_There is no man of a clear and good understanding who is not a
good-intentioned one._
XCIV. I believe that all the mortals in every quarter of the Globe, will
be struck with surprize, at hearing me broach this paradox, and will look
upon it as one of the greatest chimeras in ethics, that ever entered
the head of man; for there is scarce any one of the least observation,
who cannot affirm and attest, he has seen and known people of very good
capacities, who were very perverse and ill-disposed. But I, in opposition
to all this, assert that I never met with such a one; and I not only make
this declaration, but declare further, that I think it next to impossible
that there should be such a man, and that if by chance such a one should
be found, he ought to be considered as a monster.
XCV. But in order that we should not misunderstand or confound things,
I think it necessary for me to explain, what I understand by an
evil-intentioned man. By an evil-intentioned man, then, I mean such a
one in whom those vices reign, which are most pernicious to society,
that is to say, malignity of heart, unforgivingness, turbulence or
restlessness, and a desire of usurping other peoples property; and in
general, all sly and crafty persons should be enumerated in the catalogue
of evil-intentioned men, such for example, as are attentive to nothing
but their own gratifications and emoluments, and who have not the least
concern for, or who are totally indifferent about the good of their
neighbour, or the welfare of the public.
XCVI. The deformity, the baseness, and the dissonance from natural
reason, there is in a person’s doing a voluntary injury to another, is
so strikingly represented to a man of a clear and a sound understanding,
that except in here and there an instance, where some violent passion
intervenes to disturb and disorder the reason, it seems impossible, that
a person should voluntarily commit acts that are directly injurious and
offensive to his neighbour. And it may be from this principle, that we
have seen some who have been reputed as atheists, who, notwithstanding
their erroneous belief that there is no such thing as future rewards and
punishments, and that they expect no recompence for their good actions,
or chastisement for their bad ones hereafter; as members of human
society, have behaved well, or at least have done no civil mischief to
it; I mean that they have conducted themselves like quiet peaceable
people, and have lived contentedly upon their own patrimonies, or on what
they have lawfully acquired, and have shewn themselves averse to all
violence and injustice. Such among the antients, was Pliny the elder; and
such among those of more modern date, was the Englishman Thomas Hobbes.
XCVII. The genuine and true reason of this is, that the existence of a
Supreme Being, although it is most plain and clear, is not with respect
to the human understanding, self-evident, or, as the Theologians explain
the thing, is not _per se nota quo ad nos_; but is made infallibly
evident, by deductions drawn from other principles; and where a deduction
of this sort is absolutely necessary, a person may suspect, that it is
very possible now and then some fallacy may creep in. But the deformity
of such vicious actions as we have been speaking of, is evident of
itself; and whenever such actions are represented to the understanding,
it clearly comprehends their baseness, and the operation of them is
odious and apparent in the eyes of every man, unless as we observed
before, some circumstance intervenes to disturb his reason.
XCVIII. To this it may be urged by way of objection, in the first place,
that in order to perceive and be convinced of the turpitude of those
actions, there is no necessity for a man to be possessed of a bright
understanding, as a middling one, or even one below the middle class,
would be sufficient for this purpose; so that this reasoning will prove
the turpitude to be plain to every understanding, high, middling, and
low, or else that it is evident to neither of them.
XCIX. To this I answer, that although the thing may be known with intire
certainty to every one of them, there is a great difference between
the knowledge and comprehension of one man, and that of another. Two
understandings that are unequal, notwithstanding they may both know, and
be thoroughly persuaded of the same truth, may be struck with it very
differently; and in proportion as one of these understandings is the most
clear, that one will know it more distinctly, more strikingly, and with
a more refined degree of penetration; and in proportion as the other
is less clear, that other will perceive it less distinctly, and more
confusedly. In consequence of this inequality of understandings, objects
make a more strong or a more weak impression on the soul, and have more
or less influence to excite in it, these, or those affections. The same
infinite goodness of God which is known to the blessed, is known with
infallible certainty by the worldly also. How then comes it to pass, that
the first love him necessarily and intensely, and that we worldly mortals
are so luke-warm in our love of him? This is occasioned by no other
cause than the following, that although our knowledge of him is evident,
that of the blessed is the most clear, and ours the most obscure; and
in proportion as the understanding knows a good or an evil with greater
clearness, the will is moved with a greater impetus, to love the first,
and abhor the last.
C. This may be very opportunely and aptly explained, by the operation of
any corporeal sense; for he whose olfactory nerves are very quick, will
be more offended with an ill smell, than one in whom that sensation is
more languid and remiss; and although this last may be able clearly to
distinguish the ill smell, he will be less disgusted at it; nor will it
appear so hateful to him; and this happens from no other reason, than
that the olfactory perception of the first is very clear, and that of the
second rather obstructed or more dull; and although not only the man who
has a very quick and delicate ear, but also he who has one that is more
obtuse, may evidently perceive the dissonance of three or four voices
which are totally discordant; the last will bear it without being much
affected, and the other will be almost distracted by it; and this is all
derived from the cause above-mentioned.
CI. And it happens just so with regard to intellectual perception. The
deformity of vicious actions, which are self-evident, is apparent and
clear, not only to men of perspicuous understandings, but to those of
the most inferior capacities, provided they are not quite stupid; but
by the first perceiving them with a lively clearness, and the others
somewhat confusedly, they produce a kind of horror in those who have that
clearness of perception, which does not permit their wills to embrace
such objects; while those to whom they do not appear so disgusting and
unpleasant, may be betrayed into grasping turpitudes, under the disguise
of delights and pleasures. But I would not have it understood that I mean
to insinuate by what I have said here, that there ever is a suspension,
or obstruction of the operation, of every, or any man’s free will.
CII. It may be objected in the second place, that there are entire
nations, among whom it cannot be denied, that there are to be found
many men of excellent understandings, who hold robbery, deceit, and
even cruelty to be lawful, and that consequently, they cannot consider
these things as turpitudes, or have a just sense of their baseness. To
this I answer, that our assertion with respect to a good understanding,
does not allude to one placed in such a situation. The general error
of a nation in any matter whatever, is like a dark fog which bewilders
people, causes them to mistake their way, and perplexes the clearest
understandings. If in early infancy, when the rational faculties are
weak, children are familiarized to, and brought up under the influence
of deceitful prejudices; and when they come to years of maturity, they
are accustomed to reverence a common error as irrefragable authority; if
it should happen afterwards, that a ray of light breaks in upon them,
which discovers to them the truth, they timidly fly from the elucidation,
distrust their own reason and reflexion, and are apt to suspect such
elucidation to be a delusion, and to suppose that it would be criminal in
them to regard it.
CIII. I answer secondly, that it is not known with any degree of
certainty, that men of excellent understandings, who are educated and
brought up in those nations we call barbarous, are infected with all the
errors that prevail in those nations; and with respect to myself, I am
fully persuaded they are not. We know that various eminent men among
the Gentiles, in matters of religion, thought very differently from the
populace. It is true however, that there were but few of them who had
sufficient resolution to speak out, as they for the most part disguised
their opinions, from motives of fear or policy. We ought also to admit,
that among the barbarous nations of these times, there are still to be
found men of this character. Nor is there any necessity for limiting such
an opinion within the bounds of mere conjecture; for there are various
historical relations, which bear testimony to actions of heroic virtue,
that have been lately done by some of the individuals of those very
nations, where maxims of inhumanity are prevalent at this day; of which
if it was necessary, a long catalogue might be adduced.
CIV. In the third place, it may be objected, that experience teaches
us, there is scarce a country or populous city, where you may not find
some people of perspicuous understandings, and who, although they are
of wayward dispositions and depraved inclinations, are subtil and
penetrating. To this I answer resolutely and determinedly, that I defy
any man to produce such an instance. I have known and conversed with
many of those people, who have been esteemed men of good understanding,
and perverse dispositions, but have always found the common opinion of
those persons to be extremely erroneous. The vulgar frequently look upon
persons of very superficial talents, as men of great understanding; and
upon hearing them talk off hand, although there is nothing solid in what
they say, and observing in them a readiness at expressing themselves,
and more especially if they deliver themselves with confidence, and a
magisterial air, most people are apt to give them credit for being men
of admirable understandings; when in truth, there is hardly one out of a
hundred of them, who can penetrate more than skin-deep into the objects
he converses upon. There is another very common deception in this matter,
and that is, looking upon cunning people as men of depth or penetration,
when they are as palpably different from one another, as light is from
darkness. I call those cunning people, who are solely attentive to
nothing but their own concerns, and who by all sorts of under-hand ways
and means, and by all kinds of little arts and deceits, are endeavouring
to promote their own particular interest. Can these be called men
of sublime understandings? To do this, requires but little depth or
penetration, as all that is necessary to accomplish such ends, is low
craft and roguery; and there is hardly any capacity, be it ever so mean,
which cannot comprehend and apply such trivial artifices: every one may
arrive at doing this; but a noble understanding, discerning the baseness
of them, abominates such practices; although the vulgar, to whose bastard
dispositions they are better suited, embrace them with eagerness.
Dissimulation, so far from requiring an exalted understanding to support
and carry it on, requires none at all, for we see some irrational animals
who exercise it with great address. The foxes are very expert at it, but
that does not in any wise render their nature superior to that of brutes;
and I repeat again, that I never knew an understanding that had any thing
of the elevated or sublime in its composition, that did not abhor all
duplicity and fraud.
CV. If we see this matter in the other extreme point of view, we shall
find it liable to great equivocation. It frequently happens, that a man
of very pure virtue, who has somewhat of native dryness or bluntness in
his composition, appears to those of rude and uncultivated capacities,
as a person of a depraved disposition. Those who are zealous lovers of
truth and justice, are accustomed, not always to accommodate themselves
to those courteous condescensions; by which people acquire popular
acceptation; as by attending to the substance of things, they are apt to
overlook forms and ceremonies. Words from their mouths, signify what the
sound and sense of them express: they confider courteous dissimulation as
a treacherous enemy of virtue; and are ignorant of the art of painting
vice in counterfeit colours, for the sake of pleasing or flattering
any man; but on the contrary, are always careful to describe it so, as
that it may appear in its true native shape, and in all its deformity.
The more prevalent lying, deceit, and perfidy is, the more they loath
and nauseate it, and are observed to be more strict and severe in their
reprehensions of it; and besides, they never look smilingly, but upon
those in whom they perceive a clean mind. This unpleasing integrity,
is regarded by the bulk of the world, as a kind of misanthropy, or
malevolence towards the generality of mankind; and the number of those,
who busy themselves in painting such men, as impracticable, perverse,
and ill-intentioned is infinite; for they are pleasing but to very few,
as there are but few who are pleased with them; so that either from the
malice of their opponents, or from the want of a proper knowledge of
the world in those that are indifferent with respect to their opinions
of them, it easily comes to pass, that a man of exalted and sincere
virtue, is often looked upon by a whole town, as a person of intentional
malignity.
CVI. Whoever is upon his guard not to fall into one of the two
beforementioned errors, and has capacity to distinguish true virtue from
false, and a clear and good understanding, from a cloudy, crooked, or
crafty one, will be convinced as I myself have been convinced, that there
never fails to be much virtue lodged in the person, in whom you find a
real good and clear understanding. I would not however be understood to
insinuate, that all men of great genius and capacity should be saints;
for meritorious virtue, or such as entitles a man to inherit eternal
life, is the child of grace, and not of nature. Neither would I be
understood to say, that all kinds of moral virtues should be resplendent
in such a man as I have been describing, but only those, whose opposite
vices, at first sight, and without the assistance of any reasoning or
reflection, are manifest and apparent; and whose deformity, at a glance,
strikes the eye of every beholder; nor would I even be understood to
assert so much as this, without some limitation and exception; for
every vehement passion during the time it lasts, will make the most
prudent man act like a mad one, and the most acute one, like a fool;
but abstracted from the intervention of such accidents, it is my firm
opinion, that every man of a clear and good understanding, is an honest
and a good-intentioned one.
THE GREAT AND MASTERLY AUTHORITY of EXPERIENCE.