But while nothing in this world would persuade us that a great friend of

Mr. Forbes Robertson, let us say, would experience no surprise or

discomfort at seeing him enter the room in the bodily form of Mr.

Chaplin, there is a confusion constantly made between being attracted by

exterior, which is natural and universal, and being attracted by what is

called physical beauty, which is not entirely natural and not in the

least universal. Or rather, to speak more strictly, the conception of

physical beauty has been narrowed to mean a certain kind of physical

beauty which no more exhausts the possibilities of external

attractiveness than the respectability of a Clapham builder exhausts

the possibilities of moral attractiveness.

The tyrants and deceivers of mankind in this matter have been the

Greeks. All their splendid work for civilization ought not to have

wholly blinded us to the fact of their great and terrible sin against

the variety of life. It is a remarkable fact that while the Jews have

long ago been rebelled against and accused of blighting the world with a

stringent and one-sided ethical standard, nobody has noticed that the

Greeks have committed us to an infinitely more horrible asceticism--an

asceticism of the fancy, a worship of one aesthetic type alone. Jewish

severity had at least common-sense as its basis; it recognised that men

lived in a world of fact, and that if a man married within the degrees

of blood certain consequences might follow. But they did not starve

their instinct for contrasts and combinations; their prophets gave two

wings to the ox and any number of eyes to the cherubim with all the

riotous ingenuity of Lewis Carroll. But the Greeks carried their police

regulation into elfland; they vetoed not the actual adulteries of the

earth but the wild weddings of ideas, and forbade the banns of thought.

It is extraordinary to watch the gradual emasculation of the monsters

of Greek myth under the pestilent influence of the Apollo Belvedere. The

chimaera was a creature of whom any healthy-minded people would have

been proud; but when we see it in Greek pictures we feel inclined to tie

a ribbon round its neck and give it a saucer of milk. Who ever feels

that the giants in Greek art and poetry were really big--big as some

folk-lore giants have been? In some Scandinavian story a hero walks for

miles along a mountain ridge, which eventually turns out to be the

bridge of the giant's nose. That is what we should call, with a calm

conscience, a large giant. But this earthquake fancy terrified the

Greeks, and their terror has terrified all mankind out of their natural

love of size, vitality, variety, energy, ugliness. Nature intended every

human face, so long as it was forcible, individual, and expressive, to

be regarded as distinct from all others, as a poplar is distinct from an

oak, and an apple-tree from a willow. But what the Dutch gardeners did

for trees the Greeks did for the human form; they lopped away its living

and sprawling features to give it a certain academic shape; they hacked

off noses and pared down chins with a ghastly horticultural calm. And

they have really succeeded so far as to make us call some of the most

powerful and endearing faces ugly, and some of the most silly and

repulsive faces beautiful. This disgraceful _via media_, this pitiful

sense of dignity, has bitten far deeper into the soul of modern

civilization than the external and practical Puritanism of Israel. The

Jew at the worst told a man to dance in fetters; the Greek put an

exquisite vase upon his head and told him not to move.

Scripture says that one star differeth from another in glory, and the

same conception applies to noses. To insist that one type of face is

ugly because it differs from that of the Venus of Milo is to look at it

entirely in a misleading light. It is strange that we should resent

people differing from ourselves; we should resent much more violently

their resembling ourselves. This principle has made a sufficient hash of

literary criticism, in which it is always the custom to complain of the

lack of sound logic in a fairy tale, and the entire absence of true

oratorical power in a three-act farce. But to call another man's face

ugly because it powerfully expresses another man's soul is like

complaining that a cabbage has not two legs. If we did so, the only

course for the cabbage would be to point out with severity, but with

some show of truth, that we were not a beautiful green all over.

But this frigid theory of the beautiful has not succeeded in conquering

the art of the world, except in name. In some quarters, indeed, it has

never held sway. A glance at Chinese dragons or Japanese gods will show

how independent are Orientals of the conventional idea of facial and

bodily regularity, and how keen and fiery is their enjoyment of real

beauty, of goggle eyes, of sprawling claws, of gaping mouths and

writhing coils. In the Middle Ages men broke away from the Greek

standard of beauty, and lifted up in adoration to heaven great towers,

which seemed alive with dancing apes and devils. In the full summer of

technical artistic perfection the revolt was carried to its real

consummation in the study of the faces of men. Rembrandt declared the

sane and manly gospel that a man was dignified, not when he was like a

Greek god, but when he had a strong, square nose like a cudgel, a

boldly-blocked head like a helmet, and a jaw like a steel trap.

This branch of art is commonly dismissed as the grotesque. We have never

been able to understand why it should be humiliating to be laughable,

since it is giving an elevated artistic pleasure to others. If a

gentleman who saw us in the street were suddenly to burst into tears at

the mere thought of our existence, it might be considered disquieting

and uncomplimentary; but laughter is not uncomplimentary. In truth,

however, the phrase 'grotesque' is a misleading description of ugliness

in art. It does not follow that either the Chinese dragons or the Gothic

gargoyles or the goblinish old women of Rembrandt were in the least

intended to be comic. Their extravagance was not the extravagance of

satire, but simply the extravagance of vitality; and here lies the whole

key of the place of ugliness in aesthetics. We like to see a crag jut

out in shameless decision from the cliff, we like to see the red pines

stand up hardily upon a high cliff, we like to see a chasm cloven from

end to end of a mountain. With equally noble enthusiasm we like to see a

nose jut out decisively, we like to see the red hair of a friend stand

up hardily in bristles upon his head, we like to see his mouth broad and

clean cut like the mountain crevasse. At least some of us like all this;

it is not a question of humour. We do not burst with amusement at the

first sight of the pines or the chasm; but we like them because they are

expressive of the dramatic stillness of Nature, her bold experiments,

her definite departures, her fearlessness and savage pride in her

children. The moment we have snapped the spell of conventional beauty,

there are a million beautiful faces waiting for us everywhere, just as

there are a million beautiful spirits.

* * * * *

A DEFENCE OF FARCE

I have never been able to understand why certain forms of art should be

marked off as something debased and trivial. A comedy is spoken of as

'degenerating into farce'; it would be fair criticism to speak of it

'changing into farce'; but as for degenerating into farce, we might

equally reasonably speak of it as degenerating into tragedy. Again, a

story is spoken of as 'melodramatic,' and the phrase, queerly enough, is

not meant as a compliment. To speak of something as 'pantomimic' or

'sensational' is innocently supposed to be biting, Heaven knows why, for

all works of art are sensations, and a good pantomime (now extinct) is

one of the pleasantest sensations of all. 'This stuff is fit for a

detective story,' is often said, as who should say, 'This stuff is fit

for an epic.'

Whatever may be the rights and wrongs of this mode of classification,

there can be no doubt about one most practical and disastrous effect of

it. These lighter or wilder forms of art, having no standard set up for

them, no gust of generous artistic pride to lift them up, do actually

tend to become as bad as they are supposed to be. Neglected children of

the great mother, they grow up in darkness, dirty and unlettered, and

when they are right they are right almost by accident, because of the

blood in their veins. The common detective story of mystery and murder

seems to the intelligent reader to be little except a strange glimpse of

a planet peopled by congenital idiots, who cannot find the end of their

own noses or the character of their own wives. The common pantomime

seems like some horrible satiric picture of a world without cause or

effect, a mass of 'jarring atoms,' a prolonged mental torture of

irrelevancy. The ordinary farce seems a world of almost piteous

vulgarity, where a half-witted and stunted creature is afraid when his

wife comes home, and amused when she sits down on the doorstep. All this

is, in a sense, true, but it is the fault of nothing in heaven or earth

except the attitude and the phrases quoted at the beginning of this

article. We have no doubt in the world that, if the other forms of art

had been equally despised, they would have been equally despicable. If

people had spoken of 'sonnets' with the same accent with which they

speak of 'music-hall songs,' a sonnet would have been a thing so

fearful and wonderful that we almost regret we cannot have a specimen; a

rowdy sonnet is a thing to dream about. If people had said that epics

were only fit for children and nursemaids, 'Paradise Lost' might have

been an average pantomime: it might have been called 'Harlequin Satan,

or How Adam 'Ad 'em.' For who would trouble to bring to perfection a

work in which even perfection is grotesque? Why should Shakespeare write

'Othello' if even his triumph consisted in the eulogy, 'Mr. Shakespeare

is fit for something better than writing tragedies'?

The case of farce, and its wilder embodiment in harlequinade, is

especially important. That these high and legitimate forms of art,

glorified by Aristophanes and Molière, have sunk into such contempt may

be due to many causes: I myself have little doubt that it is due to the

astonishing and ludicrous lack of belief in hope and hilarity which

marks modern aesthetics, to such an extent that it has spread even to

the revolutionists (once the hopeful section of men), so that even those

who ask us to fling the stars into the sea are not quite sure that they

will be any better there than they were before. Every form of literary

art must be a symbol of some phase of the human spirit; but whereas the

phase is, in human life, sufficiently convincing in itself, in art it

must have a certain pungency and neatness of form, to compensate for its

lack of reality. Thus any set of young people round a tea-table may have

all the comedy emotions of 'Much Ado about Nothing' or 'Northanger

Abbey,' but if their actual conversation were reported, it would

possibly not be a worthy addition to literature. An old man sitting by

his fire may have all the desolate grandeur of Lear or Père Goriot, but

if he comes into literature he must do something besides sit by the

fire. The artistic justification, then, of farce and pantomime must

consist in the emotions of life which correspond to them. And these

emotions are to an incredible extent crushed out by the modern

insistence on the painful side of life only. Pain, it is said, is the

dominant element of life; but this is true only in a very special sense.

If pain were for one single instant literally the dominant element in

life, every man would be found hanging dead from his own bed-post by the

morning. Pain, as the black and catastrophic thing, attracts the

youthful artist, just as the schoolboy draws devils and skeletons and

men hanging. But joy is a far more elusive and elvish matter, since it

is our reason for existing, and a very feminine reason; it mingles with

every breath we draw and every cup of tea we drink. The literature of

joy is infinitely more difficult, more rare and more triumphant than the

black and white literature of pain. And of all the varied forms of the

literature of joy, the form most truly worthy of moral reverence and

artistic ambition is the form called 'farce'--or its wilder shape in

pantomime. To the quietest human being, seated in the quietest house,

there will sometimes come a sudden and unmeaning hunger for the

possibilities or impossibilities of things; he will abruptly wonder

whether the teapot may not suddenly begin to pour out honey or

sea-water, the clock to point to all hours of the day at once, the

candle to burn green or crimson, the door to open upon a lake or a

potato-field instead of a London street. Upon anyone who feels this

nameless anarchism there rests for the time being the abiding spirit of

pantomime. Of the clown who cuts the policeman in two it may be said

(with no darker meaning) that he realizes one of our visions. And it may

be noted here that this internal quality in pantomime is perfectly

symbolized and preserved by that commonplace or cockney landscape and

architecture which characterizes pantomime and farce. If the whole

affair happened in some alien atmosphere, if a pear-tree began to grow

apples or a river to run with wine in some strange fairyland, the effect

would be quite different. The streets and shops and door-knockers of the

harlequinade, which to the vulgar aesthete make it seem commonplace, are

in truth the very essence of the aesthetic departure. It must be an

actual modern door which opens and shuts, constantly disclosing

different interiors; it must be a real baker whose loaves fly up into

the air without his touching them, or else the whole internal excitement

of this elvish invasion of civilization, this abrupt entrance of Puck

into Pimlico, is lost. Some day, perhaps, when the present narrow phase

of aesthetics has ceased to monopolize the name, the glory of a farcical

art may become fashionable. Long after men have ceased to drape their

houses in green and gray and to adorn them with Japanese vases, an

aesthete may build a house on pantomime principles, in which all the

doors shall have their bells and knockers on the inside, all the

staircases be constructed to vanish on the pressing of a button, and all

the dinners (humorous dinners in themselves) come up cooked through a

trapdoor. We are very sure, at least, that it is as reasonable to

regulate one's life and lodgings by this kind of art as by any other.

The whole of this view of farce and pantomime may seem insane to us; but

we fear that it is we who are insane. Nothing in this strange age of

transition is so depressing as its merriment. All the most brilliant men

of the day when they set about the writing of comic literature do it

under one destructive fallacy and disadvantage: the notion that comic

literature is in some sort of way superficial. They give us little

knick-knacks of the brittleness of which they positively boast, although

two thousand years have beaten as vainly upon the follies of the 'Frogs'

as on the wisdom of the 'Republic.' It is all a mean shame of joy. When

we come out from a performance of the 'Midsummer Night's Dream' we feel

as near to the stars as when we come out from 'King Lear.' For the joy

of these works is older than sorrow, their extravagance is saner than

wisdom, their love is stronger than death.

The old masters of a healthy madness, Aristophanes or Rabelais or

Shakespeare, doubtless had many brushes with the precisians or ascetics

of their day, but we cannot but feel that for honest severity and

consistent self-maceration they would always have had respect. But what

abysses of scorn, inconceivable to any modern, would they have reserved

for an aesthetic type and movement which violated morality and did not

even find pleasure, which outraged sanity and could not attain to

exuberance, which contented itself with the fool's cap without the

bells!

* * * * *

A DEFENCE OF HUMILITY

The act of defending any of the cardinal virtues has to-day all the

exhilaration of a vice. Moral truisms have been so much disputed that

they have begun to sparkle like so many brilliant paradoxes. And

especially (in this age of egoistic idealism) there is about one who

defends humility something inexpressibly rakish.

It is no part of my intention to defend humility on practical grounds.

Practical grounds are uninteresting, and, moreover, on practical grounds

the case for humility is overwhelming. We all know that the 'divine

glory of the ego' is socially a great nuisance; we all do actually value

our friends for modesty, freshness, and simplicity of heart. Whatever

may be the reason, we all do warmly respect humility--in other people.

But the matter must go deeper than this. If the grounds of humility are

found only in social convenience, they may be quite trivial and

temporary. The egoists may be the martyrs of a nobler dispensation,

agonizing for a more arduous ideal. To judge from the comparative lack

of ease in their social manner, this seems a reasonable suggestion.

There is one thing that must be seen at the outset of the study of

humility from an intrinsic and eternal point of view. The new philosophy

of self-esteem and self-assertion declares that humility is a vice. If

it be so, it is quite clear that it is one of those vices which are an

integral part of original sin. It follows with the precision of

clockwork every one of the great joys of life. No one, for example, was

ever in love without indulging in a positive debauch of humility. All

full-blooded and natural people, such as schoolboys, enjoy humility the

moment they attain hero-worship. Humility, again, is said both by its

upholders and opponents to be the peculiar growth of Christianity. The

real and obvious reason of this is often missed. The pagans insisted

upon self-assertion because it was the essence of their creed that the

gods, though strong and just, were mystic, capricious, and even

indifferent. But the essence of Christianity was in a literal sense the

New Testament--a covenant with God which opened to men a clear

deliverance. They thought themselves secure; they claimed palaces of

pearl and silver under the oath and seal of the Omnipotent; they

believed themselves rich with an irrevocable benediction which set them

above the stars; and immediately they discovered humility. It was only

another example of the same immutable paradox. It is always the secure

who are humble.

This particular instance survives in the evangelical revivalists of the

street. They are irritating enough, but no one who has really studied

them can deny that the irritation is occasioned by these two things, an

irritating hilarity and an irritating humility. This combination of joy

and self-prostration is a great deal too universal to be ignored. If

humility has been discredited as a virtue at the present day, it is not

wholly irrelevant to remark that this discredit has arisen at the same

time as a great collapse of joy in current literature and philosophy.

Men have revived the splendour of Greek self-assertion at the same time

that they have revived the bitterness of Greek pessimism. A literature

has arisen which commands us all to arrogate to ourselves the liberty of

self-sufficing deities at the same time that it exhibits us to ourselves

as dingy maniacs who ought to be chained up like dogs. It is certainly a

curious state of things altogether. When we are genuinely happy, we

think we are unworthy of happiness. But when we are demanding a divine

emancipation we seem to be perfectly certain that we are unworthy of

anything.

The only explanation of the matter must be found in the conviction that

humility has infinitely deeper roots than any modern men suppose; that

it is a metaphysical and, one might almost say, a mathematical virtue.

Probably this can best be tested by a study of those who frankly

disregard humility and assert the supreme duty of perfecting and

expressing one's self. These people tend, by a perfectly natural

process, to bring their own great human gifts of culture, intellect, or

moral power to a great perfection, successively shutting out everything

that they feel to be lower than themselves. Now shutting out things is

all very well, but it has one simple corollary--that from everything

that we shut out we are ourselves shut out. When we shut our door on the

wind, it would be equally true to say that the wind shuts its door on

us. Whatever virtues a triumphant egoism really leads to, no one can

reasonably pretend that it leads to knowledge. Turning a beggar from the

door may be right enough, but pretending to know all the stories the

beggar might have narrated is pure nonsense; and this is practically

the claim of the egoism which thinks that self-assertion can obtain

knowledge. A beetle may or may not be inferior to a man--the matter

awaits demonstration; but if he were inferior by ten thousand fathoms,

the fact remains that there is probably a beetle view of things of which

a man is entirely ignorant. If he wishes to conceive that point of view,

he will scarcely reach it by persistently revelling in the fact that he

is not a beetle. The most brilliant exponent of the egoistic school,

Nietszche, with deadly and honourable logic, admitted that the

philosophy of self-satisfaction led to looking down upon the weak, the

cowardly, and the ignorant. Looking down on things may be a delightful

experience, only there is nothing, from a mountain to a cabbage, that is

really _seen_ when it is seen from a balloon. The philosopher of the ego

sees everything, no doubt, from a high and rarified heaven; only he sees

everything foreshortened or deformed.

Now if we imagine that a man wished truly, as far as possible, to see

everything as it was, he would certainly proceed on a different

principle. He would seek to divest himself for a time of those personal

peculiarities which tend to divide him from the thing he studies. It is

as difficult, for example, for a man to examine a fish without

developing a certain vanity in possessing a pair of legs, as if they

were the latest article of personal adornment. But if a fish is to be

approximately understood, this physiological dandyism must be overcome.

The earnest student of fish morality will, spiritually speaking, chop

off his legs. And similarly the student of birds will eliminate his

arms; the frog-lover will with one stroke of the imagination remove all

his teeth, and the spirit wishing to enter into all the hopes and fears

of jelly-fish will simplify his personal appearance to a really alarming

extent. It would appear, therefore, that this great body of ours and all

its natural instincts, of which we are proud, and justly proud, is

rather an encumbrance at the moment when we attempt to appreciate things

as they should be appreciated. We do actually go through a process of

mental asceticism, a castration of the entire being, when we wish to

feel the abounding good in all things. It is good for us at certain

times that ourselves should be like a mere window--as clear, as

luminous, and as invisible.

The Defendant · 第 4 / 6 段