procedure, I find, is neither by custom accounted morally wrong nor
forbidden either by statute or by civil law; nevertheless it is
forbidden by the moral law. For there is a bond of fellowship--although
I have often made this statement, I must still repeat it again and
again--which has the very widest application, uniting all men together
and each to each. This bond of union is closer between those who belong
to the same nation, and more intimate still between those who are
citizens of the same city-state. It is for this reason that our
forefathers chose to understand one thing by the universal law and
another by the civil law. The civil law is not necessarily also the
universal law; but the universal law ought to be also the civil law. But
we possess no substantial, life-like image of true Law and genuine
Justice; a mere outline sketch is all that we enjoy. I only wish that we
were true even to this; for, even as it is, it is drawn from the
excellent models which Nature and Truth afford. *70* #"Good faith" in
performance of contracts.# For how weighty are the words: "That I be not
deceived and defrauded through you and my confidence in you"! How
precious are these: "As between honest people there ought to be honest
dealing, and no deception"! But who are "honest people," and what is
"honest dealing"--these are serious questions.
It was Quintus Scaevola, the pontifex maximus, who used to attach the
greatest importance to all questions of arbitration to which the formula
was appended "as good faith requires;" and he held that the expression
"good faith" had a very extensive application, for it was employed in
trusteeships and partnerships, in trusts and commissions, in buying and
selling, in hiring and letting--in a word, in all the transactions on
which the social relations of daily life depend; in these, he said, it
required a judge of great ability to decide the extent of each
individual's obligation to the other, especially when counter-claims
were admissible in most cases.
*71* Away, then, with sharp practice and trickery, which desires, of
course, to pass for wisdom, but is far from it and totally unlike it.
For the function of wisdom is to discriminate between good and evil;
whereas, inasmuch as all things morally wrong are evil, trickery
prefers the evil to the good.
It is not only in the case of real estate transfers that the civil law,
based upon a natural feeling for the right, punishes trickery and
deception, but also in the sale of slaves every form of deception on the
vendors part is disallowed. For by the aediles' ruling the vendor is
answerable for any deficiency in the slave he sells, for he is supposed
to know if his slave is sound, or if he is a runaway, or a thief. The
case of those who have just come into the possession of slaves by
inheritance is different.
#Cunning is not wisdom.#
*72* From this we come to realize that since nature is the source of
right, it is not in accord with nature that anyone should take advantage
of his neighbour's ignorance. And no greater curse in life can be found
than knavery that wears the mask of wisdom. Thence come those countless
cases in which the expedient seems to conflict with the right. For how
few will be found who can refrain from wrong-doing, if assured of the
power to keep it an absolute secret and to run no risk of punishment!
*73* XVIII. Periclitemur, si placet, et in iis quidem exemplis, in
quibus peccari volgus hominum fortasse non putet. Neque enim de
sicariis, veneficis, testamentariis, furibus, peculatoribus hoc loco
disserendum est, qui non verbis sunt et disputatione philosophorum, sed
vinclis et carcere fatigandi, sed haec[330] consideremus, quae faciunt
ii, qui habentur boni.
L. Minuci Basili, locupletis hominis, falsum testamentum quidam e
Graecia Romam attulerunt. Quod quo facilius optinerent, scripserunt
heredes secum M. Crassum et Q. Hortensium, homines eiusdem aetatis
potentissimos; qui cum illud falsum esse suspicarentur, sibi autem
nullius essent conscii culpae, alieni facinoris munusculum non
repudiaverunt. Quid ergo? satin est hoc, ut non deliquisse videantur?
Mihi quidem non videtur, quamquam alterum vivum amavi, alterum non odi
mortuum; *74* sed, cum Basilus M. Satrium, sororis filium, nomen suum
ferre voluisset eumque fecisset heredem (hunc dico patronum agri Piceni
et Sabini; o turpem notam temporum [nomen illorum]!),[331] non erat
aequum principes civis rem habere, ad Satrium nihil praeter nomen
pervenire. Etenim, si is, qui non defendit iniuriam neque
propulsat,[332] cum potest, iniuste facit, #§ 23# ut in primo libro
disserui, qualis habendus est is, qui non modo non repellit, sed etiam
adiuvat iniuriam? Mihi quidem etiam verae hereditates non honestae
videntur, si sunt malitiosis blanditiis, officiorum non veritate, sed
simulatione quaesitae.
Atqui in talibus rebus aliud utile interdum, aliud honestum videri
solet. *75* Falso; nam eadem utilitatis, quae honestatis, est regula.
*(75)* Qui hoc non perviderit, ab hoc nulla fraus aberit, nullum
facinus. Sic enim cogitans: "Est istuc quidem honestum, verum hoc
expedit," res a natura copulatas audebit errore divellere, qui fons est
fraudium, maleficiorum, scelerum omnium.
[330] _haec_ c. Edd.; _hoc_ B H a b.
[331] _turpem notam temporum nomen illorum_ H a (_turpe_) b,
Bt.; excl. _nomen illorum_ Victorius, Ed.; _turpe nomen
illorum temporum_ c.
[332] _propulsat_ cod. Bern., O., Edd.; _propulsat a suis_
Edd.
*73* XVIII. Let us put our principle to the test, if you please, and see
if it holds good in those instances in which, perhaps, the world in
general finds no wrong; for in this connection we do not need to discuss
cut-throats, poisoners, forgers of wills, thieves, and embezzlers of
public moneys, who should be repressed not by lectures and discussions
of philosophers, but by chains and prison walls; but let us study here
the conduct of those who have the reputation of being honest men.
Certain individuals brought from Greece to Rome a forged will,
purporting to be that of the wealthy Lucius Minucius Basilus. The more
easily to procure validity for it, they made joint-heirs with themselves
two of the most influential men of the day, Marcus Crassus and Quintus
Hortensius. Although these men suspected that the will was a forgery,
still, as they were conscious of no personal guilt in the matter, they
did not spurn the miserable boon procured through the crime of others.
What shall we say, then? Is this excuse competent to acquit them of
guilt? I cannot think so, although I loved the one while he lived, and
do not hate the other now that he is dead. *74* Be that as it may,
Basilus had in fact desired that his nephew Marcus Satrius should bear
his name and inherit his property. (I refer to the Satrius who is the
present patron of Picenum and the Sabine country--and oh, what a
shameful stigma it is upon the times![BM]) And therefore it was not
right that two of the leading citizens of Rome should take the estate
and Satrius succeed to nothing except his uncle's name. For if he does
wrong who does not ward off and repel injury when he can--as I explained
in the course of the First Book--what is to be thought of the man who
not only does not try to prevent wrong, but actually aids and abets it?
For my part, I do not believe that even genuine legacies are moral, if
they are sought after by designing flatteries and by attentions
hypocritical rather than sincere.
#The same standard for expediency as for moral rectitude.#
And yet in such cases there are times when one course is likely to
appear expedient and another morally right. *75* The appearance is
deceptive; for our standard is the same for expediency and for moral
rectitude. *(75)* And the man who does not accept the truth of this will
be capable of any sort of dishonesty, any sort of crime. For if he
reasons "That is, to be sure, the right course, but this course brings
advantage," he will not hesitate in his mistaken judgment to divorce two
conceptions that nature has made one; and that spirit opens the door to
all sorts of dishonesty, wrong-doing, and crime.
[BM] The shame was that states enjoying the rights of Roman
citizenship should need a patron to protect their interests
in the Roman capital.
XIX. Itaque, si vir bonus habeat hanc vim, ut, si digitis concrepuerit,
possit in locupletium testamenta nomen eius inrepere, hac vi non utatur,
ne si exploratum quidem habeat id omnino neminem umquam suspicaturum. At
dares hanc vim M. Crasso, ut digitorum percussione heres posset scriptus
esse, qui re vera non esset heres, in foro, mihi crede, saltaret. Homo
autem iustus isque, quem sentimus virum bonum, nihil cuiquam, quod in se
transferat, detrahet. Hoc qui admiratur, is se, quid sit vir bonus,
nescire fateatur. *76* At vero, si qui voluerit animi sui complicatam
notionem evolvere, iam se ipse doceat eum virum bonum esse, qui prosit,
quibus possit, noceat nemini nisi lacessitus iniuria. Quid ergo? hic non
noceat, qui quodam quasi veneno perficiat, ut veros heredes moveat, in
eorum locum ipse succedat? "Non igitur faciat," dixerit quis, "quod
utile sit, quod expediat?" Immo intellegat nihil nec expedire nec utile
esse, quod sit iniustum; hoc qui non didicerit, bonus vir esse non
poterit.
*77* _C._[333] Fimbriam consularem audiebam de patre nostro puer iudicem
M. Lutatio Pinthiae fuisse, equiti Romano sane honesto, cum is
sponsionem fecisset, NI VIR BONUS ESSET. Itaque ei dixisse Fimbriam se
illam rem numquam iudicaturum, ne aut spoliaret fama probatum hominem,
si contra iudicavisset, aut statuisse videretur virum bonum esse
aliquem, cum ea res innumerabilibus officiis et laudibus contineretur.
Huic igitur viro bono, quem Fimbria etiam, non modo Socrates noverat,
nullo modo videri potest quicquam esse utile, quod non honestum sit.
Itaque talis vir non modo facere, sed ne cogitare quidem quicquam
audebit, quod non audeat praedicare. Haec non turpe est dubitare
philosophos, quae ne rustici quidem dubitent? a quibus natum est id,
quod iam contritum est vetustate, proverbium. Cum enim fidem alicuius
bonitatemque laudant, dignum esse dicunt, "quicum in tenebris mices."
Hoc quam habet vim nisi illam, nihil expedire, quod non deceat, etiamsi
id possis nullo refellente optinere?
*78* Videsne hoc proverbio neque Gygi illi posse veniam dari neque huic,
quem paulo ante fingebam digitorum percussione hereditates omnium posse
converrere? Ut enim, quod turpe est, id, quamvis occultetur, tamen
honestum fieri nullo modo potest, sic, quod honestum non est, id utile
ut sit, effici non potest adversante et repugnante natura.
[333] _C._ Bt., Ed., Heine; not in MSS.
#The good man not tempted to unrighteous gain.#
XIX. Suppose, then, that a good man had such power that at a snap of his
fingers his name could steal into rich men's wills, he would not avail
himself of that power--no, not even though he could be perfectly sure
that no one would ever suspect it. Suppose, on the other hand, that one
were to offer a Marcus Crassus the power, by the mere snapping of his
fingers, to get himself named as heir, when he was not really an heir,
he would, I warrant you, dance in the forum. But the righteous man, the
one whom we feel to be a good man, would never rob anyone of anything to
enrich himself. If anybody is astonished at this doctrine, let him
confess that he does not know what a good man is. *76* #Who is the good
man?# If, on the other hand, anyone should desire to unfold the idea of
a good man which lies wrapped up in his own mind,[BN] he would then at
once make it clear to himself that a good man is one who helps all whom
he can and harms nobody, unless provoked by wrong. What shall we say,
then? Would he not be doing harm who by a kind of magic spell should
succeed in displacing the real heirs to an estate and pushing himself
into their place? "Well," some one may say, "is he not to do what is
expedient, what is advantageous to himself?" Nay, verily; he should
rather be brought to realize that nothing that is unjust is either
advantageous or expedient; if he does not learn this lesson, it will
never be possible for him to be a "good man."
*77* When I was a boy, I used to hear my father tell that Gaius Fimbria,
an ex-consul, was judge in a case of Marcus Lutatius Pinthia, a Roman
knight of irreproachable character. On that occasion Pinthia had laid a
wager to be forfeited "if he did not prove in court that he was a good
man." Fimbria declared that he would never render a decision in such a
case, for fear that he might either rob a reputable man of his good
name, if he decided against him, or be thought to have pronounced some
one a good man, when such a character is, as he said, established by the
performance of countless duties and the possession of praiseworthy
qualities without number.
#To a good man moral wrong is never expedient.#
To this type of good man, then, known not only to a Socrates but even to
a Fimbria, nothing can possibly seem expedient that is not morally
right. Such a man, therefore, will never venture to think--to say
nothing of doing--anything that he would not dare openly to proclaim. Is
it not a shame that philosophers should be in doubt about moral
questions on which even peasants have no doubts at all? For it is with
peasants that the proverb, already trite with age, originated: when they
praise a man's honour and honesty, they say "He is a man with whom you
can safely play at odd and even[BO] in the dark." What is the point of
the proverb but this--that what is not proper brings no advantage, even
if you can gain your end without any one's being able to convict you of
wrong?
*78* Do you not see that in the light of this proverb no excuse is
available either for the Gyges of the story or for the man who I assumed
a moment ago could with a snap of his fingers sweep together everybody's
inheritance at once. For as the morally wrong cannot by any possibility
be made morally right, however successfully it may be covered up, so
what is not morally right cannot be made expedient, for nature refuses
and resists.
[BN] The Platonic doctrine of ideas known in a previous
existence and gradually developing into renewed
consciousness. Learning is but a remembering of what the soul
has known before.
[BO] Lit. 'flash with the fingers'; shoot out some fingers
the number of which had to be guessed.
*79* XX. At enim, cum permagna praemia sunt, est causa peccandi.
C. Marius cum a spe consulatus longe abesset et iam[334] septimum annum
post praeturam iaceret, neque petiturus umquam consulatum videretur, Q.
Metellum, cuius legatus erat, summum virum et civem, cum ab eo,
imperatore suo, Romam missus esset, apud populum Romanum criminatus est
bellum illum ducere; si se consulem fecissent; brevi tempore aut vivum
aut mortuum Iugurtham se in potestatem populi Romani redacturum. Itaque
factus est ille quidem consul, sed a fide iustitiaque discessit, qui
optimum et gravissimum civem, cuius legatus et a quo missus esset, in
invidiam falso crimine adduxerit.
*80* Ne noster quidem Gratidianus officio viri boni functus est tum, cum
praetor esset collegiumque praetorium tribuni plebi adhibuissent, ut res
nummaria de communi sententia constitueretur; iactabatur enim temporibus
illis nummus sic, ut nemo posset scire, quid haberet. Conscripserunt
communiter edictum cum poena atque iudicio constitueruntque, ut omnes
simul in rostra post meridiem escenderent. Et ceteri quidem alius alio,
Marius ab subselliis in rostra recta idque, quod communiter compositum
fuerat, solus edixit. Et ea res, si quaeris, ei magno honori fuit;
omnibus vicis statuae, ad eas tus, cerei; quid multa? nemo umquam
multitudini fuit carior.
*81* Haec sunt, quae conturbent in deliberatione non numquam, cum id, in
quo violatur aequitas, non ita magnum, illud autem, quod ex eo paritur,
permagnum videtur, ut Mario praeripere collegis et tribunis plebi
popularem gratiam non ita turpe, consulem ob eam rem fieri, quod sibi
tum proposuerat, valde utile videbatur. Sed omnium una regula est, quam
tibi cupio esse notissimam, aut illud, quod utile videtur, turpe ne sit
aut, si turpe est, ne videatur esse utile. Quod igitur? possumusne aut
illum Marium virum bonum iudicare aut hunc[335]? Explica atque excute
intellegentiam tuam, ut videas, quae sit in ea [species] forma[336] et
notio viri boni. Cadit ergo in virum bonum mentiri emolumenti sui causa,
criminari, praeripere, fallere? Nihil profecto minus.
*82* Est ergo ulla res tanti aut commodum ullum tam expetendum, ut viri
boni et splendorem et nomen amittas? Quid est, quod afferre tantum
utilitas ista, quae dicitur, possit, quantum auferre, si boni viri nomen
eripuerit, fidem iustitiamque detraxerit? Quid enim interest, utrum ex
homine se convertat quis in beluam an hominis figura immanitatem gerat
beluae?
[334] _et iam_ Edd.; _etiam_ MSS.
[335] _aut hunc_ c, Edd.; _atque hunc_ B H a b.
[336] _ea species forma_ B H a b; _ea specie forma_ c p; _ea
forma_, Klotz, Heine, Ed.; _ea species_, Bt.
#The moral loss that comes from wrong ambitions:#
*79* XX. "But stay," some one will object, "when the prize is very
great, there is excuse for doing wrong."
#(1) Marius,#
Gaius Marius had been left in obscurity for more than six whole years
after his praetorship and had scarcely the remotest hope of gaining the
consulship. It looked as if he would never even be a candidate for that
office. He was now a lieutenant under Quintus Metellus, who sent him on
a furlough to Rome. There before the Roman People he accused his own
general, an eminent man and one of our first citizens, of purposely
protracting the war and declared that if they would make him consul, he
would within a short time deliver Jugurtha alive or dead into the hands
of the Roman People. And so he was elected consul, it is true, but he
was a traitor to his own good faith and to justice; for by a false
charge he subjected to popular disfavour an exemplary and highly
respected citizen, and that too, although he was his lieutenant and
under leave of absence from him.
#(2) Gratidianus,#
*80* Even our kinsman Gratidianus failed on one occasion to perform what
would be a good man's duty: in his praetorship the tribunes of the
people summoned the college of praetors to counsel, in order to adopt by
joint resolution a standard of value for our currency; for at that time
the value of money was so fluctuating that no one could tell how much he
was worth. In joint session they drafted an ordinance, defining the
penalty and the methods of procedure in cases of violation of the
ordinance, and agreed that they should all appear together upon the
rostra in the afternoon to publish it. And while all the rest withdrew,
some in one direction, some in another, Marius (Gratidianus) went
straight from the council chamber to the rostra and published
individually what had been drawn up by all together. And that coup, if
you care to know, brought him vast honour; in every street statues of
him were erected; before these incense and candles burned. In a word, no
one ever enjoyed greater popularity with the masses.
#No material gain can compensate for moral loss.#
*81* It is such cases as these that sometimes perplex us in our
consideration, when the point in which justice is violated does not seem
so very significant, but the consequences of such slight transgression
seem exceedingly important. For example, it was not so very wrong
morally, in the eyes of Marius,[BP] to overreach his colleagues and the
tribunes in turning to himself alone all the credit with the people; but
to secure by that means his election to the consulship, which was then
the goal of his ambition,[BQ] seemed very greatly to his interest. But
for all cases we have one rule, with which I desire you to be perfectly
familiar: that which seems expedient must not be morally wrong; or, if
it is morally wrong, it must not seem expedient. What follows? Can we
account either the great Marius or our Marius Gratidianus a good man?
Work out your own ideas and sift your thoughts so as to see what
conception and idea of a good man they contain. Pray, tell me, does it
coincide with the character of your good man to lie for his own profit,
to slander, to overreach, to deceive? Nay, verily; anything but that!
*82* Is there, then, any object of such value or any advantage so worth
the winning that, to gain it, one should sacrifice the name of a "good
man" and the lustre of his reputation? What is there that your so-called
expediency can bring to you that will compensate for what it can take
away, if it steals from you the name of a "good man" and causes you to
lose your sense of honour and justice? For what difference does it make
whether a man is actually transformed into a beast or whether, keeping
the outward appearance of a man, he has the savage nature of a beast
within?
[BP] Gratidianus's.
[BQ] Never attained, however. For his conspicuous position as
a popular leader made him an early mark for Sulla's
proscriptions.
XXI. Quid? qui omnia recta et honesta neglegunt, dum modo potentiam
consequantur, nonne idem faciunt, quod is, qui etiam socerum habere
voluit eum, cuius ipse audacia potens esset? Utile ei videbatur plurimum
posse alterius invidia; id quam iniustum in patriam et quam turpe esset,
non videbat. Ipse autem socer in ore semper Graecos versus de Phoenissis
habebat, quos dicam, ut potero, incondite fortasse, sed tamen, ut res
possit intellegi:
#Eur. Phoen. 524-525#
Nam sí violandum est iús, regnandi grátia
Violándum est; aliis rébus pietatém colas.
Capitalis [Eteocles vel potius Euripides],[337] qui id unum, quod omnium
sceleratissimum fuerit, exceperit! *83* Quid igitur minuta colligimus,
hereditates, mercaturas, venditiones fraudulentas? ecce tibi, qui rex
populi Romani dominusque omnium gentium esse concupiverit idque
perfecerit! Hanc cupiditatem si honestam quis esse dicit, amens est;
probat enim legum et libertatis interitum earumque oppressionem taetram
et detestabilem gloriosam putat. Qui autem fatetur honestum non esse in
ea civitate, quae libera fuerit quaeque[338] esse debeat, regnare, sed
ei, qui id facere possit, esse utile, qua hunc obiurgatione aut quo
potius convicio a tanto errore coner avellere? Potest enim, di
immortales! cuiquam esse utile foedissimum et taeterrimum parricidium
patriae, quamvis is, qui se eo obstrinxerit, ab oppressis civibus parens
nominetur? Honestate igitur dirigenda[339] utilitas est, et quidem sic,
ut haec duo verbo inter se discrepare, re unum sonare videantur.
*84* Non habeo, ad volgi opinionem quae maior utilitas quam regnandi
esse possit; nihil contra inutilius ei, qui id iniuste consecutus sit,
invenio, cum ad veritatem coepi revocare rationem. Possunt enim cuiquam
esse utiles angores, sollicitudines, diurni et nocturni metus, vita
insidiarum periculorumque plenissima?
#_Inc. Fab._, Ribbeck^2, 651#
Múlti iniqui atque ínfideles régno, pauci bénivoli,[340]
inquit Accius. At cui regno? Quod a Tantalo et Pelope proditum iure
optinebatur. Nam quanto pluris ei regi putas, qui exercitu populi Romani
populum ipsum Romanum oppressisset civitatemque non modo liberam, sed
etiam gentibus imperantem servire sibi coëgisset? *85* Hunc tu quas
conscientiae labes in animo censes habuisse, quae vulnera? Cuius autem
vita ipsi potest utilis esse, cum eius vitae ea condicio sit, ut, qui
illam eripuerit, in maxima et gratia futurus sit et gloria? Quodsi haec
utilia non sunt, quae maxime videntur, quia plena sunt dedecoris ac
turpitudinis, satis persuasum esse debet nihil esse utile, quod non
honestum sit.
[337] Bracketed by Ed., Heine, et al.
[338] _fuerit quaeque_ c, Edd.; _fuit_ B H a b.
[339] _dirigenda_ MSS., Edd. plerique; _derigenda_ Ed.
[340] _beni(e)voli_ Stürenbg.; _benivoli sunt_ c; _boni sunt_
B H a b.
XXI. Again, when people disregard everything that is morally right and
true, if only they may secure power thereby, #(3) Pompey,# are they not
pursuing the same course as he[BR] who wished to have as a father-in-law
the man by whose effrontery he might gain power for himself? He thought
it advantageous to secure supreme power while the odium of it fell upon
another; and he failed to see how unjust to his country this was, and
how wrong morally. #(4) Caesar.# But the father-in-law himself used to
have continually upon his lips the Greek verses from the Phoenissae,
which I will reproduce as well as I can--awkwardly, it may be, but still
so that the meaning can be understood:
"If wrong may e'er be right, for a throne's sake
Were wrong most right:--be God in all else feared!"[BS]
Our tyrant deserved his death for having made an exception of the one
thing that was the blackest crime of all. *83* Why do we gather
instances of petty crime--legacies criminally obtained and fraudulent
buying and selling? Behold, here you have a man who was ambitious to be
king of the Roman People and master of the whole world; and he achieved
it! #Even to gain a throne by moral wrong is not expedient.# The man who
maintains that such an ambition is morally right is a madman; for he
justifies the destruction of law and liberty and thinks their hideous
and detestable suppression glorious. But if anyone agrees that it is not
morally right to be king in a state that once was free and that ought to
be free now, and yet imagines that it is advantageous for him who can
reach that position, with what remonstrance or rather with what appeal
should I try to tear him away from so strange a delusion? For, oh ye
immortal gods! can the most horrible and hideous of all murders--that of
fatherland--bring advantage to anybody, even though he who has committed
such a crime receives from his enslaved fellow-citizens the title of
"Father of his Country"[BT]? #Identity of expediency and moral
rectitude.# Expediency, therefore, must be measured by the standard of
moral rectitude, and in such a way, too, that these two words shall seem
in sound only to be different but in real meaning to be one and the
same.
*84* What greater advantage one could have, according to the standard of
popular opinion, than to be a king, I do not know; when, however, I
begin to bring the question back to the standard of truth, then I find
nothing more disadvantageous for one who has risen to that height by
injustice. For can occasions for worry, anxiety, fear by day and by
night, and a life all beset with plots and perils be of advantage to
anybody?
"Thrones have many foes and friends untrue, but few devoted
friends,"
says Accius. But of what sort of throne was he speaking? Why, one that
was held by right, handed down from Tantalus and Pelops. Aye, but how
many more foes, think you, had that king who with the Roman People's
army brought the Roman People themselves into subjection and compelled a
state that not only had been free but had been mistress of the world to
be his slave? *85* What stains do you think he had upon his conscience,
what scars upon his heart? But whose life can be advantageous to
himself, if that life is his on the condition that the man who takes it
shall be held in undying gratitude and glory? But if these things which
seem so very advantageous are not advantageous because they are full of
shame and moral wrong, we ought to be quite convinced that nothing can
be expedient that is not morally right.
[BR] Pompey, who in 59 married Caesar's daughter Julia,
twenty-four years his junior, and already betrothed to
Caepio.
[BS] From A. S. Way's translation.
[BT] The title bestowed on Cicero for saving the republic (in
63) and on Caesar for overthrowing it (after the battle of
Munda, in 45).
*86* XXII. Quamquam id quidem cum saepe alias, tum Pyrrhi bello a C.
Fabricio consule iterum et a senatu nostro iudicatum est. Cum enim rex
Pyrrhus populo Romano bellum ultro intulisset, cumque de imperio
certamen esset cum rege generoso ac potenti,[341] perfuga ab eo venit in
castra Fabrici eique est pollicitus, si praemium sibi proposuisset, se,
ut clam venisset, sic clam in Pyrrhi castra rediturum et eum veneno
necaturum. Hunc Fabricius reducendum curavit ad Pyrrhum, idque eius
factum laudatum a senatu est. Atqui, si speciem utilitatis opinionemque
quaerimus, magnum illud bellum perfuga unus et gravem adversarium
imperii sustulisset, sed magnum dedecus et flagitium, quicum laudis
certamen fuisset, eum non virtute, sed scelere superatum.
*87* Utrum igitur utilius vel Fabricio, qui talis in hac urbe, qualis
Aristides Athenis, fuit, vel senatui nostro, qui numquam utilitatem a
dignitate seiunxit, armis cum hoste certare an venenis? Si gloriae causa
imperium expetendum est, scelus absit, in quo non potest esse gloria;
sin ipsae opes expetuntur quoquo modo, non poterunt utiles esse cum
infamia.
Non igitur utilis illa L. Philippi Q. f. sententia, quas civitates L.
Sulla pecunia accepta ex senatus consulto liberavisset, ut eae rursus
vectigales essent neque iis pecuniam, quam pro libertate dederant,
redderemus. Ei senatus est assensus. Turpe imperio! piratarum enim
melior fides quam senatus. At aucta vectigalia, utile igitur. Quousque
audebunt dicere quicquam utile, quod non honestum? *88* potest autem
ulli imperio, quod gloria debet fultum esse et benivolentia sociorum,
utile esse odium et infamia?
Ego etiam cum Catone meo saepe dissensi; nimis mihi praefracte videbatur
aerarium vectigaliaque defendere, omnia publicanis negare, multa sociis,
cum in hos benefici esse deberemus, cum illis sic agere, ut cum colonis
nostris soleremus, eoque magis, quod[342] illa ordinum coniunctio ad
salutem rei publicae pertinebat. Male etiam Curio, cum causam
Transpadanorum aequam esse dicebat, semper autem addebat: "Vincat
utilitas!" Potius doceret non esse aequam, quia non esset utilis rei
publicae, quam, cum utilem non esse diceret, esse aequam fateretur.
[341] _potenti_ Nonius, Edd.; _potente_ MSS.
[342] _quod_ L c, Edd.; _quo_ B H a b.
#Apparent conflicts between expediency and moral rectitude:#
#(1) Fabricius and the deserter,#
*86* XXII. And yet this very question has been decided on many occasions
before and since; but in the war with Pyrrhus the decision rendered by
Gaius Fabricius, in his second consulship, and by our senate was
particularly striking. Without provocation King Pyrrhus had declared war
upon the Roman People; the struggle was against a generous and powerful
prince, and the supremacy of power was the prize; a deserter came over
from him to the camp of Fabricius and promised, if Fabricius would
assure him of a reward, to return to the camp of Pyrrhus as secretly as
he had come, administer poison to the king, and bring about his death.
Fabricius saw to it that this fellow was taken back to Pyrrhus; and his
action was commended by the senate. And yet, if the mere show of
expediency and the popular conception of it are all we want, this one
deserter would have put an end to that wasting war and to a formidable
foe of our supremacy; but it would have been a lasting shame and
disgrace to us to have overcome not by valour but by crime the man with
whom we had a contest for glory.
*87* Which course, then, was more expedient for Fabricius, who was to
our city what Aristides was to Athens, or for our senate, who never
divorced expediency from honour--to contend against the enemy with the
sword or with poison? If supremacy is to be sought for the sake of
glory, crime should be excluded, for there can be no glory in crime; but
if it is power for its own sake that is sought, whatever the price, it
cannot be expedient if it is linked with shame.
#(2) the senate and the tributary allies,#
That well-known measure, therefore, introduced by Philippus, the son of
Quintus, was not expedient. With the authority of the senate, Lucius
Sulla had exempted from taxation certain states upon receipt of a lump
sum of money from them. Philippus proposed that they should again be
reduced to the condition of tributary states, without repayment on our
part of the money that they had paid for their exemption. And the senate
accepted his proposal. Shame upon our government! The pirates' sense of
honour is higher than the senate's. "But," some one will say, "the
revenues were increased, and therefore it was expedient." How long will
people venture to say that a thing that is not morally right can be
expedient? *88* Furthermore, can hatred and shame be expedient for any
government? For government ought to be founded upon fair fame and the
loyalty of allies?
#(3) Cato and the publicans,#
On this point I often disagreed even with my friend Cato; it seemed to
me that he was too rigorous in his watchful care over the claims of the
treasury and the revenues; he refused everything that the farmers of the
revenue asked for and much that the allies desired; whereas, as I
insisted, it was our duty to be generous to the allies and to treat the
publicans as we were accustomed individually to treat our tenants--and
all the more, because harmony between the orders was essential to the
welfare of the republic.[BU] #(4) Curio and the colonies.# Curio, too,
was wrong, when he pleaded that the demands of the people beyond the Po
were just, but never failed to add "Let expediency prevail." He ought
rather to have proved that the claims were not just, because they were
not expedient for the republic, than to have admitted that they were
just, when, as he maintained, they were not expedient.
[BU] The publicans, farmers of the revenue, were the moneyed
men of the times and belonged to the equestrian order. They
purchased from the senate the farming of the revenues and
then sublet their contract to the collectors. Sometimes they
found that they had agreed to pay too high a rate and
petitioned the senate to release them from their contract or
reduce their obligations, as on this occasion (B.C. 61). The
opposition of Cato and others strained the relations between
the senate, who had control of the business, and the
equestrian order, driving many of the equites over to
Caesar's side. Complete harmony between the senate and the
knights, as Cicero says, was the only thing that could have
saved Rome from the popular party and Caesar.
*89* XXIII. Plenus est sextus liber de officiis Hecatonis talium
quaestionum: "sitne boni viri in maxima caritate annonae familiam non
alere."
In utramque partem disputat, sed tamen ad extremum utilitate, ut putat,
officium dirigit[343] magis quam humanitate.
Quaerit, si in mari iactura facienda sit, equine pretiosi potius
iacturam faciat an servoli vilis. Hic alio res familiaris, alio ducit
humanitas.
"Si tabulam de naufragio stultus arripuerit, extorquebitne eam sapiens,
si potuerit?"
Negat, quia sit iniurium.
"Quid? dominus navis eripietne suum?"
"Minime, non plus quam navigantem[344] in alto eicere de navi velit,
quia sua sit. Quoad enim perventum est[345] eo, quo sumpta navis est,
non domini est navis, sed navigantium."
*90* "Quid? si una tabula sit, duo naufragi, eique sapientes, sibine
uter_que_[346] rapiat, an alter cedat alteri?"
"Cedat vero, sed ei, cuius magis intersit vel sua vel rei publicae causa
vivere."
"Quid, si haec paria in utroque?"
"Nullum erit certamen, sed quasi sorte aut micando victus alteri cedet
alter."
"Quid? si pater fana expilet, cuniculos agat ad aerarium, indicetne id
magistratibus filius?"
"Nefas id quidem est, quin etiam defendat patrem, si arguatur."
"Non igitur patria praestat omnibus officiis?"
"Immo vero, sed ipsi patriae conducit pios habere cives in parentes."
"Quid? si tyrannidem occupare, si patriam prodere conabitur pater,
silebitne filius?"
"Immo vero obsecrabit patrem, ne id faciat. Si nihil proficiet,
accusabit, minabitur etiam, ad extremum, si ad perniciem patriae res
spectabit, patriae salutem anteponet saluti patris."
*91* Quaerit etiam, si sapiens adulterinos nummos acceperit imprudens
pro bonis, cum id rescierit, soluturusne sit eos, si cui[347] debeat,
pro bonis. Diogenes ait, Antipater negat, cui potius assentior.
Qui vinum[348] fugiens vendat sciens, debeatne dicere. Non necesse putat
Diogenes, Antipater viri boni existimat. Haec sunt quasi controversa
iura Stoicorum. "In mancipio vendendo dicendane vitia, non ea, quae nisi
dixeris, redhibeatur mancipium iure civili, sed haec, mendacem esse,
aleatorem, furacem, ebriosum?" Alteri dicenda videntur, alteri non
videntur.
*92* "Si quis aurum vendens orichalcum se putet vendere, indicetne ei
vir bonus aurum illud esse an emat denario, quod sit mille denarium?"
Perspicuum est iam, et quid mihi videatur, et quae sit inter eos
philosophos, quos nominavi, controversia.
[343] _dirigit_ MSS., Edd. plerique; _derigit_ Ed.
[344] _quam navigantem_ Heus., Edd.; _quam si navigantem_
MSS.
[345] _est_ c, Nonius; _sit_ B H a b.
[346] _sibine uterque_ Victorius, Edd.; _sibi neuter_ MSS.
[347] _si cui_ c, Nonius, Edd.; _sicut_ B H a b.
[348] _vinum_ c, Nonius, Edd.; _venenum_ B H a b p.
#Hecaton debates the question of expediency _vs._ moral rectitude.#
*89* XXIII. The sixth book of Hecaton's "Moral Duties" is full of
questions like the following: "Is it consistent with a good man's duty
to let his slaves go hungry when provisions are at famine prices?"
Hecaton gives the arguments on both sides of the question; but still in
the end it is by the standard of expediency, as he conceives it, rather
than by one of human feeling, that he decides the question of duty.
Then he raises this question: supposing a man had to throw part of his
cargo overboard in a storm, should he prefer to sacrifice a high-priced
horse or a cheap and worthless slave? In this case regard for his
property interest inclines him one way, human feeling the other.
"Suppose that a foolish man has seized hold of a plank from a sinking
ship, shall a wise man wrest it away from him if he can?"
"No," says Hecaton; "for that would be unjust."
"But how about the owner of the ship? Shall he take the plank away
because it belongs to him?"
"Not at all; no more than he would be willing when far out at sea to
throw a passenger overboard on the ground that the ship was his. For
until they reach the place for which the ship is chartered, she belongs
to the passengers, not to the owner."
*90* "Again; suppose there were two to be saved from the sinking
ship--both of them wise men--and only one small plank, should both seize
it to save themselves? Or should one give place to the other?"
"Why of course, one should give place to the other, but that other must
be the one whose life is more valuable either for his own sake or for
that of his country."
"But what if these considerations are of equal weight in both?"
"Then there will be no contest, but one will give place to the other, as
if the point were decided by lot or at a game of odd and even."
"Again, suppose a father were robbing temples or making underground
passages to the treasury, should a son inform the officers of it?"
"Nay; that were a crime; rather should he defend his father, in case he
were indicted."
"Well, then, are not the claims of country paramount to all other
duties?"
"Aye, verily; but it is to our country's interest to have citizens who
are loyal to their parents."
"But once more--if the father attempts to make himself king, or to
betray his country, shall the son hold his peace?"
"Nay, verily; he will plead with his father not to do so. If that
accomplishes nothing, he will take him to task; he will even threaten;
and in the end, if things point to the destruction of the state, he will
sacrifice his father to the safety of his country."
#A similar debate by Diogenes _vs._ Antipater.#
*91* Again, he raises the question: "If a wise man should inadvertently
accept counterfeit money for good, will he offer it as genuine in
payment of a debt after he discovers his mistake?" Diogenes says "Yes";
Antipater, "No," and I agree with him.
If a man knowingly offers for sale wine that is spoiling, ought he tell
his customers? Diogenes thinks that it is not required; Antipater holds
that an honest man would do so. These are like so many points of the law
disputed among the Stoics. "In selling a slave, should his faults be
declared--not those only which the seller is bound by the civil law to
declare or have the slave returned to him, but also the fact that he is
untruthful, or disposed to gamble, or steal, or get drunk?" The one
thinks such facts should be declared, the other does not.
*92* "If a man thinks that he is selling brass, when he is actually
selling gold, should an upright man inform him that his stuff is gold,
or go on buying for one shilling[BV] what is worth a thousand?"
It is clear enough by this time what my views are on these questions,
and what are the grounds of dispute between the above-named
philosophers.
[BV] The _denarius_ was worth at this time about ninepence.
XXIV. Pacta et promissa semperne servanda sint, QUAE NEC VI NEC DOLO
MALO, ut praetores solent, FACTA SINT.
Si quis medicamentum cuipiam dederit ad aquam intercutem pepigeritque,
si eo medicamento sanus factus esset, ne illo medicamento umquam postea
uteretur, si eo medicamento sanus factus sit et annis aliquot post
inciderit in eundem morbum nec ab eo, quicum pepigerat, impetret, ut
iterum eo[349] liceat uti, quid faciendum sit. Cum sit is inhumanus, qui
non concedat, nec ei quicquam fiat iniuriae, vitae et saluti
consulendum.
*93* Quid? si qui sapiens rogatus sit ab eo, qui eum heredem faciat, cum
ei testamento sestertium milies relinquatur, ut, ante quam hereditatem
adeat, luce palam in foro saltet, idque se facturum promiserit, quod
aliter heredem eum scripturus ille non esset, faciat, quod promiserit,
necne? Promisisse nollem et id arbitror fuisse gravitatis; quoniam
promisit, si saltare in foro turpe ducet, honestius mentietur, si ex
hereditate nihil ceperit, quam si ceperit, nisi forte eam pecuniam in
rei publicae magnum aliquod tempus contulerit, ut vel saltare, cum
patriae consulturus sit, turpe non sit.
[349] _iterum eo_ Pearce, Edd.; _item eo_ B H a b; _item tum_
c.
#Promises not binding:#
#(1) when life or health is at stake,#
XXIV. The question arises also whether agreements and promises must
always be kept, "when," in the language of the praetors' edicts, "they
have not been secured through force or criminal fraud."
If one man gives another a remedy for the dropsy, with the stipulation
that, if he is cured by it, he shall never make use of it again; suppose
the patient's health is restored by the use of it but some years later
he contracts the same disease once more; and suppose he cannot secure
from the man with whom he made the agreement permission to use the
remedy again, what should he do? That is the question. Since the man is
unfeeling in refusing the request, and since no harm could be done to
him by his friend's using the remedy, the sick man is justified in doing
what he can for his own life and health.
#(2) when reputation is at stake,#
*93* Again: suppose that a millionaire is making some wise man his heir
and leaving him in his will a hundred million sesterces[BW]; and suppose
that he has asked the wise man, before he enters upon his inheritance,
to dance publicly in broad daylight in the forum; and suppose that the
wise man has given his promise to do so, because the rich man would not
leave him his fortune on any other condition; should he keep his promise
or not? I wish he had made no such promise; that, I think, would have
been in keeping with his dignity. But seeing that he has made it, it
will be morally better for him, if he believes it morally wrong to dance
in the forum, to break his promise and refuse to accept his inheritance
rather than to keep his promise and accept it--unless, perhaps, he
contributes the money to the state to meet some grave crisis. In that
case, to promote thereby the interests of one's country, it would not
be morally wrong even to dance, if you please, in the forum.
[BW] Approximately £750,000.
*94* XXV. Ac ne illa quidem promissa servanda sunt, quae non sunt
iis[350] ipsis utilia, quibus illa promiseris. Sol Phaëthonti filio, ut
redeamus ad fabulas, facturum se esse dixit, quicquid optasset; optavit,
ut in currum patris tolleretur; sublatus est. Atque[351] is, ante quam
constitit, ictu fulminis deflagravit. Quanto melius fuerat in hoc
promissum patris non esse servatum! Quid, quod Theseus exegit promissum
a Neptuno? cui cum tres optationes Neptunus dedisset, optavit interitum
Hippolyti filii, cum is patri suspectus esset de noverca; quo optato
impetrato Theseus in maximis fuit luctibus. *95* Quid, _quod_[352]
Agamemnon cum devovisset Dianae, quod in suo regno pulcherrimum natum
esset illo anno, immolavit Iphigeniam, qua nihil erat eo quidem anno
natum pulchrius? Promissum potius non faciendum quam tam taetrum facinus
admittendum fuit.
Ergo et promissa non facienda non numquam, neque semper deposita
reddenda. Si gladium quis apud te sana mente deposuerit, repetat
insaniens, reddere peccatum sit, officium non reddere. Quid? si is, qui
apud te pecuniam deposuerit, bellum inferat patriae, reddasne depositum?
Non credo; facias[353] enim contra rem publicam, quae debet esse
carissima. Sic multa, quae honesta natura videntur esse, temporibus
fiunt non honesta; facere promissa, stare conventis, reddere deposita
commutata utilitate fiunt non honesta.
Ac de iis quidem, quae videntur esse utilitates contra iustitiam
simulatione prudentiae, satis arbitror dictum.
*96* Sed quoniam a quattuor fontibus honestatis #§§ 15 ff.# primo libro
officia duximus, in eisdem versemur, cum docebimus ea, #§§ 40-70# quae
videantur esse utilia neque sint, #§§ 71-95# quam sint virtutis inimica.
Ac de prudentia quidem, quam vult imitari malitia, itemque de iustitia,
quae semper est utilis, disputatum est. Reliquae sunt duae partes
honestatis, quarum altera in animi excellentis magnitudine et
praestantia cernitur, altera in conformatione et moderatione
continentiae et temperantiae.
[350] _iis_ Edd.; _his_ B H a b; _hijs_ c.
[351] _Atque_ MSS., Bt.^1, Müller, Heine; _Atqui_ Fl., Bt.^2,
Ed.
[352] _quod_ Ed.; not in MSS., Bt., et al.
[353] _facias_ c, Bt., Ed., Heine; _facies_ A B H a b,
Müller.
#(3) when not expedient for him to whom the promise is made.#
*94* XXV. No more binding are those promises which are inexpedient for
the persons themselves to whom they have been given. To go back to the
realm of story, the sungod promised his son Phaëthon to do for him
whatever he should wish. His wish was to be allowed to ride in his
father's chariot. It was granted. And before he came back to the ground
he was consumed by a stroke of lightning. How much better had it been,
if in his case the father's promise had not been kept. And what of that
promise, the fulfilment of which Theseus required from Neptune? When
Neptune offered him three wishes, he wished for the death of his son
Hippolytus, because the father was suspicious of the son's relations
with his step-mother. And when this wish was granted, Theseus was
overwhelmed with grief. *95* And once more; when Agamemnon had vowed to
Diana the most beautiful creature born that year within his realm, he
was brought to sacrifice Iphigenia; for in that year nothing was born
more beautiful than she. He ought to have broken his vow rather than
commit so horrible a crime.
#Trusts not always to be restored.#
Promises are, therefore, sometimes not to be kept; and trusts are not
always to be restored. Suppose that a person leaves his sword with you
when he is in his right mind, and demands it back in a fit of insanity;
it would be criminal to restore it to him; it would be your duty not to
do so. Again, suppose that a man who has entrusted money to you proposes
to make war upon your common country, should you restore the trust? I
believe you should not; for you would be acting against the state,
which ought to be the dearest thing in the world to you. Thus there are
many things which in and of themselves seem morally right, but which
under certain circumstances prove to be not morally right: to keep a
promise, to abide by an agreement, to restore a trust may, with a change
of expediency, cease to be morally right.
With this I think I have said enough about those actions which
masquerade as expedient under the guise of prudence, while they are
really contrary to justice.
*96* Since, however, in Book One we derived moral duties from the four
sources of moral rectitude, let us continue the same fourfold division
here in pointing out how hostile to virtue are those courses of conduct
which seem to be, but really are not, expedient. We have discussed
wisdom, which cunning seeks to counterfeit, and likewise justice, which
is always expedient. There remain for our discussion two divisions of
moral rectitude, the one of which is discernible in the greatness and
pre-eminence of a superior soul, the other, in the shaping and
regulation of it by temperance and self-control.
*97* XXVI. Utile videbatur Ulixi, ut quidem poëtae tragici prodiderunt
(nam apud Homerum, optimum auctorem, talis de Ulixe nulla suspicio est),
sed insimulant eum tragoediae simulatione insaniae militiam subterfugere
voluisse. Non honestum consilium, at utile, ut aliquis fortasse dixerit,
regnare et Ithacae vivere otiose cum parentibus, cum uxore, cum filio.
Ullum tu decus in cotidianis laboribus et periculis cum hac
tranquillitate conferendum putas?
Ego vero istam contemnendam et abiciendam, quoniam, quae honesta non
sit, ne utilem quidem esse arbitror. *98* Quid enim auditurum putas
fuisse Ulixem, si in illa simulatione perseveravisset? qui cum maximas
res gesserit in bello, tamen haec audiat ab Aiace:
#(Accius or Pacuvius, Judicium Armorum?) _Inc. inc. fab._, Ribbeck^2
55-60#
Cuius ípse princeps iúris iurandí fuit,
Quod ómnes scitis, sólus neglexít fidem;
Furere ássimulare, né coiret, ínstitit.
Quodní Palamedi pérspicax prudéntia
Istíus percepset[354] málitiosam audáciam,
Fidé sacratae[355] iús perpetuo fálleret.
*99* Illi vero non modo cum hostibus, verum etiam cum fluctibus, id quod
fecit, dimicare melius fuit quam deserere consentientem Graeciam ad
bellum barbaris inferendum.
Sed omittamus et fabulas et externa; ad rem factam nostramque veniamus.
M. Atilius Regulus cum consul iterum in Africa ex insidiis captus esset
duce Xanthippo Lacedaemonio, imperatore autem patre Hannibalis
Hamilcare, iuratus missus est ad senatum, ut, nisi redditi essent Poenis
captivi nobiles quidam, rediret ipse Carthaginem. Is cum Romam venisset,
utilitatis speciem videbat, sed eam, ut res declarat, falsam iudicavit;
quae erat talis: manere in patria, esse domui suae cum uxore, cum
liberis, quam calamitatem accepisset in bello, communem fortunae
bellicae iudicantem tenere consularis dignitatis gradum. Quis haec negat
esse utilia? quem censes? Magnitudo animi et fortitudo negat. *100*
XXVII. Num[356] locupletiores quaeris auctores? Harum enim est virtutum
proprium nihil extimescere, omnia humana despicere, nihil, quod homini
accidere possit, intolerandum putare. Itaque quid fecit? In senatum
venit, mandata exposuit, sententiam ne diceret recusavit, quam diu iure
iurando hostium teneretur, non esse se senatorem. Atque illud etiam ("O
stultum hominem," dixerit quispiam, "et repugnantem utilitati suae!"),
reddi captivos negavit esse utile; illos enim adulescentes esse et bonos
duces, se iam confectum senectute. Cuius cum valuisset auctoritas,
captivi retenti sunt, ipse Carthaginem rediit, neque eum caritas patriae
retinuit nec suorum. Neque vero tum ignorabat se ad crudelissimum hostem
et ad exquisita supplicia proficisci, sed ius iurandum conservandum
putabat. Itaque tum, cum vigilando necabatur, erat in meliore causa,
quam si domi senex captivus, periurus consularis remansisset.
*101* At stulte, qui non modo non censuerit captivos remittendos, verum
etiam dissuaserit.
Quo modo stulte? etiamne, si rei publicae conducebat? potest autem, quod
inutile rei publicae sit, id cuiquam civi utile esse?
[354] _percepset_ Bt., Ed., Heine; _percepisset_ MSS.;
_perspexet_ Müller.
[355] _sacratae_ Edd.; _sacrata_ B H a b; _sacratum_ c.
[356] _num_ A L c, Edd.; _nam_ B H a b.
#Apparent Expediency _vs._ Fortitude:#
#(1) Ulysses's ruse,#
*97* XXVI. Ulysses thought his ruse expedient, as the tragic poets, at
least, have represented him. In Homer, our most reliable authority, no
such suspicion is cast upon him; but the tragedies charge him with
trying to escape a soldier's service by feigning madness. The trick was
not morally right, but, some one may perhaps say, "It was expedient for
him to keep his throne and live at ease in Ithaca with parents, wife,
and son. Do you think that there is any glory in facing daily toil and
danger that can be compared with a life of such tranquillity?"
Nay; I think that tranquillity at such a price is to be despised and
rejected; for if it is not morally right, neither is it expedient. *98*
For what do you think would have been said of Ulysses, if he had
persisted in that pretended madness, seeing that, notwithstanding his
deeds of heroism in the war, he was nevertheless upbraided by Ajax thus:
"'Twas he himself who first proposed the oath; ye all
Do know; yet he alone of all his vow did break;
He feigned persistently that he was mad, that thus
He might not have to join the host. And had not then
Palamedes, shrewd and wise, his tricky impudence
Unmasked, he had evaded e'en for aye his vow."
*99* Nay, for him it had been better to battle not only with the enemy
but also with the waves, as he did, than to desert Greece when she was
united for waging the war against the barbarians.
But let us leave illustrations both from story and from foreign lands
and turn to real events in our own history. #(2) the example of
Regulus.# Marcus Atilius Regulus in his second consulship was taken
prisoner in Africa by the stratagem of Xanthippus, a Spartan general
serving under the command of Hannibal's father Hamilcar.[BX] He was sent
to the senate on parole, sworn to return to Carthage himself, if certain
noble prisoners of war[BY] were not restored to the Carthaginians. When
he came to Rome, he could not fail to see the specious appearance of
expediency, but he decided that it was unreal, as the outcome proves.
His apparent interest was to remain in his own country, to stay at home
with his wife and children, and to retain his rank and dignity as an
ex-consul, regarding the defeat which he had suffered as a misfortune
that might come to anyone in the game of war. Who says that this was not
expedient? Who, think you? Greatness of soul and courage say that it was
not. *100* #The violation of his oath could not have been expedient for
him.# XXVII. Can you ask for more competent authorities? The denial
comes from those virtues, for it is characteristic of them to await
nothing with fear, to rise superior to all the vicissitudes of earthly
life, and to count nothing intolerable that can befall a human being.
What, then, did he do? He came into the senate and stated his mission;
but he refused to give his own vote on the question; for, he held, he
was not a member of the senate so long as he was bound by the oath sworn
to his enemies. And more than that, he said--"What a foolish fellow,"
some one will say, "to oppose his own best interests"--he said that it
was not expedient that the prisoners should be returned; for they were
young men and gallant officers, while he was already bowed with age. And
when his counsel prevailed, the prisoners were retained and he himself
returned to Carthage; affection for his country and his family failed to
hold him back. And even then he was not ignorant of the fact that he was
going to a most cruel enemy and to exquisite torture; still, he thought
his oath must be sacredly kept. And so even then, when he was being
slowly put to death by enforced wakefulness, he enjoyed a happier lot
than if he had remained at home an aged prisoner of war, a man of
consular rank forsworn.
*101* "But," you will say, "it was foolish of him not only not to
advocate the exchange of prisoners but even to plead against such
action."
How was it foolish? Was it so, even if his policy was for the good of
the state? Nay; can what is inexpedient for the state be expedient for
any individual citizen?
[BX] Cicero is careless in his dates. Regulus was consul in
267 and 256. He was defeated and taken prisoner in his second
proconsulship at the battle of Tunes in 255. And the Hamilcar
of 255 was not Hannibal's father, for his career does not
begin until 247, when he was a mere youth, and he was still
in his prime when he fell in battle in Spain, in 229.
[BY] At the battle of Panormus in 250 Lucius Caecilius
Metellus took among the prisoners no less than thirteen
Carthaginian generals--all men of noble birth.
XXVIII. Pervertunt homines ea, quae sunt fundamenta naturae, cum
utilitatem ab honestate seiungunt. Omnes enim expetimus utilitatem ad
eamque rapimur nec facere aliter ullo modo possumus. Nam quis est, qui
utilia fugiat? aut quis potius, qui ea non studiosissime persequatur?
Sed quia nusquam possumus nisi in laude, decore, honestate utilia
reperire, propterea illa prima et summa habemus, utilitatis nomen non
tam splendidum quam necessarium ducimus.
*102* Quid est igitur, dixerit quis, in iure iurando? num iratum timemus
Iovem? At hoc quidem commune est omnium philosophorum, non eorum modo,
qui deum nihil habere ipsum negotii dicunt, nihil exhibere alteri, sed
eorum etiam, qui deum semper agere aliquid et moliri volunt, numquam nec
irasci deum nec nocere. Quid autem iratus Iuppiter plus nocere
potuisset, quam nocuit sibi ipse Regulus? Nulla igitur vis fuit
religionis, quae tantam utilitatem perverteret.
An ne turpiter faceret? Primum minima de malis. Num[357] igitur tantum
mali turpitudo ista habebat,[358] quantum ille cruciatus? Deinde illud
etiam apud Accium:
#Atreus; Ribbeck^2, 227-228#
Fregistín[359] fidem?
Néque dedi neque do ínfideli cuíquam
quamquam ab impio rege dicitur, luculente tamen dicitur.
*103* Addunt etiam, quem ad modum nos dicamus videri quaedam utilia,
quae non sint, sic se dicere videri quaedam honesta, quae non sint, "ut
hoc ipsum videtur honestum, conservandi iuris iurandi causa ad cruciatum
revertisse; sed fit non honestum, quia, quod per vim hostium esset
actum, ratum esse non debuit."
Addunt etiam, quicquid valde utile sit, id fieri honestum, etiamsi antea
non videretur.
Haec fere contra Regulum. Sed prima _quaeque_[360] videamus.
[357] _Num_ Edd.; _non_ MSS.
[358] _habebat_ L c, Edd.; _habebit_ A B H a b.
[359] _fregistin_ Edd.; _fregistine_ A B H a b; _fregisti_ L
c.
[360] _quaeque_ Forchhammer, Müller, Heine; not in MSS., Bt.,
Ed.
#Expediency inseparable from moral rectitude.#
XXVIII. People overturn the fundamental principles established by
nature, when they divorce expediency from moral rectitude. For we all
seek to obtain what is to us expedient; we are irresistibly drawn toward
it, and we cannot possibly be otherwise. For who is there that would
turn his back upon what is to him expedient? Or rather, who is there
that does not exert himself to the utmost to secure it? But because we
cannot discover it anywhere except in good report, propriety, and moral
rectitude, we look upon these three for that reason as the first and the
highest objects of endeavour, while what we term expediency we account
not so much an ornament to our dignity as a necessary incident to
living.
#Arguments against Regulus's fidelity to his oath:#
#(1) he had no need to fear God's wrath,#
*102* "What significance, then," some one will say, "do we attach to an
oath? It is not that we fear the wrath of Jove, is it? Not at all; it is
the universally accepted view of all philosophers that God is never
angry, never hurtful. This is the doctrine not only of those[BZ] who
teach that God is Himself free from troubling cares and that He imposes
no trouble upon others, but also of those[CA] who believe that God is
ever working and ever directing His world. Furthermore, suppose Jupiter
had been wroth, what greater injury could He have inflicted upon
Regulus than Regulus brought upon himself? Religious scruple, therefore,
had no such preponderance as to outweigh so great expediency."
#(2) "Of two evils choose the less,"#
"Or was he afraid that his act would be morally wrong? As to that, first
of all, the proverb says 'Of evils choose the least.' Did that moral
wrong, then, really involve as great an evil as did that awful torture?
And secondly, there are the lines of Accius:
_Thyestes._ 'Hast thou broke thy faith?'
_Atreus._ 'None have I giv'n; none give I ever to the faithless.'
Although this sentiment is put into the mouth of a wicked king, still it
is illuminating in its correctness."
#(3) oaths extorted by constraint not binding,#
*103* Their third argument is this: just as we maintain that some things
seem expedient but are not, so they maintain, some things seem morally
right but are not. "For example," they contend, "in this very case it
seems morally right for Regulus to have returned to torture for the sake
of being true to his oath. But it proves not to be morally right,
because what an enemy extorted by force ought not to have been binding."
#(4) exceptional expediency makes right.#
As their concluding argument, they add: whatever is highly expedient may
prove to be morally right, even if it did not seem so in advance.
These are in substance the arguments raised against the conduct of
Regulus. Let us consider them each in turn.
[BZ] The Epicureans.
[CA] The Stoics.
*104* XXIX. "Non fuit Iuppiter metuendus ne iratus noceret, qui neque
irasci solet nec nocere."
Haec quidem ratio non magis contra Reguli quam contra omne ius iurandum
valet. Sed in iure iurando non qui metus, sed quae vis sit, debet
intellegi; est enim ius iurandum affirmatio religiosa; quod autem
affirmate quasi deo teste promiseris, id tenendum est. Iam enim non ad
iram deorum, quae nulla est, sed ad iustitiam et ad fidem pertinet. Nam
praeclare Ennius:
#(Thyestes?) _Fab. inc._, Vahlen^2, 403#
Ó Fides alma ápta pinnis ét ius iurandúm Iovis!
Qui ius igitur iurandum violat, is Fidem violat, quam in Capitolio
"vicinam Iovis optimi maximi," #Unknown# ut in Catonis oratione est,
maiores nostri esse voluerunt.
*105* At enim ne iratus quidem Iuppiter plus Regulo nocuisset, quam sibi
nocuit ipse Regulus.
Certe, si nihil malum esset nisi dolere. Id autem non modo [non][361]
summum malum, sed ne malum quidem esse maxima auctoritate philosophi
affirmant. Quorum quidem testem non mediocrem, sed haud scio an
gravissimum Regulum nolite, quaeso, vituperare. Quem enim locupletiorem
quaerimus quam principem populi Romani, qui retinendi officii causa
cruciatum subierit voluntarium?
Nam quod aiunt: "minima de malis," id est ut turpiter potius quam
calamitose, an est ullum maius malum turpitudine? quae si in deformitate
corporis habet[362] aliquid offensionis, quanta illa depravatio et
foeditas turpificati animi debet videri! *106* Itaque nervosius qui ista
disserunt, solum audent malum dicere id, quod turpe sit, qui autem
remissius, ii tamen non dubitant summum malum dicere.
Nam illud quidem:
#Accius, Atreus; Ribbeck^2, 228#
Néque dedi neque do ínfideli cuíquam
idcirco recte a poëta, quia, cum tractaretur Atreus, personae serviendum
fuit. Sed si hoc sibi sument, nullam esse fidem, quae infideli data sit,
videant, ne quaeratur latebra periurio.
*107* Est autem ius etiam bellicum fidesque iuris iurandi saepe cum
hoste servanda.[363] Quod enim ita iuratum est, ut mens conciperet fieri
oportere, id servandum est; quod aliter, id si non fecerit, nullum est
periurium. Ut, si praedonibus pactum pro capite pretium non attuleris,
nulla fraus sit,[364] ne si iuratus quidem id non feceris; nam pirata
non est ex perduellium numero definitus, sed communis hostis omnium; cum
hoc nec fides debet nec ius iurandum esse commune. *108* Non enim falsum
iurare periurare est, sed, quod EX ANIMI TUI SENTENTIA iuraris, sicut
verbis concipitur more nostro, id non facere periurium est. Scite
enim[365] Euripides:
#Hippolytus 612#
Iurávi lingua, méntem iniuratám gero.
Regulus vero non debuit condiciones pactionesque bellicas et hostiles
perturbare periurio. Cum iusto enim et legitimo hoste res gerebatur,
adversus quem et totum ius fetiale et multa sunt iura communia. Quod ni
ita esset, numquam claros viros senatus vinctos[366] hostibus
dedidisset.
[361] _non modo non_ B H a; _non modo nos_ c; _non modo_ L c
p, Edd.
[362] _habet_ L c, Edd.; _habeat_ A B H a b.
[363] _Est ... servanda_ bracketed by Unger, Bt.^2, Ed.
[364] _sit_ Edd. plerique; _est_ MSS., Bt.^1
[365] _Scite enim_ A L c, Edd.; _scit enim_ B H a b.
[366] _vinctos_ A L c, Edd.; _victos_ B H a b.
#Rebuttal.#
*104* XXIX. "He need not have been afraid that Jupiter in anger would
inflict injury upon him; he is not wont to be angry or hurtful."
#(1) An oath is a covenant with Justice and Good Faith;#
This argument, at all events, has no more weight against Regulus's
conduct than it has against the keeping of any other oath. But in taking
an oath it is our duty to consider not what one may have to fear in case
of violation but wherein its obligation lies: an oath is an assurance
backed by religious sanctity; and a solemn promise given, as before God
as one's witness, is to be sacredly kept. For the question no longer
concerns the wrath of the gods (for there is no such thing) but the
obligations of justice and good faith. For, as Ennius says so admirably:
"Gracious Good Faith, on wings upborne; thou oath in Jupiter's
great name!"
Whoever, therefore, violates his oath violates Good Faith; and, as we
find it stated in Cato's speech, our forefathers chose that she should
dwell upon the Capitol "neighbour to Jupiter Supreme and Best."
*105* "But," objection was further made, "even if Jupiter had been
angry, he could not have inflicted greater injury upon Regulus than
Regulus brought upon himself."
#What is evil?#
Quite true, if there is no evil except pain. But philosophers[CB] of the
highest authority assure us that pain is not only not the supreme evil
but no evil at all. And pray do not disparage Regulus, as no unimportant
witness--nay, I am rather inclined to think he was the very best
witness--to the truth of their doctrine. For what more competent witness
do we ask for than one of the foremost citizens of Rome, who voluntarily
faced torture for the sake of being true to his moral duty?
#(2) no evil can be greater than moral wrong;#
Again, they say "Of evils choose the least"--that is, shall one "choose
moral wrong rather than misfortune," or is there any evil greater than
moral wrong? For if physical deformity excites a certain amount of
aversion, how offensive ought the deformity and hideousness of a
demoralized soul to seem! *106* Therefore, those[CC] who discuss these
problems with more rigour make bold to say that moral wrong is the only
evil, while those[CD] who treat them with more laxity do not hesitate to
call it the supreme evil.
Once more, they quote the sentiment:
"None have I given, none give I ever to the faithless."
It was proper for the poet to say that, because, when he was working out
his Atreus, he had to make the words fit the character. But if they mean
to adopt it as a principle, that a pledge given to the faithless is no
pledge, let them look to it that it be not a mere loophole for perjury
that they seek.
#What is perjury?#
*107* Furthermore, we have laws regulating warfare, and fidelity to an
oath must often be observed in dealings with an enemy: for an oath sworn
with the clear understanding in one's own mind that it should be
performed must be kept; but if there is no such understanding, it does
not count as perjury if one does not perform the vow. For example,
suppose that one does not deliver the amount agreed upon with pirates as
the price of one's life, that would be accounted no deception--not even
if one should fail to deliver the ransom after having sworn to do so;
for a pirate is not included in the number of lawful enemies, but is the
common foe of all the world; and with him there ought not to be any
pledged word nor any oath mutually binding. *108* For swearing to what
is false is not necessarily perjury, but to take an oath "upon your
conscience," as it is expressed in our legal formulas, and then fail to
perform it, that is perjury. For Euripides aptly says:
"My tongue has sworn; the mind I have has sworn no oath."
#Oaths made to an enemy as binding as treaties.#
But Regulus had no right to confound by perjury the terms and covenants
of war made with an enemy. For the war was being carried on with a
legitimate, declared enemy; and to regulate our dealings with such an
enemy, we have our whole fetial[CE] code as well as many other laws that
are binding in common between nations. Were this not the case, the
senate would never have delivered up illustrious men of ours in chains
to the enemy.
[CB] The Stoics.
[CC] The Stoics.
[CD] The Peripatetics.
[CE] See Index, s.v.
*109* XXX. At vero T. Veturius et Sp. Postumius cum iterum consules
essent, quia, cum male pugnatum apud Caudium esset, legionibus nostris
sub iugum missis pacem cum Samnitibus fecerant, dediti sunt iis; iniussu
enim populi senatusque fecerant. Eodemque tempore Ti. Numicius, Q.
Maelius, qui tum tribuni pl. erant, quod eorum auctoritate pax erat
facta, dediti sunt, ut pax Samnitium repudiaretur; atque huius
deditionis ipse Postumius, qui dedebatur, suasor et auctor fuit.
Quod idem multis annis post C. Mancinus, qui, ut Numantinis, quibuscum
sine senatus auctoritate foedus fecerat, dederetur, rogationem suasit
eam, quam L. Furius, Sex. Atilius ex senatus consulto ferebant; qua
accepta est hostibus deditus. Honestius his quam Q. Pompeius, quo, cum
in eadem causa esset, deprecante accepta lex non est. Hic ea, quae
videbatur utilitas, plus valuit quam honestas, apud superiores
utilitatis species falsa ab honestatis auctoritate superata est.
#§ 103#
*110* At non debuit ratum esse, quod erat actum per vim.--Quasi vero
forti viro vis possit adhiberi.
Cur igitur ad senatum proficiscebatur, cum praesertim de captivis
dissuasurus esset?
Quod maximum in eo est, id reprehenditis. Non enim suo iudicio stetit,
sed suscepit causam, ut esset iudicium senatus; cui nisi ipse auctor
fuisset, captivi profecto Poenis redditi essent; ita incolumis in patria
Regulus restitisset. Quod quia patriae non utile putavit, idcirco sibi
honestum et sentire illa et pati credidit.
#§ 103#
Nam quod aiunt, quod valde utile sit, id fieri honestum, immo vero esse,
non fieri. Est enim nihil utile, quod idem non honestum, nec, quia
utile, honestum, sed, quia honestum, utile.
Quare ex multis mirabilibus exemplis haud facile quis dixerit hoc
exemplo aut laudabilius aut praestantius.
#Roman strictness.#
*109* XXX. And yet that very thing happened. Titus Veturius and Spurius
Postumius in their second consulship lost the battle at the Caudine
Forks, and our legions were sent under the yoke. And because they made
peace with the Samnites, those generals were delivered up to them, for
they had made the peace without the approval of the people and senate.
And Tiberius Numicius and Quintus Maelius, tribunes of the people, were
delivered up at the same time, because it was with their sanction that
the peace had been concluded. This was done in order that the peace with
the Samnites might be annulled. And Postumius, the very man whose
delivery was in question, was the proposer and advocate of the said
delivery.
Many years later,[CF] Gaius Mancinus had a similar experience: he
advocated the bill, introduced in accordance with a decree of the senate
by Lucius Furius and Sextus Atilius, that he should be delivered up to
the Numantines, with whom he had made a treaty without authorization
from the senate; and when the bill was passed, he was delivered up to
the enemy. His action was more honourable than Quintus Pompey's;
Pompey's situation was identical with his, and yet at his own entreaty
the bill was rejected. In this latter case, apparent expediency
prevailed over moral rectitude; in the former cases, the false semblance
of expediency was overbalanced by the weight of moral rectitude.
#(3) the interests of the state higher than personal advantage;#
*110* "But," they argued against Regulus, "an oath extorted by force
ought not to have been binding." As if force could be brought to bear
upon a brave man!
"Why, then, did he make the journey to the senate, especially when he
intended to plead against the surrender of the prisoners of war?"
Therein you are criticizing what is the noblest feature of his conduct.
For he was not content to stand upon his own judgment but took up the
case, in order that the judgment might be that of the senate; and had it
not been for the weight of his pleading, the prisoners would certainly
have been restored to the Carthaginians; and in that case, Regulus would
have remained safe at home in his country. But because he thought this
not expedient for his country, he believed that it was therefore morally
right for him to declare his conviction and to suffer for it.
#(4) nothing expedient unless morally right.#
When they argued also that what is highly expedient may prove to be
morally right, they ought rather to say not that it "may prove to be"
but that it actually is morally right. For nothing can be expedient
which is not at the same time morally right; neither can a thing be
morally right just because it is expedient, but it is expedient because
it is morally right.
From the many splendid examples in history, therefore, we could not
easily point to one either more praiseworthy or more heroic than the
conduct of Regulus.
[CF] 184 years, i.e., in B.C. 137.
*111* XXXI. Sed ex tota hac laude Reguli unum illud est admiratione
dignum, quod captivos retinendos censuit. Nam quod rediit, nobis nunc
mirabile videtur, illis quidem temporibus aliter facere non potuit;
itaque ista laus non est hominis, sed temporum. Nullum enim vinculum ad
astringendam fidem iure iurando maiores artius esse voluerunt. Id
indicant leges in duodecim tabulis, indicant sacratae, indicant foedera,
quibus etiam cum hoste devincitur fides, indicant notiones
animadversionesque censorum, qui nulla de re diligentius quam de iure
iurando iudicabant.
*112* L. Manlio A. f., cum dictator fuisset, M. Pomponius tr. pl. diem
dixit, quod is paucos sibi dies ad dictaturam gerendam addidisset;
criminabatur etiam, quod Titum filium, qui postea est Torquatus
appellatus, ab hominibus relegasset et ruri habitare iussisset. Quod cum
audivisset adulescens filius, negotium exhiberi patri, accurrisse Romam
et cum primo luci[367] Pomponi domum venisse dicitur. Cui cum esset
nuntiatum, qui illum iratum allaturum ad se aliquid contra patrem
arbitraretur, surrexit e lectulo remotisque arbitris ad se adulescentem
iussit venire. At ille, ut ingressus est, confestim gladium destrinxit
iuravitque se illum statim interfecturum, nisi ius iurandum sibi
dedisset se patrem missum esse facturum. Iuravit hoc terrore coactus
Pomponius; rem ad populum detulit, docuit, cur sibi causa desistere
necesse esset, Manlium missum fecit. Tantum temporibus illis ius
iurandum valebat.
Atque hic T. Manlius is est, qui ad Anienem Galli, quem ab eo provocatus
occiderat, torque detracto cognomen invenit, cuius tertio consulatu
Latini ad Veserim fusi et fugati, magnus vir in primis et, qui
perindulgens in patrem, idem acerbe severus in filium.
[367] _primo luci_ Beier, Heine, Ed.; _primo lucis_ c; _prima
luce_ A B H a b.
#The most striking lesson in the story of Regulus.#
*111* XXXI. But of all that is thus praiseworthy in the conduct of
Regulus, this one feature above all others calls for our admiration: it
was he who offered the motion that the prisoners of war be retained. For
the fact of his returning may seem admirable to us nowadays, but in
those times he could not have done otherwise. That merit, therefore,
belongs to the age, not to the man. For our ancestors were of the
opinion that no bond was more effective in guaranteeing good faith than
an oath. That is clearly proved by the laws of the Twelve Tables, by the
"sacred" laws,[CG] by the treaties in which good faith is pledged even
to the enemy, by the investigations made by the censors and the
penalties imposed by them; for there were no cases in which they used to
render more rigorous decisions than in cases of violation of an oath.
#The sanctity of an oath in the old days.#
*112* Marcus Pomponius, a tribune of the people, brought an indictment
against Lucius Manlius, Aulus's son, for having extended the term of his
dictatorship a few days beyond its expiration. He further charged him
with having banished his own son Titus (afterward surnamed Torquatus)
from all companionship with his fellow-men, and with requiring him to
live in the country. When the son, who was then a young man, heard
that his father was in trouble on his account, he hastened to Rome--so
the story goes--and at daybreak presented himself at the house of
Pomponius. The visitor was announced to Pomponius. Inasmuch as he
thought that the son in his anger meant to bring him some new evidence
to use against the father, he arose from his bed, asked all who were
present to leave the room, and sent word to the young man to come in.
Upon entering, he at once drew a sword and swore that he would kill the
tribune on the spot, if he did not swear an oath to withdraw the suit
against his father. Constrained by the terror of the situation,
Pomponius gave his oath. He reported the matter to the people,
explaining why he was obliged to drop the prosecution, and withdrew his
suit against Manlius. Such was the regard for the sanctity of an oath in
those days.
And that lad was the Titus Manlius who in the battle on the Anio killed
the Gaul by whom he had been challenged to single combat, pulled off his
torque and thus won his surname. And in his third consulship he routed
the Latins and put them to flight in the battle on the Veseris. He was
one of the greatest of the great, and one who, while more than generous
toward his father, could yet be bitterly severe toward his son.
[CG] "Sacred" laws, according to Festus (p. 318), were laws
that placed their transgressor, together with his household
and his property, under the ban of some divinity; other
authorities limit the term to the laws enacted upon the
Sacred Mount (B.C. 394).
*113* XXXII. Sed, ut laudandus Regulus in conservando iure iurando, sic
decem illi, quos post Cannensem pugnam iuratos ad senatum misit Hannibal
se in castra redituros ea, quorum erant potiti Poeni, nisi de redimendis
captivis impetravissent, si non redierunt, vituperandi. De quibus non
omnes uno modo; nam Polybius, bonus auctor in primis, ex decem
nobilissimis, qui tum erant missi, novem revertisse dicit re a senatu
non impetrata; unum ex decem, qui paulo post, quam erat[368] egressus e
castris, redisset, quasi aliquid esset oblitus, Romae remansisse; reditu
enim in castra liberatum se esse iure iurando interpretabatur, non
recte; fraus enim astringit,[369] non dissolvit periurium. Fuit igitur
stulta calliditas perverse imitata prudentiam. Itaque decrevit senatus,
ut ille veterator et callidus vinctus ad Hannibalem duceretur.
*114*[370] Sed illud maximum: octo hominum milia tenebat Hannibal, non
quos in acie cepisset, aut qui periculo mortis diffugissent, sed qui
relicti in castris fuissent a Paulo et a Varrone consulibus. Eos senatus
non censuit redimendos, cum id parva pecunia fieri posset, ut esset
insitum militibus nostris aut vincere aut emori. Qua quidem re audita
fractum animum Hannibalis scribit idem, quod senatus populusque Romanus
rebus afflictis tam excelso animo fuisset. Sic honestatis comparatione
ea, quae videntur utilia, vincuntur.
*115* _C._[371] Acilius autem, qui Graece scripsit historiam, plures ait
fuisse, qui in castra revertissent eadem fraude, ut iure iurando
liberarentur, eosque a censoribus omnibus ignominiis notatos.
Sit iam huius loci finis. Perspicuum est enim ea, quae timido animo,
humili, demisso fractoque fiant, quale fuisset Reguli factum, si aut de
captivis, quod ipsi opus esse videretur, non quod rei publicae,
censuisset aut domi remanere voluisset, non esse utilia, quia sint
flagitiosa, foeda, turpia.
[368] _Novem ... quam erat_ c, Bt.^1, Ed.; om. A B H a b;
_unum qui_ Unger, Bt.^2
[369] _astringit_ c p, Ed., Heine; _distringit_ A B H a b,
Unger, Bt.
[370] § 114 bracketed by Heus., Bt., as un-Ciceronian.
[371] _C._ Heine, Ed.; not in MSS.
#Contrast between Regulus and the ten envoys from Hannibal.#
*113* XXXII. Now, as Regulus deserves praise for being true to his oath,
so those ten whom Hannibal sent to the senate on parole after the battle
of Cannae deserve censure, if it is true that they did not return; for
they were sworn to return to the camp which had fallen into the hands of
the Carthaginians, if they did not succeed in negotiating an exchange
of prisoners. Historians are not in agreement in regard to the facts.
Polybius, one of the very best authorities, states that of the ten
eminent nobles who were sent at that time, nine returned when their
mission failed at the hands of the senate. But one of the ten, who, a
little while after leaving the camp, had gone back on the pretext that
he had forgotten something or other, remained behind at Rome; he
explained that by his return to the camp he was released from the
obligation of his oath. He was wrong; for deceit does not remove the
guilt of perjury--it merely aggravates it. #The ancient Roman
discipline.# His cunning that impudently tried to masquerade as prudence
was, therefore, only folly. And so the senate ordered that the cunning
scoundrel should be taken back to Hannibal in chains.
*114* But the most significant part of the story is this: the eight
thousand prisoners in Hannibal's hands were not men that he had taken in
the battle or that had escaped in the peril of their lives, but men that
the consuls Paulus and Varro had left behind in camp. Though these might
have been ransomed by a small sum of money, the senate voted not to
redeem them, in order that our soldiers might have the lesson planted in
their hearts that they must either conquer or die. When Hannibal heard
this news, according to that same writer, he lost heart completely,
because the senate and the people of Rome displayed courage so lofty in
a time of disaster. Thus apparent expediency is outweighed when placed
in the balance against moral rectitude.
*115* Gaius Acilius, on the other hand, the author of a history of Rome
in Greek, says that there were several who played the same trick of
returning to the camp to release themselves thus from the obligation of
their oath, and that they were branded by the censors with every mark of
disgrace.
#Expediency and Courage identical.#
Let this be the conclusion of this topic. For it must be perfectly
apparent that acts that are done with a cowardly, craven, abject, broken
spirit, as the act of Regulus would have been if he had supported in
regard to the prisoners a measure that seemed to be advantageous for him
personally, but disadvantageous for the state, or if he had consented to
remain at home--that such acts are not expedient because they are
shameful, dishonourable, and immoral.
*116* XXXIII. Restat quarta pars, quae decore, moderatione, modestia,
continentia, temperantia continetur.
Potest igitur quicquam utile esse, quod sit huic talium virtutum choro
contrarium? Atqui ab Aristippo Cyrenaici atque Annicerii philosophi
nominati omne bonum in voluptate posuerunt virtutemque censuerunt ob eam
rem esse laudandam, quod efficiens esset voluptatis. Quibus obsoletis
floret Epicurus, eiusdem fere adiutor auctorque sententiae. Cum his
"viris[372] equisque," ut dicitur, si honestatem tueri ac retinere
sententia est, decertandum est.
*117* Nam si non modo utilitas, sed vita omnis beata corporis firma
constitutione eiusque constitutionis spe explorata, ut a Metrodoro
scriptum est, continetur, certe haec utilitas, et quidem summa (sic enim
censent), cum honestate pugnabit. Nam ubi primum prudentiae locus
dabitur? an ut conquirat undique suavitates? Quam miser virtutis
famulatus servientis voluptati! Quod autem munus prudentiae? an legere
intellegenter voluptates? Fac nihil isto esse iucundius, quid cogitari
potest turpius?
Iam, qui dolorem summum malum dicat, apud eum quem habet locum
fortitudo, quae est dolorum laborumque contemptio? Quamvis enim multis
locis dicat Epicurus, sicuti[373] dicit, satis fortiter de dolore, tamen
non id spectandum est, quid dicat, sed quid consentaneum sit ei dicere,
qui bona voluptate terminaverit, mala dolore.
Et,[374] si illum audiam, de continentia et temperantia dicit ille
quidem multa multis locis, sed aqua haeret, ut aiunt; nam qui potest
temperantiam laudare is, qui ponat summum bonum in voluptate? est enim
temperantia libidinum inimica, libidines autem consectatrices
voluptatis.
*118* Atque in his tamen tribus generibus, quoquo modo possunt, non
incallide tergiversantur; prudentiam introducunt scientiam suppeditantem
voluptates, depellentem dolores; fortitudinem quoque aliquo modo
expediunt, cum tradunt rationem neglegendae mortis, perpetiendi doloris;
etiam temperantiam inducunt non facillime illi quidem, sed tamen quoquo
modo possunt; dicunt enim voluptatis magnitudinem doloris detractione
finiri. Iustitia vacillat vel iacet potius omnesque eae virtutes, quae
in communitate cernuntur et in societate generis humani. Neque enim
bonitas nec liberalitas nec comitas esse potest, non plus quam amicitia,
si haec non per se expetantur,[375] sed ad voluptatem utilitatemve
referantur.
Conferamus igitur in pauca.
*119* Nam ut utilitatem nullam esse docuimus, quae honestati esset
contraria, sic omnem voluptatem dicimus honestati esse contrariam. Quo
magis reprehendendos Calliphontem et Dinomachum iudico, qui se
dirempturos controversiam putaverunt, si cum honestate voluptatem
tamquam cum homine pecudem copulavissent. Non recipit istam
coniunctionem honestas, aspernatur, repellit. Nec vero finis bonorum [et
malorum],[376] qui simplex esse debet, ex dissimillimis rebus misceri et
temperari potest. #De Finibus, II# Sed de hoc (magna enim res est) alio
loco pluribus; nunc ad propositum.
*120* Quem ad modum igitur, si quando ea, quae videtur[377] utilitas,
honestati repugnat, diiudicanda res sit, satis est supra disputatum. Sin
autem speciem utilitatis etiam voluptas habere dicetur, nulla potest
esse ei cum honestate coniunctio. Nam, ut tribuamus aliquid voluptati,
condimenti fortasse non nihil, utilitatis certe nihil habebit.
*121* Habes a patre munus, Marce fili, mea quidem sententia magnum, sed
perinde erit, ut acceperis. Quamquam hi tibi tres libri inter Cratippi
commentarios tamquam hospites erunt recipiendi; sed, ut, si ipse
venissem Athenas (quod quidem esset factum, nisi me e medio cursu clara
voce patria revocasset), aliquando me quoque audires, sic, quoniam his
voluminibus ad te profecta vox est mea, tribues iis[378] temporis
quantum poteris, poteris autem, quantum voles. Cum vero intellexero te
hoc scientiae genere gaudere, tum et praesens tecum propediem, ut spero,
et, dum aberis, absens loquar.
Vale igitur, mi Cicero, tibique persuade esse te quidem mihi carissimum,
sed multo fore cariorem, si talibus monitis[379] praeceptisque
laetabere.
[372] _viris_ c p, Edd.; _veris_ A B H b.
[373] _sicuti_ L c, Edd.; _sicut id_ A B H a b.
[374] _dolore. Et_ Müller, Heine; _dolore: ut_ MSS., Bt.;
_dolore. Ut_ Ed.
[375] _expetantur_ A, Edd.; _expectantur_ B a; _exspectantur_
c.
[376] Omitted by Muretus; bracketed by Heine, Ed., et al.
[377] _videtur_ c, Edd.; _videretur_ B H a b; _viderentur_ A.
[378] _iis_ Edd.; _his_ A B H a b; _hijs_ c.
[379] _monitis_ Lambinus, Edd.; _monumentis_ A B H a b;
_monimentis_ c.
#Apparent Expediency _vs._ Temperance.#
*116* XXXIII. We have still left our fourth division, comprising
propriety, moderation, temperance, self-restraint, self-control.
Can anything be expedient, then, which is contrary to such a chorus of
virtues? And yet the Cyrenaics, adherents of the school of Aristippus,
and the philosophers who bear the name of Anniceris find all good to
consist in pleasure and consider virtue praiseworthy only because it is
productive of pleasure. Now that these schools are out of date, Epicurus
has come into vogue--an advocate and supporter of practically the same
doctrine. Against such a philosophy we must fight it out "with horse and
foot," as the saying is, if our purpose is to defend and maintain our
standard of moral rectitude.
#The fallacy of Epicureanism.#
*117* For if, as we find it in the writings of Metrodorus, not only
expediency but happiness in life depends wholly upon a sound physical
constitution and the reasonable expectation that it will always remain
sound, then that expediency--and what is more, the highest expediency,
as they estimate it--will assuredly clash with moral rectitude. For,
first of all, what position will wisdom occupy in that system? The
position of collector of pleasures from every possible source? What a
sorry state of servitude for a virtue--to be pandering to sensual
pleasure! And what will be the function of wisdom? To make skilful
choice between sensual pleasures? Granted that there may be nothing more
pleasant, what can be conceived more degrading for wisdom than such a
rôle?
Then again, if anyone hold that pain is the supreme evil, what place in
his philosophy has fortitude, which is but indifference to toil and
pain? For however many passages there are in which Epicurus speaks right
manfully of pain, we must nevertheless consider not what he says, but
what it is consistent for a man to say who has defined the good in terms
of pleasure and evil in terms of pain.
And further, if I should listen to him, I should find that in many
passages he has a great deal to say about temperance and self-control;
but "the water will not run," as they say. For how can he commend
self-control and yet posit pleasure as the supreme good? For
self-control is the foe of the passions, and the passions are the
handmaids of pleasure.
#Epicureanism and the Cardinal Virtues.#
*118* And yet when it comes to these three cardinal virtues, those
philosophers shift and turn as best they can, and not without
cleverness. They admit wisdom into their system as the knowledge that
provides pleasures and banishes pain; they clear the way for fortitude
also in some way to fit in with their doctrines, when they teach that it
is a rational means for looking with indifference upon death and for
enduring pain. They bring even temperance in--not very easily, to be
sure, but still as best they can; for they hold that the height of
pleasure is found in the absence of pain. Justice totters or rather, I
should say, lies already prostrate; so also with all those virtues which
are discernible in social life and the fellowship of human society. For
neither goodness nor generosity nor courtesy can exist, any more than
friendship can, if they are not sought of and for themselves, but are
cultivated only for the sake of sensual pleasure or personal advantage.
Let us now recapitulate briefly.
#Sensual pleasure and moral rectitude incompatible.#
*119* As I have shown that such expediency as is opposed to moral
rectitude is no expediency, so I maintain that any and all sensual
pleasure is opposed to moral rectitude. And therefore Calliphon and
Dinomachus, in my judgment, deserve the greater condemnation; they
imagined that they should settle the controversy by coupling pleasure
with moral rectitude; as well yoke a man with a beast! But moral
rectitude does not accept such a union; she abhors it, spurns it. Why,
the supreme good, which ought to be simple, cannot be a compound and
mixture of absolutely contradictory qualities. But this theory I have
discussed more fully in another connection; for the subject is a large
one. Now for the matter before us.
*120* We have, then, fully discussed the problem how a question is to be
decided, if ever that which seems to be expediency clashes with moral
rectitude. But if, on the other hand, the assertion is made that
pleasure admits of a show of expediency also, there can still be no
possible union between it and moral rectitude. For, to make the most
generous admission we can in favour of pleasure, we will grant that it
may contribute something that possibly gives some spice to life, but
certainly nothing that is really expedient.
#Conclusion.#
*121* Herewith, my son Marcus, you have a present from your father--a
generous one, in my humble opinion; but its value will depend upon the
spirit in which you receive it. And yet you must welcome these three
books as fellow-guests, so to speak, along with your notes on
Cratippus's lectures. But as you would sometimes give ear to me also, if
I had come to Athens (and I should be there now, if my country had not
called me back with accents unmistakable, when I was half-way there), so
you will please devote as much time as you can to these volumes, for in
them my voice will travel to you; and you can devote to them as much
time as you will. And when I see that you take delight in this branch of
philosophy, I shall then talk further with you--at an early date,[CH] I
hope, face to face--but as long as you are abroad, I shall converse with
you thus at a distance.
Farewell, my dear Cicero, and be assured that, while you are the object
of my deepest affection, you will be dearer to me still, if you find
pleasure in such counsel and instruction.
[CH] But Cicero never saw his son Marcus again.
INDEX
References are to Book and Section; all dates, given in parentheses
(...), are B.C.
Academicians.
1. adherents of the New Academy (_q.v._);
their right to teach ethics, I, 6;
attitude toward knowledge, II, 7;
Cicero's philosophy, II, 1-8.
2. adherents of the Old Academy, III, 20.
Academy,
1. the Older, a school of philosophy founded by Plato and so called
from its home;
their doctrine of ideas, III, 76, 81;
the pre-existence and immortality of the soul;
monotheism;
the goodness of God;
striving after His perfection.
2. the New, a modification of the Old, sceptical, anti-dogmatic,
eclectic, III, 20.
Accius, Lucius, a tragic poet (born 170). His tragedies were mostly
imitations from the Greek. Cicero knew him personally;
quotes from him, III, 84, 102, 106.
Acilius;
Gaius Acilius Glabrio (tribune, 197);
interpreter, when Carneades, Diogenes, and Critolaus came to Rome;
author of History of Rome, III, 115.
Admiration, how won with dignity, II, 31 fg.
Aeacidae, descendants of Aeacus (_q.v._), the father of Peleus and
Telamon and grandfather of Achilles and Ajax, I, 38.
Aeacus, son of Zeus (Jupiter) and king of Aegina (_q.v._);
renowned for his justice and piety, I, 97;
after his death he became with Minos and Rhadamanthus judge in Hades.
Aedileship, cost of, II, 57-60.
Aegina, an island in the Saronic Gulf, a dangerous rival to Athens,
directly in front of Piraeus and only twelve miles away, III, 46;
unjustly appropriated by Athens (429), III, 46.
Aeginetans, the people of Aegina (_q.v._).
Aelius;
_see_ Tubero.
Aemilius;
_see_ Paulus and Scaurus.
Aequians, a warlike mountain tribe on the upper Anio, warring against
Rome (till 304), I, 35.
Aesopus, Claudius, an intimate friend of Cicero, Rome's greatest tragic
actor, I, 114.
Africa, the province in which Carthage was, I, 112 (Thapsus);
III, 99 (Carthage).
Africanus;
_see_ Scipio.
Agamemnon, leader of the war against Troy;
when detained at Aulis he sacrificed his daughter Iphigenia to save
the expedition, III, 95. For this he was slain on his return from
Troy by his wife Clytaemnestra.
Agesilaus, king of Sparta (398-360);
waged war in Asia (396-394), victor at Coronea, saviour of Sparta
after Mantinea (362); II, 16.
Agis IV, king of Sparta (244-240);
attempted to re-establish the institutions of Lycurgus and reform
property abuses;
put to death through organized wealth, II, 80.
Agrarian Laws, a menace to the stability of the government, II, 78-83.
Agriculture, impossible without man, II, 12;
man's noblest calling, I, 151.
Agrigentum, a city on the south coast of Sicily, once "the most
beautiful city of mortals," ruled by Phalaris (560), II, 26.
Ajax, son of Telamon; could brook no wrong, went mad, and committed
suicide when the arms of Achilles were awarded to Odysseus,
I, 113;
rebuked Odysseus, III, 98.
Subject of a tragedy by Ennius, I, 114.
Albucius, Titus, an Epicurean;
praetor in Sardinia (105);
prosecuted for extortion, II, 50.
Alexander, the Great (356-323), son of Philip of Macedon, II, 16, 48;
greater than his father in achievement, inferior in courtliness,
I, 90;
governor of Macedonia (340), II, 53;
conquered Greece (338-335), subdued Asia (334-331), Egypt (331),
invaded India (329-327), founded Alexandria and other cities, and
died of a drunken debauch (I, 90).
Alexander, tyrant of Pherae (369);
brother, son-in-law, and successor of Jason (_q.v._), defeated and
slew Pelopidas of Thebes at Cynocephalae (364);
murdered by his wife and her three brothers, II, 25, 26.
Alexandria, the metropolis of Egypt at the mouth of the Nile;
founded by Alexander (332);
centre of wealth (II, 82);
grain market, III, 50.
Alps, the mountains between Italy and further Gaul, II, 28.
Ambition, a cause of injustice, I, 25-26, 46, 65;
of moral wrong, III, 82;
of treason, III, 82-83;
the foe of freedom, I, 68; II, 28.
Amusements, wholesome, I, 103-104.
Anger, never excusable, I, 89.
Anio, the Sabine river, tributary to the Tiber;
the battle on (340), which gave Rome supremacy over all Latium,
III, 112.
Anniceris, of Cyrene (4th century), a successor of Aristippus;
his school a cross between the Epicurean and the Cyrenaic: he denied
that pleasure was merely absence of pain;
he held that every act had its own distinct purpose and that the
virtues are good in themselves;
his teachings were not permanent, III, 116.
Antigonus, one of Alexander's generals, governor of Asia (323-301),
king of Asia (306-301);
father of Demetrius Poliorcetes and Philip, II, 48.
Antiope, mother of Amphion and Zethus, by whom she was saved from the
persecutions of her former husband Lycus and his wife Dirce;
her vengeance on Dirce drove her mad;
subject of a tragedy of Pacuvius, I, 114.
Antipater, vice-regent of Macedon (334);
father of Cassander, II, 48.
Antipater, of Tarsus (2nd century), pupil and successor of Diogenes of
Babylonia;
teacher of Panaetius;
his ethical teachings, III, 51-55, 91.
Antipater, of Tyre (1st century), friend of Cato the younger;
a Stoic, II, 86.