Whether the Gift of Understanding Is Distinct from the Other Gifts?
Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of understanding is not
distinct from the other gifts. For there is no distinction between
things whose opposites are not distinct. Now "wisdom is contrary to
folly, understanding is contrary to dulness, counsel is contrary to
rashness, knowledge is contrary to ignorance," as Gregory states
(Moral. ii, 49). But there would seem to be no difference between
folly, dulness, ignorance and rashness. Therefore neither does
understanding differ from the other gifts.
Obj. 2: Further, the intellectual virtue of understanding differs
from the other intellectual virtues in that it is proper to it to be
about self-evident principles. But the gift of understanding is not
about any self-evident principles, since the natural habit of first
principles suffices in respect of those matters which are naturally
self-evident: while faith is sufficient in respect of such things as
are supernatural, since the articles of faith are like first
principles in supernatural knowledge, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 7).
Therefore the gift of understanding does not differ from the other
intellectual gifts.
Obj. 3: Further, all intellectual knowledge is either speculative or
practical. Now the gift of understanding is related to both, as
stated above (A. 3). Therefore it is not distinct from the other
intellectual gifts, but comprises them all.
_On the contrary,_ When several things are enumerated together they
must be, in some way, distinct from one another, because distinction
is the origin of number. Now the gift of understanding is enumerated
together with the other gifts, as appears from Isa. 11:2. Therefore
the gift of understanding is distinct from the other gifts.
_I answer that,_ The difference between the gift of understanding and
three of the others, viz. piety, fortitude, and fear, is evident,
since the gift of understanding belongs to the cognitive power, while
the three belong to the appetitive power.
But the difference between this gift of understanding and the
remaining three, viz. wisdom, knowledge, and counsel, which also
belong to the cognitive power, is not so evident. To some [*William
of Auxerre, Sum. Aur. III, iii, 8], it seems that the gift of
understanding differs from the gifts of knowledge and counsel, in
that these two belong to practical knowledge, while the gift of
understanding belongs to speculative knowledge; and that it differs
from the gift of wisdom, which also belongs to speculative knowledge,
in that wisdom is concerned with judgment, while understanding
renders the mind apt to grasp the things that are proposed, and to
penetrate into their very heart. And in this sense we have assigned
the number of the gifts, above (I-II, Q. 68, A. 4).
But if we consider the matter carefully, the gift of understanding is
concerned not only with speculative, but also with practical matters,
as stated above (A. 3), and likewise, the gift of knowledge regards
both matters, as we shall show further on (Q. 9, A. 3), and
consequently, we must take their distinction in some other way. For
all these four gifts are ordained to supernatural knowledge, which,
in us, takes its foundation from faith. Now "faith is through
hearing" (Rom. 10:17). Hence some things must be proposed to be
believed by man, not as seen, but as heard, to which he assents by
faith. But faith, first and principally, is about the First Truth,
secondarily, about certain considerations concerning creatures, and
furthermore extends to the direction of human actions, in so far as
it works through charity, as appears from what has been said above
(Q. 4, A. 2, ad 3).
Accordingly on the part of the things proposed to faith for belief,
two things are requisite on our part: first that they be penetrated
or grasped by the intellect, and this belongs to the gift of
understanding. Secondly, it is necessary that man should judge these
things aright, that he should esteem that he ought to adhere to these
things, and to withdraw from their opposites: and this judgment, with
regard to Divine things belong to the gift of wisdom, but with regard
to created things, belongs to the gift of knowledge, and as to its
application to individual actions, belongs to the gift of counsel.
Reply Obj. 1: The foregoing difference between those four gifts is
clearly in agreement with the distinction of those things which
Gregory assigns as their opposites. For dulness is contrary to
sharpness, since an intellect is said, by comparison, to be sharp,
when it is able to penetrate into the heart of the things that are
proposed to it. Hence it is dulness of mind that renders the mind
unable to pierce into the heart of a thing. A man is said to be a
fool if he judges wrongly about the common end of life, wherefore
folly is properly opposed to wisdom, which makes us judge aright
about the universal cause. Ignorance implies a defect in the mind,
even about any particular things whatever, so that it is contrary to
knowledge, which gives man a right judgment about particular causes,
viz. about creatures. Rashness is clearly opposed to counsel, whereby
man does not proceed to action before deliberating with his reason.
Reply Obj. 2: The gift of understanding is about the first principles
of that knowledge which is conferred by grace; but otherwise than
faith, because it belongs to faith to assent to them, while it
belongs to the gift of understanding to pierce with the mind the
things that are said.
Reply Obj. 3: The gift of understanding is related to both kinds of
knowledge, viz. speculative and practical, not as to the judgment,
but as to apprehension, by grasping what is said.
_______________________