THE FALL OF ERH-LUNG-SHAN AND THE LAST COUNCIL
It is not easy to arrive at the truth about the fall of Erh-lung-shan
Fort. There are many different accounts, and the loss of this fort
is still the subject of keen discussion between various officers.
Therefore, to enable the reader to form his own judgment, the evidence
of two of the senior men in the Fortress who did not agree is quoted.
One is General Smirnoff and the other Gun-Captain Direnkoff. Their
evidence is amplified by extracts from the Raschevsky-Schwartz diary. I
begin with Direnkoff.
'At 7 p.m. on December 27 the Japs stopped their mining work under the
glacis of the salient. This cessation of work did not attract much
attention, as it was thought to be temporary. As a matter of fact,
the enemy, having reached the desired spot, had stopped excavating
in order to load and fire their mines. On this occasion they gave no
indication of their intention, and kept on firing 11-inch shells and
throwing grenades into the fort as usual. The night passed quietly,
with no suspicion of what was to come, on our part. At 7.30 the next
morning the first explosion took place, but it was a failure. At eight
o'clock a single Japanese dashed out on to our parapet, then rushed
back again. Five minutes later I was walking from the inner parapet,
and had not quite reached the caponier when a second explosion took
place, which shook the whole fort and the hill it was on. The Japs at
once opened fire and began hurling a quantity of hand-grenades and
bombs, while they set to work to raise a wall of sand-bags on this side
of the ditch. Our losses from the explosion were about 100 killed and
wounded, several being suffocated by gases in the caponier. The officer
commanding sent word to Major-General Gorbatovsky:
'"The Japanese have blown up our advanced parapet. Our losses are very
heavy. Please send reinforcements."
'Reinforcements arrived, amounting, I should think, to about 500 men.
When darkness came on the enemy's artillery ceased firing, and only
the occasional crack of rifles disturbed the silence. The officer
commanding ordered the wounded, who were lying about everywhere, to be
brought in, and this was finished by about 10 p.m. He then sent word to
Gorbatovsky:
'"Erh-lung-shan is surrounded by Japs. What are your orders?"
'The General replied:
'"Do what you can. There are no more reserves to send you."
'The officer commanding then sent fifty men of the _Retvisan_ to drive
the Japs from the inner parapet, but the attempt failed and nearly all
were killed. The Japs, in addition to occupying this, had crawled into
the caponier. Three times our men attempted to turn them out, but were
three times driven back. By nine o'clock the Japs had contrived to make
a sand-bag parapet in it and to drag a machine-gun and torpedo-tube on
to the fort. By ten the garrison was ordered to evacuate the fort. The
officer commanding ordered us to take away the breech-blocks from the
37-millimetre guns, and on leaving the forts to give them to General
Gorbatovsky, which we did. When we left the fort about 100 men were
still in the caponier. I imagine our casualties must have been about
600 killed and wounded. The guns left to the enemy were: three 6-inch
(all disabled), one Baranovsky, two field-guns (4-pounders), seven
37-millimetre.
'We also left 300 rifles, a lot of entrenching tools, and 2 unloaded
spherical mines; of ammunition: 37-millimetre, 2,000 rounds;
Baranovsky, 200 rounds. I don't know what 6-inch ammunition was left.
The gunners, by some careless mistake, did not remove the breech-blocks
of these guns. Of food supplies we left 30 sacks of biscuits, 400
pounds of bread, 1-1/2 boxes of tinned meat, and a quantity of groats.'
General Smirnoff's evidence about this fort was as follows:
'At last, at 9 a.m. on the 28th, a big explosion took place on the
parapet. The enemy opened a heavy fire on the retrenchment; this our
men could not stand, and they took cover in the casemates underneath.
About 5 p.m. some of the enemy reached the retrenchment, while another
portion of them moved along the flank ditches. Though the garrison of
the fort consisted of some 7 to 9 officers and 300 men, their _moral_
was so affected by the example of Fort Chi-kuan-shan that the men would
not obey their officers, who ordered them out of the casemates back on
to the retrenchment; nor did the officers give an example to the men.
I sent one company after another from the reserve to reinforce the
garrison, and ordered Gorbatovsky to drive out the enemy; but the fresh
troops became infected by the others: they were demoralized, and would
not put their hearts into a counter-attack.
'When Gorbatovsky told me of this on the telephone, he, not wishing to
make it public, sent Captain Stepanoff to report personally to me, and
begged permission to abandon the fort, or else all the garrison would
be killed. I forwarded this news to Reuss for information, and _did
not give_ Gorbatovsky the permission asked for, as I was waiting to
see Stepanoff first; but before he had reached me Gorbatovsky received
orders direct from General Stössel that the fort was to be abandoned.
On withdrawing, our men rallied on the half-prepared position some 300
to 500 paces in rear, from Rocky Ridge to Fortification No. 3.'
_From the Raschevsky-Schwartz Diary, December 28._
'At 7 a.m. the enemy began to shell intermittently Fortification No.
3 and Erh-lung-shan Fort, and their miners continued working. At 9
a.m. the noise of work in the mining galleries suddenly ceased, and
two charges were exploded in the salient angles of the fort. At the
moment of the explosion there was only the gun crew on duty in the
casemate; the rest of the men were in their quarters in the gorge.
Great blocks of the inner skin of armoured concrete were torn off by
the force of the explosion and piled up in the exit, crushing several
men. On the parapet, to left and right of the shelter, were two huge
craters. To relieve the position to some extent, and to check the
enemy's assaulting columns, our batteries were ordered to fire on the
approaches in front of the fort; but what good could our fire do when
in the Zaredoubt Battery there was only one serviceable 6-inch gun,
on Laperoff Hill also only one 6-inch and a 40-millimetre battery, on
Mitrofanieff's hill one 40-millimetre battery, and on Tumulus Hill
four quick-firing field-guns? All these batteries, though under a
heavy shell-fire, did what they could.
'About 11 a.m. the first message from Captain Bulgakoff, commanding
the fort, was received by the staff of the section, reporting that
the enemy had destroyed the parapet by the great explosion, and
had seized it, that our men were panic-struck and were holding the
retrenchment with great difficulty. Gorbatovsky then sent up a
company at once from the reserves to relieve Bulgakoff, and to drive
the Japanese out of the fort. However, despite this reinforcement,
the garrison not only failed to hurl back the enemy, but lost the
retrenchment. The officers tried to lead a counter-attack, but when,
on going out from the retrenchment, the first men were killed, the
remainder refused to go on, and bolted from the retrenchment into
the quarters in the gorge. Taking advantage of the darkness, small
parties of the enemy got round the flanks, threatening to surround
the fort from the rear, to seize the gorge ditch, and cut off
communication with the Fortress. The enemy's artillery continued
firing all day. The communicating roads to the fort were destroyed,
but were being repaired all the time by our sappers, especially
at night. The abandonment of the fort was begun in the afternoon
and finished about two in the morning. On leaving the fort Captain
Bulgakoff gave orders to pour kerosene over the bed-boards and set
light to the men's quarters and light the long fuses of the mines. At
2 a.m. Gorbatovsky ordered me to go to Fock in the morning and give
him my opinion as to the necessity of holding Fortification No. 3 to
the end.'
The general opinion of the officers in Arthur was that the loss of
Erh-lung-shan Fort was due principally to the bad _moral_ of the
garrison, caused by the General's demoralizing influence and the
example he had set by Fort Chi-kuan-shan.
At 6 p.m. on December 29 a meeting--the last meeting--of the Council of
War took place in the District Staff Offices. All the senior commanders
in the Fortress were present:
1. _Captain Golovan_, Chief Staff Officer 7th East Siberian Rifle
Brigade.
2. _Lieutenant-Colonel Dmitrevsky_, Chief Staff Officer 4th East
Siberian Rifle Division.
3. _Colonel Khvostoff_, Chief of the Fortress Staff.
4. _Colonel Reuss_, Chief Staff Officer of the Kwantun District.
5. _Lieutenant-Colonel Nekrashevitch-Poklad_, commanding 25th Regiment.
6. _Colonel Petrusha_, commanding 28th Regiment.
7. _Lieutenant-Colonel Handurin_, commanding 15th Regiment.
8. _Colonel Semenoff, A.D.C._, commanding 26th Regiment.
9. _Colonel Savitsky_, commanding 14th Regiment.
10. _Colonel Griaznoff_, commanding ----[40] Regiment.
11. _Colonel Mekhmandaroff_, commanding 7th East Siberian Rifle
Artillery Division.
12. _Colonel Irman_, commanding 4th East Siberian Rifle Artillery
Brigade.
13. _Colonel Grigorenko_, commanding the Fortress Engineers.
14. _Rear-Admiral Wiren._
15. _Rear-Admiral Loschinsky._
16. _Major-General Gorbatovsky_, commanding the eastern front.
17. _Major-General Biely_, commanding the Fortress Artillery.
18. _Major-General Nadein_, temporarily commanding 4th East Siberian
Rifle Division.
19. _Major-General Nickitin_ (no special appointment).
20. _Lieutenant-General Fock_, lately commanding 4th East Siberian
Rifle Division, now in command of the land defences.
21. _Lieutenant-General Smirnoff_, Commandant of the Fortress.
22. _General Stössel, A.D.C._
It was evening, and the town and front were quiet. The collected
members conversed and exchanged opinions in a low tone while waiting
for the meeting to commence. Every one was naturally much interested
in what was coming, and most guessed why General Stössel had summoned
all the senior commanding officers. At last it began. The meeting is
recorded for clearness in the following form:
_Stössel._ 'Gentlemen, I have called you all here to give me your
opinion frankly with regard to the actual state of the Fortress and
the steps which should be taken in future. When the meeting is over
I will read you this paper' (in his hand was a letter).[41] 'Let us
commence with the juniors. Captain Golovan, what is your opinion on
this question?'
_Golovan._ 'We must certainly hold out to the very last.'
_Dmitrevsky._ 'The food is very bad. We have little ammunition now
left. I do not see that we can expect anything by continuing the
defence.'
_Nekrashevitch-Poklad._ 'We have no ammunition. Scurvy is on the
increase, and the hospitals are full. We have few men to garrison
the Fortress works. Under such circumstances, there is little use in
carrying on with the defence.'
_Petrusha._ 'We have held out till now, and we can hold out longer; and
then--God's will be done.'
_Savitsky and Griaznoff._ 'It is very difficult to hold out longer.
Everything is going badly.'
_Semenoff._ 'We must hold out at all costs. My troops are in excellent
fettle and the best of spirits.'
_Mekhmandaroff._ 'We must continue the defence.'
_Stössel._ 'You must surely know, Colonel, that, having got possession
of Erh-lung-shan Fort, the enemy command the neighbouring batteries and
works, and can from there shell us. Can you guarantee that the enemy
won't mount guns there?'
_Mekhmandaroff._ 'I cannot guarantee that, but I will swear that I will
put any of their guns out of action as soon as they are mounted. As
long as we hold on to Rocky Ridge the loss of Erh-lung-shan does not
make our general position in any way critical. We can hold out easily
for some time. We still have a number of splendid rear-guard positions.
We can, and I consider we ought to, hold out--in fact, to defend
ourselves to the last moment.'
_Irman._ 'In any case, we must hold out in the same way as we have
already held out. Why, up till now one might say that we have really
only been holding field positions, not permanent ones. We can easily
hold out longer.'
_Grigorenko._ 'We _must_ hold out. Let us look at the question on
a broader basis. To do the best, I consider we ought to reduce the
garrison of all points not being attacked--_i.e._, Liao-tieh-shan
and Signal Hill--and send the troops thus released to the threatened
points.'
_Fock._ 'No, no. Liao-tieh-shan is the keep--it mustn't be touched.'
_Reuss._ 'As the fleet has ceased to exist, Arthur's rôle of affording
a sanctuary to it is over. It is quite unnecessary to the army
operating in the north, as that army has concentrated now in great
strength. A further defence can only end in a street massacre, which
is to be deprecated.'
_Wiren and Loschinsky._ 'The place _must_ be defended to the bitter
end.'
_Gorbatovsky._ 'If the Fortress is to fall or to capitulate, we must
postpone the day as long as possible. We must fight to the last.'
_Biely._ 'I fail to understand what Dmitrevsky means by saying there is
no ammunition. We have plenty to repulse two more big attacks--102,000
shells of our own and 100,000 still available from the fleet, with
8,000,000 rounds of small-arm ammunition. From an artillery point of
view, I do not consider we are at all in a critical position. The
defence ought to be continued.'
_Nadein._ 'I also agree. We must continue to hold out.'
_Nickitin._ 'We must certainly hold out to the last. If our position is
bad, that of the enemy is not particularly happy. A further defence is
possible, and should be successful, as we have a series of excellent
positions, and in the New Chinese Town a number of excellent buildings
for the troops.'
_Fock._ 'A short time ago I was in the trenches. My God! what did I not
see? The suffering, the wounds, the sickness--never shall I forget the
sights. Who is better or more noble than the private soldier? Who can
equal him in gallantry, unselfishness, and endurance? We should not
let him die for nothing. We should not let him die unless something is
gained thereby. The losses will be greater now if the Japanese mount
guns in Erh-lung-shan----'
_Mekhmandaroff._ 'I have already guaranteed that I will not allow them
to bring a single gun into action there.'
_Fock._ 'Think of the wretched men--hungry, worn out----'
_Smirnoff._ 'I have heard everything that has been said on the
subject, and I consider it my duty to state that, according to
regulations, there should be in every fortress secret instructions
in which the _raison d'être_ of the fortress in the theatre of war
is defined. According to these instructions, the Commandant is to
be the judge as to the extent to which the fortress has done its
duty--fulfilled its mission. Unfortunately, such instructions do not
exist in this fortress. One of the objects of this fortress--to afford
a refuge and protection to the fleet--ceased to exist when the fleet
was destroyed. The other object--to co-operate in the strategical plans
of the main army by keeping employed the Japanese army now laying siege
to us--is not finished. No matter what the opinion on the question
may be, the Regulations for the Guidance of Commanders of Fortresses
definitely require them to hold out till all strength and means are
exhausted, which with us is far from the case. Thus we must continue
the defence. The scheme of defence conforming to actual circumstances
should be as follows: So long as possible we should hold the Chinese
Wall, as from behind it we can throw hand-grenades and fire mines. To
strengthen our fighting line we must weaken Liao-tieh-shan and Signal
Hill.' (Fock shook his head and tried to interrupt.) 'I am sure that we
can hold on to the Chinese Wall for a fortnight. Then we will fall back
on the second line--_i.e._, Tumulus Battery, Vladimir, Mitrofanieff,
and Nameless Hills. This line has one defect--that it won't be possible
to keep the supports and reserves near it, owing to the scarcity of
cover. We must therefore regard it as a rear-guard position; but, all
the same, we shall be able to hold the enemy on it for a week. Finally,
there is the third line on Stonebroken Ridge, running from the left
to the northern portion of the town wall, and from the right to Big
Hill. It is at present well fortified, and has directly in rear of it
a number of buildings, in which the supports and reserves can get
cover. Thanks to the strength of this position, we should be able to
hold on in it for at least three weeks. By that time our supplies will
be running out, and then--not till then' (raising his voice)--'can the
question of the Fortress's life be discussed.'
He finished.
Every one remained silent; no one liked to speak. The Commandant had
spoken what all knew to be the truth.
_Stössel_ continued: 'In my opinion the second line is extremely weak,
and it is in no way important. Well, gentlemen, I see that all of you
almost are in favour of a further defence, and we will accordingly
carry on. Russian soldiers could not act otherwise. I am extremely
grateful to all of you for coming to such a resolution.'
The meeting broke up, and the news of the conclusion reached and of the
opinions of individual members was soon spread abroad.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 40: Omitted by Author.--A.B.L.]
[Footnote 41: This paper appears, from an independent source ['The
Siege and Fall of Port Arthur,' by Major-General Kostenko, President
of the Military Court of Port Arthur during the siege], to have been
the copy of a telegram to the Tsar which Stössel had despatched to the
Tsar _before_ this council meeting was held. According to Kostenko
this telegram was: 'We cannot hold out more than a few days; am taking
measures to prevent a street massacre'; and in his opinion Stössel
did not read it out at this council meeting after the feeling of the
members had been so strongly declared against surrender, because he was
afraid of being arrested for having sent it.--A.B.L.]