_To the Editor of The New York Times:_
It is regrettable that President Wilson's admirable policy of strict
neutrality is not more sincerely and carefully observed by the press and
public of this country.
We are a cosmopolitan nation. Citizens of the five great warring
countries and their descendants, to a very great extent, constitute our
population. Partiality of any kind tends to destroy the elemental ties
which bind us together, to disrupt our Union, and to make us a house
divided against itself. James M. Beck's article in last Sunday's TIMES
is of the kind which, serving no good purpose, helps to loosen, if not
sever, our most vital domestic ties. While not for an instant doubting
Mr. Beck's sincerity, we must take issue with his inadvertently
ill-timed expression of opinion.
The article in question is based on the following statement: "Any
discussion of the ethical merits of this great controversy must start
with the assumption that there is such a thing as international
morality." How does Mr. Beck define "international morality"? How can he
assume that to exist which each of the contending nations by their
diverse actions prove to be non-extant? How can he claim that there is
an "international morality" of accepted form when each nation claims
that its interpretation must be accepted by the others?
Mr. Beck's allegation that the question "Was England justified in
declaring war against Germany?" is more easily disposed of than the
questions "Was Austria justified in declaring war against Servia?" and
"Was Germany justified in declaring war against Russia and France?"
proves two things--first, that his interest lies primarily in the
vindication of England; second, that he disregards the fundamental
causes and recognizes only the precipitating causes of the war.
The precipitating cause of the war between England and Germany is
verbosely if inadequately covered by his article. We must admit that a
treaty was broken by Germany, yet we contend that this broken agreement
was a pretext for a war fomented and impelled by basic economic causes.
At the outset, let us distinguish between a contract and a treaty. A
contract is an agreement between individuals contemplating enforcement
by a court of law; punishment by money damages in the great majority of
cases, by a specific performance in a very few. A treaty is an agreement
between nations contemplating enforcement by a court of international
public opinion; punishment by money indemnity in the great majority of
cases, by specific performance (i.e., force of arms) in a very few.
Germany's Existence Threatened.
Germany contends that her breach of treaty obligation is punishable by
the payment of money indemnity to the aggrieved party. This she has
offered to do in the case of Belgium, as she has already done in the
case of Luxemburg. Germany's existence was so seriously threatened that
her action seems justifiable, and there remains a sole moral obligation
to compensate any neutral country injured by her.
The mere fact that Belgium had made an unfortunate alliance with England
is deplorable in that Belgium has suffered terribly; but this suffering
is not attributable to Germany. When Japan violated Chinese neutrality,
China protested. Though she was entitled to a money indemnity, there is
no valid reason under the sun why the United States as a guarantor of
the integrity of China should declare war against Japan. England's
justification, in so far as there can be any justification for adding to
the toll of death, is the same as that of Germany, the preservation of
national sovereignty.
Further: "It seems unnecessary to discuss the wanton disregard of these
solemn obligations." There can be nothing wanton in a struggle for
existence, and that this European war is such a struggle is the only
possible explanation of its magnitude, ferocity, and vast possible
consequences. Then, too, though deplorable, treaty obligations are not
solemn, as Italy has proved to the complete satisfaction of so many.
Italy's contention that this is an aggressive war on the part of Germany
and Austria is as untenable as the German contention that it is an
aggressive war on the part of England. For this war was not an
aggressive war on the part of any nation, but an unavoidable war caused
by the simultaneous bursting of the long-gathering economic storm
clouds.
Again: "The ethical aspects of this great conflict must largely depend
upon the record that has been made up by the official communications."
This is similar to a contention that the ethical rights in a case in
court must depend upon the astuteness of counsel in summing up to the
jury. "A court would be deeply impressed ... by the significant
omissions of documents known to be in existence." A court of law, as our
former Assistant Attorney General of the United States surely knows,
compels no one to give testimony that tends to incriminate, and,
furthermore, does not construe failure to testify on the grounds that it
will tend to incriminate against the defendant. In the law the defendant
is entitled to every reasonable doubt. It is also conceivable that a
reasonable time for the defense to present its case would be granted
before passing judgment.
Passing on: "To discuss the justice of Austria's grievances against
Servia would take us ... into the realm of disputed facts." This seems a
delectable bit of humor. We respectfully submit that Mr. Beck's other
assertions might also be considered as "in the realm of disputed facts."
Mr. Beck admits that Austria had a just grievance against Servia, though
he questions her method of redress. Though we conceive that in the
unfortunate European tangle Austria relied on German support in the
event of international conflict, we submit that reliance on Russian
support was a bigger factor in encouraging little Servia to defy her big
neighbor than the remoter help that Germany would furnish Austria in the
event of the conflict spreading.
Austria, in the exercise of her right to engage in a punitive expedition
against Servia, guaranteed that she would do nothing to generalize the
conflict by her assurances to Russia and to the world that there would
be no annexation of Servian territory or annihilation of the Servian
Kingdom. Whether these assurances were genuine or not is impossible of
determination. We have no right to constitute ourselves arbiters of
their sincerity.
No European Solidarity.
Mr. Beck speaks of "the solidarity of European civilization and the fact
that by policy and diplomatic intercourse ... a United European State
exists, even though its organization be as yet inchoate." This
solidarity is conspicuous only by its utter non-existence. Whatever may
have been achieved by policy and diplomatic intercourse has been marred
and rendered useless by the lines of demarkation of the spheres of
influence of the great powers of Europe and by the racial and
temperamental incongruities of Europe's population.
We read: "Servia had forty-eight hours to answer; ... the other European
nations had barely a day to consider what could be done to preserve the
peace of Europe. Why should an Austro-Servian war compromise the peace
of Europe?" Was it not because of the tangled web of international
diplomacy, the Triple Entente as well as the Triple Alliance?
Referring to a German warning in regard to Austria's demands on Servia,
"the German Foreign Office anticipates that Servia 'will refuse to
comply with these demands'--why, if they were justified?" We grieve at
the shattered ideal of Mr. Beck, who, in the face of the international
calamity which has befallen the world, still can believe that all
justifiable demands are complied with.
Again, quoting German "White Paper," Annex 1B, Germany desired "that
the dispute be localized, since any intervention of another power, on
account of the various alliance obligations, would bring consequences
impossible to measure." The explanation of this statement is not--an
aggressor threatens his adversary, but, rather, a prudent man begs
opposing factions to keep cool.
Great space is devoted in the article in question to Germany's
unwillingness to place the Austro-Servian controversy in the hands of
France, England, Germany, and Italy. As Germany disavows all interest in
the controversy, if she speaks truly, it was not within her power to
dictate to her ally in a matter which she could in nowise control except
by force of arms. Furthermore, had she had the power, how could she be
expected to exert pressure on her ally to leave a vital controversy to a
court of four, two of whom were bound by alliances with Russia,
Austria's real antagonist, and a third, (Italy,) as subsequent events
have shown, Austria's natural, geographical, and hereditary enemy? At
best, had each power held to its treaty obligations, there would have
been a deadlock.
Further: "The Russian Minister ... called at the German Foreign Office
and asked it 'to urge upon Vienna ... to take up this line of
conciliation. Jagow replied that he could not advise Austria to yield.'"
Elsewhere in the article a statement is made that the Austro-Servian and
Austro-Russian questions "for all practical purposes ... were
indistinguishable." This inconsistency of having Servia in the light of
a principal and then again in the light of an agent is the greatest
stumbling block to a clear analysis of the precipitating cause of the
war. The logical explanation of Servia's position is that of Russia's
agent. Hence Germany could not be expected to exert the same pressure on
an allied principal that Russia could exert on her agent.
It is true that Germany engaged in many blundering diplomatic quibbles
in the final stages of preparation for the war; but it is also true that
England quibbled, though with greater diplomatic finesse; for instance,
"Sir Edward Grey went so far as to tell the German Ambassador that ...
if Germany would make any reasonable proposals to preserve peace, and
Russia and France rejected it, that 'his Majesty's Government would have
nothing to do with the consequences.'" Here it is apparent to every one
that the word "reasonable" begs the questions.
Slav and Teuton.
The German people were encouraged to relish the idea of a war against
Russia once that war became likely, for sooner or later it seemed
inevitable that Slav and Teuton would clash, and Germany felt confident
that at the present time she outmatched her enemy. The Russians, too,
were encouraged to desire the Slav provinces of Austria, which racially
are a part of the Russian domain. The English people were made to relish
this opportunity to strike their great commercial competitor, especially
when they could do so with little likelihood of unfavorable criticisms.
Finally, the impressionable French people were stirred to thoughts of
revenge and recovery of their lost provinces.
Sympathy with any country in this most disgraceful yet most inevitable
of wars brands the sympathizer as a party to the material and lustful
purposes of at least one of the combatants. There is no ethical
justification of this war from any standpoint. There is no justification
of this war from any standpoint. There is only an explanation of the war
from an economic standpoint. All these specious arguments on the
precipitating causes of the war can be but for the display of brilliant
forensic oratory and matchless diction. Let us thrust aside in these
dark moments of peril and horror all subterfuge.
England, overburdened with taxation, was on the verge of civil war.
Russia, whose masses were overridden roughshod by a bureaucracy
weighting down the peasants with onerous national burdens, expected
sooner or later the cataclysmic upheaval with which the Nihilistic
societies have long been threatening its tyrannical Government. France,
seriously financially embarrassed because of crop impoverishment and
bad foreign investments in Brazil, Russia, and the Balkans, was subject
to continued internal political upheavals, with ever-changing Ministries
and a growing Socialist Party.
Austria, "the ramshackle empire," was in danger of disintegrating from a
variety of causes, not the least of which was the infusibility of its
racially different elements. Germany, in a blind race for commercial
supremacy, suffered from industrial overproduction, thus creating an
unhealthy financial condition which fortified the Socialist Party to an
extent which threatened her imperialistic form of government itself.
So these monarchies whose days were numbered, because of dissatisfaction
at the waste and extravagance of a world gone mad with national excesses
committed in the name of civilization, in reality the price of our
modernization, in a final desperate effort to rally their waning
fortunes stampeded their awakening masses into a ruinous interracial war
in order to stave off the torch and the guillotine.