ATTEMPTS AT THE SOLUTION OF THE LAND QUESTION
Several attempts have been made during the last four years to solve
the land problem in the States of Morelos, Tamaulipas, Chihuahua.
Other States have followed in the wake in a more or less radical
manner according to the conditions of the peons and the necessity for
cultivating the land to feed the population.
The most interesting of all attempts was initiated by Gen. Lucio Blanco
who was fighting under Gen. Pablo Gonzalez in the division of the East.
Any one taking the trouble to look up the map of Mexico will observe
that the State of Tamaulipas touches the border of the United States
from the mouth of the Rio Grande (Matamoros) to Nuevo Laredo. Along the
line of that strip, on the most fertile parts which can be irrigated
by the waters of the Rio Grande, were lands which belonged to small
tenants and in many cases were communal lands “egidos” belonging to
Indians.
Under the Diaz régime in the last ten years of his rule, Felix Diaz,
the nephew of the dictator, was able to expropriate most of those
lands with the assistance of the governor and the jefes políticos of
Tamaulipas. The company which expropriated the lands and paid the
expenses was under the patronage of Felix Diaz. Roughly speaking there
were about 75,000 acres under the control of that company.
As soon as Gonzalez’s and Blanco’s troops had driven the Federals and
the jefes políticos from the border, Lucio Blanco originated the idea
of selling the lands of Felix Diaz to the peons of Tamaulipas.
He asked the engineers fighting under him to survey the land in
question and divide it into small lots from ten to sixty acres. Then
he offered them at public auction, giving the preference to the
soldiers under his command. The effect was surprising; peons came from
everywhere to watch the proceedings. Most of the land was sold to the
highest bidder at a very low price, on the installment plan, with a
small sum to be paid in cash. The most astonishing and significant
result of the experiment was that over 400 peons bought the land
besides a great many soldiers who, having acquired small lots, refused
to continue fighting. Their logic was irrefutable: they had taken up
arms to get back the land and now that they were in possession of it,
why fight any longer?
The problem was perplexing in the extreme. If all the generals in the
revolution acted on the same principle as Lucio Blanco then all the
Constitutionalist soldiers would stop fighting.
This incident proves quite conclusively that the revolution in Mexico
is an economic more than a political upheaval.
Carranza was informed of this land distribution and its disastrous
results in as far as it touched the military question and the result
was that Gen. Lucio Blanco had to shift his command to the western
division under General Obregon.
In the State of Chihuahua General Villa began a distribution of lands.
Unlike General Blanco, he went at the problem in a haphazard, personal
way.
As the Terrazas were personal enemies of his and owners of almost
one-third of the State of Chihuahua, he proclaimed the Terrazas estates
confiscated. The distribution was made among some of his officers,
civilians on his staff and personal friends.
In Mexico wherever there is cultivation of any kind there will be found
a farmhouse (hacienda) built like a fortress. The hacienda proper is a
small village, sometimes a small city in itself, containing the house
of the proprietor, the manager, the servants and the peons, a church,
buildings for gathering the crops, often a factory, enclosures or
stables for horses, cattle, sheep. The whole is surrounded by a high
and very thick wall which can stand a prolonged siege and can defy
capture by armed forces. Everything for its protection is found within
its walls: gatling guns, rifles, ammunition, food, clothing, and even
wells of water.
Formerly some of the haciendados were able to arm and organize as many
as 30,000 men under their command from their haciendas.
Most of the haciendas are now in the hands of the Revolutionists,
generals, officers and peons who work the farms for their own benefit.
Land without a farmhouse has not the same value, as the farmer coming
into a piece of land would have to build a house, unless the land
allotted to him happened to be near his abode. Besides, the haciendas
contain everything needed for the cultivation, such as plows,
agricultural implements, seeds, horses, cattle.
When Villa gave land away he incorporated with it a farmhouse. In that
sense he was creating another landed aristocracy to take the place of
the old one. Another factor which is important in the land question is
the climatic condition of the State. In Chihuahua with the exception
of the western part the rest is dry and needs artificial irrigation to
bring satisfactory results. Artificial irrigation has to be done by the
State or the federal government and cannot be carried on by private
individuals unless they are very rich or backed by capitalists or
corporations.
Most of the Terrazas estates thereupon fell into the hands of a few
scores of individuals instead of one single family.
When it is taken into account that the population of Chihuahua is about
405,500, it will be found that the distribution of the land by Villa
only touched an infinitesimal percentage of the population. Even if it
is calculated that it is necessary that one-third of the population
of Chihuahua may be needed to sustain the State by agriculture,
then 135,000 people or a third of the State would have to come into
possession of land. Admitting that Villa should succeed in giving away
land to all the soldiers and officers who have fought under him or
about 25,000 men, still there would be left over 110,000 landless peons
who very likely would have to go to work for the fortunate soldiers of
the northern division. The peons could justly claim that the revolution
was fought for all the Mexicans and especially for the peons and not
solely for the soldiers of the northern division.
The solution of the land question by Villa is therefore unequitable and
is likely to bring further trouble.
Zapata on the other side solved the problem in the most drastic and so
far in the most practical manner.
The State of Morelos is a very small State and has a population of
about 180,000 inhabitants. The land is very fertile, needing no
irrigation, as the periodical rainy season and the rivers irrigating
the whole State makes the growth of every kind of fruit trees,
vegetables, coffee, sugar cane, tobacco, corn, etc., luxuriant in the
highest degree. In fact several crops can be gathered every year.
Zapata did not only include the officers of his staff and army in the
land distribution but every soldier who had fought for him and every
peon and every family of peons in the State of Morelos.
In the case of the big sugar plantations Zapata levied a ransom which
was calculated on a certain percentage of the profits; to feed, clothe
and arm his soldiers. The salaries of the workers were increased and
the proprietor of the plantation was protected against depredations and
destruction. If the sugar planter refused to pay, then his machinery,
the buildings and the crops were burned. The constant threat of and
fear of Zapata’s army eliminated the worst form of slavery: peonage.
The rest of the population was empowered to appropriate and cultivate
the land surrounding the villages or near their dwellings.
In this fashion Zapata’s soldiers were fed, clothed and armed--every
ablebodied man, every peon had his rifle and his ammunition and was
always ready to fight the aggressions of the federal army. Practically
the whole male population between the ages of twenty and thirty was
under arms; when the Federals were away it attended to the crops; when
soldiers invaded its territory they were driven out of it or forced to
keep within the limits of the cities.
Without having any knowledge of French history the Zapatistas followed
in the footsteps of the French revolutionists.
While the leaders Marat, Danton, Robespierre were fighting their
and their parties’ supremacy and eliminating one another with the
assistance of the guillotine; while the French armies were fighting
the foreign invaders, the French peasants after burning a few chateaux
and driving away the aristocratic landowners settled down to work the
land for their own profits. As long as the aristocrat could not come
back to claim the land, the peasant cared not who ran the government.
Napoleon was able to become Emperor because he wisely left the peasants
in possession of lands which they had confiscated from the aristocrats.
In Mexico the identical thing has happened and continues and will
continue until some sort of government will be created to satisfy the
needs of the country. The basis of future democracy in Mexico will be
founded on municipal self rule in all the cities and rural settlements.
When that is a fact there will be little trouble with the other
branches of the government. The landowners in most of the States have
been driven out and meanwhile the peons are working on the land in
Morelos as well as in most of the other States. The rich haciendados
have left and the poor peons have stayed behind.
We hear only about battles, the capture of cities, the ambitions of
leaders, the quarrels among the generals, but we hear nothing at all
of the peons working to feed the 15,000,000 inhabitants in Mexico, of
the thousands of artisans and workingmen who help to complete the work
of the farmer.
There may be 140,000 or 150,000 men under arms in Mexico, but what
is that in comparison to the 15,000,000 people who continue to live
without fighting, who have to be fed, clothed and even amused? The
longer the revolution lasts the happier will be the lot of the average
peons, for every added day will decrease the chances of the reactionary
landowner to come back and through legal means deprive the Indian of
this land.
The French revolution lasted almost ten years. When the Bastille was
stormed about 25,000 aristocrats and prelates owned all the land in
France. When Napoleon came into power as Emperor over half a million
people owned land in France.
In Mexico over 65,000 haciendados are in possession of the country,
but a great majority of them are not on their haciendas, many are in
exile. The revolution has lasted about four years. The longer it lasts
the more chances there are that the original proprietors will stay away
and the latifundiæ will be divided automatically. The peons are more
interested in the ownership of the land than the question of peace,
the ballot, or who is going to be president or governor; they are
indifferent as to who will loan or will not loan money to the Mexican
government; if the Mexican consols are rising or dropping in value, as
long as the haciendados keep away long enough to give him a chance to
claim the land as his own. A little cultivation will give him all the
food he needs, what he does not need he will sell and buy with it a few
necessities.
For the success of the revolution it is vital that it should continue
until every reactionary element, the clergy, the landowner, the
army chiefs have been so thoroughly beaten that they will have no
opportunity to come back and play a political game of which they know
all the tricks. The reactionary elements must be so fearful of the
wrath of the revolutionists, must be made so poor, that they will never
come back again.
Carranza is right and so is Cabrera when they say that the land must
be taken wherever it can be found; that the revolutionists must carry
out the reforms with the power of their bayonets or they will never be
consummated. That those who speak of a constitutional government and of
elections are the reactionaries who want to play the game and arrest
the triumphant march of the revolution.
Madero was elected constitutionally, so was a congress, so were the
senators and the governors. The ministers sat in council. What happened
to the reforms of the plan of San Luis Potosí? Reactionaries like
Ernesto Madero and Rafael Hernandez who sat in the cabinet for two
years, very effectively canned all the reforms. The revolution had to
be fought all over again.
If Villa backed by the reactionary elements should control the
destinies of Mexico, then it would be only a question of a few months
until a new revolution would overthrow his régime.
Revolutions are the maladies of nations, they cannot be arrested in
their course with impunity, for then the disease will crop out in a
more virulent form.
Mexico at the end of the Diaz régime was as feudal as France under
Louis XVI. Mexico had the aristocratic landowner, the political
clergy and the military chiefs as well as in France. They will have
to be eradicated as thoroughly as noxious weeds from a field before
cultivation. After a while order will come out of chaos. Meanwhile the
peon is slowly coming into his own.