THE SORTIE OF THE FLEET ON AUGUST 10
For some time previous to the sortie of the fleet on August 10, Admiral
Witgeft used to assemble conferences of the Admirals and Captains, at
which the question of the fleet breaking through to Vladivostock was
thoroughly discussed. The majority were in favour of the fleet putting
out to sea. Some urged that we should engage the enemy's fleet, and at
the same time operate by making a demonstration towards Dalny as the
nearest of the enemy's naval bases. Others thought it more opportune
to go out on to the line between Korea and Shantung, where, after a
battle, the enemy's communications between Japan and his army might
be interrupted. This plan had the advantage that those of our ships
which were injured could return to Arthur for repairs. At a Council of
War held on July 18 with regard to this question the majority had been
opposed to a sortie, their chief arguments being that (1) the fleet
would have to take away with it those of its guns which were being used
on the land front, and this would reduce the power of the land defence
by nearly 30 per cent.; (2) its departure would have a bad effect on
the _moral_ of the garrison; (3) most of our destroyers were unfit
for a long voyage. Three weeks later, at a Council held on August 7,
when it was evident that the enemy, by bombarding the harbour, could
cause great damage to the ships, not only above the water-line,
but below it, as in the case of the _Retvisan_, several of those who
hitherto had been opposed to the plan of making for Vladivostock
altered their opinion.
[Illustration: REAR-ADMIRAL GRIGOROVITCH.]
The day before the fleet's departure Rear-Admiral Grigorovitch proposed
to Admiral Witgeft, at first verbally, and afterwards on paper, that
to force its way successfully to Vladivostock the fleet ought to be
composed only of the fastest ships, and the slow ones--the _Poltava_
and the _Sevastopol_--should be left in Arthur to strengthen the shore
defences. Rear-Admiral Loschinsky supported this proposal; but he
developed the idea by suggesting that when the squadron moved out of
Arthur towards Shantung he, with the two battleships, four gunboats,
and ten destroyers, should make a demonstration towards Dalny. If the
larger part of the Japanese force followed the departing squadron,
then his force would be able to bombard Dalny, the naval and principal
supply base of the Japanese army. If by some mistake, or owing to
other circumstances, the enemy's main force attacked him, then, taking
advantage of the mine defences and supported by the coast batteries, he
would be able to engage the enemy's force, although superior both in
numbers and strength, for a considerable time. Unfortunately, Witgeft
did not agree.
'My orders are to go to Vladivostock with the whole squadron, and this
I shall do.'
If he had agreed to Grigorovitch's proposal, Togo would not have had a
balance of advantage, and his force, being split up by reason of the
demonstration at Dalny, would have been weaker than ours. Our squadron
would have successfully broken through to Vladivostock without serious
injury, and Dalny would have been destroyed by Admiral Loschinsky. If
only we had not let slip the excellent opportunities we had had for
sinking the enemy's ships, their force would have been considerably
weaker than ours.
As the time approached for the squadron's departure, the Admiral
and most of the officers were depressed, for the approaching voyage
promised little good. They all realized that the squadron was going
to sea short of guns (most of those put ashore were left there), and
of very much else; they knew that our shells did little destruction,
sometimes not even bursting, whilst those, even the 4·7-inch shells,
of the enemy caused great havoc, and that, having superior speed, the
enemy would have the initiative.
The Admiral was wounded by a splinter of shell bursting on the
_Cesarevitch_ the day before the sortie, and, as if foreseeing his near
end, his last words to those on shore were: 'Gentlemen, we shall meet
in the next world.'
At daybreak on the 10th the fleet steamed out into the outer Roads,
and, forming into single-column line ahead, steered for Liao-tieh-shan.
The hospital ship _Mongolia_ left exactly at eight o'clock, and
overtook the fleet at 8.30. Some Japanese destroyers showing themselves
in the direction of Dalny, the _Novik_ was sent towards them, and
having rapidly driven them away, the whole fleet started at nearly full
speed--a formidable array of yellow-brown vessels, brought up in rear
by the _Mongolia_, glistening white, with the red cross on her funnels.
As the Commandant, from the top of Electric Cliff, watched it steam
out, he said:
'May God grant it luck! If only it can vanquish the foe and gain
possession of the sea, the Fortress will be saved. But evil will be
the day if it is defeated and does not return. How many men, guns and
shells has it not taken with it, all of which we badly want!'
* * * * *
Port Arthur's weary day of strained suspense came to an end; the night
passed and morning dawned. The signal station at Liao-tieh-shan
reported that our squadron was approaching. It did return; but heavens!
in what a plight! By the afternoon it was drawn up in the inner roads,
less four ships, the _Cesarevitch_, _Askold_, _Novik_, and _Diana_,
which had not returned, and about whose fate no one knew. Admiral
Witgeft had been killed. What had happened at sea has been described by
others, and I will spare the reader the details of this sad engagement.
Thus weakened by the loss of one of our best battleships and three of
our fastest cruisers, the rôle of the fleet might be said to have come
to an end, for the sea was held by an enemy powerful in numbers as
well as quality, and till the coming of the Baltic fleet our squadron
would not be able to engage them in battle. All it could now do was
to give us men, guns and ammunition for the land defence. Why the
Pacific Ocean fleet, consisting of the best ships in the navy, had
done nothing during a seven months' campaign, and why in the end it
had been forced to abandon all idea of an active rôle and its chief
_raison d'être_--to get command of the sea and interrupt the Japanese
sea communications--are questions which demand an answer.
'Who was to blame?' There is but one answer.
The very essential and fundamental reforms in the navy, which had been
pointed out as necessary years ago by the better and more enlightened
officers, should have been introduced, and the prehistoric naval
customs of the time of Peter the Great should have been consigned to
oblivion. To blame the individual for this is impossible: it was the
system that was at fault, as well as that official class which, like a
thousand-headed hydra, sucks and nibbles at the really healthy organism
of Russia. British and German officers will not believe my assertion
that everything on Russian ships was neglected save the personnel,
which was fairly well looked after materially and moderately well
trained. The education of the higher ranks in staff duties, as well as
their training in shooting, torpedo and other work, was so neglected
that the majority of officers had but the vaguest notion of the
practical application of theory. In most cases, owing to their constant
transfer from one to another, they did not know even their ships.
For three-quarters of the year these were in harbour and hardly any
cruising was done, while the officers were made to work so little that
at the commencement of the war they did not even know the shores of the
Kwantun Peninsula.
The return of the squadron with its mutilated hulls, battered funnels
and masts, had a bad effect, and on all sides was heard, 'The end will
now soon come!'