BEHIND THE SCENES OF THE CARRANZA-VILLA IMBROGLIO
To make the story very short we could say that Mexican and American
reactionary interests were behind Villa, in an endeavor to exclude
Carranza as a factor in Mexican politics. But the story will be more
interesting and revealing if we point out some of the methods used to
engineer the conspiracy.
During the first six months of the revolution against Huerta (1913),
few authentic stories were published about the revolution. Most of the
news came from Mexico City. There was no other political personage
who could get more space in the first page of the newspapers than
Victoriano Huerta.
In Europe, the oil interests very effectively silenced the press as to
the progress of the revolution; in Paris the press was bought outright.
[Illustration: GENERAL BENJAMIN HILL
(Defender of Naco), under General Obregon]
Although the American press cannot be bought, there are ways of
circumventing it and cheating it of the truth. The Huertista press
agents knowing the curiosity of the American people, fed them with
stories about Huerta, and with details of his official and
unofficial actions, and more than once his very thoughts were reported
and published. The refrain was always: No matter how bad Huerta may
be, he is nevertheless President de facto,--he is the strongest
man in Mexico and he should be recognized. A Mexican and a foreign
newspaperman spent four thousand dollars a week on publicity work,
while another supporter of Huerta is known to have spent ten thousand
dollars for the same purpose.
The Huerta agents came in contact with the felicista and científico
agents, and they put their heads together to devise a means of breaking
up the successful revolution. The reactionary junta watched the events
with keen interest. As soon as Villa had proved his ability as a
general, he was chosen at once as the easiest and most convenient tool
to break up the harmony between the revolutionists.
All the efforts were concentrated on Villa. He was furnished
with money, ammunition, friends and advisers. Villa’s sincerity,
impulsiveness, his violent temper and cruelty, his utter lack of
scruples and his ignorance, were splendid instruments in the hands
of the past masters of intrigue. On May 13th, 1911, during a mutiny,
Pascual Orozco and Villa almost succeeded in murdering Francisco I.
Madero. This incident pointed out to the científico element, the man
who might be induced to repeat, more successfully, the elimination of
another leader of the new revolution.
The Villa press agents began to fill the magazines and Sunday papers
with romantic stories about the bandit general, the Napoleon bandit,
the Washington, the Lincoln of Mexico. The life record of Villa, his
personality and ignorance, forbade his ever becoming a presidential
possibility. That just suited the junta, as Villa’s presidency would
have been fraught with too many dangers for the científico element.
Huerta worked very hard to bring about a break between Villa and
Carranza, while he was in power, but he did not succeed. Nevertheless,
the work of corrosion and strife was continued by the exiled
huertistas, felicistas and científicos.
During the summer of 1913, the Villa publicity reached its zenith.
As much as two hundred dollars was paid to a writer to get a story
on Villa into a New York Sunday paper. At about that time everybody
began to suspect that Huerta would resign. Carranza was approached
by the interests which had loaned money to Huerta, to discover if he
would recognize the loan, and as Carranza would not countenance such a
proposition, the foreign interests united with the Huerta, felicista
and científico exiles, with the addition of some of the Madero clan, to
work together, against the Constitutionalists.
Villa, with all his ability as a guerrilla general, became a
marionette in the hands of politicians who pulled the strings. Even
the Aguascalientes Convention became a Punch & Judy show managed from
New York, and it was used as a convenient lever to oust Carranza and
place a puppet in his stead. The original suggestion to acclaim Don F.
Iglesias Calderon as provisional president missed fire, because of the
refusal of that very fine and integral personality to take orders from
a single military division. Suggestions were telegraphed from New York
to the junta’s representatives in Aguascalientes, who, under the guise
of radical counsellors, were really dictating what Villa should do.
In fact, all the interviews passed through the hands of an American
press agent of Villa, and his manifestos, proclamations and letters
were written by the agents, and signed by Villa, who was absolutely
ignorant of the contents of the documents.
The Aguascalientes convention was to be represented by all the generals
who had fought in the revolution. Only one civilian was present: Luis
Cabrera. No soldiers outside of the personal staffs of the generals
were supposed to come near Aguascalientes.
Nevertheless, Villa sent ten thousand soldiers to the city and had
it surrounded by troops, while he sat in a caboose on a railroad
track at the outskirts. For all practical and illegitimate purposes,
the Convention was imprisoned--the deliberations were not free and
independent, and were not meant to be so. Many generals who tried to
escape outside of the ring formed by Villa’s soldiers were sent back
to the city; while others managed to slip through and joined their
commands.
A perusal of the cabinet members supposed to be named by E. Gutierrez,
shows that the list was drawn up in New York. F. Iglesias Calderon,
although perfectly honest and independent, stands very high among the
members of the Científico Junta. He refused the honor of a portfolio.
José Vasconcelos is known to the American public through the stolen
Hopkins letters, where his name was mentioned as a recipient of
American oil money. E. C. Llorente, who is to represent Gutierrez in
Washington, was a porfirista who plotted against the Madero régime at
the border.
One of the most important reasons for Villa’s caution in not rushing
into a fight against Carranza’s generals, is that he did not feel
strong enough to cope against the constitutionalist forces. Fighting
veteran Constitutionalists is a different proposition from fighting
Huerta’s raw recruits and ex-convicts, or boys. The defection of
Villa’s best generals, Generals Luis and Maclovio Herrera, and the
Arrieta brothers, could not be supplanted by the support of J. M.
Maytorena.
In his anxiety to fight Carranza, General Villa went so far as to
enlist many federal Huerta generals, whom he had fought so bitterly
and denounced so roundly, and who had escaped from Mexico in fear of
Villa’s wrath. Poor Villa seemed unconscious of the fact that he was
slowly being surrounded by all the reactionary elements in Mexico--the
same element of which he was a conspicuous victim during the Diaz
régime. When these interests that now surround him have achieved their
purpose, they will try to corrupt him, and if they cannot buy him they
will assassinate him.
Villa’s blindness could not go any farther. No reasoning, no arguments,
no sense of patriotism or decency can rouse such an innocent fool,
and therefore, force will have to decide once more the question of
supremacy.
As Luis Cabrera said in a speech before the Convention, “In all
probability, the only solution at which the Aguascalientes Convention
will arrive, will be another war, another military action,” the name
of Aguascalientes (hot waters), is very significant as to the trouble
which the Convention has brought Mexico face to face with.
The Científico-Huerta-Madero junta in New York decided a few months ago
that if Carranza could not be eliminated through the Convention, he
could be forced out by another revolution within the revolution proper.
When it was discovered that the appeal Villa had sent out to the
revolutionary generals on September 23d before the Convention, had
not succeeded in bringing about the desired result, it was decided to
induce the doubtful element in the Convention to join in a supposedly
legal procedure. After Carranza’s resignation had been refused at
the Convention in Mexico, the delegates suggested the Aguascalientes
meeting as a means of settling all the questions of reform. Villa’s
supporters, instead of keeping to the business on hand, jammed through
the Gutierrez election, published the list of the Cabinet members, and
sent Carranza an ultimatum.
In this way they expected to give a legal appearance to their
action, and thus accelerate the secession, throwing the loyal
Constitutionalists on the side of the Villa contingent.
Neither Villa nor Zapata ever harbored the intention of handing over
their forces to the generals designated by the convention--their
hope was that Carranza might resign, and then they would control the
situation by the mere threat of force, backed by their success.
It can be safely asserted that if Villa should succeed, he would be the
president maker, the virtual dictator of Mexico. Then Villa and the
científico faction would fight for supremacy ... and destroy each other.
However, no matter what the result of the struggle may be, the Mexican
people are tired of “strong men on horseback” and the succession of a
Villa tyranny would not be much more advantageous than a Huerta or Diaz
dictatorship.
The Mexican people, the 15,000,000 who have suffered so much from
military liberators, will very effectively overthrow the pretorian
rule of one or more guerrilla czars, when they discover that the
strings are managed by Mexican and foreign reactionary interests.
Villa will only repeat Orozco’s treachery and defection, and he will
pay the price of his foolishness and ignorance with the contempt and
ostracism of the real revolutionary element.