Whether Hope Is a Virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not a virtue. For "no man
makes ill use of a virtue," as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. ii,
18). But one may make ill use of hope, since the passion of hope,
like the other passions, is subject to a mean and extremes. Therefore
hope is not a virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, no virtue results from merits, since "God works
virtue in us without us," as Augustine states (De Grat. et Lib. Arb.
xvii). But hope is caused by grace and merits, according to the
Master (Sent. iii, D, 26). Therefore hope is not a virtue.
Obj. 3: Further, "virtue is the disposition of a perfect thing"
(Phys. vii, text. 17, 18). But hope is the disposition of an
imperfect thing, of one, namely, that lacks what it hopes to have.
Therefore hope is not a virtue.
_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. i, 33) that the three
daughters of Job signify these three virtues, faith, hope and
charity. Therefore hope is a virtue.
_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6) "the
virtue of a thing is that which makes its subject good, and its work
good likewise." Consequently wherever we find a good human act, it
must correspond to some human virtue. Now in all things measured and
ruled, the good is that which attains its proper rule: thus we say
that a coat is good if it neither exceeds nor falls short of its
proper measurement. But, as we stated above (Q. 8, A. 3, ad 3) human
acts have a twofold measure; one is proximate and homogeneous, viz.
the reason, while the other is remote and excelling, viz. God:
wherefore every human act is good, which attains reason or God
Himself. Now the act of hope, whereof we speak now, attains God. For,
as we have already stated (I-II, Q. 40, A. 1), when we were treating
of the passion of hope, the object of hope is a future good,
difficult but possible to obtain. Now a thing is possible to us in
two ways: first, by ourselves; secondly, by means of others, as
stated in _Ethic._ iii. Wherefore, in so far as we hope for anything
as being possible to us by means of the Divine assistance, our hope
attains God Himself, on Whose help it leans. It is therefore evident
that hope is a virtue, since it causes a human act to be good and to
attain its due rule.
Reply Obj. 1: In the passions, the mean of virtue depends on right
reason being attained, wherein also consists the essence of virtue.
Wherefore in hope too, the good of virtue depends on a man's
attaining, by hoping, the due rule, viz. God. Consequently man cannot
make ill use of hope which attains God, as neither can he make ill
use of moral virtue which attains the reason, because to attain thus
is to make good use of virtue. Nevertheless, the hope of which we
speak now, is not a passion but a habit of the mind, as we shall show
further on (A. 5; Q. 18, A. 1).
Reply Obj. 2: Hope is said to arise from merits, as regards the thing
hoped for, in so far as we hope to obtain happiness by means of grace
and merits; or as regards the act of living hope. The habit itself of
hope, whereby we hope to obtain happiness, does not flow from our
merits, but from grace alone.
Reply Obj. 3: He who hopes is indeed imperfect in relation to that
which he hopes to obtain, but has not as yet; yet he is perfect, in
so far as he already attains his proper rule, viz. God, on Whose help
he leans.
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