THE END
Almost before dawn next morning, on the eastern front near Signal Hill,
was sounded the last note in the titanic struggle for Arthur. Some
volleys rang out on the quiet air, died away into independent firing,
then stopped. Boom! boom! went two guns, and then all was silent. It
appeared that the Japanese, thinking that Signal Hill was only held
by outposts, decided to seize it under cover of night. They advanced
without even taking the usual military precautions. Unfortunately for
them the hill was held by a company of infantry, which, having noticed
their approach, allowed them to get within short range, and then poured
volley after volley into them. Twenty dead and eighty wounded were left
on the ground. They wavered, and our men charged with the bayonet.
The fight continued for some moments, costing us five wounded and one
killed.
At daybreak all the hills on both sides swarmed with men who had
recently been foes: they stared at each other fascinated. The two great
masses of men differed but little from each other. Both had come here
to die, to die without a murmur and obediently. The only difference was
that on the one side they died for duty and for an object understood by
all, knowing their own superiority; on the other they died for the same
reason, but feeling their inferiority. The latter it was who drank the
bitter cup. Their one hope now was that they should be spared the
fate of being taken prisoners of war. Negotiations were being carried
on that day, and, of course, those responsible would spare them the
shame of imprisonment. But no! They had to drain the dregs.
[Illustration: ADMIRAL WIREN.]
A carriage was seen driving from the District Staff Office; it
proceeded quickly round the central Mandarin Road to the village of
Siu-shuing, the place appointed for the meeting. In it was Colonel
Reuss, who was escorted on horseback by Colonels Khvostoff, Dmitrevsky,
Captains Schesnovitch, Golovan, Student Lebedeff (interpreter), and
Malchenko. Before they started, General Stössel, in the presence
of Fock, told them all that he had given all instructions and full
authority for the conclusion of the capitulation confidentially to
Reuss, and that Reuss had also been given a letter for General Baron
Nogi. Stössel, Fock, and Reuss were nervous; they were also, it seems,
in a great hurry, for no lawyer was asked to look over the terms of
capitulation, nor was one present even when the terms were signed.
The Commandant, holding aloof from any participation in the surrender,
sent the following cipher telegram to the Commander-in-Chief, dated
January 2, No. 1,300:
'General Stössel has entered into negotiations with the enemy for
surrendering the Fortress without informing me, and in spite of my
opinion and that of the majority of the commanding officers.'
Reuss, with his companions, soon reached the appointed spot. They were
met by the Chief of the Staff of the Japanese Army, who handed to them
the proposed text of the agreement,[44] written in English. He gave
them an hour in which to think it over, and went away. Reuss then read
the contents aloud to the others. Golovan began to protest; he was
cut short. 'They are the victors; we must submit to their demands.'
After a short conference and passionate protests from Khvostoff,
Golovan, and Schesnovitch--as a matter of fact their protests were
waste of breath, for Reuss alone had plenary powers, the others being
only there for show--Reuss agreed to make three alterations: (1) That
the garrison should not be made prisoners of war; (2) that officers
should be permitted to take their orderlies with them; (3) that the
allowance of baggage should be increased. The Japanese returned
punctually within the hour, and took away the text of the capitulation
with the alterations for consideration. After a quarter of an hour they
returned, and said definitely:
'We only agree to the second alteration. Will you sign?'
Reuss pondered for a moment, then said:
'I will.'
I will not bore the reader with the terms of the convention, which are
now well known, or the procedure of signing. No sooner was the shameful
document signed than Reuss sent a Japanese messenger to Stössel with a
note, saying:
'The capitulation is signed, and, in accordance with it, the
destruction of all property must be immediately stopped.
Stössel at once replied:
'I have done everything; tell the Japanese.'
The news of the surrender being an accomplished fact soon spread among
the garrison. Our men seemed suddenly to change their natures, all
discipline went to the winds, and rioting commenced. Some, throwing
their arms away, went straight down to the town, which became one
vast scene of drunkenness and orgy. The shops and stores were looted,
and wholesale robbery was the order of the day. The crowd broke up
everything they could, amongst other things the library of the _Novy
Kry_. The officers, seeing that it was hopeless to try and cope with
their men, hid from the maddened crowds.
And now a few words as to General Stössel and how he took the
surrender. When the riot was reported to him, he at once became
alarmed, and asked for a hundred Japanese soldiers as a guard over
his house and property. Nogi sent the men, fully armed and equipped.
Fearing that matters would become serious, Stössel sent the following
note to Smirnoff:
'The strictest steps must be taken at once to deal with the looting
which has commenced. I would request you to be so kind as to send out
patrols. Reuss tells me that the terms of the surrender are honourable.
Please excuse pencil.'
It is difficult to understand what was in his mind when he wrote that
note. Was he laughing at the Commandant, or had he gone off his head?
As soon as Irman heard of the surrender he went to Smirnoff.
'Is it true, sir, that the Fortress has been surrendered?'
'I know nothing about it. Stössel has done everything without reference
to me. Go and ask him.'
Irman went at once to Stössel, and having ascertained that the Fortress
had been given up, he asked leave to go to Chifu on a destroyer: he
wished to break through to the army in the north. But Stössel flatly
refused permission, saying:
'Good heavens! what are you talking about? What are we to do with all
the gold vases? How am I to get them away? Why, the Japanese might get
them; we must save them.'
'If you want to make certain that the Japanese don't get them, sir, I
should throw them into the sea,' was Irman's answer.
Stössel was referring to the gold vases, goblets, spoons, etc., looted
from the Pekin Palace which were kept in Arthur. The gold plate had
been kept under special arrangements in the quarter-guard of the 12th
Regiment, but when this corps left for Manchuria the plate was left
behind. On the evening of January 3 a mysterious cart arrived at the
quarter-guard, and disappeared in the dark of the night.
Some of the questions put to Stössel later at the Commission of
Inquiry, and his replies to them, may help to show how he was occupied
at this time. When asked by Major-General Roops why he, contrary to all
military regulations, took out of Arthur some thirty-eight cartloads of
his own property, he replied:
'I did it with the permission of the Emperor of Japan.'
On being asked why he did not share the fate of the garrison and go
into imprisonment, he answered:
'I was ordered not to by Her Imperial Highness the Tsarina.'
He had indeed received a telegram from the Empress in which she had
said she would be glad to 'see him in Russia.' The Emperor and Russia
did not at that time know what Stössel was!
When he was asked by the Commission why he surrendered Port Arthur
on his own responsibility, and did not summon the Council of War to
consider the question, he said:
'There was no time for that. I forestalled the Japanese, and did not
give them the possibility of breaking into Arthur; I was thus able to
prevent a street massacre.'
And this was the cry of all the whole Stössel clique before the
Committee of Inquiry.
One extract from the diary and I have finished:
'_January 2, 1905._--On the way to the rendezvous of the Japanese
Commission appointed to take over, we met an officer of the Japanese
General Staff who greeted us in Russian. Ribnikoff at once recognized
him to be a man called Ito, who had been in Arthur for several years as
a watchmaker!'
Small wonder they beat us!
So it ended--so ended Russian Port Arthur. From its loss--from this
mighty struggle, this long-drawn-out nightmare of suffering, this death
of all our aspirations--new hope is born to our nation, a hope of
better days.
_Salus patriæ. Suprema lex est._
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 44: The text of this capitulation was drawn up two years
before by one of the most able Japanese lawyers.]
CONCLUSION[45]
As this book leaves the hands of the printer, the columns of the daily
press are conveying to the world the terms of the indictment of the
chief characters mentioned in it for their share in the surrender of
the Fortress of Port Arthur to the Japanese. As this constitutes an
official confirmation of much that I have written, I include it in my
book, so that the reader may be in a position to judge if the title of
my work is justified.
This indictment, I may add, has been drawn up by three separate
Commissions, composed of the highest Government officials and experts
in military law.
Official Indictment.
Lieutenant-General Stössel, of the retired list, is charged as follows:
1. In that he, having on July 3, 1904, received an order from the
Commander-in-Chief of the Army in Manchuria to hand over command of the
Fortress of Port Arthur to its Commandant, Lieutenant-General Smirnoff,
and to leave the Fortress, disobeyed, and, remaining in the Fortress,
retained command of it--an action provided for under Article 255, Book
XXII., of the 'Military Code of 1869,' third edition.
2. In that he, in defiance of Order No. 339 of April 27, 1904, by the
Viceroy in the Far East, did interfere with the powers and duties
of the Commandant of the Fortress, thus undermining the latter's
authority, shaking public confidence in him, and so diminishing the
defensive capabilities of the Fortress. The following are instances of
such interference:
(_a_) Granting permission over the Commandant's head, and against his
orders, for supplies to be taken out of the Fortress.
(_b_) Appointing Civilian Counsellor Riabinin to the charge of the
Medical Department without making him subordinate to the Commandant
of the Fortress.
(_c_) Transferring the Dalny Hospital, in opposition to the
Commandant's orders and to the detriment of the public service, to a
site selected by himself.
(_d_) Removing the Chief of the Fire Brigade, Weykanen, from duty.
(_e_) Sending the Gendarmerie to Liao-tieh-shan.
(_f_) Closing the printing-offices of the _Novy Kry_, and ordering
the arrest of M. Nojine, who was on the staff of that journal.
(_g_) Stopping work on the second and third lines of defence.
Provided for under, etc.
3. In that he did not in time take proper steps to increase the
quantity of supplies in the Fortress, as follows:
(_a_) By not supplementing the reserve of vegetables, although this
was quite possible.
(_b_) By not arranging to requisition horses, in accordance with the
Mobilization Regulations, and to increase the number of cattle in the
Fortress.
(_c_) By not sanctioning the Commandant's request that the rations
of horse-flesh might be increased, a course which was absolutely
necessary to maintain the strength of the worn-out garrison.
Provided for under, etc.
4. In that he, during the siege, received and read certain 'Memoranda,'
written by Lieutenant-General Fock, which were composed in a derisive
and offensive spirit, and of a nature calculated to undermine the
authority of, and bring odium upon, several of the Commanders, subvert
discipline, and lower the _moral_ of the garrison; and, in spite of
their harmful influence upon the defence, took no steps to prevent
their publication and circulation among the troops.
Provided for under, etc.
5. In that he, for his personal ends, sent reports to the
Commander-in-Chief of the Army in Manchuria on May 27 and 31, and to
the Viceroy on May 30, referring to the battle at Kinchou, in which he,
in contradiction to the actual facts and to the actions of himself and
those present, asserted that 'In this warm corner we fired every shell
we had got,' and that 'we retired in perfect order on Nangalin,' and
drew up these reports in such a manner as to make it appear that he,
General Stössel, had in person acted with great energy and directed
operations, while--
(_a_) During the battle at Kinchou, he--General Stössel--remained in
Port Arthur, and personally took no part in the action.
(_b_) There was a large quantity of ammunition at Nangalin Station
for the quick-firing guns, as was known to all the artillery units.
(_c_) The retirement on Nangalin was carried out in great haste and
in complete disorder--so much so that certain units rushed through
and broke down the wire entanglement obstacle.
Provided for under, etc.
6. In that he, for his own advantage, and in order to place the actions
of his subordinates in the most favourable light, on May 28, 1904,
reported to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army in Manchuria that the
force under Lieutenant-General Fock 'was falling back gradually towards
Wolfs Hills'--a statement directly opposed to facts, as the retirement
of the force direct on to Wolf's Hills (the last of the advanced
positions) was effected in complete disorder and in great haste along
a hilly road, blocked with transport and by the inhabitants of Dalny
retreating to Port Arthur.
Provided for under, etc.
7. In that he, for his own advantage, and in order to represent himself
as taking a part in various actions (which did not take place), on
June 14, 1904, reported in writing to the Commander-in-Chief of the
Manchurian Army as to his own great activity in the conduct of the
defence, in which report he stated, in opposition to facts: ' ... I
always make a point of being in every possible engagement ...'; while
from February 8, 1904, to June 14--_i.e._, up to the date of his letter
to General Kuropatkin--not a single engagement with the Japanese took
place (except the battle at Kinchou, in which he--General Stössel--took
no part) but the bombardments, during which the whole population of
Port Arthur were in equal danger.
Provided for under, etc.
8. In that he, in the hope of justifying the prearranged surrender of
the Fortress to the enemy, on December 29, 1904, reported to the Tsar
in a telegram that: 'By the capture of Fort No. 3 the Japanese have
become masters of the whole north-east front, and the Fortress can
only hold out for a very few days. We have no artillery ammunition
...'--a report which was not in accordance with the facts, as at the
Council of War held on that day (December 29), when the members by a
large majority declared themselves in favour of holding out to the last
moment, both Major-Generals Biely and Nickitin declared that there was
sufficient ammunition in hand for a further defence.
Provided for under, etc.
9. In that he intentionally, improperly, and with false statements
recommended:
(_a_) Lieutenant-General Fock for promotion to the Third Class Order
of St. George for the battle which he lost at Kinchou, and in which
he displayed complete incompetence;
(_b_) Major-General Nadein for promotion to the Third Class Order of
St. George for the same battle, in which he in no way distinguished
himself;
(_c_) Major-General Reuss for the Fourth Class of the same Order,
this officer himself asserting that he had done nothing whatever to
merit such a reward.
Provided for under, etc.
10. In that he, while in command of the District, and being the senior
officer in a fortress which was being besieged by the Japanese, and of
which the Commandant was subordinate to him, decided to surrender the
Fortress to the enemy, and, in order to do so, in spite of the opinion
of the great majority of the Council of War held on December 29, 1904,
in favour of the continuation of the defence (which was in every way
possible), and without, in accordance with the Regulations, convening
a fresh Council of War, did between 3 and 4 p.m. on January 1, 1905,
despatch a _parlementaire_ to General Nogi, commanding the besieging
army, proposing to enter into negotiations for the surrender of the
Fortress, although all means of defence had not been exhausted, as the
fighting strength of the garrison and the amount of war material and of
supplies permitted of a continuation of it.
In that he, after this, agreed to the proposal of Lieutenant-General
Fock, commanding the land defences, to abandon Little Eagle's Nest,
Kuropatkin Lunette, and B Battery without a fight, which action greatly
diminished the power of resistance of the Fortress.
In that he, on the following day--January 2, 1905--authorized
Colonel Reuss, his Chief of the Staff, to conclude definitely the
capitulation without giving him any precise instructions as to the
terms to be insisted upon on our side, in consequence of which Colonel
Reuss signed, in the village of Siu-shuing, to terms which were
disadvantageous and derogatory to the dignity of Russia, in which
action General Stössel himself failed to perform his duty according to
his oath and to the honour of a soldier.
In that he, having surrendered the Fortress to the enemy, did not share
the fate of the garrison by accompanying it into military confinement.
Provided for under, etc.
Major-General Reuss is charged as follows:
1. In that he, while Chief of the Staff of the Kwantun District, and
being aware of General Stössel's intention to surrender the Fortress of
Port Arthur to the Japanese at a time when the fighting strength of the
garrison and the quantity of munitions of war and of supplies assured
the possibility of a continuance of the defence, concurred in this
intention, and assisted General Stössel in the execution of it--for
instance:
(_a_) At the meeting of the Defence Committee on December 8, 1904,
and at the Council of War on December 29, 1904, exaggerating the
critical state of affairs, and declaring that further opposition was
useless, and that the Fortress should be surrendered.
(_b_) Prematurely composing and despatching at General Stössel's
direction on January 1, 1905, a letter to General Nogi, commanding
the Japanese besieging army, in which proposals were made for
negotiations for a capitulation.
(_c_) On the following day, January 2, 1905, without demanding
definite instructions from General Stössel regarding the conditions
to be insisted on for surrender, going to Siu-shuing village--the
place appointed for the negotiations--and raising no objections to
the demands put forward by the Japanese representatives, signing
that same day to the capitulation of the Fortress upon terms
disadvantageous to Russia and derogatory to her dignity, and by such
action co-operating with General Stössel in the surrender of the
Fortress to the enemy.
Provided for under, etc.
Lieutenant-General Fock is charged as follows:
1. In that he, having received categorical instructions on February
27 and May 19, 1904, to make an obstinate defence, even to a defence
with the bayonet, at the Kinchou position, not only with the 5th East
Siberian Rifle Regiment, but with the 13th and 14th Regiments, which
were close at hand, and disregarding these orders and the fact that
General Stössel had himself undertaken the defence of Inchenzy Bay,
which was in rear of the position--
(_a_) When the battle had begun on the morning of May 26, 1904,
instead of taking command, did go away to Inchenzy Bay to select a
position there for the 15th Regiment, in case the Japanese should
land there, and did not arrive at the attacked position till 2 p.m.
(_b_) Did only send one of the four regiments present at Kinchou into
action, and thus did cause its separate destruction.
(_c_) Did not only fail to make any use of his reserves during the
battle, but did stop two battalions which were going up into the
fighting line, under orders from General Nadein.
(_d_) Without having exhausted every means of defence, and without
having recourse to the bayonet, did telegraph to General Stössel in
Port Arthur, in order to induce him to order a retirement, as to 'the
critical position,' and the complete lack of gun ammunition, there
being at the time a large quantity of ammunition at the station of
Nangalin.
(_e_) Having, in consequence of this, received instructions from
General Stössel to retire at dusk, did commence the retirement in
daylight, thus causing many casualties, and ceding to the Japanese
the fortified position at Kinchou, without having made use of all the
means at his disposal for its protracted defence.
Provided for under, etc.
2. In that he, during the battle of August 21, 1904, having received
an order from his immediate Commanding Officer--the Commandant of
the Fortress--to send two battalions of the 14th East Siberian Rifle
Regiment to the advanced forts on the north-east front, did not at
once obey the order, but entered into an untimely argument with the
Commandant, and did not himself accompany the last unit of the reserve
under his command.
Provided for under, etc.
3. In that he, having no official position in the defence from August
22, 1904, to December 16, 1904, and going round the positions on his
own initiative, under the pretext of assisting the defence, but really
in a cowardly desire to prove himself superior in bravery, knowledge
and ability to the other commanders, did allow himself to discuss
affairs and to issue 'Memoranda,' in which he not only offensively
criticized the actions of those who were not under his orders--accusing
them of incompetence and cowardice--but also spread abroad the idea
that the defence of the forts and fortified positions should not be
carried to such a length as to cause many casualties, and did act
in such a manner that his views and 'Memoranda' became known to the
garrison at large (including the soldiers), by which he shook the
belief of the troops in the necessity for, and the possibility of,
holding the defences to the very last.
Provided for under, etc.
4. In that he, having on December 16, 1904, taken over the duties of
Commander of the Land Defences of the Fortress of Port Arthur, and
finding it impossible to hold Fort No. 2 any longer, did report this
fact personally to the Officer Commanding the District, and did not
report it to the Commandant of the Fortress, to whom he was directly
subordinate, and having received General Stössel's permission on
December 18, 1904, did order that this fort should be abandoned and
blown up without informing the Commandant.
Provided for under, etc.
5. In that he, while Commander of the Land Defences of the Fortress,
and being aware of General Stössel's intention to surrender the
Fortress of Port Arthur to the Japanese before all means of defence
had been exhausted, as the fighting strength of the garrison and the
amount of supplies and munitions of war assured the possibility of a
continuance, concurred in this intention, and assisted General Stössel
in the execution of it. For instance:
On December 1, 1904,[46] reporting to General Stössel that it was
necessary to send a _parlementaire_ at once to General Nogi with
proposals to capitulate, and then, after its despatch, upon his
own responsibility, and in spite of the orders of the Commandant,
ordering, under threats, General Gorbatovsky, who was in command
of the defences on the east front, to abandon Little Eagle's
Nest, Kuropatkin Lunette, and B Battery without a fight, which
works were accordingly in the evening abandoned by our troops,
he--Lieutenant-General Fock--knowing full well that by these
dispositions of his he had placed the defence of the Fortress
under most disadvantageous conditions should the negotiations for
surrender be for any reason broken off, and had enabled the Japanese
representatives to demand from us most disadvantageous and degrading
terms of capitulation.
Provided for under, etc.
Lieutenant-General Smirnoff is charged as follows:
1. In that he, suspecting, after the surrender to the Japanese of Fort
No. 2, the existence of an understanding between Generals Stössel and
Fock to reduce the Fortress to such a state as to justify capitulation,
and in despite of the responsibility resting upon him under the terms
of Article 57 of the 'Regulations for the Guidance of Commanders
of Fortresses,' did not immediately deprive General Fock of his
command, did not take energetic action to prevent the above-named
officers carrying out their plan, and confined himself to despatching
a telegram to the Commander-in-Chief, in which he requested that he
might be either given full power as Commandant or relieved from all
responsibility as such for the future defence of the Fortress.
Provided for under, etc.
2. In that he, having learned on January 1, 1905, of the despatch
by General Stössel of a letter to General Nogi containing proposals
for negotiations for surrender, in spite of Article 69, Book XXII.,
of the 'Military Code of 1869,' third edition, and Article 57 of the
'Regulations for the Guidance of Commanders of Fortresses,' did not
convene a meeting of the Committee of Defence, did not insist that
General Stössel should act in accordance with Article 62 of the above
'Regulations,' and did not carry out the resolution of the Council
of War of December 29, 1904, to continue a protracted defence of the
Fortress.
Provided for under, etc.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 45: Written by the author in October, 1907. This was the
official indictment then published, and contains the main charges upon
which the officers stood their trial.--E.D.S.]
[Footnote 46:? January 1, 1905.--E.D.S.]
APPENDIX I
General Fock's Memorandum _re_ the Surrender of Fort No. 2.
[Chi-kuan-shan.]
In order that General Fock's motives may not be misunderstood, the
Memorandum written by him, in which he essayed to clear himself of
the charge of wrongfully abandoning Fort No. 2, is reproduced. It
needs, however some elucidation, both for the sake of clearness and
accuracy. Those who are not well acquainted with Fock's proceedings
in Port Arthur, both as a General and as an individual, and with
all the circumstances of the defence, might possibly misunderstand
this document, as the authors possessed a great power of persuasion,
both with pen and speech, and even now has a considerable number of
adherents and advocates.
Memorandum.
'Fort No. 2 was abandoned on December 18, 1904, with General
Stössel's permission and by my order. Next day I had a conversation
on the subject with General Smirnoff, who said:
'"Why did you surrender the fort? I would have sent you as many
reinforcements as you wanted; I have some 30,000 in the Fortress. By
abandoning it you have undermined the root of my principle--that no
fort should pass into the enemy's hands except after the death of all
its defenders."'
In saying this General Smirnoff was quite in the right. Fock did not
reinforce the garrison either in time or sufficiently, although quite
able so to do. The whole essence of the defence at the end consisted in
the use of mobile reserves for the reinforcement of threatened points.
It was by his intelligent anticipation of Nogi's tactics and his
skillfull movement and employment of reserves that Smirnoff was able so
long to check the attack.
' ... Later, when giving evidence before General Roop's Commission, I
was asked:
'"Did you take any steps to prevent the example of Fort No. 2 being
followed, and to ensure that the principle that a garrison should
resist to the last should not be forgotten?"
'I was amazed at such a question, and that a principle, of which I
had never before heard and which is not to be found in any text-book
on tactics or field-service manual, should be assumed by the
Commission to be an irrefutable axiom, to ignore which was a crime.
'But I was still more astonished a short time ago when, in a paper
submitted by General Smirnoff to the War Minister and circulated
amongst officials and other educated men, I saw the following:
'"The surrender of Fort No. 2 struck at the root of the principle
that a fort 'dies, but does not surrender'--a principle preached and
reiterated by myself and all those in command. By the example of the
surrender of this fort the garrisons of the others were shaken in
their belief that forts are 'holies of holies,' only to be captured
after the death of the whole garrison defending them, and were led
to consider them as just ordinary fortified positions which can be
freely abandoned as soon as their defence becomes difficult. This was
proved by the abandonment within ten days of Fort No. 3."
'Only when I became aware of this Note of General Smirnoff's did I
understand the drift of the question put to me by the Commission;
it was not hard then to see the connexion between the two. It was
evident, therefore, that in this important question, as in those
which had preceded, the Commission was being guided more by this
memorandum of the late Commandant of the Fortress than by the desire
for an impartial inquiry into facts.'
Though well on in years, General Fock apparently did not know, and was
astonished to hear, that 'forts die, but do not surrender,' that 'the
bones of a regiment should surround its fallen colours,' that 'a gun
must be fought till not a man is left,' etc. Fock did not know this; he
had not seen it laid down in any official text-book!
Naturally he did not and could not know it. Knowledge of the sacredness
of duty is not acquired by the perusal of manuals and regulations any
more than an honourable feeling is acquired by reading books of a
high moral tone. The duty and honour of the citizen soldier has no
written code as its guide, but only the long, brilliant list of great
deeds extending from far-off olden times to the present day. Upon these
legends, matured by time, nations, their armies, and individuals are
brought up. A sense of duty and honour is not obtained by reading, but
is imbibed with the mother's milk and developed by later teaching. I
doubt if there could be found in any European army (naturally not in
the Japanese, where officers and generals are brought up on the ethics
of the chivalrous spirit 'Bushido') a general officer who would be
surprised to hear that a fort should not surrender. How could a Russian
general be ignorant of it? Surely such an assertion is a stain on all
the general officers of the Russian army!
No, it is not so. For General Fock's ignorance of the rudiments of
military duty one must seek deeper reasons. He was, it appears, in the
_Gendarmerie_--where the duties were somewhat different to those of the
army--for almost five years. Their atmospheres are totally opposed: the
work of the one is to fight an external foe: of the other to fight an
internal enemy.
One amongst the many surprises so liberally provided for us by the old
régime was Fock's sudden reappearance in the army and arrival in the
Far East as Officer Commanding the gallant fighting 4th Division, as
the friend and adviser of General Stössel, and, indeed, as the sole
individual to work out Arthur's destiny. The defence of a fortress is
soldiers' and not gendarmes' work.
'... The specific charge against me was framed as follows:
'"In that he, while in command of the Land Defences ordered the
abandonment of Fort No. 2 without obtaining the Commandant's
permission, and without even letting him know of his intention--an
act in which he exceeded his powers, and one which is legislated for
by Articles 141 and 145, Book XXII. (third edition), S.V.P., 1869."
'This charge is curiously worded. I was accused of exceeding my
powers, and yet the Commission was at the same time well aware
that I did not abandon the fort of my own free-will, but with the
permission of General Stössel, who, being senior to General Smirnoff,
had appointed me to command the Land Defences and issued orders to
me direct. Consequently there can be no question of my exceeding my
powers.'
According to the exact sense of the regulations on the subject, the
Officer Commanding the Land Defences is directly subordinate to the
Commandant of the Fortress, and has absolutely no right to abandon
forts without his sanction, or without that of the Defence Committee.
If General Stössel, having usurped the Commandant's authority,
interfered with the defence, and his interference was detrimental to
the defence, then Fock should not have obeyed his orders, even though
proceeding from the senior officer. On the contrary, he should by every
means within his power have endeavoured to counteract such detrimental
influence in the same way that Kondratenko did during his lifetime: he
should have consulted the Commandant with regard to everything, and
have carried out his orders alone. The fact was that Stössel issued all
his orders at Fock's instigation, and did nothing without him. He knew
so little of what went on at the front that he would never have decided
to issue any order himself, and especially such a weighty order as the
abandonment of the first fort.
'... However, though the legal accusation of itself falls to the
ground, I might perhaps be considered morally guilty of abandoning
the fort. The above-quoted Articles of War might be strained, and it
might be thought something was wrong about the defence of the fort
and its abandonment.
'This prevents my confining myself merely to a straightforward answer
to the charge and compels me to ask, "Could the fort have held out
longer or not?"
'On going before the Commission for the first time, I was asked:
'"Why did you not defend the fort, and why did you abandon it without
a fight, without even waiting for General Gorbatovsky?"
'I never expected the Commission to accuse me of such a thing, and I
was so agitated that I could not reply calmly. How could I keep cool
when I heard the defenders of the fort so unjustly accused by General
Roop, the very officer whose words, twenty years ago, had been law
to me and all other combatant officers, when for hours together we
used to listen to his appreciations and criticisms of manoeuvres? He
still spoke as well as ever, weighing every word, but spoke with a
sarcastic smile; and now that I have read or heard the evidence of
all the General Officers who have been examined, I understand that it
is possible even for him to have been led astray.
'The accusation levelled by General Smirnoff against the brave
garrison was supported not only by General Officers who took no part
in the defence and had not seen it, but even by General Nickitin, to
whom the state of the fort was so well known that he refrained from
accompanying General Kondratenko along the forts after the Japanese
had mined the parapets. (It is to this that we owed his presence in
our midst.) As to General Mekhmandaroff, he even asserted that after
the explosion of three mines he could still see sentries standing by
the parapet. And General Irman, who was at the time on the western
front, based his statement on that given by Mekhmandaroff. The
evidence given by the other officers was of equal value.
'But however varied the evidence, it all pointed to one thing--that
the garrison failed to do its duty, that it did not crown the crater
in the parapet. This being so, I should point out that it is usually
the attackers who crown craters. At Sevastopol our sappers certainly
distinguished themselves by themselves crowning the craters of the
unsuccessful attack, but they had not been charged with some fifty
hundredweight of pyroxyline, as was the case in Fort No. 2.'
Thus to divert the blame on to the garrison of the fort in order to
parry the blow against himself was not creditable. The men did their
duty gallantly to the last; they fought till they were ordered to
withdraw; they did everything possible, and were in no way to blame
for the surrender and had no need of Fock to defend or praise them.
If they had not been able to crown the crater by five o'clock, it was
Fock alone who was to blame; firstly for having weakened the garrison,
secondly for not reinforcing it in time.
'The evidence of the Generals above mentioned was, on the whole,
so absurd and so little supported by facts that it does not merit
serious attention.'
The evidence of the Generals was founded on facts. They were men who
throughout the siege were rarely absent from the attacked front. They
were men of honour, whose names are the pride of the army; but this is
no reason for treating their evidence as undeserving of attention.
'... That of General Gorbatovsky, however, is different. According
to him he went to the fort at 11 p.m., and finding the men leaving
it, drove them back, sent for Captain Kwats, who was in command,
and threatened him with a court-martial for abandoning it on his
own responsibility, and only then found out that the withdrawal was
being carried out in accordance with orders from me. This evidence is
plausible, and upon it the charge is probably based; for how is it
possible to disbelieve the testimony of a General who was in command
of the eastern front?
'To judge from it, one would think that the abandonment of the fort
came as a complete surprise to him; that he thought it wrong, and,
that had he himself been in the fort, it would never have been
evacuated. I was unable to rebut this evidence at the time, and to
assert that the abandonment was not a surprise; besides, no one
present would have believed me. Fortunately for me, however, I was
not caught tripping. I asked to see the telephone messages referring
to that time, and in going through them came on one which I, and
doubtless General Gorbatovsky also, had forgotten. This message
clears me of his charge, and throws much light on the part taken by
him in the abandonment of the fort; it was from him to the Staff of
the Land Defences, and was dated 9.35 p.m., December 18, 1904:
'"From Fort No. 2 it is reported that heavy casualties are occurring
from grenades thrown by the enemy. We have not been able to reoccupy
the parapet. I therefore propose to avail myself of your permission
to blow up the casemates, and I have ordered the garrison to hold
out until the sappers have got the mines ready. As a precautionary
measure, and to cover the garrison during the retirement, please
move a company, temporarily, from the main reserve to the Ice-house.
I am just going myself to Colonel Glagoleff to give the necessary
instructions on the spot."
'Consequently, at 9.35 that night General Gorbatovsky was not only
not opposed to the surrender of the fort, but himself gave orders
for it to be abandoned; while at 11 p.m. he was, according to his
evidence, horrified at his own order, saw that it was wrong, and
talked of courts-martial.
'I hope that a study of all the papers similar to these produced
before the Commission will acquit me of the charges preferred against
me by General Roop's Commission.'
Quite true! That message was sent by General Gorbatovsky, but only
after a telephone message had been received from Fock at 7.40 p.m. to
the following effect:
'General Stössel has given orders that the casemates of Fort No. 2
are to be mined at once, and then, if the Japanese do not withdraw
from the fort--_i.e._, from the parapet--the garrison is to leave
the fort, and the casemates are to be blown up. The enemy are not
to be allowed to establish themselves on the parapet, which must
be fired on by the guns and the torpedo tube. In view of Captain
Stepanoff's report, to the effect that before sunset he and Colonel
Mekhmandaroff could see from Big Eagle's Nest only one Japanese
officer and three men on the parapet, laying sand-bags, I leave it to
you to hold on to the fort as long as you think necessary. In giving
this order, based on my report, General Stössel came to this decision
only because he thought that under present circumstances no other
course was possible. At sunset a sailor came to me and reported that
by the explosion of a bomb thrown by the enemy we had had fifteen
casualties.'
As the reader can see for himself, it was impossible to tell from this
how Fock meant to act or what he meant to do. Knowing from experience
that anything might be expected from him, and that directly after the
explosion of the mines during the day he had called the fort lost,
Gorbatovsky decided to make all arrangements for a well-organized
retirement, and so to avert a possible panic and consequent dash
through by the enemy. It was only for this reason that he sent the
telegram quoted above by Fock, but he gave no order for the fort to be
abandoned.
In reply to his message to Fock, sent at 9.35 p.m., he at once
received the following from Colonel Dmitrevsky, Chief of Fock's staff,
despatched at 9.40 p.m.:
'General Fock fully concurs in your opinion about Fort No. 2. He
trusts that you will see that the repairs to Kuropatkin Lunette are
energetically carried out.'
And this was immediately followed by a message to him from Lieutenant
Kondrasheff, dated 9.45 p.m., December 18, 1904:
'General Fock, commanding the Land Defences, wishes you to see that
all the ammunition and other stores are carried away from Fort No. 2,
and that the bridge is destroyed.'
When General Gorbatovsky received these messages he went to the fort.
Orders had already been received from General Fock to abandon it, and
the withdrawal had begun before his arrival. He had gone to find out
the exact state of affairs on the spot, and on reaching it after 11
p.m. he met the retreating garrison. It was such a surprise to him
that he 'fell upon' Captain Kwats, threatened to have him tried by
court-martial for abandoning the fort without orders, and was in reply
informed that it was being left upon an order received direct from Fock.
'However, in order to give a more accurate description of the state
of affairs, I will describe the fighting just as I saw and reported
it. I described the fight in March to General Roop's Commission, but
what I said was doubted.'
Unfortunately, a knowledge of the true state of affairs at the
withdrawal from the fort shows that Roop's Commission had formed a true
opinion of Fock's account.
'According to General Smirnoff, I so demoralized the men, that on
December 18, when the explosion took place, no volunteer could be
found among them to crown the crater.
'... I am ashamed, not on my own account, but on account of the
gallant defenders of the fort, to read Smirnoff's slander concerning
them. For what did he take Captain Kwats, the commanding officer, and
the men? Had it been necessary for the garrison to be on the parapet,
Kwats would have had no difficulty in finding volunteers even at that
critical moment. He need only have shouted, "Follow me--advance!" and
they would have dashed after him. As I have said above, my evidence
as to the fall of the fort is considered by many to be untrue, and
more credit is attached to the evidence of General Mekhmandaroff, who
said he saw a man on the rampart after the explosion, etc.'
To say that Fock demoralized the troops would only be to repeat what
has frequently been said. In Arthur no one doubted it. It is in vain
that he sheds tears for the garrison; it is his own conduct that is
questioned, not the gallantry of the men. That Kwats did not dash
forward and take men with him to crown the craters is Fock's fault. It
required much presence of mind, and the garrison was much upset.
'After the explosion, which took place at noon, the fort was
subjected to a heavy fire, and our men ran to the retrenchment and
held it. To this timely occupation of the retrenchment I ascribe the
death of many of the Japanese "forlorn hope." Having jumped up on to
the parapet and seen that we were there to meet them, they hesitated
for a moment, but this moment was long enough for them to be wafted
into eternity. They were buried under the falling débris of the
explosion. At the same time the Japanese guns opened fire on all
our near batteries; and when these were silenced, whole regiments of
the enemy stormed the parapet, but were repulsed with case shot and
rifle-fire. A few men only reached the craters, whence they began
throwing grenades, while we, from the glacis and caponier, fired
torpedo-heads and bombs.'
The storming by whole Japanese regiments is pure imagination on the
part of Fock, who was at the time at least four miles from the scene of
action. Mr. Norregaard,[47] who watched the attack, says that, after
the destruction of the first party of stormers by the falling débris
and the fire of our batteries, the Japs busied themselves clearing the
approaches to the fort and did not assault till evening.
'The heroic garrison were almost all annihilated, when a reserve of
sailors was sent up to the fort. I regret that I cannot say to what
ship they belonged or what officers were with them; I can only say
that from first to last they were heroes.
'They had to go from the Chinese Wall through Kuropatkin Lunette, and
what was this lunette like by now? Stones, planks, sand-bags, corpses
were all jumbled together in the trenches, and at the entrance of
that communicating from Fort No. 2 there was not a vestige of a
parapet. These men at first ran along the trench, and then, seeing
that it was filled up, jumped out to right and left, and under a
murderous fire doubled along in the open, officers in front. They
rushed to where it entered the fort, which was full of killed and
wounded. Some crossed the bridge, others went down into the ditch,
jumping from heap to heap.
'They entered the fort in order to fill the thinned ranks of the
defenders, and seventeen of them were at once blown up by a mine.
With their arrival one might have felt confident that the fort would
not easily be seized by the Japanese; but darkness came on and the
shouts of "Banzai" could still be heard, mingling into one continuous
and increasing roar.
'The wounded now came back less frequently, but those that came told
of horrors. From what they said I understood how difficult it was
to cross the ditch, and that few would succeed in doing it; and so,
fearing that all means of access would be closed, I asked for the
bamboo ladders to be sent up, which had been taken from the enemy on
November 26, when they tried to storm Fort No. 3.
'The position of the garrison got worse and worse. To get an order
taken we had to call for volunteers and offer the Cross of St.
George to those who succeeded in carrying it. It was clear to me and
to every one else present that the fort could not be held longer
under such conditions, and so I thought it my duty to withdraw the
remnants of that gallant band at night. I reported this to General
Stössel and asked his permission to abandon the fort; he agreed.
'I then ordered Colonel Glagoleff to hold on till night, when, after
removing everything possible in the way of supplies, he was to
withdraw the men and blow up the fort.
'At 11.30 p.m. the garrison moved out of the fort, which was blown
up at 2 a.m., and retired on Kuropatkin Lunette. It had held out
for four months, despite the Japanese having seized the caponier in
October, and established themselves in the ditch. Military history
contains few instances of such a dogged and prolonged defence.
'Next day General Smirnoff had the above quoted conversation with me.
In reply to his question as to why I had surrendered the fort, etc.,
I said:
'"I did not need your men; they would only have hampered me."
'He seemed surprised at this answer and asked, "Why?"
'"Because," I said, "the men would never have reached the place, and
then what should I have done? They wouldn't have gone because they
couldn't have done it."
'"Ah, your men are wasters--runaways!" said he, and then began to
talk of them in his usual manner.
'I quoted a few instances from history to him--among them some of
Austerlitz--in order to show him that some things always had been and
always would be; and I finished my remarks by saying:
'"It was a pity that you were not taught psychology at the Academy."'
No one denies that the fort was in a very bad way, but such conditions
are only to be expected in war where the path to glory is not strewn
with roses. As soon as the situation became critical the garrison
should have been reinforced, and this Fock did not do. He had decided
during the day that the fort could not be held, and for this reason
abandoned it.
In repeating his conversation with Smirnoff he perverted the facts,
which were, as I have already described in detail in a foregoing
chapter. Since he touched on the question of psychology, it would be
interesting to know what kind of psychology he himself understood--that
of police-work service or of war? Smirnoff certainly did occasionally
call the men 'runaways' in conversation with his intimate friends,
but he was far from thinking that the troops could be disobedient.
In saying that 'the men would never have reached the place, and then
what should I have done?' Fock was himself accurately describing the
very demoralization of which he was accused of being the cause. During
Kondratenko's life there had been no suggestion of such a spirit.
'After this I felt it was useless to attempt to persuade Smirnoff of
anything, for the simple reason that both he and Colonel Khvostoff
look upon every one who was not a General officer or an officer of
the General Staff in the same way that our great-grandmothers looked
upon their serf-handmaidens.'
What General Fock meant by this I really cannot tell.
'Our great-grandmothers said and believed that it was impossible
for Palashka to fall in love. In the same way General Smirnoff and
Colonel Khvostoff believed that the common soldier had no instinct
of self-preservation, and that such need not therefore be taken
into consideration. It need only, they thought, be reckoned with
in Generals and General Staff officers, who alone have a right to
possess it.
'Colonel Khvostoff preached this doctrine to General Nickitin in the
following words: "Officers of the General Staff are of great value to
the Empire, and they should, therefore, take care of their lives."'
'From General Smirnoff's words, "It undermined the root of the
principle which I have always insisted on," it is evident that
General Stössel did not harass General Smirnoff as much as the latter
sometimes makes out. Moreover, all who went through the siege would
like to know in what way Smirnoff insisted on the observance of this
principle. Principles can be driven into men by orders, speeches,
and examples. He did not do it in his orders, for such as he issued
were generally taken up with the transfer of nursing-sisters from
one hospital to another. And he was wise, for such orders can only
be written by leaders like Tsar Peter, Suvoroff, Napoleon, who are
well known to their men. He did not attempt it by speeches; for
where, when, and to whom could he speak? Church parades were few, and
were rarely attended by more than twenty to thirty men per regiment.
For a new, unknown man like General Smirnoff there was only one way
left--"example"; but this method was out of date, and its uselessness
was shown by Gustavus Adolphus, Nakhimoff, Korniloff, Istomin, and
therefore it did not find favour with him!
'All this proves that he did not inculcate his principle to the
garrison of Arthur, though undoubtedly future generations will know
of it through the medium of Roop's Commission.'
It is perfectly true that Smirnoff did not take to speechifying.
Together with Kondratenko he worked at the fortifying of the place
while General Stössel was haranguing the troops at church parades
and writing long orders and detailed telegrams. This principle was
not published in orders, as it was well understood by all good
officers. Of this there could be no two opinions. Generals Smirnoff,
Kondratenko, Gorbatovsky, Irman, and Tretiakoff, who stood at
the head of their troops in Arthur, supported by their fearless
example--fighting desperately for every inch of ground entrusted to
them--and not by their words, this principle, which according to Fock
was incomprehensible and silly.
The next generation will know through this Commission how well the
garrison of Arthur lived up to that principle, and it will, at the same
time, know on whom the responsibility of surrender rests.
'He reproaches the garrison of Fort No. 3 for not hurrying out of
the casemate when the explosion took place, though I, and all those
at Big Eagle's Nest, saw them fighting for a long time, throwing
hand-grenades and stones from the retrenchment.
'But it is odd that he should make such charges against anyone
when he himself not only made no haste, but did not attempt to
leave his quarters when the explosion took place in Fort No. 3 and
Fortification No. 3, and when the Chinese Wall, Rocky Ridge, and Big
Eagle's Nest were being stormed. That he did not leave his quarters
and was practically a stranger to his troops is borne out by the fact
that when, after the surrender, the Japanese were taking over the
garrison as prisoners, and he began talking to some of the men, they
made rude remarks, and were heard asking their officers "who is that
General?" As it was the first time that the majority of officers had
seen him, they had to reply: "I don't know; wait, I'll ask." Only
after inquiries were they able to tell their men, "That is General
Smirnoff, the Commandant of the Fortress."'
Fock, of all people, accused Smirnoff of staying in his quarters, and
of being a stranger to the men! In the foregoing pages I have shown by
facts what Smirnoff was to the Fortress, what he did for its defence,
and how he was thwarted at every turn. As far as is in my power I
have tried as clearly and truly as possible to draw the picture of
the hopelessness of his position. Fock, suddenly appointed Officer
Commanding Land Defences, was indeed the autocrat of the Fortress,
for Stössel was to all intents and purposes his subordinate, and
Smirnoff was ignored. Having telegraphed to the Commander-in-Chief,
Smirnoff awaited the reply, and till it came he was powerless to do
anything, for like a wise man he did not want to make bad worse. But
had it come, and had it been favourable to him, he would soon have got
everything right. Smirnoff invested with authority would have saved
Arthur's honour. Very possibly so many sound men, and so many cripples,
would not have returned to Russia, so many decorations would not have
glittered on the breasts of officers, and the number of widows and
orphans might have been greater; but there would have been no need for
any Commission such as that of General Roop. The highest tribunal of
the nation would have judged those responsible for the lost campaign,
but Arthur would have fallen, and not been surrendered.
'I shall be now believed, perhaps, if I say that no one in Arthur
knew of the above-quoted principle, and no one heard tell of it from
Smirnoff. I only heard it at General Roop's Commission. When asked,
"Did you take any steps to prevent the example of Fort No. 2 being
followed, and to ensure that the principle that a garrison should
resist to the last should not be forgotten?" I at once understood
that the defence was degraded to the level of simple treason, and
that they were trying to mock me. Was it not mockery indeed to ask
me such a question? The Commission knew that the garrison abandoned
the fort not of their own free will but by my order. To this insult I
replied as follows:
'"No steps were taken or could be taken by me, as the fort was
abandoned by my order."
'It would have meant I was to take steps against myself--cunning
question indeed. I am satisfied with the defence of that fort; nay,
proud of what constitutes one of the most brilliant pages of the
defence, and will be quoted as an example. By it one principle was
taught, namely, that no soldier will leave his post without orders,
and that the officer in supreme command will never sacrifice lives
needlessly.
'I wrote this in February or March, before any of us had seen the
translations of the books by English authors on the siege of Port
Arthur.
'My description of the fighting does not in the least agree with that
of either Norregaard or James,[48] and no wonder, as I wrote of what
happened under my eyes, and they only wrote what they heard from
survivors of the horrors of that day. I was not credited, because
with us every one wished, and still wishes, only to believe what will
besmirch the fair name of Arthur. This was why only generals were
examined by the Commission.'
He was insulted by the question put to him by the Commission, and in
his reply stated that in defending that fort he had inculcated the
principle that 'no soldier will leave his post without orders, and that
the officer in supreme command will never sacrifice lives needlessly'!
To teach this principle in field warfare is right and proper. But in
fortress warfare, when the enemy are pressing on the line of defences,
when they are storming the forts, when the fall of one fort may bring
on the fall of others, and so lead to greater complications, when there
is nowhere to retire to (we had the third line made by Smirnoff, but it
was ignored by Fock), a fort must indeed 'die and not surrender.' Thus
alone can the spirit and strength of the men in the other forts be kept
up.
'But I will return once more to the discussion of General Smirnoff's
principle. This dogma could only be instilled into the fresh minds of
children, and could not be suddenly introduced during war, for, after
one fight the bravest troops in the world would refuse to believe in
it. The more experienced and braver a man is, the dearer he wants to
sell his life.
'But General Smirnoff called the troops "wasters" and "runaways"
because they did not remain in the wrecked lodgements upon an order
issued by him from his snug room, but ran into others that were
whole, and continued fighting. That commanding officer who inspires
confidence that he will allow no one to perish needlessly will alone
be loved by his officers and men, and may God spare them from feeling
that any General is sacrificing their lives for such a principle as
that for which I was called to answer.
'But it deserves to be examined that we may thoroughly understand on
what lines we are to act in the next war. If the matter is clearly
settled one way or the other it may in the future spare commanders,
who may find themselves in the same position I was in, the horror,
the torments to which I have been subjected in hearing the reproaches
levelled at me by such a weighty Commission--reproaches which did not
touch only me, but also the heroic defenders of the fort.
'My acquittal, I feel, is due to the fact that the principle was
announced by Smirnoff, and not by Suvoroff or by the Tsar Peter,
whose nature would have precluded the enunciation of anything so
vague, so abstract.
'The birth of pure theory amongst us is synchronous with the arrival
upon the scene of a certain type of General, whose influence and
work I can best describe indirectly, by quoting a remark made upon
its results: "We are ourselves to blame for everything. Where the
General was, there were no men; where the men were, there was no
General." This was said by a lieutenant-colonel at a conference
between the Army and Navy, when remarking on a communication of
Lieutenant-Colonel Galkin's, of the General Staff.
'Such are the Generals--the originators of principles similar to that
announced by General Smirnoff. The Japanese Generals were different.
It is true that their Commander-in-Chief and Generals Commanding
armies, like Oyama, Nogi, and others, did not command battalions
and companies; but the subordinate Generals led their troops--even
scouting parties--in the attack, as we more than once witnessed
in Arthur. I mention this because, when I once spoke of Japanese
Generals sitting in the advanced trenches, some of our Generals,
hearing of the gallantry of the Japanese men from Smirnoff, told
me that I was incorrect, and that "the wonderful Japanese soldier
did not need the presence of a General." But in action things were
different. Even "the wonderful Japanese soldier" required to be set
an example by his General. Our--according to many--very ordinary
soldiers were grateful even for the fleeting presence of a General
whom they only saw passing by.
'Put into simple language, the question asked me by the Commission,
as to what steps I had taken to see that the principle that "the
garrison of a fort should resist to the last" was not shaken, means
that a Commander must not allow a single man to come out of a fort
alive.
'(_a_) If regulations permit the surrender of a _fortress_ under
certain conditions, how can they be construed to forbid the
abandonment of a _fort_, when its defenders might be useful in
defending other works of the same fortress?
'(_b_) Is it desirable that a unit told off to the defence of a fort
should go to it feeling like men who went across "the Bridge of
Sighs" in Venice?
'Was it possible for me to literally carry out this principle in
practice?
'Fort No. 2, according to Norregaard, for some hours resembled
a "witch's cauldron," vomiting fire, smoke and flames from the
bursting of countless shimose shells, hand-grenades and torpedoes.
Behind the sand-bags our handful of men were repelling with rifle
and machine-gun the numerous assaults. The Japanese cut off their
communication with the Fortress; reinforcements were not received,
and the number of defenders dwindled. The enemy pounded them
continuously, and the hours of the fort were numbered.
'Such was its state at the moment when I had to decide whether to
save that handful of brave men, or to sacrifice them for the sake of
General Smirnoff's "principle."
'I preferred the first alternative--not from feelings of humanity,
but because I could not take the other; every one else in my place
would have done the same. To judge my action fairly, it must be
borne in mind that I was not sitting before a green-topped Committee
table when I had to make this decision, nor in General Smirnoff's
comfortable quarters, but was near the Chinese Wall.[49] Far from
being in comfort and security, I was at a place that would have
suffered the next blow after the fall of Fort No. 2.
'How I should decide this question was vital to the men--if I should
become their executioner or would act as they expected me to. It was
by no means immaterial to me either; for I should be judged by my
action, and upon it would depend in the future how others fought.
'Though General Smirnoff never left his quarters during the fight, it
did not prevent him reporting it as follows:
'Page 33. "At 11 p.m. I knew that Fort No. 2 had already been
abandoned by our troops and its casemates blown up. This was done by
Captain Kwats, who had only been appointed to command it that day,
under instructions from Lieutenant-Colonel Glagoleff commanding the
section, who was acting on orders received from General Fock, without
even waiting for the arrival of General Gorbatovsky, who was in
supreme command on that flank.
'Page 34. "Meanwhile General Stössel, feeling that it was a very
bad business, issued an order, dated December 27, No. 961, based on
untrue reports made to him by Captain Kwats and Colonel Glagoleff,
in which he made out that the whole shameful affair was a great
exploit.... Ten days later the example of Fort No. 2 was followed by
the abandonment of Fort No. 3, which forced the Council of Defence
and myself to the conclusion that there was an understanding between
Generals Stössel and Fock to reduce the Fortress in the shortest
possible time to such a condition as would justify a capitulation."
'As regards General Smirnoff's opinion that the abandonment of Fort
No. 2 was due to treachery on the part of General Stössel and myself,
I am silent; but I cannot allow him to call its surrender shameful.
This opinion of his bears witness to the fact that between him and
the defenders of Arthur there was about as much in common as between
the baby and the mother who said, "Divide it," when Solomon had
ordered half of the baby to be given to each mother.'
The principle of the non-surrender of a fort should be instilled into
all soldiers from the day they join. A good soldier knows that he
must be the first to lay down his life for his country in war, and
remembers during the whole of a campaign that success is founded on
a clear appreciation of the principle of self-sacrifice by all, from
Commander-in-Chief to private soldier.
War is a death summons.
Death is the soldier's crown.
Every soldier--that is, in the true sense of the word, one who is
willing to die in the struggle--sees in death the highest end of his
calling. By this feeling he exalts the _moral_ of his comrades to an
extent which ensures victory in the end.
Under the circumstances of modern war it is more than ever necessary
that this spirit should be instilled into the individual as well
as into the mass, for the surroundings of a modern battle are more
harrowing than they were in old days. Success in war will be to that
side in which this feeling is most deep, which is best equipped, and
which possesses the most skilful and heroic leaders.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 47: 'The Great Siege,' by B.W. Norregaard.--E.D.S.]
[Footnote 48: 'The Siege of Port Arthur,' by D. James. Translation from
English by Captains von Schwartz and Romanovsky: 'Voenny Sbornik.'
1906. No. 11.]
[Footnote 49: General Fock was at the time in his quarters, a long way
from the fighting.]
APPENDIX II
Extracts from the Official Report on the Kwantun Fortress Artillery,
by Major-General Biely, lately Commanding the Fortress Artillery in
Port Arthur (submitted after the Capitulation).[50]
When hostilities commenced at Port Arthur, neither the engineer nor
artillery preparations for defence were completed, and had hurriedly to
be carried out. To make clear how some of the artillery positions came
into being needs some explanation.
In 1902 a special Committee sat, by order of the Officer Commanding the
District, in order to work out a defence scheme for the district and
for Port Arthur itself. After inspections of the ground, carried out in
1902 and 1903, this Committee decided to allot artillery units to the
following places:
(_a_) Yinchow: some fortress artillery, in the old Chinese fort at the
mouth of the Liao-ho, to protect the entrance.
(_b_) Dalny and Talienwan: some field batteries, to protect the mine
fields in Talienwan Bay.
(_c_) Kinchou: twelve batteries, to check the enemy's invasion of the
peninsula through the narrow neck between Khinoeze (Hand) and Kinchou
Bays.
The advanced positions of Nangalin and Wolf's Hills were noted for
field batteries. Plans were made for artillery emplacements immediately
in front of the Fortress on Pan-lun-shan ridge, on the height near the
temple of Miaosan.
On General Biely's recommendation it was proposed to supplement our
own artillery by the following guns, taken by us from the Chinese in
1900: One 28-centimetre,[51] two 24-centimetre, two 21-centimetre,
four 120-millimetre, two 150-millimetre, twenty-eight 87-millimetre,
more than twenty 75-millimetre, and ten 57-millimetre. We had enough
ammunition, spare parts, and gear to render the greater part of
these guns useful, and work upon their repair and preparation was
started. For the 120-millimetre, 87-millimetre, and 57-millimetre, a
supplementary order for shells, fuses, etc., was in 1903 placed in
Germany (with Krupp). However, when war broke out some of these guns
were not ready owing to deficiency in accessories, etc., and so were
not mounted in position, but were placed in reserve; but the 87- and
75-millimetre guns for Talienwan Bay and the Kinchou position were
allotted.
General Biely, foreseeing that an enemy, by taking up a position with
their ships behind Liao-tieh-shan, would be able to shell the harbour
and town with impunity, suggested that one 28-centimetre and two
24-centimetre Chinese guns should be mounted on the top of that hill.
This was not agreed to by the Committee, as they considered such an
operation by the Japanese fleet to be improbable, and because they were
alarmed at the difficulty and cost of the proposal. Similarly, the
Committee rejected his recommendation for mounting these guns elsewhere
on the shore front--for instance--in the group of batteries on Cross
Hill.
Later, after the outbreak of war, the Viceroy gave orders that a
28-centimetre gun should be mounted on the Kinchou position; but this
was not done, as it was not ready up to the time we abandoned this
position. As will be seen later, this gun, as well as others, were
afterwards got up into position on Liao-tieh-shan and Cross Hill.
In 1902 also, as soon as the scale of armament had been settled,
General Biely laid great stress upon the early provision of a proper
fortress-telephone system, of observation stations, of accurate maps
of the neighbouring ground, and of all the apparatus necessary for
accurate shooting and fire observation; but, from various causes
not under his control, matters hung fire till the end of 1903, when
authority was obtained to raise the required sum by selling a quantity
of the Chinese artillery. Orders were then at once placed with Krupp,
Kunst and Albers, and others, for such articles as could not be
procured in Arthur, whilst other material, such as telephones, wire,
insulators, etc., were bought locally. By the time war broke out this
material had not arrived, which prevented the installation of a new
telephone system.
The destruction of our fleet had naturally not been anticipated in
the original defence scheme; and the idea of mounting naval guns
on shore to supplement the land armament only took shape after the
_Cesarevitch_, _Retvisan_, and _Pallada_ were damaged on the night
of February 8, 1904, and thus condemned to a prolonged inactivity.
The first proposal was to mount four of the _Retvisan's_ 6-inch Canet
guns on Liao-tieh-shan, where, since the middle of March, two 6-inch
(68 cwt.) fortress guns had been in position. The arming of this hill
had been shown to be necessary when the enemy's ships from behind it
shelled Tiger's Tail Peninsula, and our ships in the western basin on
March 10, 22, 23, and April 15. After these guns had been mounted and
high-angle fire from our ships in the western basin had been started,
the enemy's fleet ceased this bombardment. The armament of the Fortress
was naturally much strengthened by the addition of these guns.
Their allotment to batteries was decided by circumstances. The 6-inch
and 120-millimetre guns, being powerful and having long range, were
placed on those points whence they could best attack the enemy's siege
guns. The 47-millimetre, 37-millimetre, and other smaller guns, were
placed in the first line in the intermediate works and in the trenches
between them, principally with a view to repelling assaults. Except
the 2-1/2-inch Baranovsky, these guns only had common shell, but their
accuracy, rapidity of fire, and the abundance of stores for them, made
them suitable for this purpose. The 75-millimetre guns were told off to
the first and second lines as auxiliary armament against the enemy's
nearest siege and field batteries.
This system of allotment of naval guns was not very strictly adhered
to, for it was felt that they were only lent temporarily, and would
have to be returned directly the ships' repairs were completed. For
this reason, and owing to the anxiety to mount them as quickly as
possible on account of the enemy's rapid advance, the 6-inch Canet
guns were mounted on separate batteries, newly built for them, and on
such of the forts and positions as were completed. It was not sound;
and later, when the Japanese began to pound the forts containing
these guns, they were at once silenced, and it was very difficult to
remove and replace them. It was in some cases impossible owing to the
destruction done by the enemy's fire--for instance, when the bridges
over the ditches were damaged.
The fortress howitzers were not mounted in accordance with the
authorized armament table, though the character of the ground rendered
them essential. The 6-inch howitzers were of little use, having only
a short range; for this reason General Smirnoff ordered eight 9-inch
coast howitzers to be mounted in two batteries on the land side. They
were taken from the coast batteries, where they had been quite idle,
and were mounted in rear of the first line, from which position they
did excellent work against the enemy's siege batteries, approaches, and
places of concentration. They were of the greatest use up to the end of
the siege.
For the twenty 6-inch (43 cwt.) guns (latest pattern) which arrived in
the Fortress in March and the twenty-one carriages (1877 pattern) new
batteries were built. The carriages had to be adapted to the guns, but
it was a very difficult operation and not successful, and they were
continually under repair.
On the land front new batteries were being constructed right up to the
end of the siege, to take either fresh guns from the fleet or repaired
Chinese guns, and whenever the plan of defence was changed the guns
again had to be moved.
Most of the heights round Port Arthur on which the forts and batteries
settled on by the Committee (which had drawn out the scheme for the
armament of the Fortress) were placed were sloping on the outer side,
while on the inner they ran sharply down into deep ravines. It was,
therefore, almost impossible to site these batteries to shoot well and
yet to keep them concealed. If they were placed near the top, there was
very little ground in rear of the guns, and they were visible; if they
were placed further back and down the rear slope, all idea of shelling
the approaches up the front slope would have to be given up. This was
the reason why permanent batteries and fortifications were placed on
open ground where they were visible to the enemy, and why guns were
mounted in the open on the permanent forts.
The reserve of guns was originally intended to be organized by units
of artillery, but in April it had to be broken up to arm new points.
Later on another reserve was formed of guns from the unattacked left
flank of the western front and from the central wall.
The Chinese wall, which played such an important part in the defence,
merits some description. Along the line of old Chinese batteries, from
A up to Tumulus Battery, the Chinese had built a continuous mud wall--a
dense mass of clay revetted with stone--14 feet thick at bottom, and 2
to 4 feet thick at top. It was 10-1/2 feet high, and had a banquette
all along the inner side; the outer had a slope of about 45°. Where
the roads from the town passed through it had traversed openings
and gun emplacements. There were three such openings on the eastern
front--at A Battery, Wolf's Battery, and in the ravine between Fort
Erh-lung-shan and Fortification No. 3. Before the war no one dreamed
of this wall being of use, and not only was it not kept in repair, but
in places stones and earth were taken from it. It eventually proved
most valuable; it is doubtful if we could without it have managed to
repulse so successfully some of the assaults. When the eastern front
was manned, General Smirnoff had the wall repaired and loopholed;
splinter proofs and barbettes for the guns were built, and small guns
for repulsing attacks were mounted. It was frequently hammered by the
enemy's guns, even by their 11-inch howitzers, but little real damage
was done to it, and to the end the enemy could not drive us back from
it or breach it beyond repair. Only a small portion of it near Fort
Erh-lung-shan was abandoned just before the capitulation, and this was
done by General Fock's order, but was not really necessary.
The following tables bear witness to the state of the Fortress on the
outbreak of hostilities:
Table I.
_Showing the Authorized Armament as laid down by the Committee in
1900, and the Guns actually in the Fortress on January 14, 1904._
-------------------------------+----------------------
| Number.
Nature of Guns. +------------+---------
| Authorized.| Actuals.
-------------------------------+------------+---------
10-inch of 1877 | 10 | 5
9-inch of 1877 | 12 | 12
6-inch quick-firing Canet | 20 | 20
6-inch of 1877 (of 68 cwt.) | 37 | 30
6-inch of 1877 (of 43 cwt.) | 38 | 18
42-line | 28 | 24
Heavy guns of 1877 | 12 | 12
Light field | 233 | 146
57-millimetre coast | 24 | 28
57-millimetre caponier | 84 | 14
11-inch howitzers of 1877 | 10 | 10
9-inch howitzers of 1877 | 32 | 32
6-inch field-howitzers | 26 | 24
3-line machine-guns | 48 | 38
-------------------------------+------------+---------
Total | 614 | 413[52]
-------------------------------+------------+---------
Table II.
_Showing Allotment of Guns on Works on January 14, 1904._
In consequence of the conversions and alterations in progress, the
coast batteries alone had their armament. There were eighteen[53] coast
batteries--Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, Artillery, Tiger's Tail, Nos. 12,
13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21. Two were being finished and armed--Nos.
6 and 16.
The armament mounted consisted of:
Mounted.
10-inch guns 5
9-inch guns 12
6-inch Canet 15
6-inch (68 cwt.) 12
57-millimetre coast guns 28
Heavy 4
11-inch howitzers 10
9-inch howitzers 24
---
Total ready for action 110
Being
Mounted.
6-inch Canet 5
9-inch howitzers 8
--
Total 13
On the land front only two batteries were armed:
B Battery, 6-inch guns of 68 cwt. 4
G (Sapper) Battery, 6-inch of 68 cwt. 4
--
Total guns ready for action 8
Fort 1 and B (Jagged) Battery and D Battery were under construction.
There were, therefore, only eight guns mounted on the land front.
* * * * *
The remaining guns were distributed in parks, according to sectors or
sections, near the batteries for which they were allotted--_i.e._:
_Section 5_: for Fort 1 and the intermediate batteries between Battery
21 and Fort 1. The park near batteries 19 and 20 (four 6-inch of 68
cwt., eighteen light on wheeled carriages, and eight machine-guns).
_Section 6_: for Fortification 1, Ta-ku-shan Hill, A and B Batteries,
Fortification 2, Fort Chi-kuan-shan and Big Hill. The park near the Ice
House in front of Big Hill (six 6-inch of 43 cwt., six 57-millimetre
caponier, twenty-two light guns on wheels, six light guns on pedestals,
eight 6-inch field howitzers, four machine-guns).
_Section 7_: for Eagle's Nest, rear caponiers of Redoubts Nos. 1
and 2, Fort Erh-lung-shan, Fortification at head of Water Supply
Redoubt, Fortification 3. The park near the barracks of the 7th Company
(four 6-inch of 43 cwt., twenty light on wheels, four heavy, two
machine-guns).
_Section 8_: for C and G Batteries (Jagged and Sapper), Fort 4 and
Fortification 4. The park near G Battery (eight 6-inch of 43 cwt., six
57-millimetre caponier, 24 light on wheels, four machine-guns).
_Section 9_: for Forts 1 and Chi-kuan-shan, D Battery and Salt Battery,
Fortification 5, and Redoubts 3, 4, and 5. The park near D Battery
(six 6-inch of 68 cwt., two 57-millimetre caponier, six 42-line, six
machine-guns).
_In Store and in Reserve_: In the park in the Chinese arsenal, 56 light
guns on wheels; sixteen 6-inch field howitzers, eighteen 42-line guns,
fourteen machine-guns, four heavy guns.
Thus it was intended to mount another 244 guns and 38 machine-guns on
the batteries and intermediate works so soon as these were sufficiently
advanced to receive them.
The central magazines, being merely Chinese brick buildings, were in
no way shell-proof; but of the numerous section magazines required to
store ammunition, spare parts, etc., for the decentralized supply, only
four had been built and taken over from the engineers in February, 1904
(two on the sea front, Tiger's Peninsula and Battery 17; two on the
land front, Big Hill and C Battery).
Table III.
The following were the shells in the Fortress on January 14, 1904:
Guns. Shells.
10-inch 790
9-inch 2,889
6-inch Canet 4,951
6-inch (68 cwt.) 17,512
6-inch (43 cwt.) 10,459
42-line guns 10,925
Heavy guns 2,409
Light guns 41,227
57-millimetre coast 24,078
57-millimetre caponier 3,210
11-inch howitzer 2,004
9-inch howitzer 7,819
6-inch field howitzer 11,981
Cartridge cases for machine-guns 957,615
Table IV.
Taking all cartridges, fuzes, spare parts, and other accessory stores
into consideration, the following were the rounds per gun in the
Fortress on the outbreak of war:
Guns. Rounds per Gun.
10-inch guns 158
9-inch guns and howitzers 243
6-inch Canet guns 247
6-inch guns (68 cwt. and 43 cwt.) 583
42-line and heavy guns 370
57-millimetre coast guns 860
57-millimetre caponier 230
Light field guns 282
11-inch howitzers 200
6-inch field howitzers 500
In the artillery magazine there were for the 3-inch quick-firing field
artillery guns:
Cartridge cases 6,957
Double action fuzes 8,479
Of small ammunition there were:
Cartridges.
3-line rifle 12,621,176
3-line revolver 14,512
4, 2-line revolver 5,357
4, 2-line Berdan 41,635
Chinese 2,122,050
Since the date of our taking over Port Arthur, particularly during the
disorders in China in and after 1900, the diplomatic sky had never been
really clear, and at times the political barometer alternated between
the 'set fair' and 'storm.' In 1903 it was first very unsettled, and
then kept steadily falling, which caused us to think seriously of
fortifying Port Arthur, not as heretofore, by talk and correspondence,
but by deeds.
General Vernander, head of the Engineer Department, rendered no
material assistance. He only greatly delayed matters, which had been
practically decided on, by fresh proposals and fiddling with details;
but the visit of General Kuropatkin, the War Minister to the place in
1903, gave a great impulse to affairs. After being three weeks in Port
Arthur he made himself acquainted with all the details on the spot,
inspected all the proposed fortifications, gave great encouragement to
us, and ordered certain changes to be made. The most important result
of his visit, however, was that he changed the order of building the
different works laid down by the original authors of the scheme of
defence, in accordance with their actual requirements and importance,
and gave orders for us to set to work at once simultaneously on all the
most important.
Amongst other things, he thought it advisable to strengthen the summit
of Ta-ku-shan by building a block-house for 100 men with two or four
quick-firing guns in a caponier for flanking the approaches to the main
line of works and to the hill itself. He also thought the height near
the temple behind the village of Siu-shuing should be strengthened to
cover the approach into the valley of the Lun-ho, and to command the
village. A block-house with two guns was to be placed on the near peak
west of Fort 4, that the foot and slopes of the hills, on which this
fort was built, might be shelled, and a trench was to connect up fort
and block-house. He considered the interval between Fortification 5
and Fort Erh-lung-shan too great, and said an intermediate work should
be made on the summit of the height in front of Fort Erh-lung-shan.
To distribute the defence beyond this Fort by occupying Angle Hill
and points D and E (High and Long Hills), he did not conceive to
be possible without greatly weakening the garrison. But the sudden
outbreak of war compelled us to diverge from much that had been
intended.
In an order of the Viceroy's, dated February 9, 1904, the Fortress was
declared to be in a state of siege, and three days later the reserve
men began arriving. According to the artillery mobilization scheme,
three weeks was supposed to be sufficient for this arm to be ready for
war. But the Committee of Defence of the Kwantun District, to which
this scheme was submitted, expressed the opinion that the mobilization
would take two months. It was indeed lucky for us the enemy did not
attempt a landing in Pigeon Bay the night of the torpedo attack; but
they were cautious and none too certain of themselves at that time, and
probably thought us stronger than we were.
At all events, for three months they took no decisive action on land,
which enabled us, firstly, to mobilize the garrison, receive reserves,
munitions and supplies, to look round and to draw up a scheme for the
fortification and defence of the Fortress on land, and partly also from
sea; and secondly, to get some knowledge of, and be able to appreciate
the worth of the enemy and of ourselves. In the fights at Kinchou and
on the advanced positions the enemy did not exhibit any extraordinary
bravery or superiority over us. On the contrary, what was shown up was
our inability to engage them and drive them back.
Our field force, under General Fock, having made a slight attempt to
meet the enemy on the position before Kinchou, quickly withdrew on to
the prepared position itself, and then, having lost this in sixteen
hours, and lost all its guns of position and batteries at Dalny and
Talienwan, retired more than hurriedly towards Arthur, and occupied
a strong (in the topographical sense) but long position along the
hills--Khelaza, Upilazy, Kuen-san. But the force retired from here also
on July 30 to the Fortress works, not defending the position on Wolf's
Hills, which had to a certain extent been fortified, and which it had
been decided to hold.
All the schemes for the defence of Kwantun in general, and of Port
Arthur in particular, which had been made out in peace-time, had to be
abandoned or altered at the outbreak of war, and all those who drew
up these schemes and were helping to carry them out left the district
which was destined to be the arena of a long and bloody struggle. The
brilliant ten months' defence was due to the fresh actors who appeared
on the scene and the plans made out by them. During part of January and
all February the arming of the land works and of two coast batteries (6
and 16) was energetically and incessantly carried on, chiefly by night.
The work was often interrupted by the enemy's bombardment and attempts
to block the harbour.
The following guns were received in January and February:
6-inch guns (43 cwt.) 20
6-inch field howitzers 2
87-millimetre Chinese guns (selected) 20
From the Fleet: 2-1/2-inch guns 15
3-line Maxims 25
In February the following were sent to the fort at Yinchow:
1 officer, 72 men.
4 6-inch guns (43 cwt.).
8 light field guns.
By March the land works had been armed as follows:
_Fort No. 1._
6-inch guns (68 cwt.) 4
Light guns 4
Machine-guns 4
Rocket troughs 3
_Open Caponier No. 1._
Light guns 4
_Fortification No. 1._ (Danger Hill).
Light guns 4
_A Battery._
6-inch guns (43 cwt.) 6
Light guns 4
Machine-guns 1
Rocket troughs 3
_Fortification No. 2._
6-inch field howitzers 2
Light guns 4
_B Battery._
6-inch guns (68 cwt.) 4
Light guns 2
Rocket troughs 3
_Fort No. 2_ (Chi-kuan-shan).
Light guns 4
Machine-guns 3
_Open Caponier No. 2._
Light guns 4
_Little Eagle's Nest Battery._
42-line guns 3
_Kuropatkin Lunette._
6-inch field howitzers 4
87-millimetre Chinese field guns 4
_Redoubt No. 1._
Light guns 4
_Redoubt No. 2._
6-inch field howitzers 4
_Ravine Trench._
Light guns 2
_Fort No. 3_ (Erh-lung-shan).
6-inch guns (43 cwt.) 4
Light guns 5
Machine-guns 2
Rocket troughs 4
_Bridge Battery._
Light guns 2
_Fortification No. 3._
Light guns 5
Machine-guns 2
Rocket troughs 6
_Tumulus Battery._
42-line guns 2
6-inch field howitzers 4
Light guns 4
Machine-guns 1
_Cemetery Battery._
42-line guns 4
Light guns 2
6-inch howitzers 2
Machine-guns 1