THE FALL OF FORTIFICATION NO. 3--THE FAILURE OF THE DEFENCE AND MEDICAL
ORGANIZATIONS
The garrison no longer showed the same steadiness that it had shown
in the many desperate fights in the beginning of December. This was
certainly owing to the example of Fort Chi-kuan-shan. The men's spirits
seemed to have gone, and it was too late for the officers to stop the
hæmorrhage from the moral wounds caused by Fock. A passionate desire
for life was everywhere noticeable, and any attempt to persuade the men
that it was their duty to die was now useless.
Early in the morning of the 31st Gorbatovsky was summoned by Fock
to confer with him. The latter was, as usual, dilating on the
splendid qualities of the men, and the pity it was to make them
suffer needlessly, when a great pillar of smoke suddenly shot up from
Fortification No. 3, followed by a tremendous explosion.
'I must go back, sir, and I will return at once and let you know what
has happened.'
'Yes, come back as soon as you can.'
Gorbatovsky then went off. Without waiting for a report from him, Fock
there and then, in the presence of Captain Rodionoff, of the Engineers,
wrote out his orders for the abandonment of Fortification No. 3, and
sent them off by (I think) a sailor. There was no reference, no word
to the Commandant, or even to Stössel. Comment is unnecessary; such
action speaks for itself.
What had happened is best seen by reference to the diary:
'_December 31._--About 6 a.m. General Gorbatovsky was summoned by
General Fock to the third line of defences to confer. At 9 a.m. three
successive explosions took place in Fortification No. 3. After a few
minutes a telephone message came in from the work to say that the
enemy had exploded two charges in the corners of one of the faces. At
the moment when the garrison, led by its commanding officer, Captain
Spredovy, dashed out of the quarters in the gorge casemate, in order
to get out into the interior of the place before the Japanese could
seize the parapet, a third charge was fired, which had been laid in the
gorge itself. This charge destroyed the gorge casemates, and buried
the commanding officer and 140 men under the débris. The fall of this
mass of stuff caused the hand-grenades heaped up in the casemates
to detonate and set off four mines, laid under the foundations. The
wounded and remnants of the garrison were thus shut up in the casemate,
with only one small exit into the gorge ditch, through which they had
to crawl. Not being able to get into the interior of the work, the
garrison could do nothing to hold the position. The enemy perceived
this at once, quickly got into the interior of the work, and seized
the gorge, where they brought machine-guns. About 10 o'clock we saw a
white flag on the fortification. It is not known who raised it. General
Stössel and the Fortress Commandant were informed, and within a quarter
of an hour the following order was received from General Stössel:
'"In view of the difficulty of getting out of the Fortification, the
remainder of the garrison may surrender; those who can escape may try
to."
'This order was transmitted by telephone to the work, whence a list of
those alive and wounded was telephoned back. The telephone was then
cut to prevent the enemy hearing what we said. It was thought that,
having seized the fortification, they would try and storm Tumulus
Battery. General Gorbatovsky, therefore, ordered the garrison of this
battery to be reinforced by one company of infantry, and a company of
sailors to be sent into the trenches of the second line from Laperoff's
battery along Vladimir and Mitrofanieff Batteries. About eleven o'clock
the enemy's fire ceased. Gorbatovsky decided to hold the second line,
having Tumulus Battery on the left flank and Eagle's Nest on the right.
He told the Commandant of this, and asked leave to carry it out at
night....'
From Stössel's order and subsequent dispositions on that day it is
clear that he had no idea of the relationship between the second and
third lines. Among other things he ordered the left flank of the second
line to be held, while part of the third line was held (Stonebroken
Ridge and Big Hill). From this it was plain that Stössel had never seen
the second line of positions, and had never been on the hills near.
After the fall of Erh-lung-shan Fort the besiegers opened a heavy fire
on the north-east front from Tumulus Battery to Eagle's Nest. At 1 p.m.
on January 1 they delivered an attack from the fort on Rocky Ridge. Our
troops having lost heart, and being badly demoralized, gave way; but
our gun-fire checked the enemy's assault, and the position remained in
our possession. However, despite the very strict and definite orders
given by the Commandant that the Chinese Wall from Rocky Ridge was to
be held at all costs (it was quite possible), as soon as dusk came on,
the abandonment of this wall and Rocky Ridge began under Fock's orders.
The retirement was executed without any interference from the enemy,
and we were able to take with us all except the heavier guns. At five
o'clock on January 1 our troops were distributed along the second
line--Tumulus Battery, Vladimir Battery, Mitrofanieff Hills, Eagle's
Nest, the portion of the Chinese Wall behind Chi-kuan-shan Fort, and
Kuropatkin Lunette.
The enemy having now arrived at such a position, it seems a fitting
moment to mention in what directions the organization of Port Arthur as
a fortress had most failed.
By this time most of the many grave defects in the original conception
and subsequent execution of the material defences of this stronghold
had become only too painfully clear, though it had not needed the
test of bitter experience to make the more glaring errors obvious.
There were terrible faults in the original tactical arrangement of the
defences and in the details of the works themselves.
The main line of permanent forts, the girdle, was much too close
to the objects to be protected--_i.e._, the dockyard and town. The
positions fortified by us were so close that, before capturing these
positions, the enemy were able to bombard the place, damage our fleet,
and demoralize the population. Some points of vital importance were
entirely unprovided with permanent works--_i.e._, 203 Metre Hill, Angle
and Long Hills--and were left for an improvised fortification, which
was carried out in a scrambling way after the place had been completely
invested. So little had these three positions been considered important
that until after May 18 no paths to them had ever been made. Accepting
the main line originally chosen, such as it was, there were further
defects in the forts themselves. They were in many cases badly sited.
On the eastern front the enemy had commanding positions within two
miles (Ta-ku-shan, Sia-gu-shan), from which the interior of our
defence could be seen and fired into, and our communications shelled.
This seriously hampered the movement of troops and the transport of
munitions. They were also badly designed for their sites, having
no good field of fire and much dead ground in front of them. It is
not enough to say they were ill-concealed--they were ingenuously
conspicuous. As regards armament, our long-range heavy guns, designed
to fight the enemy's siege artillery, were placed right in the front,
by which all the advantages to be obtained by their ranging power was
thrown away. They naturally drew a concentration of the enemy's fire,
and were soon rendered useless. They were a positive curse to the works
in which they were placed, for they attracted a fire on to these works,
to which they could not efficiently reply. In design many of the forts
failed. They were not defiladed; they had no covered communications
and no proper shelters. The parapets were feebly revetted with stones
and sand-bags, and not having sufficient traverses, could be swept by
enfilade fire. The concrete was not covered with earth, but was fully
exposed. Lastly, such as they were, our forts were not finished and
ready by the time they were wanted.
The faults in the choice of position and ground were largely due to
the fact that the scheme was originally a paper scheme, worked out on
the map instead of on the ground. When the local engineers saw things
on the ground, it was too late for any alteration--the scheme had been
approved and confirmed. The paucity of works, their half-finished
condition, and the absolute lack of many essentials, however, were all
due to a cheese-paring, misplaced economy. Money was scarce for the
vital defences of Arthur, while millions were being poured out on the
palaces and wharves of Dalny, on a well-equipped harbour, which was
eventually to help the Japanese.
Let us now turn to the medical organization of the Fortress. Did that
correspond to the needs of the besieged Fortress? What influence had
that on its fate?
At the beginning of the war, in spite of the growth of the garrison,
there were the following hospitals: (1) A mixed hospital of 400 beds;
(2) the Reserve Hospital No. 1, 200 beds; (3) the Port Hospital, 40
beds; (4) two small civil hospitals. Of course, this quantity of
hammocks could not possibly suffice to meet the needs of a garrison
50,000 strong. If to the garrison be added the fleet, the civilian
and native population, the number of beds appears yet more absurd.
According to the field service regulations, the proportion of beds to
strength of troops should be 1 to 8; the proportion existing at the
commencement of the war was 1 to 100! In March was opened the Naval
Hospital, 200 beds, increased in July to 500; in April Reserve Hospital
No. 6, 210 beds; in May three reserve hospitals, 630 beds; in June
three reserve hospitals and a mobile hospital, 630 beds. After the
fortnight's assaults in August, when all the hospitals were filled with
wounded and were threatened with dysentery, Reserve Hospital No. 11 was
opened, with 1,200 beds, in the naval barracks.
Although, when once the war had started, it was daily to be expected
that the enemy might land and Port Arthur be thus completely cut off,
from the moment the first shot was fired the equipping of the hospitals
with medical and other appliances was carried out at snail's pace.
During the three months when the Fortress was in direct communication
with the capital, no single additional bed was added--that is,
omitting the Naval Hospital and the _Mongolia_, opened within two
months of the beginning of the war for a special purpose. The former
was arranged for during peace-time and the building had already been
finished. It was only with the arrival of the new Commandant and the
Sanitary Inspector of the Fortress, Civil Councillor Subotin, that
the organization of the medical service was gradually placed on some
sort of footing. Their efforts were not particularly fruitful, because,
instead of immediately giving effect to the urgent representations and
applications of the Commandant, the authorities in the north spilt
seas of ink, and continued thus to spend their time till we were cut
off. At the beginning of the strict investment (after the fights on
the advanced positions) there were only 2,500 beds in the hospitals
under the Military and Naval Departments, and in the three hospital
buildings taken over by the Red Cross there were only 500 beds, or a
total of 3,000--one-third of the proper number. During the period of
the strict blockade the number of beds increased. According to official
statistics, another 1,500 were added; but this addition can only be
taken as nominal, as there were practically no reserves in the medical
store depôts at the beginning of the war, and it was impossible to
procure any locally. But still, accepting these official figures,
during the worst period in Arthur 4,500 sick and wounded could be
tended. The minimum figure of sick at the end of the siege, which
cannot be disputed, was 15,000; the actual number was more like 18,000.
To show how these 'extra' 10,000 to 12,000 suffering soldiers found
shelter or relief means the unveiling of the most revolting picture
of the siege. About half of these 'extra' cases were distributed
_somewhere_ in the hospitals above mentioned, and the remainder were
put in hastily-run-up sheds--little cemeteries of living beings. In
these during the last month of the siege there were sometimes as many
as a thousand sick men crowded together, under the charge of one
medical man, often a surgeon, who could only be a helpless spectator of
their sufferings.
Just glance at one of these 'infernos' in the month of December.
Outside it is freezing; inside, in spite of the musty and sickening
stench, the cold is intense. On all sides is filth, nothing but filth,
and on it and amongst it crawl millions of greasy grey lice. The
silence is only broken by the sighs and groans of the sick and the
hungry--for all in here are both sick and hungry. Death, the Liberator,
is also here. He is in every corner, at the doors, at the windows,
crawling along the floors and on to the bed-boards; he envelops
everything--and waits. At the front a man dies suddenly, and all is
over. In the hospitals Death is fought. But here, here, everything is
in his power--he only has to wait. Second after second, minute after
minute, hour after hour, men pass into eternity, into oblivion. There
are hundreds of cases of scurvy. They lie side by side on the floor,
on the bed-boards, underneath them, just as they were placed when they
came in--some in great-coats, some in tunics, some in miserable boots,
some barefooted. The faces are shapeless, swollen, and distorted, and
upon the yellow skin are large dark blue bruises. The swollen gums,
covered with hideous sores, project out of many grinning mouths,
and show the lack of teeth, which are continuously falling out....
Here, far away from their friends and relations, forgotten by all, in
horrible, complete consciousness, they are silently waiting the end.
And to think that much of this suffering might have been spared these
men had the Medical Service been properly organized, had the highest
authorities done their duty, instead of busying themselves with writing
orders. Things would not have been so bad even if Stössel had confirmed
the resolution of the Council of War about the killing of horses on
December 8. Feeding the garrison on horses' flesh and white bread would
at once have checked the growth of disease; and there were more than
3,000 horses and 3,000,000 pounds of flour in the Fortress.
The hospitals which existed in peace-time and the hospitals which
expanded before the strict blockade answered their purpose fairly
well. Those which were opened after the commencement of the strict
blockade were far from doing so. They had no linen, nor beds, nor
medical supplies, to say nothing of a sufficient quantity of trained
nurses or doctors. The most disgraceful in this respect were Reserve
Field Hospital No. 2, of 1,200 beds, opened for infectious cases and
Mobile Field Hospital No. 5 (4th Division, General Fock), situated on
Tiger's Peninsula. What could be expected from hospitals opened after
the August assaults, when there was nothing left in the place with
which to equip them? For the 1,200 beds of No. 2 only four doctors were
told off. This hospital was renowned throughout the Fortress for its
horrors: there is no need to describe them. A commission was appointed,
which found the internal organization and arrangements of the hospital
so revolting that the Hospital Inspector was immediately removed, and
in his place was appointed M. Menshoff, who had recently been Chief of
the Police in Dalny. Of 3,500 patients received into it, 1,500 died.
Mobile Hospital No. 5 was little better.
The system of opening a hospital extension on the day of a big
attack was hopeless. It led to the sudden concentration of the
sick and wounded in the hospitals nearest to where the attack was
taking place, and where there was most congestion and appalling
confusion. The wounded sometimes received no medical assistance for
days together, as the personnel, working as it did for twenty-four
hours in the twenty-four, could not cope with such a big influx, and
they were carried from one hospital to another, often dying on the
road. Meanwhile, the other hospitals, situated some way off from the
locality attacked, did not take their share, owing to this inefficient
organization.
Many of the doctors made desperate efforts, but when dealing with
masses like this individual efforts were drops in the ocean.
Subotin was the Fortress Sanitary Inspector, immediately subordinate
to the Commandant, and he did his best; but there was no independent
central organization in the Medical Service of the Fortress, which
could have looked ahead and taken steps to distribute the sick properly
in the hospitals during attacks. The Medical Service was dependent
on the combatant authorities, whose hands were much taken up with
fighting. What was required was a central administration, which could
have foreseen what might happen and have controlled the arrangements.
The officer in charge should have been invested with high rank and
great authority, and should have had a properly trained personnel.
Scurvy first made its appearance in the Fortress at a very early date:
as early as April it appeared among the crew of the _Pallada_, but,
thanks to timely and energetic measures, it was then stamped out.
Unfortunately, no material preventive measures were taken against its
recurrence, with the exception of vague suggestions as to better food
and to add green food to the rations, though where better food could
be got or vegetables could be bought was difficult to say. The scurvy
cases increased from hundreds in October and thousands in November to
10,000 in December. The hospitals were so full of it that men were
afraid of going into them, and at the end of the siege preferred to
remain on duty, even when sick.
Of 18,000 sick and wounded reported on the day the garrison marched
out, 6,000 only were wounded; the balance were cases of scurvy. There
were really more, as many men only slightly ill were doing duty. Dr.
Kefel, of the Naval Hospital, on making an inspection of the men on one
section of the right flank on December 11, found that 21 per cent.
of these on duty had scurvy. Exactly a fortnight afterwards, on his
inspecting the same section, he found 40-1/2 per cent. suffering from
it. These were the same men, for they had not been relieved.
It was pointed out in his report on this that: 'If the spreading of
scurvy increases in the above arithmetical progression, then in every
fortnight we shall have 200 more on the sick list out of every thousand
in the fighting line, and in one and a half months there will be no men
left fit for duty....
'If extreme measures are immediately taken, and we make use of all the
meat, white bread, and antiscorbutic diet available, we may hope that
those who are now well may not catch it, that the slight cases will
not become worse, and that the worse cases will do tolerably well.
Therefore there are before us two alternatives: to keep our food-supply
and have, after a month and a half, not a single serviceable soldier,
or to have eaten up our supplies of provisions at the end of six
weeks, but during all that time to have kept the garrison in fighting
strength. The strategist, not the arithmetician, can decide which is
the more advantageous choice to make for the Fortress.'
When this report was laid before General Stössel, with a proposal to
increase the ration, he replied: 'There cannot be so many men as this
ill in that section. It is nonsense; there are not half that number
there.' And so the question remained undecided. It was only at the very
end that an order was given for a slight increase.
To the question, 'Was it possible to have avoided this epidemic of
scurvy, and could we have checked it with what we had in Port Arthur?'
the answer is undoubtedly 'Yes!'
How exactly this could have been done is a harder question to answer.
From the moment we were cut off from the north the rations of the
garrison were gradually cut short, and by November, when the men
were physically and morally weakened, the rations were reduced to the
minimum. Instead of bread, biscuits were issued, which could not really
be counted as rations for scurvy cases, as to these they were as useful
as stones.
The progress of the disease might have been checked if (1) a probable
period of resistance had been thought out and fixed; (2) if rational
use had been made of all sources of supply--horses, mules, cats, dogs,
and flour. In the beginning of December more than 2,000,000 pounds
of excellent flour was received. Had 3 pounds of white flour been
issued per man, it would have lasted for three months. Half a pound of
horse-flesh per man would have lasted for six weeks, though the number
of horses for transport purposes would, of course, have been limited.
The first was not done, thanks to the chaos resulting from the harmful
interference of Stössel and Fock.
The second was decided on at the council of December 8 (at which, by
some incomprehensible oversight, the Sanitary Inspector of the Fortress
was not asked to attend), but was not confirmed by Stössel.