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THE TRUTH ABOUT PORT ARTHUR
First Edition April, 1908.
Second Impression May, 1908.
Third Impression September, 1908.
[Illustration: GENERAL SMIRNOFF.]
THE TRUTH ABOUT
PORT ARTHUR
BY MONSIEUR E.K. NOJINE
ACCREDITED RUSSIAN WAR CORRESPONDENT DURING THE SIEGE
TRANSLATED AND ABRIDGED BY
CAPTAIN A.B. LINDSAY
2ND KING EDWARD'S OWN GURKHA RIFLES
TRANSLATOR OF 'THE BATTLE OF TSU-SHIMA,' ETC.
EDITED BY
MAJOR E.D. SWINTON, D.S.O.
ROYAL ENGINEERS
AUTHOR OF 'THE DEFENCE OF DUFFER'S DRIFT'
WITH MAP AND ILLUSTRATIONS
LONDON
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W.
1908
PREFACE
The siege of Port Arthur was the event of the late war in the Far East
which most attracted the attention and interest of the rest of the
world. There were other military operations, it is true, of equal if
not of greater importance to the ultimate issue of the struggle; but,
owing to their complexity, their slowness, and the absence of definite
advance information, their progress and purport were not easily grasped
by any save military students. The case of Port Arthur was different.
The long drawn-out agony of the siege was continued before the eyes of
the world for many months,[1] and, while the imagination was touched by
its romantic side, the point at issue was at once apparent.
Even so, there was much mystery about the conduct of the defence and
the eventual fall of the Fortress; for, owing to its remote position
and almost complete isolation by the enemy, the available information
almost entirely consisted of that supplied by correspondents with
the Japanese, and was, therefore, information from the outside, and
more or less a history of _results_ alone. In 1907, or between two
and three years after the culmination of the siege, the inevitable
disclosures--the aftermath of defeat--which sometimes help to an
appreciation of _causes_ began to be made in Russia.
More than one book has recently been written by Russians who saw the
defence from inside the Fortress, and who therefore claim to be in a
position to give the inner history of the tragedy.
'The Truth about Port Arthur' was published in Russia last year. M.
Nojine, the author, by whose permission this abridged translation
has been made, was the accredited Russian war-correspondent in Port
Arthur, and as such went through the greater part of the siege. He had
exceptional facilities for collecting material for his work, for he
was all through in close contact with the 'fighting' leaders of Port
Arthur, and had access to official documents and diaries, and, having
been an eye-witness of much, and possessing the trained observation of
a journalist, his testimony should carry weight. His book is one long
indictment of the then régime in Russia, and of some of the officials
connected with the defence of Port Arthur.
By the time that the English translation was completed, in the autumn
of 1907, it was announced that some of the senior officers who
conducted the defence were to be tried by court-martial. In fact, from
the copy of the official indictment then published,[2] it seemed as if
it might almost have been framed upon material furnished by M. Nojine's
book. It was therefore decided to delay publication whilst matters were
_sub judice_. The trial is now over, the result is known to the world,
and there seems no reason why the English version of the account by an
eye-witness of what went on in the ill-fated Fortress should not be
given to the public.
The translator and editor disclaim all responsibility for the
statements made and the opinions expressed, which are the author's own.
If he has sometimes been carried beyond the limits of a strictly
judicial impartiality, it is, perhaps, in the circumstances,
comprehensible. His patriotism must have been again and again outraged
by the existing maladministration, while his personal feelings were
probably embittered by the treatment which he and those who bore the
burden of the defence received.
Though the author, as will be seen by a perusal of his book, is not
sparing of censure and is distinctly outspoken in his conclusions,
yet he is capable of giving praise when he considers it to be due.
Indeed, it is a relief, amongst so much that is depressing, to read his
opinion of Generals Smirnoff and Kondratenko amongst others, and his
whole-hearted championship of the stolid, dogged Russian soldier who,
weighed down by the incompetence of many above him, struggled through
those weary months of defeat, privation, and suspense.
Amongst much in this book which gives food for thought there are two or
three matters described by the author which are truly extraordinary.
For instance, it is difficult to believe that when, after so much
threatening, the storm eventually burst and war broke out, Port
Arthur--that outpost of the Russian Empire--was so far from being ready
that on January 14, 1904, only eight guns of the allotted armament
were mounted on the land defences. And yet there is official authority
for this statement (see Appendix II.). It is also remarkable that even
before the place was finally cut off by complete investment in July,
1904, the troops had to be put on short rations; this seems to have
been caused by the subordination, even in war, of the military to other
requirements. General Fock's theory also upon fortress warfare (p. 227)
is strangely at variance with the practice of his great countryman
Todleben, who defended Sevastopol for 349 days, and his reasoning is
difficult to follow. Finally, the action of the senior officer of
a beleaguered fortress, in disobeying and concealing the official
messages which ordered his recall and appointed his successor, seems
inconceivable.
Undoubtedly, if a proper organization had existed upon the outbreak
of hostilities instead of the inadequate product of a nation's false
economy, Port Arthur might have held out for a considerably longer
time than it did; but speculation upon the possible results of this
is beyond the scope of this preface. Without labouring the morals
pointed by this siege, it is clear that policy should wait on military
preparedness, that now as of old the internal jealousies within an army
are as dangerous to it as the enemy, and that it is still the moral
factor that counts most.
In the translation there has of necessity been some abridgement; but
an endeavour has been made all through to convey the writer's meaning
and, wherever possible, to use his exact words. The chief interest
of the work for British readers seems to be in the picture presented
of the general conduct of the defence and of the state of affairs in
the Fortress rather than in the more technical accounts of the actual
fighting, which are very like each other. To those not engaged, the
description of an attack on one point bears much resemblance to the
descriptions of attacks on other points. It is with this feeling that
the necessary curtailment has been made. Some, also, of the author's
picturesque writing, which would probably appeal less to the Briton
than it would to the Slav, has been eliminated.
All military history must to a certain extent lose in interest for the
non-professional reader from the continual occurrence of the names of
small places which are only of importance to the military student, and
which, even without necessitating a reference to the map, rather break
the continuity of the narrative. This is especially so in the case of
the recent war, where the majority of the localities referred to are
obscure spots, possessing names of Chinese origin which not only are
very long and uncouth, but also have a confusing resemblance to each
other. Added to this, they have been as a rule spelled differently in
every account or on every map. It has, therefore, been decided in this
translation to give, wherever possible, the English equivalents of the
Russian instead of the Chinese or Japanese names of places, forts, or
positions. They are shorter, convey more meaning to the British reader,
and therefore so far tend to simplification. This has been thought to
outweigh the disadvantages of the fact that they are comparatively
unknown, for the Chinese or Japanese names have so far been almost
exclusively used in England.
To this rule there are three exceptions. Three localities at Port
Arthur possess non-Russian names, which are now almost historic in the
English tongue, and for which it would be confusing and almost pedantic
to use the Russian equivalents. These are 203 Metre Hill, North Fort
Chi-kuan-shan, and Fort Erh-lung-shan, which would not be recognized
under their Russian names of High Hill,[3] Fort No. 2, Fort No. 3. For
these three places the names already so well known have been used,
except in Appendix I. and the table of Appendix III.
As regards the accounts of the fighting and the numbers engaged, it
must be borne in mind that the organization of both the Russian and
Japanese infantry is different to that existing in the British army,
and that where a regiment is mentioned in the text it means three
battalions. Thus a division of the East Siberian Rifles (as well as a
Japanese active division) consisted of two brigades of two regiments of
three battalions each, or twelve battalions.
Finally, a short description of the defences of Port Arthur will,
perhaps, elucidate the author's narrative. At the outbreak of war the
land defences of the Fortress consisted of the following:
The Chinese Wall, which was a continuous earth rampart extending for
some distance round the north of the place.
Five principal permanent works of large size and great strength,
arranged in a rough semicircle from sea to sea. Of these, one, No. 5,
was not finished at the outbreak of hostilities. Another, No. 6, which
was to have completed the girdle on the west, was not commenced. These
works are called in the text 'forts.'
Five subsidiary works in the intervals between the principal 'forts.'
These were not of such strength as the latter, and were for the most
part completed but not armed at the commencement of hostilities. They
are called in the text 'fortifications.'
Certain of the batteries on the land side, and a few auxiliary
works--such as redoubts, etc.
After the outbreak of war the existing permanent and semi-permanent
works were supplemented by a large number of batteries and closed
infantry works, in some of which guns were emplaced. These were sited
between the other works, or, in some cases, upon special points, and
are called 'redoubts' and 'lunettes.' There were also a few open
infantry works constructed for the special purpose of 'flanking'
others, or for firing over ground in front of them not covered by their
own fire. These are here called 'open caponiers,' and should not be
confused with the masonry structures called 'caponiers,' placed at the
bottom of the deep ditches of the larger works for the defence of those
ditches.
Round, between, and behind the forts, fortifications, redoubts,
lunettes, etc., a maze of trenches grew up for fire, shelter, and
communication, and numerous bomb-proofs, magazines, dressing stations,
were also built. In front were wire entanglements, live electric wires,
land mines--every obstacle that ingenuity could suggest.
To assist in identification a table has been prepared in which the
Russian and the other names (where available) of the localities
mentioned are given. A chronological table of the principal events of
the siege has been also added.
London, _March, 1908_.
TABLE OF NAMES
List of Principal Places mentioned, giving their Russian and in some
Cases their Other Names.
--------------------------------------+------------------
Russian Names. | Other Names.
--------------------------------------+------------------
_Principal Works--'Forts.'_ |
|
No. 1 Fort (S.E.). | Paiyin-shan Fort;
| South Fort.
No. 2 " (N.E.). North Fort | Chi-kuan-shan;
| Fort Kitohadai.
No. 3 " (N.). | Fort Erh-lung-shan;
| Fort Nirusan.
No. 4 " (N.W.). | I-tzu-shan Fort.
No. 5 " (W.). | Tayanko North.
No. 6 " (S.W.). |
|
_Subsidiary Works--'Fortifications.'_ |
|
Fortification No. 1 (S.E.). | South-east
| Chi-kuan-shan
| Battery.
" No. 2 (E.). | Dangerous Mountain.
" No. 3 (N.). | Sung-su-shan Fort;
| Sho-zu-shan Fort;
| Shoju-san.
" No. 4 (W.). | South An-tzu-shan Fort.
" No. 5 (S.W.). | Cha-kua-tzu.
|
_Intermediate, Temporary, and |
Field Works._ |
|
Takhe Redoubt (S.E.). | South-east Redoubt.
Rear Redoubt (E.). |
Kuropatkin Lunette (N.E.). | 'Q' Work.
No. 1 Open Caponier (N.E.). |
Redoubt No. 1 (N.E.). | East Pan-lun-shan
| Redoubt;
| East Banru-san.
No. 2 Open Caponier (N.E.). |'P' Work.
Redoubt No. 2 (N.E.). |West Pan-lun-shan Redoubt;
| West Banru-san.
No. 3 Open Caponier (N.E.). |'G' Work; Hachi-maki-yama.
Water Supply Redoubt (N.) |Fort Kuropatkin.
Rocky Redoubt (N.). |Railway Redoubt; Lung-yen.
Temple Redoubt (N.). |
Pan-lun-shan Redoubt (N.W.). |
Flat Hill, No. 1 Redoubt (N.W.). |
" No. 2 " (N.W.). |
" No. 3 " (N.W.). |
" No. 4 " Stone- |
broken (N.W.). |
Double Angle Lunette (N.W.). |
New Lunette (N.W.). |
Fougasse Lunette (N.W.). |
No. 5 Redoubt (W.). |Quarry Battery.
No. 4 " (W.). |
Timber Redoubt (S.W.). |
Salt Redoubt (S.W.). |
Quail Hill (centre). |
|
_Land Batteries._ |
|
Cross (S.E.). |
Dragon's Back (E.). |
Dragon's Head (E.). |
'A' (E.). |
'B' (N.E.). |
Zaliterny (N.E.). |'R.'
Little Eagle's Nest (N.E.). |'M.'
Eagle's Nest (N.E.). |Bodai; Wang-tai.
Zaredoubt (N.). |'H.'
Howitzer (N.). |
Wolf's (N.). |'I.'
Tumulus (N.). |Sung-su-shan Auxiliary.
Cemetery (N.W.). |Cemetery.
'C' (Sapper) (N.W.). |
Jagged Hill (N.W.). |
Howitzer (N.W.). |
Obelisk Hill (N.W.). | Obelisk Hill.
Tea (W.). | Stonebroken.
Pigeon (W.). |
'D' (W.). | South Tayanko.
Salt, [? Redoubt] (S.W.). |
|
_Coast Batteries._ |
|
White Wolf. |
No. 1. } |
" 2. } | Tiger's Head.
" 3. } |
" 4. } |
" 5. } On |
" 6. } } Tiger's | } Chi-kuan-shan.
" 7. } } Peninsula. |
" 8. } | Man-tzu-ying.
" 9. } |
" 10. } |
Lighthouse.} |
No. 12 (S.). |
" 13, Golden Hill (S.). |
" 14 (S.) |
" 15, Electric Cliff (S.). |
" 16 (S.E.). | Six-inch Gun.
" 17 (S.E.). |
" 18 (S.E.). |
" 19 (S.E.). |
" 20 (S.E.). |
" 21, Long Battery (S.E.). |
" 22 (S.E.). |
|
_Other Places._ |
|
Kuen-san Hill (N.E.). | Ken-san Hill.
Sia-gu-shan (E.). | Shokozan; Hsiao-ku-shan.
Ta-ku-shan (E.). | Ta-ku-shan.
High Hill (N.W.). | 203 Metre Hill; Royusan.
Angle Hill (N.W.). | 174 Metre Hill.
Long Hill (N.W.). | Namakoyama.
Divisional Hill (N.). |
Flat Hill (N.). | Akasakayama
Wolf's Hills (N.E.). | Feng-huang-shen.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 1: One hundred and fifty-four days after the close
investment.]
[Footnote 2: See Conclusion, p. 336.]
[Footnote 3: There is another hill called High Hill, on the eastern
flank, which has been left as such.]
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF PRINCIPAL EVENTS
1904.
Feb. 8. Japanese torpedo Russian Fleet.
" 25. Japanese attempt to 'block.'
Mar. 10. Japanese bombard the harbour.
" 17. General Smirnoff arrives.
" 22. Japanese bombard the harbour.
" 25. Japanese attempt to 'block.'
April 13. The _Petropalovsk_ blown up by a mine.
" 14. The Viceroy, Admiral Alexeieff, arrives in Port
Arthur.
May 2. Japanese attempt to 'block.'
" 4. Japanese land at Petsiwo.
" 5. The Viceroy leaves Port Arthur.
" 15. The _Hatsuse_ sunk by a Russian mine. The _Fuji_
damaged.
" 16. Action at Shanshihlipu.
" 20. Japanese attack by sea.
" 26. Battle of Kinchou. Dalny evacuated.
June 18. General Stössel receives a telegram of recall.
" 19. Sortie of Russian Fleet. _Sevastopol_ damaged by
a mine. Japanese attempt to torpedo Russian
Fleet.
" 26. } The fight on Green Hills. Russians lose Kuen-san
" 27. } Hill.
July 3. }
" 4. } Russian attempts to recapture Kuen-san fail.
" 5. }
" 26. }
" 27. } Russians driven from Green Hills position.
" 28. }
July 29. Russians driven from Wolf's Hills position.
" 30. }
" 31. } Investment commences.
Aug. 8. Ta-ku-shan and Sia-gu-shan lost by Russians.
" 9. First attempt to recapture Ta-ku-shan Hill fails.
" 10. Sortie of the Russian Fleet.
" 11. Second attempt to recapture Ta-ku-shan Hill
fails.
" 16. Japanese suggest surrender of Port Arthur.
" 21. }
" 22. } Great Japanese assault. Nos. 1 and 2 Redoubts
" 23. } captured by Japanese.
Sept. 19. Japanese capture Water-supply Redoubt.
" 20. Japanese capture Temple Redoubt.
Oct. 1. Japanese commence firing from 11-inch howitzers.
" 29. } General assault by Japanese. No. 2 Open
" 30. } Caponier captured by them.
Nov. 20-26. Japanese assaults.
Dec. 5. 203 Metre Hill captured.
" 6. Japanese commence to shell Russian ships.
" 15. General Kondratenko killed.
" 18. Chi-kuan-shan Fort captured.
" 28. Erh-lung-shan Fort captured.
" 31. Fortification No. 3 captured.
1905.
Jan. 1. Eagle's Nest captured.
" 2. Capitulation signed.
CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
I. THE BOMB-SHELL 3
II. SETTLING DOWN TO IT 8
III. DEVELOPMENTS 17
IV. SMIRNOFF ARRIVES 23
V. STÖSSEL STAYS 27
VI. THE WORK OF JAPANESE MINE-LAYERS 32
VII. NEWS FROM THE NORTH 36
VIII. MORE BLOCKERS 41
IX. WHAT WE DID WHILE THE ENEMY WERE ADVANCING 44
X. THE NAVY LOSE A CHANCE 50
XI. PREPARATIONS ON THE KINCHOU POSITION 54
XII. THE BATTLE OF KINCHOU COMMENCES 61
XIII. THE BATTLE CONTINUES 67
XIV. NANGALIN RAILWAY-STATION 75
XV. THE LAST OF DALNY 80
XVI. THE FATE OF THE FORTRESS 84
XVII. THE LOSS OF KUEN-SAN HILL 91
XVIII. THE JUNE SORTIE OF THE FLEET 96
XIX. FORTIFYING OUR LINE 103
XX. THE ATTACK ON GREEN HILLS 110
XXI. THE BATTLE CONTINUES 120
XXII. STÖSSEL HOIST BY HIS OWN PETARD 133
XXIII. THE LOSS OF TA-KU-SHAN HILL 140
XXIV. THE SORTIE OF THE FLEET ON AUGUST 10 150
XXV. OUR SECOND ATTACK ON TA-KU-SHAN--A FLAG
OF TRUCE 155
XXVI. DEATH OF PRINCE MACHABELLY--ALL-ROUND
FIGHTING 163
XXVII. STÖSSEL DISOBEYS--PROGRESS DURING AUGUST 173
XXVIII. AWARDS--SOME PERSONAL NOTES 186
XXIX. SEPTEMBER PASSES 191
XXX. MOLE WARFARE 206
XXXI. JAPANESE VIEWS-GENERAL FOCK's MEMORANDUM
ON FORTRESS DEFENCE 222
XXXII. HINTS OF SURRENDER--MORE ASSAULTS 233
XXXIII. THE FIGHT FOR 203 METRE HILL 243
XXXIV. THE LOSS OF THE HILL 252
XXXV. A RETROSPECT ON THE POSITION AT SEA 259
XXXVI. A COUNCIL MEETING 265
XXXVII. KONDRATENKO'S DEATH AND SOME RESULTS 274
XXXVIII. THE LOSS OF FORT CHI-KUAN-SHAN 284
XXXIX. THE SAPPERS--REWARDS 292
XL. THE FALL OF ERH-LUNG-SHAN AND THE LAST
COUNCIL 299
XLI. THE FALL OF FORTIFICATION NO. 3.--THE FAILURE
OF THE DEFENCE AND MEDICAL ORGANIZATIONS 310
XLII. THE LAST DAY BUT ONE 322
XLIII. THE END 330
CONCLUSION 336
APPENDIX I. 347
APPENDIX II. 364
APPENDIX III. 381
APPENDIX IV. 385
INDEX 389
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
GENERAL SMIRNOFF FRONTISPIECE
ADMIRAL LOSCHINSKY TO FACE PAGE 20
COLONEL KHVOSTOFF " 23
ADMIRAL MAKHAROFF " 35
MAJOR-GENERAL TRETIAKOFF " 69
COLONEL LAPEROFF " 73
A WOMAN DRESSED AS A SOLDIER WHO WENT
THROUGH SEVERAL FIGHTS " 87
A BOMBPROOF " 105
REAR-ADMIRAL GRIGOROVITCH " 151
INSIDE A TRENCH ON THE EASTERN FRONT " 166
GENERAL GORBATOVSKY " 171
ON THE ATTACKED FRONT " 174
THE ASSAULT REPULSED " 182
BURIAL-PARTIES AT WORK " 185
COLONEL RASCHEVSKY " 188
PANORAMA OF NORTH-EAST FRONT " 193
A CANET GUN MOUNTED ON FORT V.,
SEPTEMBER 22 " 197
A COMPANY IN THE TRENCHES " 200
BOMBARDMENT: JAPANESE SHELLS BURSTING
ON HILL " 208
RESULTS OF A BOMBARDMENT " 210
GENERAL SMIRNOFF FIRING THE CAMOUFLET " 217
KUROPATKIN LUNETTE AFTER THE ASSAULT
IN OCTOBER " 221
B BATTERY " 231
RESERVES WAITING UNDER 203 METRE HILL " 246
GENERAL BIELY " 256
GENERAL KONDRATENKO " 276
NORTH FORT, CHI-KUAN-SHAN, SHOWING GREEN
HILLS IN THE DISTANCE " 285
ADMIRAL WIREN " 330
THE
TRUTH ABOUT PORT ARTHUR
'_Culpam pæna premit comes._'
Port Arthur has fallen....
The bare fact is now a matter of history; but at last the time has
come to reckon up in detail all that happened during the blockade by
land and sea. As late war correspondent in the theatre of operations
in Kwantun, as a close witness of all that took place, and as one
who voluntarily went through that terrible time, I look upon it as
my sacred duty to narrate what this defence cost the garrison and
inhabitants of the unhappy town--to tell the truth, the whole truth,
and nothing but the truth.
All who went through that heartrending siege, and who reflected at all
on what was passing before their eyes, became gradually aware of--and
finally, I might almost say, resigned to--two great facts. First, that
the Fortress Commandant, Lieutenant-General Smirnoff, had two enemies
to fight--one inside the Fortress and one out; second, that it was the
internal enemy which proved too strong. The immense efforts of General
Smirnoff and of his immediate assistants--the late General Kondratenko,
Admirals Grigorovitch, Loschinsky, and Wiren, and Generals Biely and
Gorbatovsky--were in vain.
Why?
To this question the following pages will, I hope, supply the answer;
but, before commencing my narrative, I should explain that I shall only
recount facts either confirmed by documentary evidence or witnessed by
myself.
CHAPTER I
THE BOMB-SHELL
When, one hour before midnight on February 8, 1904, our warships began
to belch fire from their many steel mouths, and the seaward batteries
suddenly thundered forth their angry death-dealing tidings, no one
dreamed that the noise was War, for no one had taken the constant
rumours of the rupture of diplomatic relations and of approaching
hostilities at all seriously. Those who heard the increasing cannonade
buoyed themselves up with the vague hope that some surprise combined
manoeuvres were taking place between the fleet and the coast defences.
When three rockets, however, snaked up into the inky night from Golden
Hill and burst on high, they told their message, and finally when the
gun-fire from Electric Cliff and the adjacent batteries changed to
salvos, those who understood the message of the rockets doubted no
longer.
Thus was all hope of a peaceful issue to the negotiations with Japan
shattered. Our incapable, idle, and utterly short-sighted diplomacy,
which had so long and so stupidly exhausted the patience of the
Mikado's Government, was now at an end. It was to enjoy a dishonourable
repose, whilst others reaped the harvest of its handiwork. The hour had
struck for the cold, impartial judgment of history.
Although the sky in the East had for weeks been blood-red with the
menace of immediate war, yet when it came the surprise was absolute,
its horror intensified by our complete unreadiness.
Regiments hearing the alarm fell in. Officers, surprised in bed, at a
ball, at the theatre, or in restaurants, hurried off to march their
units to the alarm posts: hurried, but went without speed--for, alas!
no one had hitherto taken the trouble to become acquainted with the
geography of the Fortress, and the consequence was that most of the
troops wandered about unknown roads and hill-tracks, in vain searching
for the posts assigned to them. The confusion which ensued was
incredible--a fitting prelude to the fall of Port Arthur. Finally, when
the troops did arrive at their posts, to their amazement they found in
them either no small-arm ammunition at all or else only the ordinary
quantity for the guards. To the men it was at first a huge joke; they
naturally thought they were only doing a 'sham fight.' But the jest
wore off as they sat on through the night, and through the next day,
hungry, and chilled to the bone by the pitiless icy wind which was
howling down the hill-sides. It was possibly good training for the
hardships to follow? It was not until the morning that it struck some
bright staff-officer to send up ammunition. This reached the frozen
detachments on the following evening, together with the means of
cooking. Yes, certainly Luck did favour us sometimes in Port Arthur;
she did that night, in that the Japanese did not press a land attack.
While this cheerful state of chaos reigned in the Fortress, on the sea
the prologue to the war was already over. One Russian ship alone--the
_Novik_--could be heard, hull down on the horizon, firing at Japanese
destroyers. In the town itself a doleful rumour spread apace, that some
of our ships had been blown up. It was not believed. We were afraid to
believe what we did hear, but did not want to hear the truth, which we
dreaded still more.
Next morning Port Arthur woke earlier than usual. Every one wanted to
know what had actually happened during the night. Alas! the reports
as to Japanese torpedo attacks were only too well founded, and the
_Cesarevitch_, _Pallada_, and _Retvisan_ were _hors de combat_. Despite
the completeness of the night attack, and the calculating thoroughness
with which the enemy had done their work--clearest proof that man
could want of the outbreak of war--in the absence of any official
communication from the Commandant, the population still hoped against
hope. The more impressionable prepared to leave, but otherwise things
went on much as usual. At the wharf a crowd collected to look at the
_Retvisan_ lying in the entrance to the harbour; from her appearance
it was difficult to believe that she had sustained any damage, and the
reports were pronounced untrue. The printing office of the _Novy Kry_
was another centre of attraction, every one hustling round to buy a
paper with some account of the night's work. But in the paper was no
word of war.
Although outwardly the current of life in Port Arthur seemed to flow
unruffled, this calm did not extend to those in authority. The staffs,
which up to the preceding evening had been peacefully slumbering for
six years, were now extraordinarily busy; their activity was proved by
the utter confusion which reigned. The disorganization of the Fortress
Staff particularly was almost ludicrous: officers hurried hither and
thither, contradictory and impossible orders were being issued and
countermanded, and above and through all this confusion resounded the
ceaseless chattering of the telephone-bells. It was not a sight to
inspire confidence. It seemed as if the staff momentarily anticipated
some fatal and sudden blow, but did not know what to do in order to
ward it off. Colonel Khvostoff, the Chief of the Fortress Staff, and
his immediate assistants alone kept their heads. He knew that the time
was approaching when every one would see the real state of things, and
to what extent the 'stronghold'--Port Arthur--was impregnable. [Several
alarmists had already been punished by the Commandant for spreading
rumours that many of the batteries were gunless, and many of the guns
without ammunition.] He and his predecessor, General Flug, had done
all that was in their power, but they might as well have knocked their
heads against a wall.
Meanwhile the Viceroy's staff wrote orders, which ended up in the
Viceroy's own words: 'You must all keep calm, in order to be able to
perform your duty in the most efficient manner possible, trusting to
the help of God that every man will do his work, remembering that
neither prayers to God nor service for the Tsar are in vain.'
In the outer harbour the Pacific Ocean squadron was lying, steam up and
cleared for action, waiting the order to go out and engage the enemy.
When, at 10 a.m., the _Boyarin_, having returned to harbour, signalled
that the Japanese fleet was approaching in force, the Viceroy and
General Stössel, escorted by a troop of Cossacks, and followed by a
numerous suite, went up on to Golden Hill. It certainly was to be hoped
that General Stössel, to whom the Emperor had entrusted the Fortress,
and who had recently reported to him that it was ready, would 'keep
calm' and do his duty 'in the most efficient manner'; but those who
were privileged to see him on that historic morning saw no traces of
calmness in his demeanour.
After about an hour the presence of the whole Japanese fleet on the
horizon was signalled, but the majority of the people knew nothing, and
all was quiet in the town. A little later and Port Arthur was paralysed
with fear, for the very ground quivered with the shock as the guns of
both fleets and of the coast batteries suddenly opened fire. The battle
had begun, and the fleet of young Japan, a nation which had only begun
to take lessons in Western culture thirty-two years ago, was pitted
against that of Russia--founded two hundred years ago by Peter the
Great.
In twenty minutes' time 12-inch shells were detonating in the streets
of the town, and the population began to flee in panic to the hills.
The battle waxed, but there was curious silence on Liao-tieh-shan
and Quail Hills--two peaks which commanded the ground all round Port
Arthur. The first was armed with a lighthouse and the second with a
fire observation-tower! In spite of the fire, but little damage was
done on either side--the enemy could not hurt Electric Cliff and Golden
Hill, and the bark of our shore batteries was worse than their bite,
owing to the short range of their guns. Indeed, owing to lack of guns
and ammunition, some of our batteries were actually firing blank,
whilst others maintained a haughty silence. Though Russia did not then
know of this, the Japanese did, but, with their natural cunning, held
their tongues. The British knew of it, and chuckled whilst they kept
silence for their allies.
Just before noon the bombardment ceased, and the Japanese fleet steamed
off. The first wild panic subsided and the little railway-station was
soon crowded with fugitives, all anxious to depart.
What the Viceroy, Alexeieff, said to Stössel that day is hidden by a
veil of obscurity, but that he decided to remove him from the post
of General admits of not the slightest doubt, for Lieutenant-General
Konstantine Nikolaevitch Smirnoff was chosen by the War Minister to
supersede Stössel as Commandant, and left Warsaw for Port Arthur on
February 25.