XCIII. We having shewn now, that we possess no physical science or
demonstrative knowledge of natural things, we may entertain a reasonable
doubt whether we shall ever be able to attain any such. The most learned
Valles, is clear that we shall not; because physical knowledge is
confined to singular things, and alledges that from singular things, you
can’t derive a science. But as we have observed before, this argument is
ill founded, and insufficient.
XCIV. We might lay more stress upon two authorities the sceptics alledge
in their favour, which are taken from the Ecclesiastes. The first is from
Chap. III. in these words. _Cuncta fecit bona in tempore suo, et mundum
tradidit disputationi eorum, ut non inveniat homo opus, quod operatus est
Deus ab initio usque ad finem._ The second is more formal and precise,
and taken from Chap. VIII. _Et intellexi, quod omnium operum Dei nullam
possit homo invenire rationem eorum, quæ sunt sub sole: et quantò plus
laboraverit ad quærendum, tantò minus inveniat, etiamsi dixerit sapiens
se nosse, non poterit reperire._ But in truth, these texts, when they
affirm the impossibility of discovering the causes and reason of natural
effects, may be understood to allude to the providential, and not to
the natural or physical ones. In fact, this is the sense in which some
fathers and expositors understand them.
XCV. Others again argue, that the desire of knowing the causes of
natural effects, is natural to, and implanted in man by nature itself;
and as a natural desire can’t prompt a man to an impossible inquiry,
it follows, that attaining the science we are speaking of, is within
the compass of possibility. To this argument, Valles replies, it is
absolutely possible; and although not in this life, it is in that to
come, at which period, the blessed will see with God all things most
clearly. This solution is attended with the following difficulty, that a
natural desire can’t be directed to an impossible object; neither can it
terminate in a supernatural one; and the knowledge the blessed will have
of supernatural things, must be entitively supernatural, because it will
depend immediately on the light of glory. Upon the whole, we may suppose,
that there may belong to the soul in a state of separation from the
body, abstracted from the supernatural blessing of the light of glory, a
certain knowledge of all material things, in consequence of the species,
infused in the course and order of nature; which is the sentiment of
Egidius Romanus, Father Saurez, and others; and this knowledge being
natural, may possibly be the effect of the thirst we possess for
acquiring it in this mortal life.
XCVI. But we can’t help remarking, that the foregoing argument does
not stand in need of this solution, because it proceeds upon a false
supposition not adverted to by Valles; which is, that the desire of
knowing things philosophically, is a principle implanted in man by
nature. If this was so, all men would be impressed with this desire,
which is not the case; for the greatest part of them seem to have no
passion at all for physics; and many despise philosophical speculations,
as useless, vain, and by no means entertaining. It is true, that all
men are desirous of knowledge, but this desire is not directed in all
of them to the same object, or to the same species of objects. Generous
souls are naturally lovers of truth; but the majority, are only anxious
to understand those things, the knowledge of which, may contribute to the
gratification of their passions.
XCVII. We have seen the little force of the arguments urged on both
sides, with respect to the doubts we have been canvassing. On which
account, I won’t venture to give sentence in the question. Nor do I,
nor can any one else without the assistance of Revelation, know the
just limits of the human understanding with regard to natural things.
And although the various philosophical systems which have hitherto been
invented, are exposed to great doubts, or are impeachable of containing
manifest nullities in them, who knows but that, in future some one may
be discovered so compleat, and so well founded, that the understanding
may be convinced of the truth of it. My opinion is, that if this is ever
to be accomplished, it must be done by pursuing the plan and method
prescribed by my Lord Bacon. It is true, that this is so laborious
and prolix, that the execution of it may be apprehended to be morally
impossible; for although the monarchs of two very powerful kingdoms,
France and England, for the space of more than a hundred years, have
caused four hundred able men, at a great expence, and under proper
regulations, to be employed in making innumerable experiments, and in
reasoning upon, and explaining them, the work is not yet far advanced;
when then may we expect to see it accomplished? The Academy of Sciences
at Paris, and the Royal Society of London, don’t amount to more than a
shred of my Lord Bacon’s extensive project.
On the Shew or Affectation of Learning and Knowledge.