THE JAPANESE AMENDMENT.
During the framing of the Protocol of Geneva by the Committees of the
Fifth Assembly of the League of Nations, the language of the document
was changed by what has been called the Japanese Amendment; and while
the provisions which constitute that amendment as part of the Protocol
have been generally considered in the previous discussion in connection
with the application of various Articles, still that amendment attained
such prominence in the discussions in the Fifth Assembly and since,
that it may well be separately reviewed.
The Japanese Amendment related to domestic questions, questions within
the domestic jurisdiction of a State; and before coming to its terms,
it will be well to see what the situation as to these domestic
questions is under the Covenant, taken by itself.
The Covenant, as we have seen,[1] provided for the submission to the
Council of all disputes between Members of the League which were not
otherwise adjusted by some kind of agreement or by some kind of
Tribunal. In regard to those disputes submitted to the Council, the
eighth paragraph of Article 15 of the Covenant said that if one of the
parties claimed, and if the Council found, that the dispute related to
a question which by international law was entirely within the
jurisdiction of a State, the Council should so report and make not even
a recommendation regarding a settlement. In other words, if the
dispute related to a domestic question and one of the parties to the
dispute raised the point, the Council could not proceed at all to make
any recommendation which would bind the parties to the dispute or
either of them to anything whatever.
At the same time, under the Covenant, by Article 11, either the Council
or the Assembly might consider _any_ circumstance tending to threaten
or disturb international peace. The language in this regard is
general. It means no more than discussion and {65} suggestion, except
perhaps publicity; but under this language of Article 11, the parties
were left with their liberty of action in the matter; and indeed, under
the Covenant, the Members of the League entered into no commitment
against going to war in the case of a dispute about a domestic question.
So we may sum up the provisions of the Covenant as to a dispute
regarding a domestic question by saying that while such a dispute might
go to the Council,[2] still the Council,[2] if the point were raised,
could make no recommendation about it; but the Council (or the
Assembly) might take the matter into consideration as a subject of
discussion when it threatened peace, with the hope and duty to preserve
the peace if possible; but in regard to this the parties remained free
to act as they might themselves finally determine.
The Protocol of course, as we have also seen,[3] makes a great change
in this situation because it contains a general agreement by the
parties not to resort to war, an agreement which is applicable to
disputes about domestic questions to the same extent that it is
applicable to disputes about international questions; this general
agreement not to go to war includes all questions of both kinds.
Furthermore, the Protocol makes it very much more likely that disputes
between Members of the League will go for a hearing to a Committee of
Arbitrators than to the Council; we have seen[4] that the likelihood of
any dispute going to the Council under the new régime, for
consideration on the merits, is remote. The functions of the Council
regarding disputes are to some extent delegated to the Permanent Court
of International Justice, but even more largely to Committees of
Arbitrators agreed on or appointed _ad hoc_.
Now the Japanese amendment is not strictly a single amendment; it is in
two parts. The first part is the last (third) paragraph of Article 5
of the Protocol, reading as follows:
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"If the question is held by the Court or by the Council to be a
matter solely within the domestic jurisdiction of the State, this
decision shall not prevent consideration of the situation by the
Council or by the Assembly under Article 11 of the Covenant."
We must bear in mind that by the second paragraph of Article 5, any
Committee of Arbitrators, in its consideration of a dispute is subject
to the same limitations concerning a dispute about a domestic question
as are provided for the Council. The method of so limiting the
Committee of Arbitrators is that the question of law is decided by the
Permanent Court of International Justice, and if that Court decides
that the question is domestic, the Committee of Arbitrators simply so
declares and proceeds no farther.
What the paragraph of Article 5 above quoted says is that although
neither the Council nor a Committee of Arbitrators may consider a
dispute regarding a domestic question if the point is raised, still
none the less the Council or the Assembly, under Article 11 of the
Covenant, may consider the situation in its bearing upon the peace of
the world. Now such consideration under Article 11 of the Covenant
would have been possible without this statement, so that, to my mind,
this portion of the Japanese amendment makes no change in that regard.
The paragraph does not change the legal situation at all, but simply
makes explicit what was otherwise implied.
The other portion of the Japanese Amendment is the clause which is
added to sub-head 1 of the second paragraph of Article 10, beginning
with the word "nevertheless."
In order to see just what this other portion of the Japanese Amendment
is, I cite here the second paragraph of Article 10 (omitting certain
phrases not here material) with the words of the Japanese Amendment
italicised:
"In the event of hostilities having broken out, any State shall
be presumed to be an aggressor, unless a decision of the Council,
which must be taken unanimously, shall otherwise declare:
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1. If it * * * has disregarded a unanimous report of the Council,
a judicial sentence or an arbitral award recognizing that the
dispute between it and the other belligerent State arises out of
a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic
jurisdiction of the latter State; _nevertheless, in the last case
the State shall only be presumed to be an aggressor if it has not
previously submitted the question to the Council or the Assembly,
in accordance with Article 11 of the Covenant_."
The language of Article 10 of the Protocol is quite involved, I have
already discussed it at some length,[5] endeavoring to show that its
real effect differs greatly from the theory of its framers, a theory
borne out, perhaps, by the language of Article 10 considered as
language only. I sum up _that theory_ as follows:
Laying down the general principle that a State which resorts to war
contrary to the Covenant or to the Protocol is an aggressor, and
prescribing a general procedure by which it is for the Council to
decide, unanimously of course, whether such a violation has taken place
(and in the absence of such unanimous decision to declare an armistice)
none the less Article 10 limits or qualifies this general procedure by
enumerating certain classes of cases in which the facts would
_supposedly_ be so open, so notorious, so impossible to question, that
they would create a presumption as to the State which was the
aggressor; and such presumption could be upset only by unanimous vote
of the Council against it.
I repeat that this is the theory of MM. Benes and Politis; it is not
mine.
My own view, heretofore expressed, is that in no case could the
supposedly notorious facts create a presumption because there would
always be a difference of opinion as to those very facts themselves.
But proceeding on the other theory, and looking only at the language,
the presumptions are important; here it is necessary to refer to only
one of them.
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This presumption arises when a State has "disregarded" a decision by
the Council, by the Court or by the Arbitrators following the Court,
that a dispute arises out of a domestic question _and has also not
submitted_[6] the question to the Council or the Assembly for
discussion, under Article 11 of the Covenant.
Before the Japanese amendment, the text was that the presumption arose
when a State "disregarded" such a decision to the effect that the
dispute arose out of a domestic question.
Now let us see what the difference between the two is, that is to say,
the difference between the text _prior_ to the Japanese amendment and
the text _with_ the Japanese amendment.
In either case the decision on the question of law has gone against the
complaining State. The proper tribunal has decided that the question
is a domestic question and that decision in either case is and remains
conclusive.
In either case, the State "disregarding" that decision and going to war
is an aggressor. We may see that this is so by supposing that the
entire original text as well as the text of this portion of the
Japanese amendment was stricken out.[7] Then, clearly, the State would
be an aggressor under Article 2 of the Protocol and under the first
paragraph of Article 10; and there is nothing either in the original
text that we are considering or in the Japanese addition thereto which
changes that conclusion.[8]
The difference then between the original text and the text with the
amendment is this: in the original text, a complaining State
disregarding such a binding decision as to the domestic character of
the question was _presumed_ an aggressor if it went {69} to war _either
before or after_ the consideration of the matter by the Council or the
Assembly under Article 11 of the Covenant. Under the text as amended,
such a State is _presumed_ to be an aggressor only if it resorts to war
_before_ such consideration under that Article 11.
In other words, the difference between the original and amended texts
would arise only in the following circumstances: State A brings a
dispute against State B before a tribunal (Council, Committee of
Arbitrators, etc.). The tribunal renders a binding decision that the
dispute arises out of a domestic question. The complaining State,
bound by that decision, then brings the matter before the Council or
the Assembly under Article 11 of the Covenant and no adjustment
results; thereupon the complaining State resorts to war.
Under those circumstances, in the original text, the State resorting to
war would be _presumed_ an aggressor, a presumption to be upset only by
the unanimous vote of the Council against it. Under the amended text,
the complaining State would be an aggressor, but there would be no
presumption; and the determination that it was an aggressor would come
on to be made by the Council, which would either have to vote
unanimously that the complaining State was an aggressor, or else
proclaim an armistice.
I confess that it is difficult to see why such a refined and subtle and
technical distinction about the presumption of aggression should be
made. If there is a binding decision by a tribunal that a dispute
arises out of a domestic question, surely a complaining State, under
the principles of the Protocol, is bound not to go to war, because it
is legally wrong in its claim and has been so adjudged. Just why a
State going to war under such circumstances should be _presumed_ to be
and be an aggressor if it goes to war _before_ a discussion of the
matter subsequent to the decision and not be _presumed_ to be an
aggressor but merely be an aggressor, if it goes to war _after_ such
discussion, is not logically to be explained.
However, the foregoing discussion resulting in such an {70} obscure and
technical distinction is, as I intimated, based solely on the language
of the Article and on the legalistic theory of its framers as to its
meaning and result. Earlier in my discussion,[9] I pointed out that I
do not agree with the conclusions of MM. Benes and Politis, for I do
not think that the presumptions laid down in Article 10 of the Protocol
would ever have any material bearing on the decision reached by the
Council. In other words, repeating in substance what I said before, I
believe that the power to declare an armistice is the only power under
Article 10 of the Protocol which the Council would ever exercise,
except in a case where a State itself denounced itself as an aggressor.
Furthermore, it seems to me that the very intricacies of the language
of Article 10 of the Protocol are themselves a very real indication
that my conclusion is correct.
As a matter of reality, I cannot see that the Japanese amendment in any
conceivable case would cause any difference in what would happen. We
must suppose that war has commenced, for unless there is a resort to
war, Article 10 of the Protocol is out of the picture entirely.
Assuming then a resort to war, there are, under Article 10, with all
its provisions and exceptions and presumptions, only two real
possibilities:
a. There is an open and admitted and defiant aggression.
b. There is a difference as to the facts and it follows that it is
not possible for the Council _at once_ to reach a unanimous
conclusion in the case; accordingly the Council declares an
armistice which each belligerent must accept or become an
aggressor.
What these two cases come to is obviously one of two alternatives,
namely, either some State is going on with its fighting, with its war,
regardless of the Council and regardless of the Protocol, or else there
is an armistice and the fighting stops. Under the first circumstance,
the provisions as to presumptions and as to the decisions of the
Council are alike of no {71} consequence; and, in the second case, the
war ends with an armistice as soon as it commences.
The drafting of Article 10 of the Protocol is unfortunately obscure;
but when the language of the whole Japanese amendment is carefully
looked at, it seems to me that it certainly adds nothing to the powers
of either the Council or the Assembly in considering disputes arising
from domestic questions, and that the legal right of any State to
determine and control its own domestic matters remains unquestioned;
indeed, it may be said to remain more unquestioned than it is now; for,
under the Protocol, that right cannot be questioned by the League,
either in Council or in Assembly; it cannot be questioned by the
Permanent Court or by Arbitrators; and it cannot be questioned by war.
All that is possible is friendly discussion and consideration under
Article 11 of the Covenant and that, so far as Members of the League
are concerned, is possible now.
Of course it might be argued that the various possible decisions and
presumptions under Article 10 of the Protocol might make some
difference as to the charging of the costs of the aggression under
Article 15 of the Protocol; but the possibilities involved are too
remote to be worthy of discussion.
[1] _Supra_, p. 18, _et seq._
[2] or the Assembly.
[3] _Supra_, p. 50, _et seq._
[4] _Supra_, p. 23, _et seq._
[5] pp. 54-63.
[6] The text says "previously." Presumably this means before
hostilities broke out. It might mean before the "disregard" of the
decision that the dispute was domestic. Precisely how a State could
"disregard" such a decision, except by resort to war, is not very
clear. The French is "qui aura passé outre à un rapport," etc.
[7] That is, all the text above quoted as part of sub-head 1 of the
second paragraph of Article 10, beginning "has disregarded a unanimous
report of the Council."
[8] The Japanese proposal regarding this Article as it first stood, was
to strike out all the words referring to the "domestic jurisdiction,"
etc.; the addition of the clause commencing "nevertheless" was a
compromise; it would have been a much simpler result and a better one,
I think, to have omitted the whole clause, as the Japanese proposed.
[9] pp. 61, 67.
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