchiridion viii) that "hope is
only of such things as belong to him who is supposed to hope for
them."
_I answer that,_ We can hope for something in two ways: first,
absolutely, and thus the object of hope is always something arduous
and pertaining to the person who hopes. Secondly, we can hope for
something, through something else being presupposed, and in this way
its object can be something pertaining to someone else. In order to
explain this we must observe that love and hope differ in this, that
love denotes union between lover and beloved, while hope denotes a
movement or a stretching forth of the appetite towards an arduous
good. Now union is of things that are distinct, wherefore love can
directly regard the other whom a man unites to himself by love,
looking upon him as his other self: whereas movement is always
towards its own term which is proportionate to the subject moved.
Therefore hope regards directly one's own good, and not that which
pertains to another. Yet if we presuppose the union of love with
another, a man can hope for and desire something for another man, as
for himself; and, accordingly, he can hope for another's eternal
life, inasmuch as he is united to him by love, and just as it is the
same virtue of charity whereby a man loves God, himself, and his
neighbor, so too it is the same virtue of hope, whereby a man hopes
for himself and for another.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
_______________________