One is propounded by those thinkers whom, to distinguish them from the

persons who announce themselves as enemies of all society, we may call

the Philosophical Anarchists, thinkers who are entitled to respectful

consideration because their doctrine represents a protest that needs

to be made against the conception of an all-engulfing State in which

individual initiative and self-guided development might be merged and

lost. They desire to get rid of the defects of government by getting

rid of government itself; that is to say, by leaving men entirely

alone without any coercive control, trusting to their natural good

impulses to restrain them from harming one another. In such a state

of things there would be no Citizenship, properly so called, but only

the isolation of families, or perhaps of individuals--for it is not

quite clear how far the family is expected to remain in the Anarchist

paradise--an isolation more or less qualified by brotherly love. We are

so far at present from a prospect of reaching the conditions needed for

such an amelioration that it is enough to note this view and pass on.

A second and diametrically opposite cure for the evils of existing

society comes from those who are commonly termed Socialists or

Collectivists. It consists in so widely enlarging the functions of

government as to commit to it not merely all the work it now performs

of defending the country, maintaining order, enacting laws, and

enforcing justice between man and man, but also the further work of

producing and distributing all commodities, allotting to each man his

proper labour and proper remuneration, or possibly, instead of giving

any pecuniary remuneration, providing each man with what he needs for

life. Under this régime two of the hindrances to good citizenship would

be much reduced. There ought to be less indifference to politics when

everybody’s interest in the management of public concerns had been

immensely increased by the fact that he found himself dependent on

the public officials for everything. Nobody could plead that he was

occupied by his own private business, because his private business

would have vanished. So also selfish personal interest in making gains

out of government must needs disappear when private property itself

had ceased to exist. Whether, however, self-interest might not still

find means of influencing public administration in ways beneficial to

individual cupidity, and whether personal selfishness might not be even

more dangerous, under such conditions, in proportion to the extended

range and power of government,--this is another question which cannot

be discussed till some definite scheme for the allotment of work and of

remuneration (if any) shall have been propounded. Party Spirit would

evidently, in a Collectivistic State, pass into new forms. It might,

however, become more potent than ever before. But that again would

depend on the kind of scheme for the reshaping of economic society that

had been adopted.

We may pass from these suggestions for the extinction, or

reconstruction on new lines, of the existing social and political

system to certain minor devices for improving the structure and methods

of government which have been put forward as likely to help the citizen

to discharge his duties more efficiently.

One of these is the system of Proportional Representation. It is argued

that if electoral areas were created with more than two members

each, and if each elector was either allowed to vote for a number

of candidates less than the number to be chosen, or was allowed to

concentrate all his votes upon one candidate, or more, according to the

number to be chosen, two good results would follow. The will of the

electors would be more adequately and exactly expressed, because the

minority, or possibly more than one minority, as well as the majority,

would have everywhere its representative. The zeal of the electors

would be stimulated, because in each district a section of opinion not

large enough to have a chance of winning an election, if there were

but one member, and accordingly now apathetic, because without hope,

would then be roused to organize itself and to take a warmer interest

in public affairs. The Proportional system is, therefore, advocated

as one of those improvements in machinery which would react upon the

people by quickening the pulses of public life. Some experiments have

already been made in this direction. Those tried in England did not

win general approval and have been dropped. That which is still in

operation in the State of Illinois has not, if my informants are right,

given much satisfaction. But the plan is said to work well both in

Belgium and in some of the cantons of Switzerland; so one may hope that

further experiments will be attempted. It deserves your careful study,

but it is too complicated and opens too many side issues to be further

discussed now and here.[4]

[4] Since the above was written a Royal Commission has been

appointed in Britain to examine divers questions relating

to elections, and is investigating this, among other plans.

Attempts have been made in some places to overcome the indifference of

citizens to their duty by fining those who, without sufficient excuse,

fail to vote. This plan of Obligatory Voting, as it is called, finds

favour in some Swiss cantons and in Belgium, but is too uncongenial to

the habits of England or of the United States to be worth considering

as a practical measure in either country. Moreover, the neglect to vote

is no very serious evil in either country, at least as regards the more

important elections. Swiss legislation on the subject is evidence not

so much of indifference among the citizens of that country as of the

high standard of public duty they are expected to reach.

When we come to the proposals made both here and in England for the

reference of proposals to a direct popular vote, we come to a question

of real practical importance. I wish that I had time to state to

you and to examine the arguments both for and against this mode of

legislation, which has been practised for many years in Switzerland

with a virtually unanimous approval, and has been applied pretty freely

in some of your States. It has taken two forms. One is the so-called

Initiative, under which a section of the electors (being a number,

or a proportion, prescribed by law) may propose a law upon which the

people vote. This is being tried in Switzerland, but so far as I have

been able to gather, has not yet proved its utility. The balance of

skilled opinion seems to incline against it. The other is called the

Referendum, and consists in the submission to popular vote of measures

already passed by the legislative body. In this form the reference of

laws to the people undoubtedly sharpens the interest of the ordinary

citizen in the conduct of public affairs. The Swiss voters, at any

rate, take pains to inform themselves on the merits of the measures

submitted to them. These are widely and acutely canvassed at public

meetings, and in the press. A large vote is usually cast, and all,

whether or no they approve the result, agree that it is an intelligent,

not a heedless, vote. The Swiss do not seem to think that the power and

dignity of the legislature is weakened, as some might expect it to be,

when their final voice is thus superseded by that of the people. All I

need now ask you to note and remember is that the practice of bringing

political issues directly before the people, whatever its drawbacks,

does tend to diminish both that indolence and indifference which is

pretty common among European voters. It requires every citizen to think

for himself and deliver his vote upon all the more important measures,

and it also reduces the power of that Party Spirit which everywhere

distracts men’s minds from the real merits of the questions before

the country. When a law is submitted to the Swiss people for their

judgment, their decision nowise affects either the Executive or the

Legislature. The law may be rejected by the people, but the officials

who drafted the law continue to hold office. The party which brought it

in and carried it through the Legislature is not deemed to have been

censured or weakened by the fact of its ultimate rejection. That party

spirit is less strong in Switzerland than in any other free country

(except perhaps Norway) may be largely attributed to this disjunction

of the deciding voice in legislation from those governmental organs

which every political party seeks to control. The Swiss voter is to-day

an exceptionally intelligent and patriotic citizen, fitter to exercise

the function of direct legislation than perhaps any other citizen in

Europe, and the practice of directly legislating has doubtless helped

to train him for the function.

It must, however, be admitted that the circumstances of that little

republic and its cantons are too peculiar to make it safe to draw

inferences from Swiss experience to large countries like Britain and

France, the political life of which is highly centralized. The States

of your Union may appear to offer a better field, and the results

of the various experiments which some of them (such as Oklahoma) are

trying will be watched with interest by Europeans.

In considering the harm done to civic duty by selfish personal

interests we were led to observe that the fewer points of contact

between government and the pecuniary interests of private citizens,

the better both for the purity of government and for the conscience of

the private citizen. How far government ought to include within its

functions schemes for increasing national wealth, otherwise than by

such means (being means which a government alone can employ because

to be effective they must be done on a great scale) as the improving

of education, the diffusing of knowledge, the providing means of

transportation, the conservation of natural resources, and so forth,

may be matter for debate. But at any rate government ought to avoid

measures tending to enrich any one person or group of persons at the

expense of the citizens generally. Common justice requires that.

Accordingly, all contracts should be made on the terms best for the

public, and if possible by open bidding. Franchises, if not reserved

by the public authority for itself, should be granted only for limited

times and so as to secure the interests of the community, whether by

way of a rent payable to the city or county treasury or otherwise.

Public employees should not be made into a privileged class, to

which there is given larger pay than other workers of the same class

and capacity receive. All bills promoted by a private person, firm,

or company looking to his or their pecuniary advantage ought to be

closely scrutinized by some responsible public authority. In England

we draw a sharp distinction between such bills and general public

legislation, and we submit the former to a quasi-judicial examination

by a Parliamentary committee in order to avoid possible jobs or

scandals or losses to the public. As respects general legislation,

i. e., that which is not in its terms local or personal, it may be

difficult or impossible to prevent a law from incidentally benefiting

one group or class of men and injuring another. But everything that

can be done ought to be done to prevent any set of men from abusing

legislation to serve their own interest. If there be truth in what

one hears about the groups which in France, Belgium, and Germany have,

through political pressure, obtained by law bounties benefiting their

industries, or tariffs specially favourable to their own commercial

enterprises, the danger that the general taxpayer, or the consumer, may

be sacrificed to these private interests, is a real danger. To remove

the occasion and the opportunities for the exercise of such pressure,

which is likely to be often exerted in a covert way and to warp or

pervert the legislator’s mind, is to diminish a temptation and to

remove a stumbling block that lies in the path of civic duty. Whether

a man be in theory a Protectionist or a Free Trader, whether or not he

desires to nationalize public utilities, he must recognize the dangers

incident to the passing of laws which influential groups of wealthy

men may have a personal interest in promoting or resisting, because

they offer a prospect of gain sufficiently large to make it worth while

to “get at” legislatures and officials. Such dangers arise in all

governments. That which makes them formidable in democracies is the

fact that the interest of each individual citizen in protecting himself

and the public against the selfish groups may be so small an interest

that everybody neglects it, and the groups get their way.

As we have been considering improvements in the machinery of

government, this would be a fitting place for a discussion of what you

call Primary Election Laws, which are intended both to reduce the power

of party organizations and to stimulate the personal zeal of the voter

by making it easier for him to influence the selection of a candidate.

We have, however, in Europe, nothing corresponding to the Primary

Laws of American States, nothing which recognizes a political party

as a concrete body, nothing which deals with the mode of selecting

candidates; and many of you doubtless know better than I do what has

been the effect of these American enactments and whether they have

really roused the ordinary citizen to bestir himself and to assert

his independence of such party organizations as may have heretofore

interfered with it. Europeans do not take kindly to the notion of

giving statutory recognition to a Party, and they doubt whether the

astuteness of those whom you call “machine politicians” may not succeed

in getting hold of the new statutory Primaries as they did of the old

ones. Be the merits of the new legislation what they may, one must hope

that its existence will not induce the friends of reform to relax their

efforts to reduce in other ways the power of political “Machines.”

One obvious expedient to which good citizens may resort for keeping

other citizens up to the mark is to be found in the enactment and

enforcement of stringent laws against breaches of public trust. I

took occasion, in referring to the practices of bribery and treating

at elections, to note the wholesome effect of the statute passed in

England in 1883 for repressing those offences. Although St. Paul has

told us that he who is under grace does not need to be under the

law, Christianity has not yet gone far enough to enable any of us to

dispense with the moral force law can exert, both directly through

the penalties it imposes and indirectly through the type of conduct

which it exhorts the community to maintain. Laws may do much to raise

and sustain the tone of all the persons engaged in public affairs as

officials or as legislators, not only by appealing to their conscience,

but by giving them a quick and easy reply to those who seek improper

favours from them. A statute may express the best conscience of the

whole people and set the standard they approve, even where the practice

of most individuals falls short of the standard. If the prosecuting

authorities and the courts do their duty unflinchingly, without regard

to the social position of the offender, a statute may bring the

practice of ordinary men up to the level of that collective conscience

of the nation which it embodies.

In every walk of life a class of persons constantly subject to a

particular set of temptations is apt to form habits, due to the

pressure of those temptations, which are below what the conscience

of the better men in the community approves. The aim of legislation,

as expressing that best conscience of the whole community, ought to

be to correct or extirpate those habits and make each particular

class understand that it is not to be excused because it has special

temptations and thinks its own sins venial. Even the men who yield

to the temptations peculiar to their own class are willing to join

in condemning those who yield to some other kind of temptation. Thus

the “better conscience” may succeed in screwing up one class after

another to a higher level. But the enactment of a law is not enough.

It must be strictly enforced. Procedure must be prompt. Juries must

be firm. Technicalities must not be suffered to obstruct the march of

justice. Sentences must be carried out, else the statute will become,

as statutes often have become, a record of aspiration rather than of

accomplishment.

To contrive plans by which the interest of the citizen in public

affairs shall be aroused and sustained, is far easier than to induce

the citizen to use and to go on using, year in and year out, the

contrivances and opportunities provided for his benefit. Yet it is

from the heart and will of the citizen that all real and lasting

improvements must proceed. In the words of the Gospel, it is the inside

of the cup and platter that must be made clean. The central problem of

civic duty is the ethical problem. Indifference, selfish interests, the

excesses of party spirit, will all begin to disappear as civic life is

lifted on to a higher plane, and as the number of those who, standing

on that higher plane, will apply a strict test to their own conduct and

to that of their leaders, realizing and striving to discharge their

responsibilities, goes on steadily increasing until they come to form

the majority of the people. What we have called “the better conscience”

must be grafted on to the “wild stock” of the natural Average Man.

How is this to be done? The difficulty is the same as that which meets

the social reformer or the preacher of religion.

One must try to reach the Will through the Soul. The most obvious way

to begin is through the education of those who are to be citizens,

moral education combined with and made the foundation for instruction

in civic duty. This is a task which the Swiss alone among European

nations seem to have seriously undertaken. Here in America it has

become doubly important through the recent entrance into your

community of a vast mass of immigrants, most of them ignorant of our

language, still more of them ignorant, not only of your institutions,

but of the general principles and habits of free government. Most of

them doubtless belong to races of high natural intelligence, and many

of them have the simple virtues of the peasant. You are providing

for all of them good schools, and their children will soon become

Americans in speech and habits, quite patriotic enough so far as

flag-waving goes. But they will not so soon or so completely acquire

your intellectual and moral standard, or imbibe your historical and

religious traditions. There is no fear but what they will quickly learn

to vote. To some Europeans you seem to have been overconfident in

intrusting them with a power which most of them cannot yet have learned

to use wisely. That however you have done, and as you hold that it

cannot now be undone, your task must now be to teach them, if you can,

to understand your institutions, to think about the vote they have to

give, and to realize the responsibilities which the suffrage implies

as these were realized by your New England forefathers when they

planted free commonwealths in the wilderness nearly three centuries ago.

Valuable as instruction may be in fitting the citizen to comprehend and

judge upon the issues which his vote determines, there must also be the

will to apply his knowledge for the public good. What appeal shall be

made to him?

We--I say “we” because this is our task in Europe no less than it is

yours here--we may appeal to his enlightened self-interest, making

self-interest so enlightened that it loses its selfish quality. We can

remind him of all the useful work which governments may accomplish when

they are conducted by the right men in the right spirit. Take, for

instance, the work to be performed in those cities wherein so large and

increasing a part of the population now dwell. How much remains to be

done to make cities healthier, to secure better dwellings for the poor,

to root out nests of crime, to remove the temptations to intemperance

and gambling, to bring within the reach of the poorest all possible

facilities both for intellectual progress and for enjoying the

pleasures of art and music! How much may we do so to adorn the city

with parks and public buildings as to make its external aspect instil

the sense of beauty into its inhabitants and give them a fine pride

in it! These are some of the tasks which cannot safely be intrusted

to a municipality unless its government is above suspicion, unless

men of probity and capacity are placed in power, unless the whole

community extends its sympathy to the work and keeps a vigilant eye

upon all the officials. Municipal governments cannot be encouraged to

own public utilities so long as there is a risk that somebody may own

municipal governments. Have we not here a strong motive for securing

purity and efficiency in city administration? Is it not the personal

interest of every one of us that the city we dwell in should be such

as I have sought to describe? Nothing makes more for happiness than to

see others around one happy. The rich residents need not grudge--nor

indeed would your rich residents grudge, for there is less grumbling

among the rich tax payers here than in Europe--taxation which they

could see was being honestly spent for the benefit of the city. The

interest each one of us has as a member of a city or a nation in seeing

our fellow-citizens healthy, peaceful, and happy is a greater interest,

if it be measured in terms of our own real enjoyment of life, than is

that interest, of which we so constantly are reminded, which we have

in making the State either wealthy by the development of trade, or

formidable to foreign countries by its armaments.

We may also appeal to every citizen’s sense of dignity and

self-respect. We may bid him recollect that he is the heir of rights

and privileges which you and our ancestors fought for, and which

place him, whatever his birth or fortune, among the rulers of his

country. He is unworthy of himself, unmindful of what he owes to the

Constitution that has given him these functions, if he does not try to

discharge them worthily. These considerations are no doubt familiar to

us Englishmen and Americans, though we may not always feel their force

as deeply as we ought. To the new immigrants of whom I have already

spoken they are unfamiliar; yet to the best among these also they have

sometimes powerfully appealed. You had, in the last generation, no more

high-minded and patriotic citizen than the German exile of 1849, the

late Mr. Carl Schurz.

When every motive has been invoked, and every expedient applied that

can stimulate the sense of civic duty, one never can feel sure that

the desired result will follow. The moral reformer and the preacher

of religion have the same experience. The ebbs and flows of ethical

life are beyond the reach of scientific prediction. There are times

of awakening, “times of refreshing from the presence of the Lord,” as

your Puritan ancestors said, but we do not know when they will come nor

can we explain why they come just when they do. Every man can recall

moments in his own life when the sky seemed to open above him, and when

his vision was so quickened that all things stood transfigured in a

purer and brighter radiance, when duty, and even toil done for the sake

of duty, seemed beautiful and full of joy.

You remember Wordsworth’s lines--

“Hence, in a season of fair weather,

Though inland far we be,

Our souls have sight of that celestial sea

That brought us hither.”

If we survey the wide field of European history, we shall find that

something like this happens with nations also. They, too, have moments

of exaltation, moments of depression. Their ideals rise and fall. They

are for a time filled with a spirit which seeks truth, which loves

honour, which is ready for self-sacrifice; and after a time the light

begins to fade from the hills and this spirit lingers only among the

best souls.

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