THE "AMENDED" COVENANT.
I trust that no one appreciates better than myself that examination of
a document bit by bit and piece by piece tends to blind the vision.
One sees the trees and not the forest. Worse than that, one gets a
false vision, a picture, if I may change the metaphor, of the buttons
on the coat but not of the man wearing the coat and still less of the
soul within the man.
A critical examination of an international legal document leads to a
discussion of trivialities and to hypotheses of almost impossible
possibilities. Of course it is true that the carrying out of a great
international agreement in the light of the facts and conditions of
international life as they arise does not proceed along the technical
lines that I have followed, but rather along those lines of policy
which really control international action. I do not mean necessarily
selfish policy, but policy in the larger sense of decisions based upon
the best judgment of those in power for the time being.
What really ought to be done in studying any proposal such as the
Protocol of Geneva, is to realize, if possible, the ultimate purpose of
the document and to visualize, so far as we can, what would happen if
it came into force, not so much what _might_ happen under a particular
phrase, but how the international relations of the world would proceed
if the whole agreement were a reality.
I have mentioned more than once that the Protocol of Geneva
contemplates that its provisions shall form part of the Covenant; in
other words, that the two documents shall be amalgamated, forming an
amended Covenant. With the hope of facilitating a general view, I have
endeavored to put the two documents together in the form of an
"amended" Covenant, and the result of this effort is set out below.[1]
Looking at the text of this "amended" Covenant, one may observe that
while twenty of the present twenty-six Articles {107} remain unchanged
in form, Articles 12 to 17, inclusive, are expanded and somewhat
rewritten; and eight Articles are added; and I do not think that the
text of the "amended" Covenant could be phrased in much less language
than it appears below.
Of course the length of a document in itself is not of much
consequence; but it is not unimportant to observe that the "amended"
Covenant is very much longer than the Covenant as it now reads. This
fact, I say, is important, because it is the visible evidence of a
reality. The Protocol of Geneva is not a mere completion of the
provisions of the Covenant. Advocates of the Protocol make a very
serious mistake when they erroneously say that the Protocol of Geneva
is merely a rounding out of incomplete and partial agreements of the
Covenant.
And it must be borne in mind that new or varied phrases in one Article
may change the whole; the amended Covenant is altered not only in those
Articles which may be textually amended, but throughout; I attempted to
show this in detail as to Article 10 of the Covenant[2]; like any other
document, the entire new paper must be read together.
What the Protocol of Geneva does is to create a new and a different
League of Nations. It is true that what I may call the procedural and
structural functions of the League are not changed; but the system of
international relations which is now set up under the League is so much
changed that one may properly say that it is an entirely new and
different system.
To my mind, there are three outstanding features of the "amended"
Covenant. It creates a complete system of compulsory arbitration; it
consecrates the legality of the _status quo_; and it is a general
defensive alliance.
Now let us compare these three features of the "amended" Covenant with
the ideas of the existing Covenant.
The first mentioned, the system of compulsory arbitration, is by far
the most important and the one that should be the starting point for
any view of the "amended" Covenant as a whole. In this arbitration
system is contained the idea of outlawry of {108} war which the
document embodies. The arbitration of disputes under the new system is
to take the place of war, which is outlawed.
All that the Covenant did was to forbid some wars, to provide for delay
in every case, and otherwise to rely wholly upon voluntary arbitration
and, in cases where they could be obtained, upon unanimous
recommendations of the Council. The framers of the Covenant were most
careful to avoid the idea of compulsory arbitration, for all that even
the unanimous recommendation of the Council could do was to prevent
hostilities.
Under the "amended" Covenant, the defensive alliance of the Members of
the League becomes complete. It is intended to see to it that arbitral
decrees are carried out; to see to it that the _status quo_ remains
untouched, except by voluntary agreement; and to see to it that the
violator is met by the combined forces of other States.
Contrast the provisions of the Covenant, which contemplate no concerted
action, unless agreed to at the time, other than economic and financial
pressure; and the preservation of the _status quo_ only so far as
Article 10 of the Covenant extends.
It would be unfair and untrue to call this new system a super-state,
for it is nothing of the sort; but it would be in a sense untrue also
to say that this new system is merely a development of the Covenant
itself; it is the sort of change that one might call a development if
it had taken two or three generations or a century to bring it about;
but not properly to be called a development when it all comes at once.
The natural conclusion to be reached is that such a complete change
cannot be realized at this time, and that is the sound conclusion.
That a system of law should be built up governing the international
relations of the States of the world, by which their differences should
be adjusted by the orderly processes of legality, excluding as a method
of adjustment the chaos of war, may be admitted. Thus far, the changes
proposed by the Protocol of Geneva are desirable; the question is
merely as to the length to which the countries of the world are willing
to go in {109} this direction at this time; and I include as a part of
this development, the outlawry of war, the agreement that war is not to
be resorted to by any State, that it should disappear from
international relations, except in so far as force must necessarily
remain as defence.
It is to be hoped that this part of the Protocol may stand; and it must
be admitted that there is inherently and _ipso facto_ to some extent a
consecration of the legality of the _status quo_ by the outlawry of war
and by peaceful settlement of disputes by legal means.
On the other hand, various features of what I may call the defensive
alliance portion of the Protocol seem to me to be impossible and at
this time inadvisable. They are supposed to flow logically from the
system of compulsory arbitration; and certainly the problem which they
attempt to solve does follow logically from any system of compulsory
arbitration and outlawry of war. If we assume war to be outlawed and a
system by which there is to be a legal settlement of disputes in place
of war, the question of course arises: Well, what is to happen in a
given case if some State which has accepted this system and has agreed
to it should refuse to abide by it, should not carry out an award or
decision or should even take up arms against it, what then?
The Continental mind very logically answers this question by saying
there must be a system of execution of decrees and that if you outlaw
war, you must have a combination for defence. This is true from the
point of view of logic; but it is not true from the point of view of
life. Compulsory arbitration and outlawry of war are untried ideas,
and we cannot say now, under all circumstances, what should be done in
the course of their working, if they are put to work; much less can
Nations now bind themselves as to a definite and complete course of
action under all possible and varying future circumstances. That such
a system of concerted action against aggression as is proposed by the
Protocol of Geneva may perhaps in time be worked out along with the
growth and development of the ideas of outlawry of {110} war and of
arbitration, may be admitted. That it can be done now is, to my mind,
contrary to the realities of life and to the lessons of history.
There is another phase of this last discussion which should be
particularly noticed. It is impossible for any such agreement for
concerted action not to have a direct bearing upon countries which are
not parties to the agreement; in other words, Russia and the United
States. We must admit at least the theoretic possibility of a conflict
between one of the Members of the League and one of these two Great
Powers, insisting, if we will, that such a possibility is highly remote
so far as the United States is concerned, and utterly unknowable so far
as Russia is concerned; but none the less a possibility.
And certainly, in view of that possibility, any provisions of a
document which looks toward force as a last resort of defence should,
in my judgment, be drawn with the utmost care to avoid the idea of a
possible conflict between the parties to the document on the one hand
and an outside State on the other. Outlawry of war and arbitration are
things to be agreed upon and not to be compelled against those who are
unwilling to agree; for the breach of such an agreement is a much more
serious and a very different thing than a refusal to arbitrate, or even
than going to war when there is no agreement.
That the hospitality, if I may call it so, of the League of Nations
should be extended to States which are unwilling to join it; that its
facilities should be offered to these States for the settlement of
disputes in every case where they are willing to accept them; that the
covenants of the Members of the League for justice toward an outside
State should be as explicit and complete as its covenants toward a
Member, I quite agree; the covenants of the Members of the League
should be covenants of peace among themselves, and of justice toward
all. This is the road to a universal League of all Nations.
If it be said that to Finland or the Baltic States or Poland or
Roumania or Turkey there is danger from their great neighbour, {111} I
cannot deny such a possibility; and if any Members of the League are
willing to join with such States in protection against such danger,
either in advance of its occurrence or when it happens, I would see no
objection to it, if such agreements were coupled with all the offers of
peaceful settlement that could be written, as well as with offers of
membership in the League, either permanent or _ad hoc_.
To a state which is contemplating the possibility of signing the
Protocol of Geneva, it may well be that the provisions of that document
regarding sanctions stand out as the most important, the ones having
the greatest possibilities as to obligations of future action. This is
a very natural point of view, and even a very proper one. And, while I
myself am very deeply convinced that, from the point of view of world
politics, the most far-reaching and vital provisions of this document
are those which refer to arbitration and to the outlawry of war, yet
perhaps for that very reason, I am equally convinced that the most
serious changes which are necessary in the paper are changes in its
provisions for sanctions and for enforcement.
With the principles of compulsory arbitration I am wholly in accord;
with the principle that outlawry of war should follow as the necessary
and natural consequence of the substitution of a reign of law for a
reign of force I quite agree; and that some tribunal should determine,
if need arise, that the agreement has been broken and that there is an
"outlaw," is a natural consequence of those principles; and that there
may be defence against aggression, if it comes, almost no one will
deny. But there, I think, we must stop so far as present agreement is
concerned. That any State may, _if it chooses_, go to the defence of
another against an adjudged aggressor I would concede; but that all
States can be or should be now required to sign an agreement so to go
to such defence, I deny. In the present state of world opinion and
when its own direct interests are not involved, any free people can
well say that it will not or ought not to sign such an undertaking.
So I say that, while arbitration may be agreed to in advance {112} and
outlawry of war may be agreed to in advance, sanctions and assistance
in defence must be voluntary.
Where does all this leave the problems of disarmament and security?
I answer by saying that the solution of these problems is very
difficult, because with it are involved feelings of national fear and
haunting doubts of possible national disaster. The feeling of security
must be a plant of slow growth, and progress toward disarmament cannot
be realized except to the extent that that growth comes. All that can
be done now is to make a beginning, and, if too much is attempted, less
will be accomplished. The world must rely on the development of the
new idea of the reign of law and reach its feeling of security as that
reign succeeds and triumphs.
The Protocol of Geneva is one of the most important of modern
international documents. This is true whether it comes into force as a
binding treaty or whether it does not; and it is true because the
Protocol represents a development of international thought since the
World War along lines of what may be called international morality, of
what may almost be called international religion, which, while not
novel in the realm of thought, were wholly novel in the diplomatic
field of action.
The belief that international law must be strengthened, the thought
that it must lay hold of international questions before the time of war
and the idea that the security of a country is to be a security for
peace and not simply a security in war, were the principles upon which
the Covenant of the League of Nations was based; but in that document
they were to some extent formulated only as hopes for the future.
These ideas which the Protocol of Geneva seeks to make complete
realities have fundamentally become a part of international life. To
my mind, they are certain to be carried out in some document in the
near future and one of their incidents will be the realization of
schemes for the reduction of armament as an incident of the development
of the feeling which exists as to security.
{113}
The Protocol of Geneva will undoubtedly be much changed as a result of
the consideration which is now being given to it by the various
important governments of the world.[3] In various respects the
Protocol goes farther than cautious public sentiment of countries like
Great Britain and her Dominions is, or ought to be, willing now to
proceed; but it is these very matters which can easily be changed and
which will be changed.
The Conference on Disarmament and its result are the cornerstones on
which the Protocol of Geneva rests. That Conference must be held and
it must have a result; the public sentiment of the world demands it;
and the satisfaction of that demand involves the adoption by the
Members of the League of the Protocol of Geneva, not the document as it
now is, but as it will be.
[1] See Annex G, p. 271.
[2] _Supra_, p. 84.
[3] Since this monograph was written, I have received the text of the
Report of the British Delegates regarding the Protocol of Geneva
(Miscellaneous No. 21, 1924, Cmd. 2289). It is reprinted as Annex E,
page 217. It is a most valuable and interesting document. I have
carefully considered its conclusions, some of which are not the same as
my own, and despite my very high regard for its authors, I see no
reason to change anything that I have written.
{116}
ANNEXES.
PAGE
A. THE COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS .......................... 117
B. THE PROTOCOL OF GENEVA ......................................... 132
C. THE REPORT TO THE FIFTH ASSEMBLY ............................... 156
D. RESOLUTIONS .................................................... 210
E. REPORT OF THE BRITISH DELEGATES ................................ 217
F. THE AMERICAN PLAN .............................................. 263
G. THE "AMENDED" COVENANT ......................................... 271
{117}
ANNEX A.
THE COVENANT
OF THE
LEAGUE OF NATIONS.[1]
THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES,
In order to promote international co-operation and to achieve
international peace and security
by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war,
by the prescription of open, just and honourable relations
between nations,
by the firm establishment of the understandings of
international law as the actual rule of conduct among
Governments, and
by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect
for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organised
peoples with one another,
Agree to this Covenant of the League of Nations.
ARTICLE 1.
The original Members of the League of Nations shall be those of the
Signatories which are named in the Annex to this Covenant and also such
of those other States named in the Annex as shall accede without
reservation to this Covenant. Such accession shall be effected by a
Declaration deposited with the Secretariat within two months of the
coming into force of the Covenant. Notice thereof shall be sent to all
other Members of the League.
Any fully self-governing State, Dominion or Colony not named in the
Annex may become a Member of the League if its admission is agreed to
by two-thirds of the Assembly, provided that it shall give effective
guarantees of its sincere intention to observe its international
obligations, and shall accept such regulations as may be prescribed by
the League in regard to its military, naval and air forces and
armaments.
{118}
Any Member of the League may, after two years' notice of its intention
so to do, withdraw from the League, provided that all its international
obligations and all its obligations under this Covenant shall have been
fulfilled at the time of its withdrawal.
ARTICLE 2.
The action of the League under this Covenant shall be effected through
the instrumentality of an Assembly and of a Council, with a permanent
Secretariat.
ARTICLE 3.
The Assembly shall consist of Representatives of the Members of the
League.
The Assembly shall meet at stated intervals and from time to time as
occasion may require at the Seat of the League or at such other place
as may be decided upon.
The Assembly may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere
of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world.
At meetings of the Assembly each Member of the League shall have one
vote, and may have not more than three Representatives.
ARTICLE 4.
The Council shall consist of Representatives of the Principal Allied
and Associated Powers, together with Representatives of four other
Members of the League. These four Members of the League shall be
selected by the Assembly from time to time in its discretion. Until
the appointment of the Representatives of the four Members of the
League first selected by the Assembly, Representatives of Belgium,
Brazil, Spain and Greece shall be members of the Council.
With the approval of the majority of the Assembly, the Council may name
additional Members of the League whose Representatives shall always be
members of the Council; the Council {119} with like approval may
increase the number of Members of the League to be selected by the
Assembly for representation on the Council.
The Council shall meet from time to time as occasion may require, and
at least once a year, at the Seat of the League, or at such other place
as may be decided upon.
The Council may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere
of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world.
Any Member of the League not represented on the Council shall be
invited to send a Representative to sit as a member at any meeting of
the Council during the consideration of matters specially affecting the
interests of that Member of the League.
At meetings of the Council, each Member of the League represented on
the Council shall have one vote, and may have not more than one
Representative.
ARTICLE 5.
Except where otherwise expressly provided in this Covenant or by the
terms of the present Treaty, decisions at any meeting of the Assembly
or of the Council shall require the agreement of all the Members of the
League represented at the meeting.
All matters of procedure at meetings of the Assembly or of the Council,
including the appointment of Committees to investigate particular
matters, shall be regulated by the Assembly or by the Council and may
be decided by a majority of the Members of the League represented at
the meeting.
The first meeting of the Assembly and the first meeting of the Council
shall be summoned by the President of the United States of America.
ARTICLE 6.
The permanent Secretariat shall be established at the Seat of the
League. The Secretariat shall comprise a Secretary General and such
secretaries and staff as may be required.
{120}
The first Secretary General shall be the person named in the Annex;
thereafter the Secretary General shall be appointed by the Council with
the approval of the majority of the Assembly.
The secretaries and staff of the Secretariat shall be appointed by the
Secretary General with the approval of the Council.
The Secretary General shall act in that capacity at all meetings of the
Assembly and of the Council.
The expenses of the League shall be borne by the Members of the League
in the proportion decided by the Assembly.
ARTICLE 7.
The Seat of the League is established at Geneva.
The Council may at any time decide that the Seat of the League shall be
established elsewhere.
All positions under or in connection with the League, including the
Secretariat, shall be open equally to men and women.
Representatives of the Members of the League and officials of the
League when engaged on the business of the League shall enjoy
diplomatic privileges and immunities.
The buildings and other property occupied by the League or its
officials or by Representatives attending its meetings shall be
inviolable.
ARTICLE 8.
The Members of the League recognise that the maintenance of peace
requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point
consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of
international obligations.
The Council, taking account of the geographical situation and
circumstances of each State, shall formulate plans for such reduction
for the consideration and action of the several Governments.
Such plans shall be subject to reconsideration and revision at least
every ten years.
After these plans shall have been adopted by the several {121}
Governments, the limits of armaments therein fixed shall not be
exceeded without the concurrence of the Council.
The Members of the League agree that the manufacture by private
enterprise of munitions and implements of war is open to grave
objections. The Council shall advise how the evil effects attendant
upon such manufacture can be prevented, due regard being had to the
necessities of those Members of the League which are not able to
manufacture the munitions and implements of war necessary for their
safety.
The Members of the League undertake to interchange full and frank
information as to the scale of their armaments, their military, naval
and air programmes and the condition of such of their industries as are
adaptable to war-like purposes.
ARTICLE 9.
A permanent Commission shall be constituted to advise the Council on
the execution of the provisions of Articles 1 and 8 and on military,
naval and air questions generally.
ARTICLE 10.
The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against
external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political
independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such
aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the
Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be
fulfilled.
ARTICLE 11.
Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the
Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to
the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be
deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. In case
any such emergency should arise the Secretary General shall on the
request of any Member of the League forthwith summon a meeting of the
Council.
{122}
It is also declared to be the friendly right of each Member of the
League to bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any
circumstance whatever affecting international relations which threatens
to disturb international peace or the good understanding between
nations upon which peace depends.
ARTICLE 12.
The Members of the League agree that, if there should arise between
them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture they will submit the
matter either to arbitration or judicial settlement or to enquiry by
the Council, and they agree in no case to resort to war until three
months after the award by the arbitrators or the judicial decision, or
the report by the Council.
In any case under this Article the award of the arbitrators or the
judicial decision shall be made within a reasonable time, and the
report of the Council shall be made within six months after the
submission of the dispute.
ARTICLE 13.
The Members of the League agree that whenever any dispute shall arise
between them which they recognise to be suitable for submission to
arbitration or judicial settlement and which cannot be satisfactorily
settled by diplomacy, they will submit the whole subject-matter to
arbitration or judicial settlement.
Disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty, as to any question of
international law, as to the existence of any fact which if established
would constitute a breach of any international obligation, or as to the
extent and nature of the reparation to be made for any such breach, are
declared to be among those which are generally suitable for submission
to arbitration or judicial settlement.
For the consideration of any such dispute, the court to which the case
is referred shall be the Permanent Court of International Justice,
established in accordance with Article 14, or any tribunal agreed on by
the parties to the dispute or stipulated in any convention existing
between them.
{123}
The Members of the League agree that they will carry out in full good
faith any award or decision that may be rendered and that they will not
resort to war against a Member of the League which complies therewith.
In the event of any failure to carry out such an award or decision, the
Council shall propose what steps should be taken to give effect thereto.
ARTICLE 14.
The Council shall formulate and submit to the Members of the League for
adoption plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court of
International Justice. The Court shall be competent to hear and
determine any dispute of an international character which the parties
thereto submit to it. The Court may also give an advisory opinion upon
any dispute or question referred to it by the Council or by the
Assembly.
ARTICLE 15.
If there should arise between Members of the League any dispute likely
to lead to a rupture, which is not submitted to arbitration or judicial
settlement in accordance with Article 13, the Members of the League
agree that they will submit the matter to the Council. Any party to
the dispute may effect such submission by giving notice of the
existence of the dispute to the Secretary General, who will make all
necessary arrangements for a full investigation and consideration
thereof.
For this purpose the parties to the dispute will communicate to the
Secretary General, as promptly as possible, statements of their case
with all the relevant facts and papers, and the Council may forthwith
direct the publication thereof.
The Council shall endeavour to effect a settlement of the dispute, and
if such efforts are successful, a statement shall be made public giving
such facts and explanations regarding the dispute and the terms of
settlement thereof as the Council may deem appropriate.
If the dispute is not thus settled, the Council either {124}
unanimously or by a majority vote shall make and publish a report
containing a statement of the facts of the dispute and the
recommendations which are deemed just and proper in regard thereto.
Any Member of the League represented on the Council may make public a
statement of the facts of the dispute and of its conclusions regarding
the same.
If a report by the Council is unanimously agreed to by the members
thereof other than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to
the dispute, the Members of the League agree that they will not go to
war with any party to the dispute which complies with the
recommendations of the report.
If the Council fails to reach a report which is unanimously agreed to
by the members thereof, other than the Representatives of one or more
of the parties to the dispute, the Members of the League reserve to
themselves the right to take such action as they shall consider
necessary for the maintenance of right and justice.
If the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of them, and is
found by the Council, to arise out of a matter which by international
law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that party, the
Council shall so report, and shall make no recommendation as to its
settlement.
The Council may in any case under this Article refer the dispute to the
Assembly. The dispute shall be so referred at the request of either
party to the dispute, provided that such request be made within
fourteen days after the submission of the dispute to the Council.
In any case referred to the Assembly, all the provisions of this
Article and of Article 12 relating to the action and powers of the
Council shall apply to the action and powers of the Assembly, provided
that a report made by the Assembly, if concurred in by the
Representatives of those Members of the League represented on the
Council and of a majority of the other Members of the League, exclusive
in each case of the Representatives of the parties to the dispute,
shall have the same force as a report by the Council concurred in by
all the members thereof {125} other than the Representatives of one or
more of the parties to the dispute.
ARTICLE 16.
Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its
covenants under Articles 12, 13 or 15, it shall _ipso facto_ be deemed
to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the
League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the
severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all
intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the
covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial,
commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the
covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a
Member of the League or not.
It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the
several Governments concerned what effective military, naval or air
force the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed
forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League.
The Members of the League agree, further, that they will mutually
support one another in the financial and economic measures which are
taken under this Article, in order to minimise the loss and
inconvenience resulting from the above measures, and that they will
mutually support one another in resisting any special measures aimed at
one of their number by the covenant-breaking State, and that they will
take the necessary steps to afford passage through their territory to
the forces of any of the Members of the League which are co-operating
to protect the covenants of the League.
Any Member of the League which has violated any covenant of the League
may be declared to be no longer a Member of the League by a vote of the
Council concurred in by the Representatives of all the other Members of
the League represented thereon.
{126}
ARTICLE 17.
In the event of a dispute between a Member of the League and a State
which is not a Member of the League, or between States not Members of
the League, the State or States not Members of the League shall be
invited to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the
purposes of such dispute, upon such conditions as the Council may deem
just. If such invitation is accepted, the provisions of Articles 12 to
16 inclusive shall be applied with such modifications as may be deemed
necessary by the Council.
Upon such invitation being given the Council shall immediately
institute an inquiry into the circumstances of the dispute and
recommend such action as may seem best and most effectual in the
circumstances.
If a State so invited shall refuse to accept the obligations of
membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, and shall
resort to war against a Member of the League, the provisions of Article
16 shall be applicable as against the State taking such action.
If both parties to the dispute when so invited refuse to accept the
obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such
dispute, the Council may take such measures and make such
recommendations as will prevent hostilities and will result in the
settlement of the dispute.
ARTICLE 18.
Every treaty or international engagement entered into hereafter by any
Member of the League shall be forthwith registered with the Secretariat
and shall as soon as possible be published by it. No such treaty or
international engagement shall be binding until so registered.
ARTICLE 19.
The Assembly may from time to time advise the {127} reconsideration by
Members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable and
the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might
endanger the peace of the world.
ARTICLE 20.
The Members of the League severally agree that this Covenant is
accepted as abrogating all obligations or understandings _inter se_
which are inconsistent with the terms thereof, and solemnly undertake
that they will not hereafter enter into any engagements inconsistent
with the terms thereof.
In case any Member of the League shall, before becoming a Member of the
League, have undertaken any obligations inconsistent with the terms of
this Covenant, it shall be the duty of such Member to take immediate
steps to procure its release from such obligations.
ARTICLE 21.
Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of
international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional
understandings like the Monroe doctrine, for securing the maintenance
of peace.
ARTICLE 22.
To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late
war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which
formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able
to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern
world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and
development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and
that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in
this Covenant.
The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that
the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations
who by reason of their resources, their experience or their
geographical position can best undertake this {128} responsibility, and
who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be
exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League.
The character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of the
development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory,
its economic conditions and other similar circumstances.
Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have
reached a stage of development where their existence as independent
nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of
administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as
they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be
a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.
Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stage
that the Mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the
territory under conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscience
and religion, subject only to the maintenance of public order and
morals, the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms
traffic and the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the establishment
of fortifications or military and naval bases and of military training
of the natives for other than police purposes and the defence of
territory, and will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and
commerce of other Members of the League.
There are territories, such as South-West Africa and certain of the
South Pacific Islands, which, owing to the sparseness of their
population, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centres
of civilisation, or their geographical contiguity to the territory of
the Mandatory, and other circumstances, can be best administered under
the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory,
subject to the safeguards above mentioned in the interests of the
indigenous population.
In every case of mandate, the Mandatory shall render to the Council an
annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge.
{129}
The degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised by
the Mandatory shall, if not previously agreed upon by the Members of
the League, be explicitly defined in each case by the Council.
A permanent Commission shall be constituted to receive and examine the
annual reports of the Mandatories and to advise the Council on all
matters relating to the observance of the mandates.
ARTICLE 23.
Subject to and in accordance with the provisions of international
conventions existing or hereafter to be agreed upon, the Members of the
League:
(_a_) will endeavour to secure and maintain fair and humane
conditions of labour for men, women, and children, both in
their own countries and in all countries to which their
commercial and industrial relations extend, and for that
purpose will establish and maintain the necessary international
organisations;
(_b_) undertake to secure just treatment of the native
inhabitants of territories under their control;
(_c_) will entrust the League with the general supervision over
the execution of agreements with regard to the traffic in women
and children, and the traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs;
(_d_) will entrust the League with the general supervision of
the trade in arms and ammunition with the countries in which the
control of this traffic is necessary in the common interest;
(_e_) will make provision to secure and maintain freedom of
communications and of transit and equitable treatment for the
commerce of all Members of the League. In this connection, the
special necessities of the regions devastated during the war of
1914-1918 shall be borne in mind;
(_f_) will endeavour to take steps in matters of international
concern for the prevention and control of disease.
{130}
ARTICLE 24.
There shall be placed under the direction of the League all
international bureaux already established by general treaties if the
parties to such treaties consent. All such international bureaux and
all commissions for the regulation of matters of international interest
hereafter constituted shall be placed under the direction of the League.
In all matters of international interest which are regulated by general
convention but which are not placed under the control of international
bureaux or commissions, the Secretariat of the League shall, subject to
the consent of the Council and if desired by the parties, collect and
distribute all relevant information and shall render any other
assistance which may be necessary or desirable.
The Council may include as part of the expenses of the Secretariat the
expenses of any bureau or commission which is placed under the
direction of the League.
ARTICLE 25.
The Members of the League agree to encourage and promote the
establishment and co-operation of duly authorised voluntary national
Red Cross organisations having as purposes the improvement of health,
the prevention of disease and the mitigation of suffering throughout
the world.
ARTICLE 26.
Amendments to this Covenant will take effect when ratified by the
Members of the League whose Representatives compose the Council and by
a majority of the Members of the League whose Representatives compose
the Assembly.
No such amendments shall bind any Member of the League which signifies
its dissent therefrom, but in that case it shall cease to be a Member
of the League.
[1] Including Amendments adopted to December, 1924.
_The text of the Protocol of Geneva, which follows as Annex B, is
printed in French and English on opposite pages._
[Transcriber's note: In the source book, the French and English texts
were on facing pages, French on the even/left-hand pages, English on
the odd/right-hand pages. The same page order has been preserved in
this etext, occasionally resulting split paragraphs.]
{132}
ANNEX B.
PROTOCOLE POUR LE REGLEMENT PACIFIQUE DES DIFFERENDS INTERNATIONAUX.
Animés de la ferme volonté d'assurer le maintien de la paix générale et
la sécurité des peuples dont l'existence, l'indépendance ou les
territoires pourraient être menacés;
Reconnaissant la solidarité qui unit les membres de la communauté
internationale;
Affirmant que la guerre d'agression constitue une infraction à cette
solidarité et un crime international;
Désireux de faciliter la complète application du système prévu au Pacte
de la Société des Nations pour le règlement pacifique des différends
entre les Etats et d'assurer la répression des crimes internationaux; et
Afin de réaliser, comme l'envisage l'article 8 du Pacte, la réduction
des armements nationaux au minimum compatible avec la sécurité
nationale et avec l'exécution des obligations internationales imposées
par une action commune,
Les Soussignés, dûment autorisés à cet effet, sont convenus des
dispositions suivantes:
ARTICLE PREMIER.
Les Etats signataires s'engagent à faire tous efforts en leur pouvoir
pour l'introduction dans le Pacte d'amendements conformes au sens des
dispositions contenues dans les articles suivants.
Ils conviennent que ces dispositions deviendront obligatoires dans
leurs rapports respectifs à la date de la mise en vigueur du présent
Protocole et que, vis-à-vis d'eux, l'Assemblée et le Conseil de la
Société des Nations seront, dès lors, autorisés à exercer tous les
droits et devoirs qui leur sont conférés par ce Protocole.
ARTICLE 2.
Les Etats signataires conviennent qu'en aucun cas ils ne
{133}
ANNEX B.
PROTOCOL FOR THE PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES.
Animated by the firm desire to ensure the maintenance of general peace
and the security of nations whose existence, independence or
territories may be threatened;
Recognising the solidarity of the members of the international
community;
Asserting that a war of aggression constitutes a violation of this
solidarity and an international crime;
Desirous of facilitating the complete application of the system
provided in the Covenant of the League of Nations for the pacific
settlement of disputes between States and of ensuring the repression of
international crimes; and
For the purpose of realising, as contemplated by Article 8 of the
Covenant, the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point
consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of
international obligations;
The Undersigned, duly authorised to that effect, agree as follows:
ARTICLE 1.
The signatory States undertake to make every effort in their power to
secure the introduction into the Covenant of amendments on the lines of
the provisions contained in the following articles.
They agree that, as between themselves, these provisions shall be
binding as from the coming into force of the present Protocol and that,
so far as they are concerned, the Assembly and the Council of the
League of Nations shall thenceforth have power to exercise all the
rights and perform all the duties conferred upon them by the Protocol.
ARTICLE 2.
The signatory States agree in no case to resort to war either
{134}
doivent recourir à la guerre, ni entre eux ni contre tout Etat qui, le
cas échéant, accepterait toutes les obligations ci-après définies,
excepté dans le cas de résistance à des actes d'agression ou quand ils
agissent en accord avec le Conseil ou l'Assemblée de la Société des
Nations, selon les dispositions du Pacte et du présent Protocole.
ARTICLE 3.
Les Etats signataires s'engagent à reconnaître comme obligatoire, de
plein droit et sans convention spéciale, la juridiction de la Cour
permanente de Justice internationale dans les cas visés au paragraphe 2
de l'Article 36 du Statut de la Cour, mais sans préjudice de la faculté
pour un Etat quelconque, lorsqu'il adhérera au protocole special ouvert
le 16 décembre 1920, prévu par ledit article, de formuler les réserves
compatibles avec ladite clause.
L'adhésion à ce protocole spécial ouvert le 16 décembre 1920 devra être
faite dans le délai d'un mois qui suivra la mise en vigueur du présent
Protocole.
Les Etats qui adhéreront au présent Protocole après sa mise en vigueur
devront s'acquitter de l'obligation ci-dessus dans le mois qui suivra
leur adhésion.
ARTICLE 4.
En vue de compléter les dispositions des alinéas 4, 5, 6 et 7 de
l'article 15 du Pacte, les Etats signataires conviennent de se
conformer à la procedure suivante:
1. Si le différend soumis au Conseil n'a pu être réglé par lui
ainsi qu'il est prévu au paragraphe 3 dudit article 15, le Conseil
engagera les Parties à soumettre le différend à un règlement
judiciaire ou arbitral.
2. a) Si les Parties s'y refusent, il est procédé, à la demande
d'au moins l'une des Parties, à la constitution d'un Comité
d'arbitres. Le Comité sera constitué, autant que possible, par
l'accord des Parties.
{135}
with one another or against a State which, if the occasion arises
accepts all the obligations hereinafter set out, except in case of
resistance to acts of aggression or when acting in agreement with the
Council or the Assembly of the League of Nations in accordance with the
provisions of the Covenant and of the present Protocol.
ARTICLE 3.
The signatory States undertake to recognise as compulsory, _ipso facto_
and without special agreement, the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court
of International Justice in the cases covered by paragraph 2 of Article
36 of the Statute of the Court, but without prejudice to the right of
any State, when acceding to the special protocol provided for in the
said Article and opened for signature on December 16th, 1920, to make
reservations compatible with the said clause.
Accession to this special protocol, opened for signature on December
16th, 1920, must be given within the month following the coming into
force of the present Protocol.
States which accede to the present Protocol, after its coming into
force, must carry out the above obligation, within the month following
their accession.
ARTICLE 4.
With a view to render more complete the provisions of paragraphs 4, 5,
6, and 7 of Article 15 of the Covenant, the signatory States agree to
comply with the following procedure:
1. If the dispute submitted to the Council is not settled by it as
provided in paragraph 3 of the said Article 15, the Council shall
endeavour to persuade the parties to submit the dispute to judicial
settlement or arbitration.
2. (_a_) If the parties cannot agree to do so, there shall, at the
request of at least one of the parties, be constituted a Committee
of Arbitrators. The Committee shall so far as possible be
constituted by agreement between the parties.
{136}
_b_) Si, dans le délai que le Conseil aura fixé, elles ne se sont
pas entendues en tout ou en partie sur le nombre, le nom et les
pouvoirs des arbitres, ainsi que sur la procedure, le Conseil
réglera les points en suspens. Il choisira d'urgence--en
consultant les Parties--les arbitres et leur président, parmi les
personnes qui, par leur nationalité, leur caractère et leur
expérience, lui paraîtront donner les plus hautes garanties de
compétence et d'impartialité.
_c_) Après que les conclusions des Parties auront été formulées,
le Comité d'arbitres, à la demande de toute Partie, sollicitera,
par l'entremise du Conseil, sur les points de droit contestés,
l'avis consultatif de la Cour permanente de Justice
Internationale qui, dans ce cas, se réunira d'urgence.
3. Si aucune des Parties ne demande l'arbitrage, le Conseil
reprendra l'examen du différend. Au cas où le Conseil établit un
rapport voté à l'unanimité de ses membres autres que les
représentants de toute Partie au différend, les Etats signataires
conviennent de se conformer aux solutions recommandées par lui.
4. Au cas où le Conseil ne peut établir un rapport accepté par
tous ses membres autres que les représentants de toute Partie au
différend, il soumettra le différend a l'arbitrage. Il réglera
lui-même la composition, les pouvoirs et la procedure du Comité
d'arbitres et aura égard, dans le choix des arbitres, aux
garanties de compétence et d'impartialité visées au No. 2_b_
ci-dessus.
5. En aucun cas ne pourront être remises en question les solutions
ayant déjà fait l'objet d'une recommandation unanime du Conseil
acceptée par l'une des Parties interéssées.
6. Les Etats signataires s'engagent à éxecuter de bonne foi les
sentences judiciaires ou arbitrales et à se conformer, comme il
a été dit a l'alinéa 3 ci-dessus, aux solutions recommandées par
le Conseil. Dans le cas où un Etat manquerait à ces engagements,
le Conseil exercera toute son influence pour en assurer le
respect. S'il ne peut y réussir, il proposera les mesures qui
doivent en assurer
{137}
(_b_) If within the period fixed by the Council the parties have
failed to agree, in whole or in part, upon the number, the names
and the powers of the arbitrators and upon the procedure, the
Council shall settle the points remaining in suspense. It shall
with the utmost possible despatch select in consultation with the
parties the arbitrators and their President from among persons
who by their nationality, their personal character and their
experience, appear to it to furnish the highest guarantees of
competence and impartiality.
(_c_) After the claims of the parties have been formulated, the
Committee of Arbitrators, on the request of any party, shall
through the medium of the Council request an advisory opinion
upon any points of law in dispute from the Permanent Court of
International Justice, which in such case shall meet with the
utmost possible despatch.
3. If none of the parties asks for arbitration, the Council shall
again take the dispute under consideration. If the Council
reaches a report which is unanimously agreed to by the members
thereof other than the representatives of any of the parties to
the dispute, the signatory States agree to comply with the
recommendations therein.
4. If the Council fails to reach a report which is concurred in
by all its members, other than the representatives of any of the
parties to the dispute, it shall submit the dispute to
arbitration. It shall itself determine the composition, the
powers and the procedure of the Committee of Arbitrators and, in
the choice of the arbitrators, shall bear in mind the guarantees
of competence and impartiality referred to in paragraph 2 (_b_)
above.
5. In no case may a solution, upon which there has already been a
unanimous recommendation of the Council accepted by one of the
parties concerned, be again called in question.
6. The signatory States undertake that they will carry out in
full good faith any judicial sentence or arbitral award that may
be rendered and that they will comply, as provided in paragraph 3
above, with the solutions recommended by the Council. In the
event of a State failing to carry out the above undertakings, the
Council shall exert all its influence to secure compliance
{138}
l'effet, ainsi qu'il est dit à la fin de l'article 13 du Pacte.
Dans le cas où un Etat, manquant à ces engagements, recourrait à
la guerre, les sanctions prévues à l'article 16 du Pacte,
interpretées de la manière indiquée au présent Protocole, lui
deviendraient immédiatement applicables.
7. Les dispositions du présent article ne s'appliquent pas au
règlement des différends qui pourraient s'élever à la suite
des mesures de guerre prises par un ou plusieurs Etats signataires
en accord avec le Conseil ou l'Assemblée.
ARTICLE 5.
La disposition de l'alinéa 8 de l'article 15 du Pacte demeure
applicable devant le Conseil.
Si, pendant le cours d'une des procédures d'arbitrage prévues à
l'article 4 ci-dessus, l'une des Parties prétend que le différend, ou
une partie du différend, porte sur une question que le droit
international laisse à la compétence exclusive de cette Partie, les
arbitres consulteront sur ce point la Cour permanente de Justice
internationale par l'entremise du Conseil. L'avis de la Cour liera les
arbitres qui se borneront, si cet avis est affirmatif, à le constater
dans leur sentence.
Si la question est reconnue par la Cour permanente ou par le Conseil
comme étant de la compétence exclusive d'un Etat, la décision
intervenue n'empêchera pas que la situation soit examinée par le
Conseil ou par l'Assemblée, conformément à l'article 11 du Pacte.
ARTICLE 6.
Si, conformément à l'alinéa 9 de l'article 15 du Pacte, le différend
est porté devant l'Assemblée, celle-ci aura, pour le règlement du
différend, tous les pouvoirs dévolus au Conseil en ce qui concerne
l'essai de conciliation des Parties, tel qu'il est prévu aux alinéas 1,
2 ct 3 de l'article 15 du Pacte et au No. 1 de l'article 4 ci-dessus.
A défaut de reglement amiable obténu par l'Assemblée:
{139}
therewith. If it fails therein, it shall propose what steps should
be taken to give effect thereto, in accordance with the provision
contained at the end of Article 13 of the Covenant. Should a State
in disregard of the above undertakings resort to war, the sanctions
provided for by Article 16 of the Covenant, interpreted in the
manner indicated in the present Protocol, shall immediately become
applicable to it.
7. The provisions of the present article do not apply to the
settlement of disputes which arise as the result of measures of war
taken by one or more signatory States in agreement with the Council
or the Assembly.
ARTICLE 5.
The provisions of paragraph 8 of Article 15 of the Covenant shall
continue to apply in proceedings before the Council.
If in the course of an arbitration, such as is contemplated in Article
4 above, one of the parties claims that the dispute, or part thereof,
arises out of a matter which by international law is solely within the
domestic jurisdiction of that party, the arbitrators shall on this
point take the advice of the Permanent Court of International Justice
through the medium of the Council. The opinion of the Court shall be
binding upon the arbitrators, who, if the opinion is affirmative, shall
confine themselves to so declaring in their award.
If the question is held by the Court or by the Council to be a matter
solely within the domestic jurisdiction of the State, this decision
shall not prevent consideration of the situation by the Council or by
the Assembly under Article 11 of the Covenant.
ARTICLE 6.
If in accordance with paragraph 9 of Article 15 of the Covenant a
dispute is referred to the Assembly, that body shall have for the
settlement of the dispute all the powers conferred upon the Council as
to endeavouring to reconcile the parties in the manner laid down in
paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of Article 15 of the Covenant and in paragraph 1
of Article 4 above.
Should the Assembly fail to achieve an amicable settlement:
{140}
Si l'une des Parties demande l'arbitrage, il est procédé par le
Conseil à la constitution du Comité d'arbitres, dans les
conditions prevues au No. 2 de l'article 4 ci-dessus, lettres
_a_, _b_ et _c_;
Si aucune des Parties ne demande l'arbitrage, l'Assemblée reprend,
avec les mêmes pouvoirs que le Conseil, l'examen du différend.
Les solutions recommandées par le Rapport de l'Assemblée, dans
les conditions d'approbation prévues à la fin de l'alinéa 10 de
l'article 15 du Pacte, ont la même valeur et produiront les mêmes
effets, en tout ce qui concerne le présent Protocole, que celles
recommandées par le Rapport du Conseil dans les conditions prévues
au No. 3 de l'article 4 ci-dessus.
Si la majorité nécessaire ne peut être obtenue, le différend sera
soumis a l'arbitrage et le Conseil réglera lui-même la composition, les
pouvoirs et la procédure du Comité d'arbitres, comme il est dit au No.
4 dudit article 4.
ARTICLE 7.
Dans le cas d'un différend s'elevant entre deux ou plusieurs Etats
signataires, ceux-ci conviennent que, soit avant que le differénd ait
été soumis à une procédure de règlement pacifique, soit au cours d'une
telle procédure, ils ne procéderont à aucune augmentation d'armements
ou d'effectifs qui pourrait modifier la situation fixée par la
Conférence pour la réduction des armements prévue à l'article 17 du
présent Protocole; ils ne procederont non plus à aucune mesure de
mobilisation militaire, navale, aerienne, industrielle ou économique,
ni en géneral à aucun acte de nature à aggraver ou à étendre le
différend.
Conformément aux dispositions de l'article 11 du Pacte, il est du
devoir du Conseil d'examiner toute plainte en violation des engagements
ci-dessus, qui pourrait lui être adressée par un ou plusieurs des Etats
parties au différend. Si le Conseil considère que la plainte est
recevable, il doit, s'il l'estime convenable, organiser des enquêtes et
des investigations dans un ou plusieurs des pays intéressés. Ces
enquêtes et ces investigations doivent être faites dans les délais les
plus brefs, et les Etats signataires s'engagent à donner toutes
facilités pour leur exécution.
{141}
If one of the parties asks for arbitration, the Council shall proceed
to constitute the Committee of Arbitrators in the manner provided in
sub-paragraphs (_a_), (_b_) and (_c_) of paragraph 2 of Article 4
above.
If no party asks for arbitration, the Assembly shall again take the
dispute under consideration and shall have in this connection the
same powers as the Council. Recommendations embodied in a report
of the Assembly, provided that it secures the measure of support
stipulated at the end of paragraph 10 of Article 15 of the Covenant,
shall have the same value and effect, as regards all matters dealt
with in the present Protocol, as recommendations embodied in a
report of the Council adopted as provided in paragraph 3 of Article
4 above.
If the necessary majority cannot be obtained, the dispute shall be
submitted to arbitration and the Council shall determine the
composition, the powers and the procedure of the Committee of
Arbitrators as laid down in paragraph 4 of Article 4.
ARTICLE 7.
In the event of a dispute arising between two or more signatory States,
these States agree that they will not, either before the dispute is
submitted to proceedings for pacific settlement or during such
proceedings, make any increase of their armaments or effectives which
might modify the position established by the Conference for the
Reduction of Armaments provided for by Article 17 of the present
Protocol, nor will they take any measure of military, naval, air,
industrial or economic mobilisation, nor, in general, any action of a
nature likely to extend the dispute or render it more acute.
It shall be the duty of the Council, in accordance with the provisions
of Article 11 of the Covenant, to take under consideration any
complaint as to infraction of the above undertakings which is made to
it by one or more of the States parties to the dispute. Should the
Council be of opinion that the complaint requires investigation, it
shall, if it deems it expedient, arrange for enquiries and
investigations in one or more of the countries concerned. Such
enquiries and investigations shall be carried
{142}
Les mesures ainsi prises par li Conseil sont destinées uniquement à
faciliter li règlement pacifique des différends et ne doivent préjuger
en rien du règlement lui-même.
Si, à la suite de ces enquêtes et investigations, une infraction
quelconque aux dispositions du premier alinéa du présent article est
établie, il est du devoir du Conseil de sommer l'Etat ou les Etats
coupables de l'infraction de la faire disparaître. Si l'Etat ou les
Etats en question ne se conforment pas à cette sommation, le Conseil
déclare lesdits Etats coupables d'une violation du Pacte ou du présent
Protocole et doit décider les mesures à prendre en vue de faire cesser
au plus tôt une situation de nature à menacer la paix du monde.
Pour l'application du présent article, le Conseil prendra sa décision à
la majorite des deux tiers.
ARTICLE 8.
Les Etats signataires s'engagent à s'abstenir de toute action qui
pourrait constituer une menace d'agression contre un autre Etat.
Dans li cas où un des Etats signataires estime qu'un autre Etat procédé
à des préparatifs de guerre, il a le droit d'en saisir le Conseil.
Celui-ci, après avoir vérifié les faits, opère comme il est dit à
l'article 7, alinéas 2, 4 et 5.
ARTICLE 9.
L'existence de zones demilitarisées étant de nature à prévenir les
agressions et à en faciliter la détermination sans équivoque
conformément à l'article 10 ci-dessous, l'établissement de pareilles
zones est recommandé entre les Etats qui y seraient également
consentants, comme un moyen d'éviter une violation du présent Protocole.
Les zones démilitarisées déjà existantes en vertu de certains Traités
ou Conventions, ou qui seraient établies à l'avenir entre Etats
également consentants, pourront faire l'objet d'un contrôle temporaire
ou permanent, organisé par le Conseil, à la demande et aux frais d'un
ou de plusieurs Etats limitrophes.
{143}
out with the utmost possible despatch, and the signatory States
undertake to afford every facility for carrying them out.
The sole object of measures taken by the Council as above provided is
to facilitate the pacific settlement of disputes and they shall in no
way prejudge the actual settlement.
If the result of such enquiries and investigations is to establish an
infraction of the provisions of the first paragraph of the present
Article, it shall be the duty of the Council to summon the State or
States guilty of the infraction to put an end thereto. Should the
State or States in question fail to comply with such summons, the
Council shall declare them to be guilty of a violation of the Covenant
or of the present Protocol, and shall decide upon the measures to be
taken with a view to end as soon as possible a situation of a nature to
threaten the peace of the world.
For the purposes of the present Article decisions of the Council may be
taken by a two-thirds majority.
ARTICLE 8.
The signatory States undertake to abstain from any act which might
constitute a threat of aggression against another State.
If one of the signatory States is of opinion that another State is
making preparations for war, it shall have the right to bring the
matter to the notice of the Council.
The Council, if it ascertains that the facts are as alleged, shall
proceed as provided in paragraphs 2, 4, and 5 of Article 7.
ARTICLE 9.
The existence of demilitarised zones being calculated to prevent
aggression and to facilitate a definite finding of the nature provided
for in Article 10 below, the establishment of such zones between States
mutually consenting thereto is recommended as a means of avoiding
violations of the present Protocol.
The demilitarised zones already existing under the terms of certain
treaties or conventions, or which may be established in future between
States mutually consenting thereto, may at the request and at the
expense of one or more of the conterminous States, be placed under a
temporary or permanent system of supervision to be organized by the
Council.
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ARTICLE 10.
Est agresseur tout Etat qui recourt à la guerre en violation des
engagements prévus au Pacte ou au présent Protocole. Est assimilée au
recours à la guerre la violation du statut d'une zone démilitarisée.
Dans le cas d'hostilités engagées, est présumé agresseur, sauf décision
contraire du Conseil prise à l'unanimité:
1. Tout Etat qui aura refusé de soumettre le différend à la
procédure pour règlement pacifique prévue aux articles 13 et 15
du Pacte, complétés par le présent Protocole--ou qui aura refusé
de se conformer, soit à une décision judiciaire ou arbitrale,
soit à une recommandation unanime du Conseil--ou qui aura passé
outre à un rapport unanime du Conseil, à une décision judiciaire
ou arbitrale reconnaissant que le différend qui s'est élevé
entre lui et l'autre Etat belligérant porte sur une question que
le Droit international laisse à la compétence exclusive de cet
Etat; toutefois, dans ce dernier cas, l'Etat ne sera présumé
agresseur que s'il n'a pas soumis auparavant la question au
Conseil ou à l'Assemblée, conformément à l'article 11 du Pacte.
2. Tout Etat qui aura violé une des mesures provisoires
prescrites par le Conseil pendant la période de procédure, visées
à l'article 7 du présent Protocole.
Hors les hypothèses visées aux numéros 1 et 2 du présent article, si le
Conseil n'a pu déterminer dans le plus bref délai l'agresseur, il aura
l'obligation de prescrire aux belligérants un armistice dont il fixera
les conditions à la majorité des deux tiers et dont il surveillera
l'observation.
Tout belligérant ayant refusé l'armistice ou en ayant violé les
conditions, sera réputé agresseur.
Le Conseil enjoindra aux Etats signataires d'appliquer sans retard
contre l'agresseur les sanctions visées à l'article 11 du présent
Protocole, et tout Etat signataire, ainsi requis, sera dès lors fondé à
exercer les droits d'un belligérant.
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ARTICLE 10.
Every State which resorts to war in violation of the undertakings
contained in the Covenant or in the present Protocol is an aggressor.
Violation of the rules laid down for a demilitarised zone shall be held
equivalent to resort to war.
In the event of hostilities having broken out, any State shall be
presumed to be an aggressor, unless a decision of the Council, which
must be taken unanimously, shall otherwise declare:
1. If it has refused to submit the dispute to the procedure of
pacific settlement provided by Articles 13 and 15 of the Covenant
as amplified by the present Protocol, or to comply with a judicial
sentence or arbitral award or with a unanimous recommendation of
the Council, or has disregarded a unanimous report of the Council,
a judicial sentence or an arbitral award recognising that the
dispute between it and the other belligerent State arises out of
a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic
jurisdiction of the latter State; nevertheless, in the last case
the State shall only be presumed to be an aggressor if it has not
previously submitted the question to the Council or the Assembly,
in accordance with Article 11 of the Covenant.
2. If it has violated provisional measures enjoined by the Council
for the period while the proceedings are in progress as
contemplated by Article 7 of the present Protocol.
Apart from the cases dealt with in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the present
Article, if the Council does not at once succeed in determining the
aggressor, it shall be bound to enjoin upon the belligerents an
armistice, and shall fix the terms, acting, if need be, by a two-thirds
majority and shall supervise its execution.
Any belligerent which has refused to accept the armistice or has
violated its terms shall be deemed an aggressor.
The Council shall call upon the signatory States to apply forthwith
against the aggressor the sanctions provided by Article 11 of the
present Protocol, and any signatory State thus called upon shall
thereupon be entitled to exercise the rights of a belligerent.
{146}
ARTICLE 11.
Dès que le Conseil a fait aux Etats signataires l'injonction prévue au
dernier alinéa de l'article 10 du présent Protocole, les obligations
desdits Etats en ce qui concerne les sanctions de toute nature visées
aux alinéas 1 et 2 de l'article 16 du Pacte, deviennent immédiatement
opérantes afin que ces sanctions puissent porter leurs effets contre
l'agresseur sans aucun retard.
Ces obligations doivent être interprétées en ce sens que chacun des
Etats signataires est tenu de collaborer loyalement et effectivement
pour faire respecter le Pacte de la Société des Nations et pour
s'opposer à tout acte d'agression dans la mésure que lui permettent sa
situation géographique et les conditions spéciales de ses armements.
Conformément à l'alinéa 3 de l'article 16 du Pacte, les Etats
signataires prennent l'engagement, individuel et collectif, de venir à
l'aide de l'Etat attaqué ou menacé, et de se prêter un mutuel appui,
grâce à des facilités et à des échanges réciproques en ce qui concerne
le ravitaillement en matières premières et denrées de toute nature, les
ouvertures de crédit, les transports et le transit et, à cet effet, de
prendre toutes mesures en leur pouvoir pour maintenir la sécurité des
communications terrestres et maritimes de l'Etat attaqué ou menacé.
Si les deux Parties au différend sont agresseurs au sens de l'article
10, les sanctions économiques et financières s'appliquent a l'une et à
l'autre.
ARTICLE 12.
En raison de la complexité des conditions dans lesquelles le Conseil
pourrait être appelé à remplir les fonctions visées à l'article 11
ci-dessus concernant les sanctions économiques et financières et pour
préciser les garanties qui sont offertes par le présent Protocole aux
Etats signataires, le Conseil invitera immédiatement les organisations
économiques et financières de la Société des Nations à procéder à une
étude et à
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ARTICLE 11.
As soon as the Council has called upon the signatory States to apply
sanctions, as provided in the last paragraph of Article 10 of the
present Protocol, the obligations of the said States, in regard to the
sanctions of all kinds mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 16 of
the Covenant, will immediately become operative in order that such
sanctions may forthwith be employed against the aggressor.
Those obligations shall be interpreted as obliging each of the
signatory States to co-operate loyally and effectively in support of
the Covenant of the League of Nations, and in resistance to any act of
aggression, in the degree which its geographical position and its
particular situation as regards armaments allow.
In accordance with paragraph 3 of Article 16 of the Covenant the
signatory States give a joint and several undertaking to come to the
assistance of the State attacked or threatened, and to give each other
mutual support by means of facilities and reciprocal exchanges as
regards the provision of raw materials and supplies of every kind,
openings of credits, transport and transit, and for this purpose to
take all measures in their power to preserve the safety of
communications by land and by sea of the attacked or threatened State.
If both parties to the dispute are aggressors within the meaning of
Article 10, the economic and financial sanctions shall be applied to
both of them.
ARTICLE 12.
In view of the complexity of the conditions in which the Council may be
called upon to exercise the functions mentioned in Article 11 of the
present Protocol concerning economic and financial sanctions, and in
order to determine more exactly the guarantees afforded by the present
Protocol to the signatory States, the Council shall forthwith invite
the economic and financial organisations of the League of Nations to
consider and report
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soumettre un rapport sur la nature des dispositions à prendre pour
mettre en vigueur les sanctions et mesures de coopération économique et
financière, visées à l'article 16 du Pacte et à l'article 11 du present
Protocole.
En possession de ces informations, le Conseil établira par ses
organismes compétents:
1. les plans d'action destinés à faire jouer les sanctions
economiques et financières contre un Etat agresseur;
2. les plans de coopération économique et financière entre
un Etat attaqué et les divers Etats lui portant assistance,
et il communiquera ces plans aux Membres de la Société et aux autres
Etats signataires.
ARTICLE 13.
Eu égard aux sanctions militaires, navales et aériennes dont
l'application éventuelle est prévue à l'article 16 du Pacte et à
l'article 11 du présent Protocole, le Conseil aura qualité pour
recevoir les engagements d'Etats déterminant par avance les forces
militaires, navales et aériennes que ces Etats pourraient faire
intervenir immédiatement afin d'assurer l'exécution des obligations
dérivant à ce sujet du Pacte et du présent Protocole.
Dès que le Conseil a fait aux Etats signataires l'injonction prévue au
dernier alinéa de l'article 10 ci-dessus, ces Etats peuvent en outre
faire entrer en ligne, suivant les accords antérieurement faits, leurs
forces militaires, navales et aériennes au secours d'un Etat
particulier, victime de l'agression.
Les accords visés au précédent alinéa sont enregistrés et publiés par
le Secrétariat de la Société des Nations; ils restent ouverts à tout
Etat Membre de la Société, qui voudrait y accéder.
ARTICLE 14.
Le Conseil a seul qualité pour déclarer qui'l y a lieu de faire cesser
l'application des sanctions et de rétablir les conditions normales.
{149}
as to the nature of the steps to be taken to give effect to the
financial and economic sanctions and measures of co-operation
contemplated in Article 16 of the Covenant and in Article 11 of this
Protocol.
When in possession of this information, the Council shall draw up
through its competent organs:
1. Plans of action for the application of the economic and
financial sanctions against an aggressor State;
2. Plans of economic and financial co-operation between a State
attacked and the different States assisting it;
and shall communicate these plans to the Members of the League and to
the other signatory States.
ARTICLE 13.
In view of the contingent military, naval and air sanctions provided
for by Article 16 of the Covenant and by Article 11 of the present
Protocol, the Council shall be entitled to receive undertakings from
States determining in advance the military, naval and air forces which
they would be able to bring into action immediately to ensure the
fulfilment of the obligations in regard to sanctions which result from
the Covenant and the present Protocol.
Furthermore, as soon as the Council has called upon the signatory
States to apply sanctions, as provided in the last paragraph of Article
10 above, the said States may, in accordance with any agreements which
they may previously have concluded, bring to the assistance of a
particular State, which is the victim of aggression, their military,
naval and air forces.
The agreements mentioned in the preceding paragraph shall be registered
and published by the Secretariat of the League of Nations. They shall
remain open to all States Members of the League which may desire to
accede thereto.
ARTICLE 14.
The Council shall alone be competent to declare that the application of
sanctions shall cease and normal conditions be re-established.
{150}
ARTICLE 15.
Pour répondre à l'esprit du présent Protocole, les Etats signataires
conviennent que la totalité des frais de toute opération d'ordre
militaire, naval ou aérien, entreprise pour la répréssion d'une
agression, conformément aux termes de ce Protocole, ainsi que la
réparation de tous dommages subis par les personnes civiles ou
militaires, et de tous dommages matériels occasionnés par les
opérations de part et d'autre, seront supportés par l'Etat agresseur
jusqu'à l'extréme limite de sa capacité.
Toutefois, vu l'article 10 du Pacte, il ne pourra, comme suite à
l'application des sanctions visées au présent Protocole, être porté
atteinte en aucun cas à l'intégrité territoriale ou à l'indépendance
politique de l'Etat agresseur.
ARTICLE 16.
Les Etats signataires conviennent qu'en cas de différend entre un ou
plusieurs parmi eux et un ou plusieurs Etats non signataires du présent
Protocole értangers à la Société des Nations, ces Etats étrangers
seront invités, aux conditions prévues à l'article 17 du Pacte, à se
soumettre aux obligations acceptées par les signataires du présent
Protocole aux fins de règlement pacifique.
Si l'Etat invité, refusant d'accepter les dites conditions et
obligations, recourt à la guerre centre un Etat signataire, les
dispositions de l'article 16 du Pacte, telles qu'elles sont précisées
par le présent Protocole, lui sont applicables.
ARTICLE 17.
Les Etats signataires s'engagent à prendre part à une Conférence
internationale pour la réduction des armements qui devra être convoquée
par le Conseil et qui se réunira à Geneve le lundi 15 juin 1925. Tous
autres Etats, Membres ou non de la Société, seront invités à cette
Conférence.
En vue de la convocation de la Conférence, le Conseil
{151}
ARTICLE 15.
In conformity with the spirit of the present Protocol the signatory
States agree that the whole cost of any military, naval or air
operations undertaken for the repression of an aggression under the
terms of the Protocol, and reparation for all losses suffered by
individuals, whether civilians or combatants, and for all material
damage caused by the operations of both sides, shall be borne by the
aggressor State up to the extreme limit of its capacity.
Nevertheless, in view of Article 10 of the Covenant, neither the
territorial integrity nor the political independence of the aggressor
State shall in any case be affected as the result of the application of
the sanctions mentioned in the present Protocol.
ARTICLE 16.
The signatory States agree that in the event of a dispute between one
or more of them and one or more States which have not signed the
present Protocol and are not Members of the League of Nations, such
non-Member States shall be invited, on the conditions contemplated in
Article 17 of the Covenant, to submit, for the purpose of a pacific
settlement, to the obligations accepted by the States signatories of
the present Protocol.
If the State so invited, having refused to accept the said conditions
and obligations, resorts to war against a signatory State, the
provisions of Article 16 of the Covenant, as defined by the present
Protocol, shall be applicable against it.
ARTICLE 17.
The signatory States undertake to participate in an International
Conference for the Reduction of Armaments which shall be convened by
the Council and shall meet at Geneva on Monday, June 15th, 1925. All
other States, whether Members of the League or not, shall be invited to
this Conference.
In preparation for the convening of the Conference, the
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préparera, en tenant compte des engagements prévus aux articles 11 et
13 du présent Protocole, un programme général pour la reduction et la
limitation des armements qui sera mis à la disposition de cette
Conférence et communiqué aux gouvernements le plus tôt possible, et au
plus tard trois mois avant la réunion.
Si au moins la majorité des Membres représentés en permanence au
Conseil et dix autres Membres de la Société n'ont pas déposé leur
ratification pour le 1er mai 1925, le Sécretaire général de la Société
devra prendre immédiatement l'avis du Conseil pour savoir s'il doit
annuler les invitations ou simplement ajourner la Conférence à une date
ultérieure, qui sera fixée par le Conseil pour permettre la réunion du
nombre necessaire de ratifications.
ARTICLE 18.
Toutes les fois que, dans l'article 10 ou dans toutes autres
dispositions du présent Protocole, il est fait mention d'une décision
du Conseil, elle s'entend dans le sens de l'article 15 du Pacte, à
savoir que le vote des représentants des Parties au différend ne compte
pas dans le calcul de l'unanimité ou de la majorité requise.
ARTICLE 19.
A défaut de stipulations expresses, le présent Protocole n'affecte pas
les droits et les obligations des Membres de la Société des Nations,
tels qu'ils résultent du Pacte.
ARTICLE 20.
Tout différend relatif à l'interpretation du présent Protocole sera
soumis à la Cour permanente de Justice Internationale.
ARTICLE 2l.
Le présent Protocole, dont les textes français et anglais feront foi,
sera ratifié.
{153}
Council shall draw up with due regard to the undertakings contained in
Articles 11 and 13 of the present Protocol a general programme for the
reduction and limitation of armaments, which shall be laid before the
Conference and which shall be communicated to the Governments at the
earliest possible date, and at the latest three months before the
Conference meets.
If by May 1st, 1925, ratifications have not been deposited by at least
a majority of the permanent Members of the Council and ten other
Members of the League, the Secretary-General of the League shall
immediately consult the Council as to whether he shall cancel the
invitations or merely adjourn the Conference to a subsequent date to be
fixed by the Council so as to permit the necessary number of
ratifications to be obtained.
ARTICLE 18.
Wherever mention is made in Article 10, or in any other provision of
the present Protocol, of a decision of the Council, this shall be
understood in the sense of Article 15 of the Covenant, namely that the
votes of the representatives of the parties to the dispute shall not be
counted when reckoning unanimity or the necessary majority.
ARTICLE 19.
Except as expressly provided by its terms, the present Protocol shall
not affect in any way the rights and obligations of Members of the
League as determined by the Covenant.
ARTICLE 20.
Any dispute as to the interpretation of the present Protocol shall be
submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice.
ARTICLE 21.
The present Protocol, of which the French and English texts are both
authentic, shall be ratified.
{154}
Le dépôt des ratifications sera effectué au Secrétariat de la Société
des Nations le plus tôt qu'il sera possible.
Les Etats dont le gouvernement a son siège hors d'Europe auront la
faculté de se borner à faire connaître au Secrétariat de la Societe des
Nations que leur ratification a été donnée et, dans ce cas, ils devront
en transmettre l'instrument aussitôt que faire se pourra.
Dès que la majorité des Membres représentés en permanence au Conseil et
dix autres Membres de la Société auront déposé ou effectué leur
ratification, un procès-verbal sera dressé par le Secrétariat pour le
constater.
La mise en vigueur du Protocole aura lieu après que ce procès-verbal
aura été dressé et dès que le plan de réduction des armements aura été
adopté par la Conférence prevue à l'article 17.
Si, dans un délai, à fixer par ladite Conférence après l'adoption du
plan de réduction des armements, ce plan n'a pas été exécuté, il
appartiendra au Conseil de le constater; par l'effet de cette
constatation le présent Protocole deviendra caduc.
Les conditions en vertu desquelles le Conseil pourra constater que le
plan établi par la Conférence internationale pour la réduction des
armements n'a pas été exécuté et que, par conséquent, le présent
Protocole est devenu caduc, seront définies par la Conférence elle-même.
Tout Etat signataire qui ne se conformerait pas, après l'expiration du
délai fixé par la Conférence, au plan adopté par elle, ne pourra
bénéficier des dispositions du présent Protocole.
En foi de quoi les Soussignés, dûment autorisés à cet effet, ont signé
le présent Protocole.
Fait à Genève, le deux octobre, mil neuf cent vingt-quatre, en un seul
exemplaire qui restera déposé dans les archives du Secretariat de la
Société des Nations et qui sera enregistré par lui à la date de son
entrée en vigueur.
{155}
The deposit of ratifications shall be made at the Secretariat of the
League of Nations as soon as possible.
States of which the seat of government is outside Europe will be
entitled merely to inform the Secretariat of the League of Nations that
their ratification has been given; in that case, they must transmit the
instrument of ratification as soon as possible.
So soon as the majority of the permanent Members of the Council and ten
other Members of the League have deposited or have effected their
ratifications, a _procès-verbal_ to that effect shall be drawn up by
the Secretariat.
After the said _procès-verbal_ has been drawn up, the Protocol shall
come into force as soon as the plan for the reduction of armaments has
been adopted by the Conference provided for in Article 17.
If within such period after the adoption of the plan for the reduction
of armaments as shall be fixed by the said Conference, the plan has not
been carried out, the Council shall make a declaration to that effect;
this declaration shall render the present Protocol null and void.
The grounds on which the Council may declare that the plan drawn up by
the International Conference for the Reduction of Armaments has not
been carried out, and that in consequence the present Protocol has been
rendered null and void, shall be laid down by the Conference itself.
A signatory State which, after the expiration of the period fixed by
the Conference, fails to comply with the plan adopted by the
Conference, shall not be admitted to benefit by the provisions of the
present Protocol.
In faith whereof the Undersigned, duly authorised for this purpose,
have signed the present Protocol.
DONE at Geneva, on the second day of October, nineteen hundred and
twenty-four, in a single copy, which will be kept in the archives of
the Secretariat of the League and registered by it on the date of its
coming into force.
{156}
ANNEX C.
GENERAL REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FIFTH ASSEMBLY ON BEHALF OF THE FIRST
AND THIRD COMMITTEES BY M. POLITIS (GREECE) AND M. BENES
(CZECHOSLOVAKIA).
I
INTRODUCTION.
After being examined for several years by the Third Committee, the
problem of the reduction of armaments has this year suddenly assumed a
different, a wider and even an unexpected form.
Last year a draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance was prepared, which the
Assembly sent to the Members of the League for their consideration.
The replies from the Governments were to be examined by the Fifth
Assembly.
At the very beginning of its work, however, after a memorable debate,
the Assembly indicated to the Third Committee a new path. On September
6th, 1924, on the proposal of the Prime Ministers of France and Great
Britain, M. Edouard Herriot and Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, the Assembly
adopted the following resolution:
"The Assembly,
"Noting the declarations of the Governments represented,
observes with satisfaction that they contain the basis of
an understanding tending to establish a secure peace,
"Decides as follows:
"With a view to reconciling in the new proposals the
divergences between certain points of view which have been
expressed and, when agreement has been reached, to enable
an international conference upon armaments to be summoned
by the League of Nations at the earliest possible moment:
"(1) The Third Committee is requested to consider the
{157}
material dealing with security and the reduction of armaments,
particularly the observations of the Governments on the draft
Treaty of Mutual Assistance, prepared in pursuance of
Resolution XIV of the Third Assembly and other plans prepared
and presented to the Secretary-General since the publication
of the draft Treaty, and to examine the obligations contained
in the Covenant of the League in relation to the guarantees
of security which a resort to arbitration and a reduction of
armaments may require:
"(2) The First Committee is requested:
"(_a_) To consider, in view of possible amendments, the
articles in the Covenant relating to the settlement of
disputes;
"(_b_) To examine within what limits the terms of Article
36, paragraph 2, of the Statute establishing the Permanent
Court of International Justice might be rendered more
precise and thereby facilitate the more general acceptance
of the clause;
and thus strengthen the solidarity and the security of the
nations of the world by settling by pacific means all disputes
which may arise between States."
This resolution had two merits, first, that of briefly summarising all
the investigations made in the last four years by the different
organisations of the League in their efforts to establish peace and
bring about the reduction of armaments, and, secondly, that of
indicating the programme of work of the Committees in the hope that,
with the aid of past experience, they would at last attain the end in
view.
The Assembly had assigned to each Committee a distinct and separate
task; to the First Committee, the examination of the pacific settlement
of disputes by methods capable of being applied in every case; to the
Third Committee, the question of the security of nations considered as
a necessary preliminary condition for the reduction of their armaments.
Each Committee, after a general discussion which served to {158} detach
the essential elements from the rest of the problem, referred the
examination of its programme to a Sub-Committee, which devoted a large
number of meetings to this purpose.
The proposals of the Sub-Committees then led to very full debates by
the Committees, which terminated in the texts analysed below.
As, however, the questions submitted respectively to the two Committees
form part of an indivisible whole, contact and collaboration had to be
established between the Committees by means of a Mixed Committee of
nine members and finally by a joint Drafting Committee of four members.
For the same reason, the work of the Committees has resulted in a
single draft protocol accompanied by two draft resolutions for which
the Committees are jointly responsible.
Upon these various texts, separate reports were submitted, which, being
approved by the Committees respectively responsible for them, may be
considered as an official commentary by the Committees.
These separate reports have here been combined in order to present as a
whole the work accomplished by the two Committees and to facilitate
explanation.
Before entering upon an analysis of the proposed texts, it is expedient
to recall, in a brief historical summary, the efforts of the last four
years, of which the texts are the logical conclusion.
HISTORICAL STATEMENT.
The problem of the reduction of armaments is presented in Article 8 of
the Covenant in terms which reveal at the outset the complexity of the
question and which explain the tentative manner in which the subject
has been treated by the League of Nations in the last few years.
"The Members of the League recognise that the maintenance
of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to
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the lowest point consistent with national safety and the
enforcement by common action of international obligations."
Here we see clearly expressed the need of reducing the burden which
armaments imposed upon the nations immediately after the war and of
putting a stop to the competition in armaments which was, in itself, a
threat to the peace of the world. But, at the same time, there is
recognised the duty of safeguarding the national security of the
Members of the League and of safeguarding it, not only by the
maintenance of a necessary minimum of troops, but also by the
co-operation of all the nations, by a vast organisation for peace.
Such is the meaning of the Covenant, which, while providing for
reduction of armaments properly so called, recognises at the same time
the need of _common action_, by all the Members of the League, with a
view to compelling a possible disturber of the peace to respect his
_international obligations_.
Thus, in this first paragraph of Article 8, which is so short but so
pregnant, mention is made of all the problems which have engaged the
attention of our predecessors and ourselves and which the present
Assembly has specially instructed us to solve, the problems of
_collective security_ and the _reduction of armaments_.
Taking up Article 8 of the Covenant, the First Assembly had already
outlined a programme. At its head it placed a pronouncement of the
Supreme Council:
"In order to diminish the economic difficulties of Europe,
armies should everywhere be reduced to a peace footing.
Armaments should be limited to the lowest possible figure
compatible with national security."
The Assembly also called attention to a resolution of the International
Financial Conference of Brussels held a short time before:
"Recommending to the Council of the League of Nations the
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desirability of conferring at once with the several Governments
concerned with a view to securing a general reduction of the
crushing burdens which, on their existing scale, armaments
still impose on the impoverished peoples of the world, sapping
their resources and imperilling their recovery from the ravages
of war."
It also requested its two Advisory Commissions to set to work at once
to collect the necessary information regarding the problem referred to
in Article 8 of the Covenant.
From the beginning the work of the Temporary Mixed Commission and of
the Permanent Advisory Commission revealed the infinite complexity of
the question.
The Second Assembly limited its resolutions to the important, but none
the less (if one may say so) secondary, questions of traffic in arms
and their manufacture by private enterprise. It only touched upon the
questions of military expenditure and budgets in the form of
recommendations and, as regards the main question of reduction of
armaments, it confined itself to asking the Temporary Mixed Commission
to formulate a definite scheme.
It was between the Second and Third Assemblies that the latter
Commission, which was beginning to get to grips with the various
problems, revealed their constituent elements. In its report it placed
on record that:
"The memory of the world war was still maintaining in many
countries a feeling of insecurity, which was represented
in the candid statements in which, at the request of the
Assembly, several of them had put forward the requirements
of their national security, and the geographical and
political considerations which contributed to shape their
policy in the matter of armaments."
At the same time, however, the Commission stated:
"Consideration of these statements as a whole has clearly
revealed not only the sincere desire of the Governments
to reduce national armaments and the corresponding
{161}
expenditure to a minimum, but also the importance of the results
achieved. These facts"--according to the Commission--"are
indisputable, and are confirmed moreover, by the replies
received from Governments to the Recommendation of the Assembly
regarding the limitation of military expenditure."
That is the point we had reached _two years ago_; there was a
_unanimous desire to reduce armaments_. Reductions, though as yet
inadequate, had been begun, and there was a _still stronger desire to
ensure the security of the world_ by a stable and permanent
organisation for peace.
That was the position which, after long discussions, gave rise _at the
Third Assembly to the famous Resolution XIV_ and at the Fourth Assembly
_to the draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance_, for which we are now
substituting the Protocol submitted to the Fifth Assembly.
What progress has been made during these four years?
Although the Treaty of Mutual Assistance was approved in principle by
eighteen Governments, it gave rise to certain misgivings. We need only
recall the most important of these, hoping that a comparison between
them and an analysis of the new scheme will demonstrate that the First
and Third Committees have endeavoured, with a large measure of success,
to dispose of the objections raised and that the present scheme
consequently represents an immense advance on anything that has
hitherto been done.
In the first place, a number of Governments or delegates to the
Assembly argued that the guarantees provided by the draft Treaty of
Mutual Assistance did not imply with sufficient definiteness the
reduction of armaments which is the ultimate object of our work.
The idea of the Treaty was to give effect to Article 8 of the Covenant,
but many persons considered that it did not, in fact, secure the
automatic execution of that article. Even if a reduction of armaments
was achieved by its means, the amount {162} of the reduction was left,
so the opponents of the Treaty urged, to the estimation of each
Government, and there was nothing to show that it would be considerable.
With equal force many States complained that no provision had been made
for the development of the _juridicial and moral elements of the
Covenant_ by the side of material guarantees. The novel character of
the charter given to the nations in 1919 lay essentially in the advent
of a moral solidarity which foreshadowed the coming of a new era. That
principle ought to have, as its natural consequence, _the extension of
arbitration and international jurisdiction_, without which no human
society can be solidly grounded. A considerable portion of the
Assembly asked that efforts should also be made in this direction. The
draft Treaty seemed from this point of view to be insufficient and
ill-balanced.
Finally, the articles relating to partial treaties gave rise, as you
are aware, to certain objections. Several Governments considered that
they would lead to the establishment of groups of Powers animated by
hostility towards other Powers or groups of Powers and that they would
cause political tension. The absence of the barriers of compulsory
arbitration and judicial intervention was evident here as everywhere
else.
Thus, by a logical and gradual process, there was elaborated the system
at which we have now arrived.
The reduction of armaments required by the Covenant and demanded by the
general situation of the world to-day led us to consider the question
of security as a necessary complement to disarmament.
The support demanded from different States by other States less
favourably situated had placed the former under the obligation of
asking for a sort of moral and legal guarantee that the States which
have to be supported would act in perfect good faith and would always
endeavor to settle their disputes by pacific means.
It became evident, however, with greater clearness and force {163} than
ever before, that if the security and effective assistance demanded in
the event of aggression was the condition _sine quâ non_ of the
reduction of armaments, it was at the same time the necessary
complement of the pacific settlement of international disputes, since
the non-execution of a sentence obtained by pacific methods of
settlement would necessarily drive the world back to the system of
armed force. Sentences imperatively required sanctions or the whole
system would fall to the ground.
_Arbitration was therefore considered by the Fifth Assembly to be the
necessary third factor, the complement of the two others with which it
must be combined in order to build up the new system set forth in the
Protocol._
Thus, after five years' hard work, we have decided to propose to the
Members of the League _the present system of arbitration, security and
reduction of armaments_--a system which we regard as being complete and
sound.
That is the position with which the Fifth Assembly has to deal to-day.
The desire to arrive at a successful issue is unanimous. A great
number of the decisions adopted in the past years have met with general
approval. There has arisen a thoroughly clear appreciation of the
undoubted gaps which have to be filled and of the reasonable
apprehensions which have to be dissipated. Conditions have therefore
become favourable for arriving at an agreement.
An agreement has been arrived at on the basis of the draft Protocol
which is now submitted to you for consideration.
{164}
II
ANALYSIS OF THE SCHEME.
1.--WORK OF THE FIRST COMMITTEE.
(_Rapporteur_: M. Politis)
DRAFT PROTOCOL FOR THE PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES.
_Preamble._
The object of the Protocol, which is based upon the resolution of
September 6th, 1924, is to facilitate the reduction and limitation of
armaments provided for in Article 8 of the Covenant of the League of
Nations by guaranteeing the security of States through the development
of methods for the pacific settlement of all international disputes and
the effective condemnation of aggressive war.
These general ideas are summarised in the preamble of the Protocol.
COMPULSORY ARBITRATION.
(_Articles 1 to 6, 10, 16, 18 and 19 of the Protocol_)
1.--INTRODUCTION.
Compulsory arbitration is the fundamental basis of the proposed system.
It has seemed to be the only means of attaining the ultimate aim
pursued by the League of Nations, viz. the establishment of a pacific
and legal order in the relations between peoples.
The realisation of this great ideal, to which humanity aspires with a
will which has never been more strongly affirmed, presupposes, as an
indispensable condition, the elimination of war, the extension of the
rule of law and the strengthening of the sentiment of justice.
The Covenant of the League of Nations erected a wall of protection
around the peace of the world, but it was a first attempt {165} at
international organisation and it did not succeed in closing the circle
sufficiently thoroughly to leave no opening for war. It reduced the
number of possible wars. It did not condemn them all. There were some
which it was forced to tolerate. Consequently, there remained, in the
system which it established, numerous fissures, which constituted a
grave danger to peace.
The new system of the Protocol goes further. It closes the circle
drawn by the Covenant; it prohibits all wars of aggression. Henceforth
no purely private war between nations will be tolerated.