LXXXVIII. From this known ignorance of ours, we may deduce a very useful
reflexion, which is, to be firm and steady in observing a due subjection
to the sacred dogmas of faith. The inordinate confidence we place in
our own reason, is a great enemy to religion. He who estimates his own
understanding at an excessive high rate, rests his faith on the edge of
a precipice; for this vanity has shewn itself very glaringly, in all
the heresies we ever knew. In their pursuits of other vices, mankind
have taken different turns, but in this they have been all uniform; for
although they have neither been all lascivious, nor all covetous, nor all
ambitious; still in this instance, they have all presumed much on their
own understanding. And what can be a more efficacious antidote against
this mad presumption, than reflecting upon the little or nothing, we have
been able to discover in matters of philosophy? how can he, who knows he
cannot penetrate the misteries of nature, dare attempt fathoming those of
grace? If he reflects, there will result from that reflexion, a distrust
of his own reason, and he will submit himself obediently to authority.
The philosopher Anaxagoras, whom on account of the extraordinary subtilty
of his ingenuity, they by way of eminence, called the soul or spirit of
antiquity, after having laboured with infinite industry in philosophy,
said, that nature was all surrounded with clouds and darkness.
_Anaxagoras pronuntiat circumfussa esse tenebris omnia._ (Lactant. lib.
iii. Divin. Instit. cap. 28.) And I must observe, that this philosopher,
who knew nature was impenetrable to his understanding, was the first of
all the philosophers, if we believe Aristotle, Laertius, and Plutarch,
who declared himself convinced of the indispensable necessity of a
supreme intelligence, who must be the author and director of the whole.
On the other hand, those who boasted, and flattered themselves that they
had discovered all the mysteries and profundities of nature, for the most
part, denied either the existence, or the providence of a deity.
LXXXIX. I can with truth say of myself, that next to the divine grace,
a conviction of my own ignorance with regard to natural things, is
the most powerful weapon I could ever discover, wherewith to overcome
all those difficulties or objections, which natural reason suggests,
against the mysteries of faith. I often say to myself, good God! how
can I understand those wonders, which by using his extraordinary power,
are wrought by the omnipotent hand, if I cannot comprehend, the common
effects of his ordinary power? It is true, I am ignorant how, or by
what means, a divine person can unite himself to human nature; but I am
also ignorant, how a spiritual soul can be united to a material body.
Notwithstanding which, this is a matter of fact, and happens within
myself. Neither do I perceive, how the same water which falls from
heaven, should be converted, not only into here and there a particular
body, but into all the animal and vegetable substances upon earth. In the
most plausible part of theological controversy, I find myself exceedingly
embarrassed; for if I take the side of providence, I am assailed with
the forcible arguments in favour of liberty; and if I put myself on the
side of liberty, they wage powerful war against me with the arguments in
favour of providence. But do not I see the same arguments, urged with
greater vehemence, in the vulgar philosophical controversy respecting the
composition and unity of universal space, in which, whatever sentiment is
maintained, they instead of answering their opponents arguments, perplex
the dispute with a multiplicity of words? If I defend, with Aristotle,
the infinite divisibility of universal space, although to avoid being
concluded, I don’t do it with my mouth, I cannot in my mind, help
acknowledging the unity of a great number of its parts; and if with Zeno
I acquiesce in the indivisibility, the mathematical arguments derived
from the diagonal of a square, two concentric wheels united, and many
other principles, not only leave me without an answer, but in a manner
strike me dumb.
XC. I say again, if in those natural things that are open to our view,
and which we touch with our hands every day, there occur a thousand
difficulties, that are insuperable to, and beyond the reach of our
understandings, have we not the greatest reason to suppose, that the
same thing happens with respect to supernatural matters, they being
totally superior to the sphere of our senses? If, maugre all my prying,
I can’t perceive how God does an infinite number of things, which I see
him do every day, would it not be madness in me, to deny or to doubt
the existence of revealed things, only because I can’t descry how God
executes those things?
If there was a man so short-sighted, that he could not see objects that
were very near him, and should pretend that he saw those which were at
the distance of a hundred miles from his eyes, or else should take it
into his head to insist, that such objects, although they are well known
to be _in esse_, do not exist, only because he can’t see them, would
not all the world pronounce him a lunatic? This is exactly the same
sort of madness as that of those who deny there are divine mysteries,
only because they can’t comprehend or pry into them. Little vain stupid
man, if the fabric of those material compositions which are ever before
your eyes, and are at all times familiar to your touch, is totally
impenetrable to your short and limited capacity, how can you expect to
comprehend the ineffable manner, in which Omnipotence performs those
supernatural wonders? You will tell me, that you can find no solution of
the arguments, which the Gentile urges to you against the mystery of the
Trinity, or against that of the Incarnation; and I answer, that neither
can you find any, to those the philosopher urges against the composition
of universal space, take which side of the question you will, and suppose
it to be made up, of either divisible, or indivisible matter; but would
you conclude from thence, that it is not composed of either one or the
other? you certainly would not; and it would be equal, if not greater
delirium, to deny the truth of those mysteries, only because you can’t
answer, and remove the objections that are made to them. Is it fit, that
an Infinite Power should proportion his works, to the limited measure
of your understanding? or is it reasonable to suppose that God can do
nothing, which you can’t comprehend?
XCI. No north wind, so quickly disperses the clouds which interrupt the
rays of the sun, as these reflexions clear up the doubts, which natural
reason opposes to the mysteries of faith. Leave then the presumptuous
dogmatists to chew their scepticism, and to make the most of the
objections it furnishes against religion. But the sort of scepticism,
which is precisely limited and confined to physics, is so far from
prejudicing faith, that it serves to confirm and rivet it; by removing
the obstacles, which the presumption of natural reason throws in the way,
to interrupt the effect of that humble docility, which is so necessary,
to preserve the understanding in a due state of subjection to the
authority of revelation.
XCII. Those men do great injury, not only to philosophy, but to the
church also, who rashly endeavour, to interest the doctrine of revelation
in the defence of their particular philosophical opinions. This the
heretics lay hold of, to calumniate us with converting philosophical
sentiments, into articles of faith; and by this artifice, they persuade
their followers, that our belief is arduous, and unnecessarily
complicated. Upon this presumption, some strangers found their
assertions, when they accuse us of countenancing idiotism, and mixing it
with religion. It is but a little while ago, that one of them declared
in his writings, that the opinions of men in Spain were not more free,
than their persons were in Turkey. In order to preserve a due respect for
sacred things, it is necessary, not to confound them with profane ones;
whoever should begin to erect habitations in temples, would be the author
of temples losing that respectful reverence that ought to be preserved
in them. There are judges appertaining to the church, whose province it
is, to determine what doctrines are useful, what pernicious, and what
indifferent. Let us then leave the decision of those matters to them, and
don’t let those who sincerely seek the truth, be terrified and disturbed
by those scare-crows that are set up by partiality and faction, and
sometimes by the pride of those, who have given their names to particular
schools, or by the envy of others, who could not arrive at doing so much.