"will use his great influence to induce Austria to accept
this proposal, thus proving that Germany and England are
working together to prevent what would be an international
catastrophe."
[Second German "White Paper."]
This last proposition, however, was never accepted or declined, for the
impetuous Kaiser gave his twelve-hour ultimatum to Russia to demobilize,
and this was an arrogant demand which no self-respecting power, much
less so great a one as Russia, could possibly accept.
While this demand was in progress Sir Edward Grey was making his last
attempt to preserve peace by asking Germany to sound Vienna, as he would
sound St. Petersburg, whether it would be possible for the four
disinterested powers to offer to Austria that they would
"undertake to see that she obtained full satisfaction of her
demands on Servia, provided they did not embarrass Servian
sovereignty and the integrity of Servian territory."
Sir Edward Grey went so far as to tell the German Ambassador that if
this was not satisfactory, and if Germany would make any reasonable
proposals to preserve peace and Russia and France rejected it, that
"his Majesty's Government would have nothing to do with the
consequences,"
which obviously meant either neutrality or actual intervention in behalf
of Germany and Austria.
On the same day the British Ambassador at Berlin besought the German
Foreign Office to
"put pressure on the authorities at Vienna to do something in
the general interest to reassure Russia and to show themselves
disposed to continue discussions on a friendly basis."
And Sir Edward Goschen reports that the German Foreign Minister replied
that last night he had
"begged Austria to reply to your last proposal, and that he
had received a reply to the effect that the Austrian Minister
for Foreign Affairs would take the wishes of the Emperor this
morning in the matter."
_Again the text of the letter in which Germany "begged" Austria to be
conciliatory is not found in the record._
The excuse of Germany that the mobilization of Russia compelled it to
mobilize does not justify the war. Mobilization does not necessarily
mean aggression, but simply preparation. If Russia had the right to
mobilize because Austria mobilized, Germany equally had the right to
mobilize when Russia mobilized, but it does not follow that either of
the three nations could justify a war to compel the other parties to
demobilize. Mobilization is only a preparation against eventualities. It
is the right of the sovereign State and by no code of ethics a _casus
belli_. The demand of Germany that Russia could not arm to defend
itself, when Austria was preparing for a possible attack on Russia, has
few, if any, parallels in history for bullying effrontery. It treated
Russia as an inferior, almost a vassal, State.
It must be observed that, while Germany insisted that Russia should
demobilize, the Kaiser offered no reciprocal promise. On his theory
Germany and Austria were to be left free to complete their preparations,
but Russia was to tie her own hands and leave herself "naked to her
enemies." This is shown by the last telegrams which passed between the
Czar and Kaiser. The Czar telegraphed:
"I have received your telegram. I comprehend that you are
forced to mobilize, but I should like to have from you the
same guaranty which I have given you, viz., that these
measures do not mean war, and that we shall continue to
negotiate for the welfare of our two countries and the
universal peace which is so dear to our hearts. With the aid
of God it must be possible to our long-tried friendship to
prevent the shedding of blood. I expect with full confidence
your urgent reply."
To this the Kaiser replied:
"I thank you for your telegram. I have shown yesterday to your
Government the way through which alone war may yet be averted.
Although I asked for a reply by today noon, no telegram from
my Ambassador has reached me with the reply of your
Government. I therefore have been forced to mobilize my army.
An immediate, clear, and unmistakable reply of your Government
is the sole way to avoid endless misery. Until I receive this
reply I am unable, to my great grief, to enter upon the
subject of your telegram. I must ask most earnestly that you,
without delay, order your troops to commit, under no
circumstances, the slightest violation of our frontiers."
This impetuous step of Germany to compel its great neighbor to desist
from military preparations to defend itself came most inopportunely, for
on Aug. 1 the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador _for the first time_ declared
to the Russian Government its willingness to discuss the terms of the
Austrian ultimatum to Servia, and it was then suggested that the form of
the ultimatum and the questions arising thereon should be discussed in
London. (Dispatch from British Ambassador at Vienna to Sir Edward Grey,
dated Sept. 1, 1914.) Sir Edward Grey at once advised the English
Ambassador in Berlin of the fact, and urged that it was still possible
to maintain peace
"if only a little respite in time can be gained before any
great power begins war,"
[English "White Paper," No. 131.]
but the Kaiser, having issued the arrogant ultimatum to Russia to
demobilize in twelve hours, had gone too far for retreat, and, spurred
on by the arrogant Potsdam military party, he "let slip the dogs of
war." After the fatal Rubicon had been crossed and the die was cast the
Czar telegraphed King George:
"In this solemn hour I wish to assure you once more I have done all in
my power to avert war."
Such will be the verdict of history.
The Judgment.
These are _the facts_ as shown by the record, and upon them, in my
judgment, an impartial court would not hesitate to pass the following
judgment:
1--_That Germany and Austria in a time of profound peace secretly
concerted together to impose their will upon Europe and upon Servia in a
matter affecting the balance of power in Europe. Whether in so doing
they intended to precipitate a European war to determine the mastery of
Europe is not satisfactorily established, although their whole course of
conduct suggests this as a possibility. They made war almost inevitable
by (a) issuing an ultimatum that was grossly unreasonable and
disproportionate to any grievance that Austria had and (b) in giving to
Servia, and Europe, insufficient time to consider the rights and
obligations of all interested nations._
2--_That Germany had at all times the power to compel Austria to
preserve a reasonable and conciliatory course, but at no time
effectively exerted that influence. On the contrary, she certainly
abetted, and possibly instigated, Austria in its unreasonable course._
3--_That England, France, Italy, and Russia at all times sincerely
worked for peace, and for this purpose not only overlooked the original
misconduct of Austria but made every reasonable concession in the hope
of preserving peace._
4--_That Austria, having mobilized its army, Russia was reasonably
justified in mobilizing its forces. Such act of mobilization was the
right of any sovereign State, and as long as the Russian armies did not
cross the border or take any aggressive action no other nation had any
just right to complain, each having the same right to make similar
preparations._
5--_That Germany, in abruptly declaring war against Russia for failure
to demobilize when the other powers had offered to make any reasonable
concession and peace parleys were still in progress, precipitated the
war._
6--_That Belgium as a sovereign State has as an inherent right the power
to determine when and under what conditions an alien can cross her
frontiers. This right exists independently of treaties, but is, in the
case of Belgium, reinforced by the Treaty of 1839 and The Hague
Convention, whereby the leading European nations (including Germany)
guarantee its "perpetual neutrality." The invasion of Belgium by Germany
was in violation of these rights, and England only respected its own
solemn covenant when, in defense of that neutrality, it declared war
against Germany._
In Conclusion.
The writer of this article has reached these conclusions with
reluctance, as he has a feeling of deep affection for the German people
and equal admiration for their ideals and matchless progress. Even more
he admires the magnificent courage with which the German Nation, beset
on every hand by powerful antagonists, is now defending its prestige as
a nation. The whole-hearted devotion of this great nation to its flag is
worthy of the best traditions of the Teutonic race. Nevertheless, this
cannot alter the ethical truth, which stands apart from any
considerations of nationality; nor can it affect the conclusion that the
German Nation has been plunged into this abyss by its scheming statesmen
and its self-centred and highly neurotic Kaiser, who in the twentieth
century sincerely believes that he is the proxy of Almighty God on
earth, and therefore infallible.
In visiting its condemnation, the Supreme Court of Civilization should
therefore distinguish between the military caste, headed by the Kaiser
and the Crown Prince, which precipitated this great calamity, and the
German people.
The very secrecy of the plot against the peace of the world and the
failure to disclose to the German people the diplomatic communications
hereinbefore quoted, strongly suggest that this detestable war is not
merely a crime against civilization, _but also against the deceived and
misled German people_. They have a vision and are essentially
progressive and peace-loving in their national characteristics, while
the ideals of their military caste are those of the Dark Ages.
One day the German people will know the full truth and then there will
be a dreadful reckoning for those who have plunged a noble and
peace-loving nation into this fathomless chasm of misfortune.
"Though the mills of God grind slowly,
Yet they grind exceeding small,
Though with patience He stands waiting,
With exactness grinds He all."