BOOK III

THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE RIGHT AND THE EXPEDIENT

LIBER TERTIUS / BOOK III

*1* I. P. Scipionem, M.[265] fili, eum, qui primus Africanus appellatus

est, dicere solitum scripsit Cato, qui fuit eius fere aequalis, numquam

se minus otiosum esse, quam cum otiosus, nec minus solum, quam cum solus

esset. Magnifica vero vox et magno viro ac sapiente digna; quae declarat

illum et in otio de negotiis cogitare et in solitudine secum loqui

solitum, ut neque cessaret umquam et interdum colloquio alterius non

egeret. Ita duae res, quae languorem afferunt ceteris, illum acuebant,

otium et solitudo. Vellem nobis hoc idem vere dicere liceret; sed si

minus imitatione tantam ingenii praestantiam consequi possumus,

voluntate certe proxime accedimus; nam et a re publica forensibusque

negotiis armis impiis vique prohibiti otium persequimur et ob eam causam

urbe relicta rura peragrantes saepe soli sumus.

*2* Sed nec hoc otium cum Africani otio nec haec solitudo cum illa

comparanda est. Ille enim requiescens a rei publicae pulcherrimis

muneribus otium sibi sumebat aliquando et e[266] coetu hominum

frequentiaque interdum tamquam in portum se in solitudinem recipiebat,

nostrum autem otium negotii inopia, non requiescendi studio constitutum

est. Exstincto enim senatu deletisque iudiciis quid est quod dignum

nobis aut in curia aut in foro agere possimus? *3* Ita, qui in maxima

celebritate atque in oculis civium quondam vixerimus, nunc fugientes

conspectum sceleratorum, quibus omnia redundant, abdimus nos, quantum

licet, et saepe soli sumus. Sed quia sic ab hominibus doctis accepimus,

non solum ex malis eligere minima oportere, sed etiam excerpere ex his

ipsis,[267] si quid inesset boni, propterea et otio fruor, non illo

quidem, quo debebat is,[268] qui quondam peperisset otium civitati, nec

eam solitudinem languere patior, quam mihi affert necessitas, non

voluntas.

*4* Quamquam Africanus maiorem laudem meo iudicio assequebatur. Nulla

enim eius ingenii monumenta mandata litteris, nullum opus otii, nullum

solitudinis munus exstat; ex quo intellegi debet illum mentis agitatione

investigationeque earum rerum, quas cogitando consequebatur, nec otiosum

nec solum umquam fuisse; nos autem, qui non tantum roboris habemus, ut

cogitatione tacita a[269] solitudine abstrahamur, ad hanc scribendi

operam omne studium curamque convertimus. Itaque plura brevi tempore

eversa quam multis annis stante re publica scripsimus.

[265] _M._ Nonius; _Marce_ MSS.

[266] _e_ c, Edd.; _a_ a; not in B H b.

[267] _ex his ipsis_ c, Edd.; _ex his_ a; _ex ipsis_ B H b.

[268] _debebat is_ c, Edd.; _debeat_ B H b; _debeat is_ corr.

in _debeat_ a.

[269] _a_ c, Edd.; not in B H a b.

#Preface: Scipio and Cicero.#

*1* I. Cato, who was of about the same years, Marcus, my son, as that

Publius Scipio who first bore the surname of Africanus, has given us the

statement that Scipio used to say that he was never less idle than when

he had nothing to do and never less lonely than when he was alone. An

admirable sentiment, in truth, and becoming to a great and wise man. It

shows that even in his leisure hours his thoughts were occupied with

public business and that he used to commune with himself when alone; and

so not only was he never unoccupied, but he sometimes had no need for

company. The two conditions, then, that prompt others to

idleness--leisure and solitude--only spurred him on. I wish I could say

the same of myself and say it truly. But if by imitation I cannot attain

to such excellence of character, in aspiration, at all events, I

approach it as nearly as I can; for as I am kept by force of armed

treason away from practical politics and from my practice at the bar, I

am now leading a life of leisure. For that reason I have left the city

and, wandering in the country from place to place, I am often alone.

*2* But I should not compare this leisure of mine with that of

Africanus, nor this solitude with his. For he, to find leisure from his

splendid services to his country, used to take a vacation now and then

and to retreat from the assemblies and the throngs of men into solitude,

as into a haven of rest. #The orator's retirement.# But my leisure is

forced upon me by want of public business, not prompted by any desire

for repose. For now that the senate has been abolished and the courts

have been closed, what is there, in keeping with my self-respect, that I

can do either in the senate-chamber or in the forum? *3* So, although I

once lived amid throngs of people and in the greatest publicity, I am

now shunning the sight of the miscreants with whom the world abounds and

withdrawing from the public eye as far as I may, and I am often alone.

But I have learned from philosophers that among evils one ought not only

to choose the least, but also to extract even from these any element of

good that they may contain. For that reason, I am turning my leisure to

account--though it is not such repose as the man should be entitled to

who once brought the state repose from civil strife--and I am not

letting this solitude, which necessity and not my will imposes on me,

find me idle.

*4* And yet, in my judgment, Africanus earned the higher praise. For no

literary monuments of his genius have been published, we have no work

produced in his leisure hours, no product of his solitude. From this

fact we may safely infer that, because of the activity of his mind and

the study of those problems to which he used to direct his thought, he

was never unoccupied, never lonely. But I have not strength of mind

enough by means of silent meditation to forget my solitude; and so I

have turned all my attention and endeavour to this kind of literary

work. I have, accordingly, written more in this short time since the

downfall of the republic than I did in the course of many years, while

the republic stood.

*5* II. Sed cum tota philosophia, mi Cicero, frugifera et fructuosa nec

ulla pars eius inculta ac deserta sit, tum nullus feracior in ea locus

est nec uberior[270] quam de officiis, a quibus constanter honesteque

vivendi praecepta ducuntur. Quare, quamquam a Cratippo nostro, principe

huius memoriae philosophorum, haec te assidue audire atque accipere

confido, tamen conducere arbitror talibus aures tuas vocibus undique

circumsonare, nec eas, si fieri possit, quicquam aliud audire. *6* Quod

cum omnibus est faciendum, qui vitam honestam ingredi cogitant, tum haud

scio an nemini potius quam tibi; sustines enim non parvam exspectationem

imitandae industriae nostrae, magnam honorum, non nullam fortasse

nominis. Suscepisti onus praeterea grave et Athenarum et Cratippi; ad

quos cum tamquam ad mercaturam bonarum artium sis profectus, inanem

redire turpissimum est dedecorantem et urbis auctoritatem et magistri.

Quare, quantum coniti animo potes, quantum labore contendere, si

discendi labor est potius quam voluptas, tantum fac ut efficias neve

committas, ut, cum[271] omnia suppeditata sint a nobis, tute tibi

defuisse videare.

Sed haec hactenus; multa enim saepe ad te cohortandi gratia scripsimus;

nunc ad reliquam partem propositae divisionis revertamur.

*7* Panaetius igitur, qui sine controversia de officiis accuratissime

disputavit, quemque nos correctione quadam adhibita potissimum secuti

sumus, tribus generibus propositis, in quibus deliberare homines et

consultare de officio solerent, uno, cum dubitarent, honestumne id

esset, de quo ageretur, an turpe, altero, utilene esset an inutile,

tertio, si id, quod speciem haberet honesti, pugnaret cum eo, quod utile

videretur, quo modo ea discerni oporteret, de duobus generibus primis

tribus libris explicavit, de tertio autem genere deinceps se scripsit

dicturum nec exsolvit id, quod promiserat. *8* Quod eo magis miror, quia

scriptum a discipulo eius Posidonio est triginta annis vixisse

Panaetium, posteaquam illos libros edidisset. Quem locum miror a

Posidonio breviter esse tactum in quibusdam commentariis, praesertim cum

scribat nullum esse locum in tota philosophia tam necessarium.

*9* Minime vero assentior iis, qui negant eum locum a Panaetio

praetermissum, sed consulto relictum, nec omnino scribendum fuisse, quia

numquam posset utilitas cum honestate pugnare. De quo alterum potest

habere dubitationem, adhibendumne fuerit hoc genus, quod in divisione

Panaeti tertium est, an plane omittendum, alterum dubitari non potest,

quin a Panaetio susceptum sit, sed relictum. Nam qui e divisione

tripertita duas partes absolverit, huic necesse est restare tertiam;

praeterea in extremo libro tertio de hac parte pollicetur se deinceps

esse dicturum. *10* Accedit eodem testis locuples Posidonius, qui etiam

scribit in quadam epistula P. Rutilium Rufum dicere solere, qui

Panaetium audierat, ut nemo pictor esset inventus, qui in Coa Venere eam

partem, quam Apelles inchoatam reliquisset, absolveret (oris enim

pulchritudo reliqui corporis imitandi spem auferebat), sic ea, quae

Panaetius praetermisisset [et non perfecisset][272] propter eorum, quae

perfecisset, praestantiam neminem persecutum.

[270] _uberior_ c, Edd.; _uerior_ B H a b.

[271] _ut, cum_ c, Edd.; _ut ne, cum_ B H a b.

[272] _et non perfecisset_ MSS.; del. Muretus; bracketed by

Edd.

#Young Cicero admonished to diligence in his studies.#

*5* II. But, my dear Cicero, while the whole field of philosophy is

fertile and productive and no portion of it barren and waste, still no

part is richer or more fruitful than that which deals with moral duties;

for from these are derived the rules for leading a consistent and moral

life. And therefore, although you are, as I trust, diligently studying

and profiting by these precepts under the direction of our friend

Cratippus, the foremost philosopher of the present age, I still think it

well that your ears should be dinned with such precepts from every side

and that, if it could be, they should hear nothing else. *6* These

precepts must be laid to heart by all who look forward to a career of

honour, and I am inclined to think that no one needs them more than you.

For you will have to fulfil the eager anticipation that you will imitate

my industry, the confident expectation that you will emulate my course

of political honours, and the hope that you will, perhaps, rival my name

and fame. You have, besides, incurred a heavy responsibility on account

of Athens and Cratippus: for since you have gone to them for the

purchase, as it were, of a store of liberal culture, it would be a great

discredit to you to return empty-handed, thereby disgracing the high

reputation of the city and of your master. Therefore, put forth the best

mental effort of which you are capable; work as hard as you can (if

learning is work rather than pleasure); do your very best to succeed;

and do not, when I have put all the necessary means at your disposal,

allow it to be said that you have failed to do your part.

But enough of this. For I have written again and again for your

encouragement. Let us now return to the remaining section of our

subject as outlined.

#Panaetius on Moral Duties.#

*7* Panaetius, then, has given us what is unquestionably the most

thorough discussion of moral duties that we have, and I have followed

him in the main--but with slight modifications. He classifies under

three general heads the ethical problems which people are accustomed to

consider and weigh: first, the question whether the matter in hand is

morally right or morally wrong; second, whether it is expedient or

inexpedient; third, how a decision ought to be reached, in case that

which has the appearance of being morally right clashes with that which

seems to be expedient. He has treated the first two heads at length in

three books; but while he has stated that he meant to discuss the third

head in its proper turn, he has never fulfilled his promise. *8* And I

wonder the more at this, because Posidonius, a pupil of his, records

that Panaetius was still alive thirty years after he published those

three books. And I am surprised that Posidonius has but briefly touched

upon this subject in certain memoirs of his, and especially, as he

states that there is no other topic in the whole range of philosophy so

essentially important as this.

#Why Panaetius omitted the "Conflict" of the moral and the expedient.#

*9* Now, I cannot possibly accept the view of those who say that that

point was not overlooked but purposely omitted by Panaetius, and that it

was not one that ever needed discussion, because there never can be such

a thing as a conflict between expediency and moral rectitude. But with

regard to this assertion, the one point may admit of doubt--whether that

question which is third in Panaetius's classification ought to have been

included or omitted altogether; but the other point is not open to

debate--that it was included in Panaetius's plan but left unwritten. For

if a writer has finished two divisions of a threefold subject, the third

must necessarily remain for him to do. Besides, he promises at the close

of the third book that he will discuss this division also in its proper

turn. *10* We have also in Posidonius a competent witness to the fact.

He writes in one of his letters that Publius Rutilius Rufus, who also

was a pupil of Panaetius's, used to say that "as no painter had been

found to complete that part of the Venus of Cos which Apelles had left

unfinished (for the beauty of her face made hopeless any attempt

adequately to represent the rest of the figure), so no one, because of

the surpassing excellence of what Panaetius did complete, would venture

to supply what he had left undone."

*11* III. Quam ob rem de iudicio Panaeti dubitari non potest; rectene

autem hanc tertiam partem ad exquirendum officium adiunxerit an secus,

de eo fortasse disputari potest. Nam, sive honestum solum bonum est, ut

Stoicis placet, sive, quod honestum est, id ita summum bonum est, quem

ad modum Peripateticis vestris videtur, ut omnia ex altera parte

collocata vix minimi momenti instar habeant, dubitandum non est, quin

numquam possit utilitas cum honestate contendere. Itaque accepimus

Socratem exsecrari solitum eos, qui primum haec natura cohaerentia

opinione distraxissent. Cui quidem ita sunt Stoici assensi, ut et,

quicquid honestum esset, id utile esse censerent nec utile quicquam,

quod non honestum.

*12* Quodsi is esset Panaetius, qui virtutem propterea colendam diceret,

quod ea efficiens utilitatis esset, ut ii, qui res expetendas vel

voluptate vel indolentia metiuntur, liceret ei dicere utilitatem

aliquando cum honestate pugnare; sed cum sit is, qui id solum bonum

iudicet, quod honestum sit, quae autem huic repugnent specie quadam

utilitatis, eorum neque accessione meliorem vitam fieri nec decessione

peiorem, non videtur debuisse eius modi deliberationem introducere, in

qua, quod utile videretur, cum eo, quod honestum est, compararetur. *13*

Etenim quod summum bonum a Stoicis dicitur, convenienter naturae vivere,

id habet hanc, ut opinor, sententiam: cum virtute congruere semper,

cetera autem, quae secundum naturam essent, ita legere, si ea virtuti

non repugnarent. Quod cum ita sit, putant quidam hanc comparationem non

recte introductam, nec omnino de eo genere quicquam praecipiendum

fuisse.

Atque[273] illud quidem honestum, quod proprie vereque dicitur, id in

sapientibus est solis neque a virtute divelli umquam potest; in iis

autem, in quibus sapientia perfecta non est, ipsum illud quidem

perfectum honestum nullo modo, similitudines honesti esse possunt. *14*

Haec enim officia, de quibus his libris disputamus, media Stoici

appellant; ea communia sunt et late patent; quae et ingenii bonitate

multi assequuntur et progressione discendi. Illud autem officium, quod

rectum idem appellant, perfectum atque absolutum est et, ut idem dicunt,

omnes numeros habet nec praeter sapientem cadere in quemquam potest.

*15* Cum autem aliquid actum est, in quo media officia compareant,[274]

id cumulate videtur esse perfectum, propterea quod volgus, quid absit a

perfecto, non fere intellegit; quatenus autem intellegit, nihil putat

praetermissum; quod idem[275] in poematis, in picturis usu venit in

aliisque compluribus, ut delectentur imperiti laudentque ea, quae

laudanda non sint, ob eam, credo, causam, quod insit in iis[276] aliquid

probi, quod capiat ignaros, qui quidem,[277] quid in una quaque re vitii

sit, nequeant iudicare; itaque, cum sunt docti a peritis, desistunt

facile sententia.

[273] _Atque_ MSS., Bt.^1, Müller, Heine; _atqui_ Fleckeisen,

Bt.^2, Ed.

[274] _compareant_ Anemoecius, Edd.; _comparant_ B H a b;

_appareant_ c; _comparent_ p.

[275] _idem_ Nonius, Müller, Heine; _autem_ B H a b; _item_

c, Bt.

[276] _iis_ Baiter, Müller, Heine; _his_ B H a b; _hijs_ c.

[277] _qui quidem_ many MSS., Bt.^1, Müller; _qui idem_ B H a

b c; _qui [idem]_ Bt.^2, Heine.

#The conflict between Expediency and Moral Rectitude only apparent.#

*11* III. In regard to Panaetius's real intentions, therefore, no doubt

can be entertained. But whether he was or was not justified in adding

this third division to the inquiry about duty may, perhaps, be a matter

for debate. For whether moral goodness is the only good, as the Stoics

believe, or whether, as your Peripatetics think, moral goodness is in so

far the highest good that everything else gathered together into the

opposing scale would have scarcely the slightest weight, it is beyond

question that expediency can never conflict with moral rectitude. And

so, we have heard, Socrates used to pronounce a curse upon those who

first drew a conceptual distinction between things naturally

inseparable. With this doctrine the Stoics are in agreement in so far as

they maintain that if anything is morally right, it is expedient, and

if anything is not morally right, it is not expedient.

*12* But if Panaetius were the sort of man to say that virtue is worth

cultivating only because it is productive of advantage, as do certain

philosophers who measure the desirableness of things by the standard of

pleasure or of absence of pain, he might argue that expediency sometimes

clashes with moral rectitude. But since he is a man who judges that the

morally right is the only good, and that those things which come in

conflict with it have only the appearance of expediency and cannot make

life any better by their presence nor any worse by their absence, it

follows that he ought not to have raised a question involving the

weighing of what seems expedient against what is morally right. *13*

Furthermore, when the Stoics speak of the supreme good as "living

conformably to nature," they mean, as I take it, something like this:

that we are always to be in accord with virtue, and from all other

things that may be in harmony with nature to choose only such as are not

incompatible with virtue. This being so, some people are of the opinion

that it was not right to introduce this counterbalancing of right and

expediency and that no practical instruction should have been given on

this question at all.

And yet moral goodness, in the true and proper sense of the term, is the

exclusive possession of the wise and can never be separated from virtue;

but those who have not perfect wisdom cannot possibly have perfect moral

goodness, but only a semblance of it. *14* #The "absolute" and the

"mean."# And indeed these duties under discussion in these books the

Stoics call "mean duties"[BB]; they are a common possession and have

wide application; and many people attain to the knowledge of them

through natural goodness of heart and through advancement in learning.

But that duty which those same Stoics call "right" is perfect and

absolute and "satisfies all the numbers,"[BC] as that same school says,

and is attainable by none except the wise man. *15* On the other hand,

when some act is performed in which we see "mean" duties manifested,

that is generally regarded as fully perfect, for the reason that the

common crowd does not, as a rule, comprehend how far it falls short of

real perfection; but as far as their comprehension does go, they think

there is no deficiency. This same thing ordinarily occurs in the

estimation of poems, paintings, and a great many other works of art:

ordinary people enjoy and praise things that do not deserve praise. The

reason for this, I suppose, is that those productions have some point of

excellence which catches the fancy of the uneducated, because these have

not the ability to discover the points of weakness in any particular

piece of work before them. And so, when they are instructed by experts,

they readily abandon their former opinion.

[BB] See note on I, 8.

[BC] I.e., fills all the requirements of absolute

perfection--an allusion to the Pythagorean doctrine that

specific numbers stand for perfection of specific kinds;

"absolute duty" combines them all.

IV. Haec igitur officia, de quibus his libris disserimus, quasi secunda

quaedam honesta esse dicunt, non sapientium modo propria, sed cum omni

hominum genere communia. *16* Itaque iis omnes, in quibus est virtutis

indoles, commoventur. Nec vero, cum duo Decii aut duo Scipiones fortes

viri commemorantur, aut cum Fabricius [aut Aristides][278] iustus

nominatur, aut ab illis fortitudinis aut ab hoc[279] iustitiae tamquam a

sapiente petitur exemplum; nemo enim horum sic sapiens, ut sapientem

volumus intellegi, nec ii, qui sapientes habiti et nominati, M. Cato et

C. Laelius, sapientes fuerunt, ne illi quidem septem, sed ex mediorum

officiorum frequentia similitudinem quandam gerebant speciemque

sapientium.

*17* Quocirca nec id, quod vere honestum est, fas est cum utilitatis

repugnantia comparari, nec id, quod communiter appellamus honestum, quod

colitur ab iis, qui bonos se viros haberi volunt, cum emolumentis umquam

est comparandum, tamque id honestum, quod in nostram intellegentiam

cadit, tuendum conservandumque nobis est quam illud, quod proprie

dicitur vereque est honestum, sapientibus; aliter enim teneri non

potest, si qua ad virtutem est facta progressio.

Sed haec quidem de iis, qui conservatione officiorum existimantur boni.

*18* Qui autem omnia metiuntur emolumentis et commodis neque ea volunt

praeponderari honestate, ii solent in deliberando honestum cum eo, quod

utile putant, comparare, boni viri non solent. Itaque existimo

Panaetium, cum dixerit homines solere in hac comparatione dubitare, hoc

ipsum sensisse, quod dixerit, "solere" modo, non etiam "oportere."

Etenim non modo pluris putare, quod utile videatur, quam quod honestum

sit,[280] sed etiam haec inter se comparare et in his addubitare

turpissimum est.

Quid ergo est, quod non numquam dubitationem afferre soleat

considerandumque videatur? Credo, si quando dubitatio accidit, quale sit

id, de quo consideretur. *19* Saepe enim tempore fit, ut, quod turpe

plerumque haberi soleat, inveniatur non esse turpe; exempli causa

ponatur aliquid, quod pateat latius: Quod potest maius esse[281] scelus

quam non modo hominem, sed etiam familiarem hominem occidere? Num igitur

se astrinxit scelere, si qui tyrannum occidit quamvis familiarem? Populo

quidem Romano non videtur, qui ex omnibus praeclaris factis illud

pulcherrimum existimat. Vicit ergo utilitas honestatem? Immo vero

honestas utilitatem secuta est.[282]

Itaque, ut sine ullo errore diiudicare possimus, si quando cum illo,

quod honestum intellegimus, pugnare id videbitur, quod appellamus utile,

formula quaedam constituenda est; quam si sequemur in comparatione

rerum, ab officio numquam recedemus. *20* Erit autem haec formula

Stoicorum rationi disciplinaeque maxime consentanea; quam quidem his

libris propterea sequimur, quod, quamquam et a veteribus Academicis et a

Peripateticis vestris, qui quondam idem erant, qui Academici, quae

honesta sunt, anteponuntur iis, quae videntur utilia, tamen splendidius

haec ab eis disseruntur,[283] quibus, quicquid honestum est, idem utile

videtur nec utile quicquam, quod non honestum, quam ab iis,[284] quibus

et honestum aliquid non utile et utile[285] non honestum. Nobis autem

nostra Academia magnam licentiam dat, ut, quodcumque maxime probabile

occurrat, id nostro iure liceat defendere. Sed redeo ad formulam.

[278] _aut Aristides_ (_Aristidesve_ p) MSS., Lactantius;

bracketed by J. M. Heusinger, Edd.

[279] _hoc_ Lactantius, Edd., _his_ MSS.

[280] _sit_ c, Bt.^2, Müller; not in B H a b, Bt.^1; _est_

Heine.

[281] _esse_ c, Edd.; not in B H a b.

[282] _utilitatem secuta est_ MSS., Müller, Heine;

_utilitatem; honestatem utilitas secuta est_ Baiter, Ed.

[283] _disseruntur_ certain MSS., C. Lange and Fr. Fabricius,

Müller, Heine; _disserentur_ MSS., Bt.

[284] _iis_ Edd.; _his_ (_hijs_ c) MSS.

[285] _et honestum ... et utile_ Lambinus, Bt.^2, Müller,

Heine, _et honestum ... aut utile_ B H a b; _aut honestum ...

aut utile_ c, Bt.^1

#Absolute goodness and imperfect humanity.#

IV. The performance of the duties, then, which I am discussing in these

books, is called by the Stoics a sort of second-grade moral goodness,

not the peculiar property of their wise men, but shared by them with all

mankind. *16* Accordingly, such duties appeal to all men who have a

natural disposition to virtue. And when the two Decii or the two Scipios

are mentioned as "brave men" or Fabricius [or Aristides] is called "the

just," it is not at all that the former are quoted as perfect models of

courage or the latter as a perfect model of justice, as if we had in one

of them the ideal "wise man." For no one of them was wise in the sense

in which we wish to have "wise" understood; neither were Marcus Cato and

Gaius Laelius wise, though they were so considered and were surnamed

"the wise." Not even the famous Seven were "wise." But because of their

constant observance of "mean" duties they bore a certain semblance and

likeness to wise men.

*17* For these reasons it is unlawful either to weigh true morality

against conflicting expediency, or common morality, which is cultivated

by those who wish to be considered good men, against what is profitable;

but we every-day people must observe and live up to that moral right

which comes within the range of our comprehension as jealously as the

truly wise men have to observe and live up to that which is morally

right in the technical and true sense of the word. For otherwise we

cannot maintain such progress as we have made in the direction of

virtue.

So much for those who have won a reputation for being good men by their

careful observance of duty.

#Moral rectitude and apparent expediency.#

*18* Those, on the other hand, who measure everything by a standard of

profits and personal advantage and refuse to have these outweighed by

considerations of moral rectitude are accustomed, in considering any

question, to weigh the morally right against what they think the

expedient; good men are not. And so I believe that when Panaetius stated

that people were accustomed to hesitate to do such weighing, he meant

precisely what he said--merely that "such was their custom," not that

such was their duty. And he gave it no approval; for it is most immoral

to think more highly of the apparently expedient than of the morally

right, or even to set these over against each other and to hesitate to

choose between them.

#Occasion for doubt.#

What, then, is it that may sometimes give room for a doubt and seem to

call for consideration? It is, I believe, when a question arises as to

the character of an action under consideration. *19* For it often

happens, owing to exceptional circumstances, that what is accustomed

under ordinary circumstances to be considered morally wrong is found not

to be morally wrong. For the sake of illustration, let us assume some

particular case that admits of wider application: what more atrocious

crime can there be than to kill a fellow-man, and especially an intimate

friend? But if anyone kills a tyrant--be he never so intimate a

friend--he has not laden his soul with guilt, has he? The Roman People,

at all events, are not of that opinion; for of all glorious deeds they

hold such an one to be the most noble. Has expediency, then, prevailed

over moral rectitude? Not at all; moral rectitude has gone hand in hand

with expediency.

#Need of a rule for guidance.#

Some general rule, therefore, should be laid down to enable us to decide

without error, whenever what we call the expedient seems to clash with

what we feel to be morally right; and if we follow that rule in

comparing courses of conduct, we shall never swerve from the path of

duty. *20* That rule, moreover, shall be in perfect harmony with the

Stoics' system and doctrines. It is their teachings that I am following

in these books, and for this reason: the older Academicians and your

Peripatetics (who were once the same as the Academicians) give what is

morally right the preference over what seems expedient; and yet the

discussion of these problems, if conducted by those who consider

whatever is morally right also expedient and nothing expedient that is

not at the same time morally right, will be more illuminating than if

conducted by those who think that something not expedient may be morally

right and that something not morally right may be expedient. But our New

Academy allows us wide liberty, so that it is within my right to defend

any theory that presents itself to me as most probable. But to return to

my rule.

*21* V. Detrahere igitur alteri aliquid et hominem hominis incommodo

suum commodum augere magis est contra naturam quam mors, quam paupertas,

quam dolor, quam cetera, quae possunt aut corpori accidere aut rebus

externis. Nam principio tollit convictum humanum et societatem. Si enim

sic erimus affecti, ut propter suum quisque emolumentum spoliet aut

violet alterum, disrumpi necesse est, eam quae maxime est secundum

naturam, humani generis societatem. *22* Ut, si unum quodque membrum

sensum hunc haberet, ut posse putaret se valere, si proximi membri

valetudinem ad se traduxisset, debilitari et interire totum corpus

necesse esset, sic, si unus quisque nostrum ad se rapiat commoda aliorum

detrahatque, quod cuique possit, emolumenti sui gratia, societas hominum

et communitas evertatur necesse est. Nam sibi ut quisque malit, quod ad

usum vitae pertineat, quam alteri acquirere, concessum est non

repugnante natura, illud natura non patitur, ut aliorum spoliis nostras

facultates, copias, opes augeamus.

*23* Neque vero hoc solum natura, id est iure gentium, sed etiam legibus

populorum, quibus in singulis civitatibus res publica continetur, eodem

modo constitutum est, ut non liceat sui commodi causa nocere alteri; hoc

enim spectant leges, hoc volunt, incolumem esse civium coniunctionem;

quam qui dirimunt, eos morte, exsilio, vinclis, damno coërcent.

Atque hoc multo magis efficit ipsa naturae ratio, quae est lex divina et

humana; cui parere qui velit (omnes autem parebunt, qui secundum naturam

volent vivere), numquam committet, ut alienum appetat et id, quod alteri

detraxerit, sibi adsumat. *24* Etenim multo magis est secundum naturam

excelsitas animi et magnitudo itemque comitas, iustitia, liberalitas

quam voluptas, quam vita, quam divitiae; quae quidem contemnere et pro

nihilo ducere comparantem cum utilitate communi magni animi et excelsi

est. [Detrahere autem de altero sui commodi causa magis est contra

naturam quam mors, quam dolor, quam cetera generis eiusdem.][286]

*25* Itemque magis est secundum naturam pro omnibus gentibus, si fieri

possit, conservandis aut iuvandis maximos labores molestiasque suscipere

imitantem Herculem illum, quem hominum fama beneficiorum memor in

concilio caelestium collocavit, quam vivere in solitudine non modo sine

ullis molestiis, sed etiam in maximis voluptatibus abundantem omnibus

copiis, ut excellas etiam pulchritudine et viribus.

Quocirca optimo quisque et splendidissimo ingenio longe illam vitam huic

anteponit. Ex quo efficitur hominem naturae oboedientem homini nocere

non posse.

*26* Deinde, qui alterum violat, ut ipse aliquid commodi consequatur,

aut nihil existimat se facere contra naturam aut magis fugiendam[287]

censet mortem, paupertatem, dolorem, amissionem etiam liberorum,

propinquorum, amicorum quam facere cuiquam iniuriam. Si nihil existimat

contra naturam fieri hominibus violandis, quid cum eo disseras, qui

omnino hominem ex homine tollat? sin fugiendum id quidem censet,

sed[288] multo illa peiora, mortem, paupertatem, dolorem, errat in eo,

quod ullum aut corporis aut fortunae vitium vitiis animi gravius

existimat.

[286] _Detrahere ... generis eiusdem_ MSS.; bracketed by

Baiter, Edd.

[287] _fugiendam_ b, Ed.; _fugienda_ B H a c.

[288] _sed_ c, Edd.; _et_ B H a b.

#Wrongful gains are against the laws:#

#(1) of nature,#

*21* V. Well then, for a man to take something from his neighbour and to

profit by his neighbour's loss is more contrary to nature than is death

or poverty or pain or anything else that can affect either our person or

our property. For, in the first place, injustice is fatal to social life

and fellowship between man and man. For if we are so disposed that each,

to gain some personal profit, will defraud or injure his neighbour, then

those bonds of human society, which are most in accord with nature's

laws, must of necessity be broken. *22* Suppose, by way of comparison,

that each one of our bodily members should conceive this idea and

imagine that it could be strong and well if it should draw off to itself

the health and strength of its neighbouring member, the whole body would

necessarily be enfeebled and die; so, if each one of us should seize

upon the property of his neighbours and take from each whatever he could

appropriate to his own use, the bonds of human society must inevitably

be annihilated. For, without any conflict with nature's laws, it is

granted that everybody may prefer to secure for himself rather than for

his neighbour what is essential for the conduct of life; but nature's

laws do forbid us to increase our means, wealth, and resources by

despoiling others.

#(2) of nations,#

*23* But this principle is established not by nature's laws alone (that

is, by the common rules of equity), but also by the statutes of

particular communities, in accordance with which in individual states

the public interests are maintained. In all these it is with one accord

ordained that no man shall be allowed for the sake of his own advantage

to injure his neighbour. For it is to this that the laws have regard;

this is their intent, that the bonds of union between citizens should

not be impaired; and any attempt to destroy these bonds is repressed by

the penalty of death, exile, imprisonment, or fine.

#(3) of gods and men.#

Again, this principle follows much more effectually directly from the

Reason which is in Nature, which is the law of gods and men. If anyone

will hearken to that voice (and all will hearken to it who wish to live

in accord with nature's laws), he will never be guilty of coveting

anything that is his neighbour's or of appropriating to himself what he

has taken from his neighbour. *24* Then, too, loftiness and greatness of

spirit, and courtesy, justice, and generosity are much more in harmony

with nature than are selfish pleasure, riches, and life itself; but it

requires a great and lofty spirit to despise these latter and count them

as naught, when one weighs them over against the common weal.

#Self-seeking _vs._ self-sacrifice.# [But for anyone to rob his

neighbour for his own profit is more contrary to nature than death,

pain, and the like.]

*25* In like manner it is more in accord with nature to emulate the

great Hercules and undergo the greatest toil and trouble for the sake of

aiding or saving the world, if possible, than to live in seclusion, not

only free from all care, but revelling in pleasures and abounding in

wealth, while excelling others also in beauty and strength. Thus

Hercules denied himself and underwent toil and tribulation for the

world, and, out of gratitude for his services, popular belief has given

him a place in the council of the gods.

The better and more noble, therefore, the character with which a man is

endowed, the more does he prefer the life of service to the life of

pleasure. Whence it follows that man, if he is obedient to nature,

cannot do harm to his fellow-man.

*26* Finally, if a man wrongs his neighbour to gain some advantage for

himself, he must either imagine that he is not acting in defiance of

nature or he must believe that death, poverty, pain, or even the loss of

children, kinsmen, or friends, is more to be shunned than an act of

injustice against another. If he thinks he is not violating the laws of

nature, when he wrongs his fellow-men, how is one to argue with the

individual who takes away from man all that makes him man? But if he

believes that while such a course should be avoided, the other

alternatives are much worse--namely, death, poverty, pain--he is

mistaken in thinking that any ills affecting either his person or his

property are more serious than those affecting his soul.

VI. Ergo unum debet esse omnibus propositum, ut eadem sit utilitas unius

cuiusque et universorum; quam si ad se quisque rapiet, dissolvetur omnis

humana consortio.

*27* Atque etiam, si hoc natura praescribit, ut homo homini, quicumque

sit, ob eam ipsam causam, quod is homo sit, consultum velit, necesse est

secundum eandem naturam omnium utilitatem esse communem. Quod si ita

est, una continemur omnes et eadem lege naturae, idque ipsum si ita est,

certe violare alterum naturae lege prohibemur. Verum autem primum; verum

igitur extremum. *28* Nam illud quidem absurdum est, quod quidam dicunt,

parenti se aut fratri nihil detracturos sui commodi causa, aliam

rationem esse civium reliquorum. Hi sibi nihil iuris, nullam societatem

communis utilitatis causa statuunt esse cum civibus, quae sententia

omnem societatem distrahit civitatis.

Qui autem civium rationem dicunt habendam, externorum negant, ii[289]

dirimunt communem humani generis societatem: qua sublata beneficentia,

liberalitas, bonitas, iustitia funditus tollitur; quae qui tollunt,

etiam adversus deos immortales impii iudicandi sunt. Ab iis enim

constitutam inter homines societatem evertunt, cuius societatis

artissimum vinculum est magis arbitrari esse contra naturam hominem

homini detrahere sui commodi causa quam omnia incommoda subire vel

externa vel corporis ... vel etiam ipsius animi, quae vacent

iustitia[290]; haec enim una virtus omnium est domina et regina

virtutum.

*29* Forsitan quispiam dixerit: Nonne igitur sapiens, si fame ipse

conficiatur, abstulerit cibum alteri homini ad nullam rem utili? [Minime

vero; non enim mihi est vita mea utilior quam animi talis affectio,

neminem ut violem commodi mei gratia.][291] Quid? si Phalarim, crudelem

tyrannum et immanem, vir bonus, ne ipse frigore conficiatur, vestitu

spoliare possit, nonne faciat?

*30* Haec ad iudicandum sunt facillima. Nam, si quid ab homine ad nullam

partem utili utilitatis tuae causa detraxeris, inhumane feceris

contraque naturae legem; sin autem is tu sis, qui multam utilitatem rei

publicae atque hominum societati, si in vita remaneas, afferre possis,

si quid ob eam causam alteri detraxeris, non sit reprehendendum. Sin

autem id non sit eius modi, suum cuique incommodum ferendum est potius

quam de alterius commodis detrahendum. Non igitur magis est contra

naturam morbus aut egestas aut quid eius modi quam detractio atque

appetitio alieni, sed communis utilitatis derelictio contra naturam est;

est enim iniusta. *31* Itaque lex ipsa naturae, quae utilitatem hominum

conservat et continet, decernet profecto, ut ab homine inerti atque

inutili ad sapientem, bonum, fortem virum transferantur res ad vivendum

necessariae, qui si occiderit, multum de communi utilitate detraxerit,

modo hoc ita faciat, ut ne ipse de se bene existimans seseque diligens

hanc causam habeat ad iniuriam. Ita semper officio fungetur utilitati

consulens hominum et ei, quam saepe commemoro, humanae societati.

*32* Nam quod ad Phalarim attinet, perfacile iudicium est. Nulla est

enim societas nobis cum tyrannis, et potius summa distractio est, neque

est contra naturam spoliare eum, si possis, quem est honestum necare,

atque hoc omne genus pestiferum atque impium ex hominum communitate

exterminandum est. Etenim, ut membra quaedam amputantur, si et ipsa

sanguine et tamquam spiritu carere coeperunt et nocent reliquis partibus

corporis, sic ista in figura hominis feritas et immanitas beluae a

communi tamquam humanitatis corpore[292] segreganda est.

Huius generis quaestiones sunt omnes eae, in quibus ex tempore officium

exquiritur.

[289] _ii_ Bt., Ed.; _hi_ B a b; _hii_ H; _hij_ c.

[290] _quae vacent iustitia_ MSS., Ed., Heine; _quae vacent

iniustitia_ cod. Ubaldini, Bt.^1; _quae non v. iustitia_ O.

[291] Bracketed by Unger, Edd.

[292] _humanitatis corpore_ Muret, cod. Guelf., Ed., Bt.,

Heine; _humanitate corporis_ MSS., Müller; Unger strikes out

_corporis_.

#The interest of society is the interest of the individual.#

VI. This, then, ought to be the chief end of all men, to make the

interest of each individual and of the whole body politic identical. For

if the individual appropriates to selfish ends what should be devoted to

the common good, all human fellowship will be destroyed.

*27* And further, if nature ordains that one man shall desire to

promote the interests of a fellow-man, whoever he may be, just because

he is a fellow-man, then it follows, in accordance with that same

nature, that there are interests that all men have in common. And if

this is true, we are all subject to one and the same law of nature; and

if this also is true, we are certainly forbidden by nature's law to

wrong our neighbour. Now the first assumption is true; therefore the

conclusion is likewise true. *28* For that is an absurd position which

is taken by some people, who say that they will not rob a parent or a

brother for their own gain, but that their relation to the rest of their

fellow-citizens is quite another thing. Such people contend in essence

that they are bound to their fellow-citizens by no mutual obligations,

social ties, or common interests. This attitude demolishes the whole

structure of civil society.

#Better endure any loss than wrong a fellow man for gain.#

Others again who say that regard should be had for the rights of

fellow-citizens, but not of foreigners, would destroy the universal

brotherhood of mankind; and when this is annihilated, kindness,

generosity, goodness, and justice must utterly perish; and those who

work all this destruction must be considered as wickedly rebelling

against the immortal gods. For they uproot the fellowship which the gods

have established between human beings, and the closest bond of this

fellowship is the conviction that it is more repugnant to nature for man

to rob a fellow-man for his own gain than to endure all possible loss,

whether to his property or to his person ... or even to his very

soul--so far as these losses are not concerned with justice[BD]; for

this virtue is the sovereign mistress and queen of all the virtues.

*29* But, perhaps, some one may say: "Well, then, suppose a wise man

were starving to death, might he not take the bread of some perfectly

useless member of society?" [Not at all; for my life is not more

precious to me than that temper of soul which would keep me from doing

wrong to anybody for my own advantage.] "Or again; supposing a righteous

man were in a position to rob the cruel and inhuman tyrant Phalaris of

clothing, might he not do it to keep himself from freezing to death?"

*30* These cases are very easy to decide. For if merely for one's own

benefit one were to take something away from a man, though he were a

perfectly worthless fellow, it would be an act of meanness and contrary

to nature's law. #The interests of society must decide about

exceptions.# But suppose one would be able, by remaining alive, to

render signal service to the state and to human society--if from that

motive one should take something from another, it would not be a matter

for censure. But if such is not the case, each one must bear his own

burden of distress rather than rob a neighbour of his rights. We are not

to say, therefore, that sickness or want or any evil of that sort is

more repugnant to nature than to covet and to appropriate what is one's

neighbour's; but we do maintain that disregard of the common interests

is repugnant to nature; for it is unjust. *31* And therefore nature's

law itself, which protects and conserves human interests, will surely

determine that a man who is wise, good, and brave, should in emergency

have the necessaries of life transferred to him from a person who is

idle and worthless; for the good man's death would be a heavy loss to

the common weal; only let him beware that self-esteem and self-love do

not find in such a transfer of possessions a pretext for wrong-doing.

But thus guided in his decision, the good man will always perform his

duty, promoting the general interests of human society on which I am so

fond of dwelling.

#No duty due to a tyrant.#

*32* As for the case of Phalaris, a decision is quite simple: we have no

ties of fellowship with a tyrant, but rather the bitterest feud; and it

is not opposed to nature to rob, if one can, a man whom it is morally

right to kill;--nay, all that pestilent and abominable race should be

exterminated from human society. And this may be done by proper

measures; for as certain members are amputated, if they show signs

themselves of being bloodless and virtually lifeless and thus jeopardize

the health of the other parts of the body, so those fierce and savage

monsters in human form should be cut off from what may be called the

common body of humanity.

Of this sort are all those problems in which we have to determine what

moral duty is, as it varies with varying circumstances.

[BD] I.e., there are no circumstances of loss or gain that

can warrant a violation of justice.

*33* VII. Eius modi igitur credo res Panaetium persecuturum fuisse, nisi

aliqui casus aut occupatio eius consilium peremisset. Ad quas ipsas

consultationes superioribus libris satis multa praecepta sunt, ex

quibus[293] perspici possit, quid sit propter turpitudinem fugiendum,

quid sit, quod idcirco fugiendum non sit, quod omnino turpe non sit.

Sed quoniam operi inchoato, prope tamen absoluto tamquam fastigium

imponimus, ut geometrae solent non omnia docere, sed postulare, ut

quaedam sibi concedantur, quo facilius, quae volunt, explicent, sic ego

a te postulo, mi Cicero, ut mihi concedas, si potes, nihil praeter id,

quod honestum sit, propter se esse expetendum. Sin hoc non licet per

Cratippum, at illud certe dabis, quod honestum sit, id esse maxime

propter se expetendum. Mihi utrumvis satis est et tum hoc, tum illud

probabilius videtur nec praeterea quicquam probabile.

*34* Ac primum in hoc Panaetius defendendus est, quod non utilia cum

honestis pugnare aliquando posse dixerit (neque enim ei fas erat), sed

ea, quae viderentur utilia. Nihil vero utile, quod non idem honestum,

nihil honestum, quod non idem utile sit, saepe testatur negatque ullam

pestem maiorem in vitam hominum invasisse quam eorum opinionem, qui ista

distraxerint. Itaque, non ut aliquando anteponeremus utilia honestis,

sed ut ea sine errore diiudicaremus, si quando incidissent,[294] induxit

eam, quae videretur esse, non quae esset, repugnantiam. Hanc igitur

partem relictam explebimus nullis adminiculis, sed, ut dicitur, Marte

nostro. Neque enim quicquam est de hac parte post Panaetium explicatum,

quod quidem mihi probaretur, de iis, quae in manus meas venerunt.[295]

[293] _superioribus ... ex quibus_ Walker, Bt.^2, Ed.; _ex

superioribus ... quibus_ MSS., Bt.^1; _superioribus ...

quibus_, Heine.

[294] _ea ... incidissent_ MSS., Bt.^1, Heine, Ed.; _eam_

[repugnantiam] ... _incidisset_ Unger, Bt.^2

[295] _venerunt_ Manutius, Edd.; _venerint_ MSS.

*33* VII. It is subjects of this sort that I believe Panaetius would

have followed up, had not some accident or business interfered with his

design. For the elucidation of these very questions there are in his

former books rules in plenty, from which one can learn what should be

avoided because of its immorality and what does not have to be avoided

for the reason that it is not immoral at all.

We are now putting the capstone, as it were, upon our structure, which

is unfinished to be sure, but still almost completed; and as

mathematicians make a practice of not demonstrating every proposition

but require that certain axioms be assumed as true, in order more easily

to explain their meaning, so, my dear Cicero, I ask you to assume with

me, if you can, that nothing is worth the seeking for its own sake

except what is morally right. #Moral Right the only good or the chief

good.# But if Cratippus[BE] does not permit this assumption, you will

still grant this at least--that what is morally right is the object most

worth the seeking for its own sake. Either alternative is sufficient for

my purposes; first the one and then the other seems to me the more

probable; and besides these, there is no other alternative that seems

probable at all.[BF]

#Vindication of Panaetius: nothing can be expedient that is not morally

right.#

*34* In the first place, I must undertake the defence of Panaetius on

this point; for he has said not that the truly expedient could under

certain circumstances clash with the morally right (for he could not

have said that conscientiously[BG]), but only that what _seemed_

expedient could do so. For he often bears witness to the fact that

nothing is really expedient that is not at the same time morally right,

and nothing morally right that is not at the same time expedient; and he

says that no greater curse has ever assailed human life than the

doctrine of those who have separated these two conceptions. And so he

introduced an apparent, not a real, conflict between them, not to the

end that we should under certain circumstances give the expedient

preference over the moral, but that, in case they ever should get in

each other's way, we might decide between them without uncertainty. This

part, therefore, which was passed over by Panaetius, I will carry to

completion without any auxiliaries, but fighting my own battle, as the

saying is. For of all that has been worked out on this line since the

time of Panaetius, nothing that has come into my hands is at all

satisfactory to me.

[BE] As a Peripatetic, Cratippus insisted that there was

_natural_ good as well as _moral_ good; thus health, honour,

etc., were good and worth seeking for their own sake, though

in less degree than virtue. But the Stoics (and Cicero is now

speaking as a Stoic) called all those other blessings not

"good" nor "worth seeking for their own sake," but

"indifferent."

[BF] With this he waves aside, without even the honour of

mentioning them, the Epicureans, Cyrenaics, etc.

[BG] Because he was a Stoic.

*35* VIII. Cum igitur aliqua species utilitatis obiecta est, commoveri

necesse est; sed si, cum animum attenderis, turpitudinem videas

adiunctam ei rei, quae speciem utilitatis attulerit, tum non utilitas

relinquenda est, sed intellegendum, ubi turpitudo sit, ibi utilitatem

esse non posse. Quodsi nihil est tam contra naturam quam turpitudo

(recta enim et convenientia et constantia natura desiderat aspernaturque

contraria) nihilque tam secundum naturam quam utilitas, certe in eadem

re utilitas et turpitudo[296] esse non potest.

Itemque, si ad honestatem nati sumus eaque aut sola expetenda est, ut

Zenoni visum est, aut certe omni pondere gravior habenda quam reliqua

omnia, quod Aristoteli placet, necesse est, quod honestum sit, id esse

aut solum aut summum bonum; quod autem bonum, id certe utile: ita,

quicquid honestum, id utile.

*36* Quare error hominum non proborum, cum aliquid, quod utile visum

est, arripuit, id continuo secernit ab honesto. Hinc sicae, hinc venena,

hinc falsa testamenta nascuntur, hinc furta, peculatus, expilationes

direptionesque sociorum et civium, hinc opum nimiarum, potentiae non

ferendae, postremo etiam in liberis civitatibus regnandi exsistunt

cupiditates, quibus nihil nec taetrius nec foedius excogitari potest.

Emolumenta enim rerum fallacibus iudiciis vident, poenam non dico legum,

quam saepe perrumpunt, sed ipsius turpitudinis, quae acerbissima est,

non vident.

*37* Quam ob rem hoc quidem deliberantium genus pellatur e medio (est

enim totum sceleratum et impium), qui deliberant, utrum id sequantur,

quod honestum esse videant, an se scientes scelere contaminent; in ipsa

enim dubitatione facinus inest, etiamsi ad id non pervenerint. Ergo ea

deliberanda omnino non sunt, in quibus est turpis ipsa deliberatio.

Atque etiam ex omni deliberatione celandi et occultandi spes opinioque

removenda est. Satis enim nobis, si modo in philosophia aliquid

profecimus, persuasum esse debet, si omnes deos hominesque celare

possimus, nihil tamen avare, nihil iniuste, nihil libidinose, nihil

incontinenter esse faciendum.

[296] _re utilitas et turp._ c, Edd.; _re utili turpitudo_ B

H a b.

#Expediency and immorality incompatible.#

*35* VIII. Now when we meet with expediency in some specious form or

other, we cannot help being influenced by it. But if upon closer

inspection one sees that there is some immorality connected with what

presents the appearance of expediency, then one is not necessarily to

sacrifice expediency but to recognize that there can be no expediency

where there is immorality. But if there is nothing so repugnant to

nature as immorality (for nature demands right and harmony and

consistency and abhors their opposites), and if nothing is so thoroughly

in accord with nature as expediency, then surely expediency and

immorality cannot coexist in one and the same object.

#The morally right is also expedient.#

Again: if we are born for moral rectitude and if that is either the only

thing worth seeking, as Zeno thought, or at least to be esteemed as

infinitely outweighing everything else, as Aristotle holds, then it

necessarily follows that the morally right is either the sole good or

the supreme good. Now, that which is good is certainly expedient;

consequently, that which is morally right is also expedient.

#The evils resulting from contrary view.#

*36* Thus it is the error of men who are not strictly upright to seize

upon something that seems to be expedient and straightway to dissociate

that from the question of moral right. To this error the assassin's

dagger, the poisoned cup, the forged wills owe their origin; this gives

rise to theft, embezzlement of public funds, exploitation and plundering

of provincials and citizens; this engenders also the lust for excessive

wealth, for despotic power, and finally for making oneself king even in

the midst of a free people; and anything more atrocious or repulsive

than such a passion cannot be conceived. For with a false perspective

they see the material rewards but not the punishment--I do not mean the

penalty of the law, which they often escape, but the heaviest penalty of

all, their own demoralization.

*37* Away, then, with questioners of this sort (for their whole tribe is

wicked and ungodly), who stop to consider whether to pursue the course

which they see is morally right or to stain their hands with what they

know is crime. For there is guilt in their very deliberation, even

though they never reach the performance of the deed itself. Those

actions, therefore, should not be considered at all, the mere

consideration of which is itself morally wrong.

#Moral rectitude and secret sin.#

Furthermore, in any such consideration we must banish any vain hope and

thought that our action may be covered up and kept secret. For if we

have only made some real progress in the study of philosophy, we ought

to be quite convinced that, even though we may escape the eyes of gods

and men, we must still do nothing that savours of greed or of injustice,

of lust or of intemperance.

#Rep. II, 359 C#

*38* IX. Hinc ille Gyges inducitur a Platone, qui, cum terra

discessisset magnis quibusdam imbribus, descendit in illum hiatum

aëneumque equum, ut ferunt fabulae, animadvertit, cuius in lateribus

fores essent; quibus apertis corpus hominis mortui vidit magnitudine

invisitata[297] anulumque aureum in digito; quem ut detraxit, ipse

induit (erat autem regius pastor), tum in concilium se pastorum recepit.

Ibi cum palam eius anuli ad palmam converterat, a nullo videbatur, ipse

autem omnia videbat; idem rursus videbatur, cum in locum anulum

inverterat. Itaque hac opportunitate anuli usus reginae stuprum intulit

eaque adiutrice regem dominum interemit, sustulit, quos obstare

arbitrabatur, nec in his eum facinoribus quisquam potuit videre. Sic

repente anuli beneficio rex exortus est Lydiae.

Hunc igitur ipsum anulum si habeat sapiens, nihilo[298] plus sibi licere

putet peccare, quam si non haberet[299]; honesta enim bonis viris, non

occulta quaeruntur.

*39* Atque hoc loco philosophi quidam, minime mali illi quidem, sed non

satis acuti, fictam et commenticiam fabulam prolatam dicunt a Platone;

quasi vero ille aut factum id esse aut fieri potuisse defendat! Haec est

vis huius anuli et huius exempli: si nemo sciturus, nemo ne suspicaturus

quidem sit, cum aliquid divitiarum, potentiae, dominationis, libidinis

causa feceris, si id dis hominibusque futurum sit semper ignotum, sisne

facturus. Negant id fieri posse. Nequaquam[300] potest id quidem; sed

quaero, quod negant posse, id si posset, quidnam facerent. Urguent

rustice sane; negant enim posse et in eo perstant; hoc verbum quid

valeat, non vident. Cum enim quaerimus, si celare possint, quid facturi

sint, non quaerimus, possintne celare, sed tamquam tormenta quaedam

adhibemus, ut, si responderint se impunitate proposita facturos, quod

expediat, facinorosos se esse fateantur, si negent, omnia turpia per se

ipsa fugienda esse concedant.

Sed iam ad propositum revertamur.

[297] _invisitata_ B H^1, Edd.; _inusitata_ H^2 a b c.

[298] _ni(c)hilo_ c, Edd.; _nihil_ B H a b.

[299] _peccare ... haberet_ MSS.; bracketed by Madv., Bt.

[300] _nequaquam_ Manutius, Bt., Ed., Heine; _quamquam_ (and

yet it is possible) MSS., Müller.

#The story of Gyges and his ring.#

*38* IX. By way of illustrating this truth Plato introduces the familiar

story of Gyges: Once upon a time the earth opened in consequence of

heavy rains; Gyges went down into the chasm and saw, so the story goes,

a horse of bronze; in its side was a door. On opening this door he saw

the body of a dead man of enormous size with a gold ring upon his

finger. He removed this and put it on his own hand and then repaired to

an assembly of the shepherds, for he was a shepherd of the king. As

often as he turned the bezel of the ring inwards toward the palm of his

hand, he became invisible to every one, while he himself saw everything;

but as often as he turned it back to its proper position, he became

visible again. And so, with the advantage which the ring gave him, he

debauched the queen, and with her assistance he murdered his royal

master and removed all those who he thought stood in his way, without

anyone's being able to detect him in his crimes. Thus, by virtue of the

ring, he shortly rose to be king of Lydia.

Now, suppose a wise man had just such a ring, he would not imagine that

he was free to do wrong any more than if he did not have it; for good

men aim to secure not secrecy but the right.

*39* And yet on this point certain philosophers, who are not at all

vicious but who are not very discerning, declare that the story related

by Plato is fictitious and imaginary. As if he affirmed that it was

actually true or even possible! #The moral of the story.# But the force

of the illustration of the ring is this: if nobody were to know or even

to suspect the truth, when you do anything to gain riches or power or

sovereignty or sensual gratification--if your act should be hidden for

ever from the knowledge of gods and men, would you do it? The condition,

they say, is impossible. Of course it is. But my question is, if that

were possible which they declare to be impossible, what, pray, would one

do? They press their point with right boorish obstinacy: they assert

that it is impossible and insist upon it; they refuse to see the meaning

of my words, "if possible." For when we ask what they would do, if they

could escape detection, we are not asking whether they can escape

detection; but we put them as it were upon the rack: should they answer

that, if impunity were assured, they would do what was most to their

selfish interest, that would be a confession that they are criminally

minded; should they say that they would not do so, they would be

granting that all things in and of themselves immoral should be avoided.

But let us now return to our theme.

*40* X. Incidunt multae saepe causae, quae conturbent animos utilitatis

specie, non cum hoc deliberetur, relinquendane sit honestas propter

utilitatis magnitudinem (nam id quidem improbum est), sed illud,

possitne id, quod utile videatur, fieri non turpiter. Cum Collatino

collegae Brutus imperium abrogabat, poterat videri facere id iniuste;

fuerat enim in regibus expellendis socius Bruti consiliorum et adiutor.

Cum autem consilium hoc principes cepissent, cognationem Superbi

nomenque Tarquiniorum et memoriam regni esse tollendam, quod erat utile,

patriae consulere, id erat ita honestum, ut etiam ipsi Collatino placere

deberet. Itaque utilitas valuit propter honestatem, sine qua ne utilitas

quidem esse potuisset.

At in eo rege, qui urbem condidit, non item; *41* species enim

utilitatis animum pepulit eius; cui cum visum esset utilius solum quam

cum altero regnare, fratrem interemit. Omisit his et pietatem et

humanitatem, ut id, quod utile videbatur neque erat, assequi posset, et

tamen muri causam[301] opposuit, speciem honestatis nec probabilem nec

sane idoneam. Peccavit igitur, pace vel Quirini vel Romuli dixerim.

*42* Nec tamen nostrae nobis utilitates omittendae sunt aliisque

tradendae, cum iis[302] ipsi egeamus, sed suae cuique utilitati, quod

sine alterius iniuria fiat, serviendum est. Scite Chrysippus, ut multa:

"Qui stadium," inquit, "currit, eniti et contendere debet, quam maxime

possit, ut vincat, supplantare eum, quicum[303] certet, aut manu

depellere nullo modo debet; sic in vita sibi quemque petere, quod

pertineat ad usum, non iniquum est, alteri deripere ius non est."

*43* Maxime autem perturbantur officia in amicitiis, quibus et non

tribuere, quod recte possis, et tribuere, quod non sit aequum, contra

officium est. Sed huius generis totius breve et non difficile praeceptum

est. Quae enim videntur utilia, honores, divitiae, voluptates, cetera

generis eiusdem, haec amicitiae numquam anteponenda sunt. At neque

contra rem publicam neque contra ius iurandum ac fidem amici causa vir

bonus faciet, ne si index quidem erit de ipso amico; ponit enim personam

amici, cum induit iudicis. Tantum dabit amicitiae, ut veram amici causam

esse malit, ut orandae litis tempus, quoad per leges liceat, accommodet.

*44* Cum vero iurato sententia dicenda erit,[304] meminerit deum se

adhibere[305] testem, id est, ut ego arbitror, mentem suam, qua nihil

homini dedit deus ipse divinius. Itaque praeclarum a maioribus accepimus

morem rogandi iudicis, si eum teneremus, QUAE SALVA FIDE FACERE POSSIT.

Haec rogatio ad ea pertinet, quae paulo ante dixi honeste amico a iudice

posse concedi; nam si omnia facienda sint, quae amici velint, non

amicitiae tales, sed coniurationes putandae sint. *45* Loquor autem de

communibus amicitiis; nam in sapientibus viris perfectisque nihil potest

esse tale.

Damonem et Phintiam Pythagoreos ferunt hoc animo inter se fuisse, ut,

cum eorum alteri Dionysius tyrannus diem necis destinavisset et is, qui

morti addictus esset, paucos sibi dies commendandorum suorum causa

postulavisset, vas factus sit[306] alter eius sistendi, ut, si ille non

revertisset, moriendum esset ipsi. Qui cum ad diem se recepisset,

admiratus eorum fidem tyrannus petivit, ut se ad amicitiam tertium

ascriberent.

*46* Cum igitur id, quod utile videtur in amicitia, cum eo, quod

honestum est, comparatur, iaceat utilitatis species, valeat honestas;

cum autem in amicitia, quae honesta non sunt, postulabuntur, religio et

fides anteponatur amicitiae. Sic habebitur is, quem exquirimus, dilectus

officii.

[301] _causam_ c, Edd.; _causa_ B H a b.

[302] _iis_ Bt., Ed., Heine; _his_ B H a b; _hijs_ c.

[303] _quicum_ MSS., Bt., Heine; _quocum_ Ed.

[304] _erit_ Ed., Bt.^2, Heine; _sit_ MSS.; _est_ Bt.^1

[305] _adhibere_ B H a, Bt., Ed.; _habere_ b c, Lact.,

Müller.

[306] _sit_ Manubius, Edd.; _est_ MSS., Nonius.

#Conflicts between:#

#(1) apparent Expediency and Justice,#

*40* X. Many cases oftentimes arise to perplex our minds with a specious

appearance of expediency: the question raised in these cases is not

whether moral rectitude is to be sacrificed to some considerable

advantage (for that would of course be wrong), but whether the apparent

advantage can be secured without moral wrong. When Brutus deposed his

colleague Collatinus from the consular office, his treatment of him

might have been thought unjust; for Collatinus had been his associate,

and had helped him with word and deed in driving out the royal family.

But when the leading men of the state had determined that all the

kindred of Superbus and the very name of the Tarquins and every reminder

of the monarchy should be obliterated, then the course that was

expedient--namely, to serve the country's interests--was so

pre-eminently right, that it was even Collatinus's own duty to acquiesce

in its justice. And so expediency gained the day because of its moral

lightness; for without moral rectitude there could have been no possible

expediency.

Not so in the case of the king[BH] who founded the city: *41* it was the

specious appearance of expediency that actuated him; and when he decided

that it was more expedient for him to reign alone than to share the

throne with another, he slew his brother.[BI] He threw to the winds his

brotherly affection and his human feelings, to secure what seemed to

him--but was not--expedient; and yet in defence of his deed he offered

the excuse about his wall--a specious show of moral rectitude, neither

reasonable nor adequate at all. He committed a crime, therefore, with

due respect to him let me say so, be he Quirinus or Romulus.[BJ]

#(2) individual and general interests,#

*42* And yet we are not required to sacrifice our own interests and

surrender to others what we need for ourselves, but each one should

consider his own interests, as far as he may without injury to his

neighbour's. "When a man enters the foot-race," says Chrysippus with his

usual aptness, "it is his duty to put forth all his strength and strive

with all his might to win; but he ought never with his foot to trip, or

with his hand to foul a competitor. Thus in the stadium of life, it is

not unfair for anyone to seek to obtain what is needful for his own

advantage, but he has no right to wrest it from his neighbour."

#(3) obligations to friends and duty,#

*43* It is in the case of friendships, however, that men's conceptions

of duty are most confused; for it is a breach of duty either to fail to

do for a friend what one rightly can do, or to do for him what is not

right. But for our guidance in all such cases we have a rule that is

short and easy to master: apparent advantages--political preferment,

riches, sensual pleasures, and the like--should never be preferred to

the obligations of friendship. But an upright man will never for a

friend's sake do anything in violation of his country's interests or his

oath or his sacred honour, not even if he sits as judge in a friend's

case; for he lays aside the rôle of friend when he assumes that of

judge. Only so far will he make concessions to friendship, that he will

prefer his friend's side to be the juster one and that he will set the

time for presenting his case, as far as the laws will allow, to suit

his friend's convenience. *44* But when he comes to pronounce the

verdict under oath, he should remember that he has God as his

witness--that is, as I understand it, his own conscience, than which God

himself has bestowed upon man nothing more divine. From this point of

view it is a fine custom that we have inherited from our forefathers (if

we were only true to it now) to appeal to the juror with this

formula--"to do what he can consistently with his sacred honour." This

form of appeal is in keeping with what I said a moment ago would be

morally right for a judge to concede to a friend. For supposing that we

were bound to do everything that our friends desired, such relations

would have to be accounted not friendships but conspiracies. *45* But I

am speaking here of ordinary friendships; for among men who are ideally

wise and perfect such situations cannot arise.

#Damon and Phintias.#

They say that Damon and Phintias, of the Pythagorean school, enjoyed

such ideally perfect friendship, that when the tyrant Dionysius had

appointed a day for the execution of one of them, and the one who had

been condemned to death requested a few days' respite for the purpose of

putting his loved ones in the care of friends, the other became surety

for his appearance, with the understanding that if his friend did not

return, he himself should be put to death. And when the friend returned

on the day appointed, the tyrant in admiration for their faithfulness

begged that they would enrol him as a third partner in their friendship.

#Rules of precedence.#

*46* Well then, when we are weighing what seems to be expedient in

friendship against what is morally right, let apparent expediency be

disregarded and moral rectitude prevail; and when in friendship requests

are submitted that are not morally right, let conscience and scrupulous

regard for the right take precedence of the obligations of friendship.

In this way we shall arrive at a proper choice between conflicting

duties--the subject of this part of our investigation.

[BH] Romulus.

[BI] Remus.

[BJ] I.e., whether he be god or man.

XI. Sed utilitatis specie in re publica saepissime peccatur, ut in

Corinthi disturbatione nostri; durius etiam Athenienses, qui sciverunt,

ut Aeginetis, qui classe valebant, pollices praeciderentur. Hoc visum

est utile; nimis enim imminebat propter propinquitatem Aegina Piraeo.

Sed nihil, quod crudele, utile; est enim hominum naturae, quam sequi

debemus, maxime inimica crudelitas. *47* Male etiam, qui peregrinos

urbibus uti prohibent eosque exterminant, ut Pennus apud patres nostros,

Papius nuper. Nam esse pro cive, qui civis non sit, rectum est non

licere; quam legem tulerunt sapientissimi consules Crassus et Scaevola;

usu vero urbis prohibere peregrinos sane inhumanum est.

Illa praeclara, in quibus publicae utilitatis species prae honestate

contemnitur. Plena exemplorum est nostra res publica cum saepe, tum

maxime bello Punico secundo; quae Cannensi calamitate accepta maiores

animos habuit quam umquam rebus secundis; nulla timoris significatio,

nulla mentio pacis. Tanta vis est honesti, ut speciem utilitatis

obscuret.

*48* Athenienses cum Persarum impetum nullo modo possent sustinere

statuerentque, ut urbe relicta coniugibus et liberis Troezene depositis

naves conscenderent libertatemque Graeciae classe defenderent, Cyrsilum

quendam suadentem, ut in urbe manerent Xerxemque[307] reciperent,

lapidibus obruerunt. Atqui[308] ille utilitatem sequi videbatur; sed ea

nulla erat repugnante honestate.

*49* Themistocles post victoriam eius belli, quod cum Persis fuit, dixit

in contione se habere consilium rei publicae salutare, sed id sciri non

opus esse; postulavit, ut aliquem populus daret, quicum communicaret;

datus est Aristides; huic ille, classem Lacedaemoniorum, quae subducta

esset ad Gytheum, clam incendi posse, quo facto frangi Lacedaemoniorum

opes necesse esset. Quod Aristides cum audisset, in contionem magna

exspectatione venit dixitque perutile esse consilium, quod Themistocles

afferret, sed minime honestum. Itaque Athenienses, quod honestum non

esset, id ne utile quidem putaverunt totamque eam rem, quam ne audierant

quidem, auctore Aristide repudiaverunt. Melius hi quam nos, qui piratas

immunes, socios vectigales habemus.

[307] _Xerxemque_ B H a b, Bt., Heine; _Xersenque_ c;

_Xersemque_ Nonius, Ed.

[308] _Atqui_ Victorius, Fl., Bt.^2, Ed.; _Atque_ MSS., Bt.^1

#(4) apparent political expediency and duty to humanity.#

XI. Through a specious appearance of expediency wrong is very often

committed in transactions between state and state, as by our own country

in the destruction of Corinth. A more cruel wrong was perpetrated by the

Athenians in decreeing that the Aeginetans, whose strength lay in their

navy, should have their thumbs cut off. This seemed to be expedient;

for Aegina was too grave a menace, as it was close to the Piraeus. But

no cruelty can be expedient; for cruelty is most abhorrent to human

nature, whose leadings we ought to follow. *47* They, too, do wrong who

would debar foreigners from enjoying the advantages of their city and

would exclude them from its borders, as was done by Pennus in the time

of our fathers, and in recent times by Papius. It may not be right, of

course, for one who is not a citizen to exercise the rights and

privileges of citizenship; and the law on this point was secured by two

of our wisest consuls, Crassus and Scaevola. Still, to debar foreigners

from enjoying the advantages of the city is altogether contrary to the

laws of humanity.

#Moral right far outweighs apparent expediency.#

There are splendid examples in history where the apparent expediency of

the state has been set at naught out of regard for moral rectitude. Our

own country has many instances to offer throughout her history, and

especially in the Second Punic War when news came of the disaster at

Cannae, Rome displayed a loftier courage than ever she did in success;

never a trace of faint-heartedness, never a mention of making terms. The

influence of moral right is so potent, that it eclipses the specious

appearance of expediency.

*48* When the Athenians could in no way stem the tide of the Persian

invasion and determined to abandon their city, bestow their wives and

children in safety at Troezen, embark upon their ships, and fight on the

sea for the freedom of Greece, a man named Cyrsilus proposed that they

should stay at home and open the gates of their city to Xerxes. They

stoned him to death for it. And yet he was working for what he thought

was expediency; but it was not--not at all, for it clashed with moral

rectitude.

*49* After the victorious close of that war with Persia, Themistocles

announced in the Assembly that he had a plan for the welfare of the

state, but that it was not politic to let it be generally known. He

requested the people to appoint some one with whom he might discuss it.

They appointed Aristides. Themistocles confided to him that the Spartan

fleet, which had been hauled up on shore at Gytheum, could be secretly

set on fire; this done, the Spartan power would inevitably be crushed.

When Aristides heard the plan, he came into the Assembly amid the eager

expectation of all and reported that the plan proposed by Themistocles

was in the highest degree expedient, but anything but morally right. The

result was that the Athenians concluded that what was not morally right

was likewise not expedient, and at the instance of Aristides they

rejected the whole proposition without even listening to it. Their

attitude was better than ours; for we let pirates go scot free, while we

make our allies pay tribute.[BK]

[BK] The Cilician pirates had been crushed by Pompey and

settled at Soli (Pompeiopolis). They gathered strength again

during the distractions of the civil wars, and Antony is even

said to have sought their aid in the war against Brutus and

Cassius.

Marseilles and King Deiotarus of Armenia had supported Pompey

and in consequence were made tributary by Caesar's party.

XII. Maneat ergo, quod turpe sit, id numquam esse utile, ne tum quidem,

cum id, quod esse utile putes, adipiscare; hoc enim ipsum, utile putare,

quod turpe sit, calamitosum est. *50* #§ 40# Sed incidunt, ut supra

dixi, saepe causae, cum repugnare utilitas honestati videatur, ut

animadvertendum sit, repugnetne plane an possit cum honestate coniungi.

Eius generis hae sunt quaestiones: si exempli gratia vir bonus

Alexandrea Rhodum magnum frumenti numerum advexerit in Rhodiorum inopia

et fame summaque annonae caritate, si idem sciat complures mercatores

Alexandrea solvisse navesque in cursu frumento onustas petentes Rhodum

viderit, dicturusne sit id Rhodiis an silentio suum quam plurimo

venditurus. Sapientem et bonum virum fingimus; de eius deliberatione et

consultatione quaerimus, qui celaturus Rhodios non sit, si id turpe

iudicet, sed dubitet, an turpe non sit.

*51* In huius modi causis aliud Diogeni Babylonio videri solet, magno et

gravi Stoico, aliud Antipatro, discipulo eius, homini acutissimo.

Antipatro omnia patefacienda, ut ne quid omnino, quod venditor norit,

emptor ignoret, Diogeni venditorem, quatenus iure civili constitutum

sit, dicere vitia oportere, cetera sine insidiis agere et, quoniam

vendat, velle quam optime vendere.

"Advexi, exposui, vendo meum non pluris quam ceteri, fortasse etiam

minoris, cum maior est copia. Cui fit iniuria?"

*52* Exoritur Antipatri ratio ex altera parte: "Quid ais? tu cum

hominibus consulere debeas et servire humanae societati eaque lege natus

sis et ea habeas principia naturae, quibus parere et quae sequi debeas,

ut utilitas tua communis sit utilitas vicissimque communis utilitas tua

sit, celabis homines, quid iis adsit commoditatis et copiae?"

Respondebit Diogenes fortasse sic: "Aliud est celare, aliud tacere;

neque ego nunc te celo, si tibi non dico, quae natura deorum sit, qui

sit finis bonorum, quae tibi plus prodessent cognita quam tritici

vilitas[309]; sed non, quicquid tibi audire utile est, idem[310] mihi

dicere necesse est."

*53* "Immo vero," inquiet ille, "necesse est,[311] siquidem meministi

esse inter homines natura coniunctam societatem."

"Memini," inquiet ille; "sed num ista societas talis est, ut nihil suum

cuiusque sit? Quod si ita est, ne vendendum quidem quicquam est, sed

donandum."

[309] _vilitas_ a, Edd.; _utilitas_, B H b c.

[310] _idem_ B H a b; _id_ c, Bt.

[311] _immo ... est_ c, Ed., Heine; _immo vero necesse est_

p; _immo vero_ [_inquiet ille_] _necesse est_ Bt.

XII. Let it be set down as an established principle, then, that what is

morally wrong can never be expedient--not even when one secures by means

of it that which one thinks expedient; for the mere act of thinking a

course expedient, when it is morally wrong, is demoralizing. *50*

#Expediency _vs._ moral rectitude in business relations.# But, as I said

above, cases often arise in which expediency may seem to clash with

moral rectitude; and so we should examine carefully and see whether

their conflict is inevitable or whether they may be reconciled. The

following are problems of this sort: suppose, for example, a time of

dearth and famine at Rhodes, with provisions at fabulous prices; and

suppose that an honest man has imported a large cargo of grain from

Alexandria and that to his certain knowledge also several other

importers have set sail from Alexandria, and that on the voyage he has

sighted their vessels laden with grain and bound for Rhodes; is he to

report the fact to the Rhodians or is he to keep his own counsel and

sell his own stock at the highest market price? I am assuming the case

of a virtuous, upright man, and I am raising the question how a man

would think and reason who would not conceal the facts from the Rhodians

if he thought that it was immoral to do so, but who might be in doubt

whether such silence would really be immoral.

#Diogenes _vs._ Antipater.#

*51* In deciding cases of this kind Diogenes of Babylonia, a great and

highly esteemed Stoic, consistently holds one view; his pupil Antipater,

a most profound scholar, holds another. According to Antipater all the

facts should be disclosed, that the buyer may not be uninformed of any

detail that the seller knows; according to Diogenes the seller should

declare any defects in his wares, in so far as such a course is

prescribed by the common law of the land; but for the rest, since he has

goods to sell, he may try to sell them to the best possible advantage,

provided he is guilty of no misrepresentation.

"I have imported my stock," Diogenes's merchant will say; "I have

offered it for sale; I sell at a price no higher than my

competitors--perhaps even lower, when the market is overstocked. Who is

wronged?"

*52* "What say you?" comes Antipater's argument on the other side; "it

is your duty to consider the interests of your fellow-men and to serve

society; you were brought into the world under these conditions and have

these inborn principles which you are in duty bound to obey and follow,

that your interest shall be the interest of the community and conversely

that the interest of the community shall be your interest as well; #Is

concealment of truth immoral?# will you, in view of all these facts,

conceal from your fellow-men what relief in plenteous supplies is close

at hand for them?"

"It is one thing to conceal," Diogenes will perhaps reply; "not to

reveal is quite a different thing. At this present moment I am not

concealing from you, even if I am not revealing to you, the nature of

the gods or the highest good; and to know these secrets would be of more

advantage to you than to know that the price of wheat was down. But I am

under no obligation to tell you everything that it may be to your

interest to be told."

*53* "Yea," Antipater will say, "but you are, as you must admit, if you

will only bethink you of the bonds of fellowship forged by nature and

existing between man and man."

"I do not forget them," the other will reply; "but do you mean to say

that those bonds of fellowship are such that there is no such thing as

private property? If that is the case, we should not sell anything at

all, but freely give everything away."

XIII. Vides in hac tota disceptatione non illud dici: "Quamvis hoc turpe

sit, tamen, quoniam expedit, faciam," sed ita expedire, ut turpe non

sit, ex altera autem parte, ea re, quia turpe sit, non esse faciendum.

*54* Vendat aedes vir bonus propter aliqua vitia, quae ipse norit,

ceteri ignorent, pestilentes sint et habeantur salubres, ignoretur in

omnibus cubiculis apparere serpentes, male materiatae _sint_,[312]

ruinosae, sed hoc praeter dominum nemo sciat; quaero, si haec emptoribus

venditor non dixerit aedesque vendiderit pluris multo, quam se

venditurum putarit, num id iniuste aut improbe fecerit.

*55* "Ille vero," inquit Antipater; "quid est enim aliud erranti viam

non monstrare, quod Athenis exsecrationibus publicis sanctum est, si hoc

non est, emptorem pati ruere et per errorem in maximam fraudem

incurrere? Plus etiam est quam viam non monstrare; nam est scientem in

errorem alterum inducere."

*(55)* Diogenes contra: "Num te emere coëgit, qui ne hortatus quidem

est? Ille, quod non placebat, proscripsit, tu, quod placebat, emisti.

Quodsi, qui proscribunt villam bonam beneque aedificatam, non

existimantur fefellisse, etiamsi illa nec bona est nec aedificata

ratione, multo minus, qui domum non laudarunt. Ubi enim iudicium

emptoris est, ibi fraus venditoris quae potest esse? Sin autem dictum

non omne praestandum est, quod dictum non est, id praestandum putas?

Quid vero est stultius quam venditorem eius rei, quam vendat, vitia

narrare? quid autem tam absurdum, quam si domini iussu ita praeco

praedicet: 'Domum pestilentem vendo?'"

*56* Sic ergo in quibusdam causis dubiis ex altera parte defenditur

honestas, ex altera ita de utilitate dicitur, ut id, quod utile

videatur, non modo facere honestum sit, sed etiam non facere turpe. Haec

est illa, quae videtur utilium fieri cum honestis saepe dissensio. Quae

diiudicanda sunt;[313] non enim, ut quaereremus, exposuimus, sed ut

explicaremus. *57* Non igitur videtur nec frumentarius ille Rhodios[314]

nec hic aedium venditor celare emptores debuisse. Neque enim id est

celare, quicquid reticeas, sed cum, quod tu scias, id ignorare

emolumenti tui causa velis eos, quorum intersit id scire. Hoc autem

celandi genus quale sit et cuius hominis, quis non videt? Certe non

aperti, non simplicis, non ingenui, non iusti, non viri boni, versuti

potius, obscuri, astuti, fallacis, malitiosi, callidi, veteratoris,

vafri. Haec tot et alia plura nonne inutile est vitiorum subire nomina?

[312] _sint_ Bt.^1, Ed., Heine; not in MSS., Bt^2.

[313] _sunt_ MSS., Bt.^1, Heine, Ed.; _est_ [dissensio]

Unger, Bt.^2

[314] _Rhodios_ c, Edd.; _Rhodius_ B H a b.

XIII. In this whole discussion, you see, no one says "However wrong

morally this or that may be, still, since it is expedient, I will do

it"; but the one side asserts that a given act is expedient, without

being morally wrong, while the other insists that the act should not be

done, because it is morally wrong.

#A vendor's duty.#

*54* Suppose again that an honest man is offering a house for sale on

account of certain undesirable features of which he himself is aware but

which nobody else knows; suppose it is unsanitary, but has the

reputation of being healthful; suppose it is not generally known that

vermin are to be found in all the bedrooms; suppose, finally, that it is

built of unsound timber and likely to collapse, but that no one knows

about it except the owner; if the vendor does not tell the purchaser

these facts but sells him the house for far more than he could

reasonably have expected to get for it, I ask whether his transaction is

unjust or dishonourable.

*55* "Yes," says Antipater, "it is; for to allow a purchaser to be hasty

in closing a deal and through mistaken judgment to incur a very serious

loss, if this is not refusing 'to set a man right when he has lost his

way' (a crime which at Athens is prohibited on pain of public

execration), what is? It is even worse than refusing to set a man on

his way: it is deliberately leading a man astray."

*(55)* "Can you say," answers Diogenes, "that he compelled you to

purchase, when he did not even advise it? He advertised for sale what he

did not like; you bought what you did like. If people are not considered

guilty of swindling when they place upon their placards FOR SALE: A FINE

VILLA, WELL BUILT, even when it is neither good nor properly built,

still less guilty are they who say nothing in praise of their house. For

where the purchaser may exercise his own judgment, what fraud can there

be on the part of the vendor? But if, again, not all that is expressly

stated has to be made good, do you think a man is bound to make good

what has not been said? What, pray, would be more stupid than for a

vendor to recount all the faults in the article he is offering for sale?

And what would be so absurd as for an auctioneer to cry, at the owner's

bidding, 'Here is an unsanitary house for sale?'"

*56* In this way, then, in certain doubtful cases moral rectitude is

defended on the one side, while on the other side the case of expediency

is so presented as to make it appear not only morally right to do what

seems expedient, but even morally wrong not to do it. This is the

contradiction that seems often to arise between the expedient and the

morally right. #Cicero's decision in the cases.# But I must give my

decision in these two cases; for I did not propound them merely to raise

the questions, but to offer a solution. *57* I think, then, that it was

the duty of that grain dealer not to keep back the facts from the

Rhodians, and of this vendor of the house to deal in the same way with

his purchaser. The fact is that merely holding one's peace about a

thing does not constitute concealment, but concealment consists in

trying for your own profit to keep others from finding out something

that you know, when it is for their interest to know it. And who fails

to discern what manner of concealment that is and what sort of person

would be guilty of it? At all events he would be no candid or sincere or

straightforward or upright or honest man, but rather one who is shifty,

sly, artful, shrewd, underhand, cunning, one grown old in fraud and

subtlety. Is it not inexpedient to subject oneself to all these terms of

reproach and many more besides?

*58* XIV. Quodsi vituperandi, qui reticuerunt, quid de iis existimandum

est, qui orationis vanitatem adhibuerunt? C. Canius, eques Romanus, nec

infacetus et satis litteratus, cum se Syracusas otiandi, ut ipse dicere

solebat, non negotiandi causa contulisset, dictitabat[315] se hortulos

aliquos emere velle, quo invitare amicos et ubi se oblectare sine

interpellatoribus posset. Quod cum percrebruisset, Pythius ei quidam,

qui argentariam faceret Syracusis, venales quidem se hortos non habere,

sed licere uti Canio, si vellet, ut suis, et simul ad cenam hominem in

hortos invitavit in posterum diem. Cum ille promisisset, tum Pythius,

qui esset ut argentarius apud omnes ordines gratiosus, piscatores ad se

convocavit et ab iis petivit, ut ante suos hortulos postridie

piscarentur, dixitque, quid eos facere vellet. Ad cenam tempori[316]

venit Canius; opipare a Pythio apparatum convivium, cumbarum ante oculos

multitudo; pro se quisque, quod ceperat, afferebat, ante pedes Pythi

pisces abiciebantur.

*59* Tum Canius: "Quaeso," inquit, "quid est hoc, Pythi? tantumne

piscium? tantumne cumbarum?"

Et ille: "Quid mirum?" inquit, "hoc loco est Syracusis quicquid est

piscium, hic aquatio, hac villa isti carere non possunt."

Incensus Canius cupiditate contendit a Pythio, ut venderet; gravate ille

primo; quid multa? impetrat. Emit homo cupidus et locuples tanti, quanti

Pythius voluit, et emit instructos; nomina facit, negotium conficit.

Invitat Canius postridie familiares suos, venit ipse mature; scalmum

nullum videt, quaerit ex proximo vicino, num feriae quaedam piscatorum

essent, quod eos nullos videret.

"Nullae, quod sciam," inquit; "sed hic piscari nulli solent; itaque heri

mirabar, quid accidisset."

*60* Stomachari Canius; sed quid faceret? nondum enim C. Aquilius,

collega et familiaris meus, protulerat de dolo malo formulas; in quibus

ipsis, cum ex eo quaereretur,[317] quid esset dolus malus, respondebat:

cum esset aliud simulatum, aliud actum. Hoc quidem sane luculente ut ab

homine perito definiendi. Ergo et Pythius et omnes aliud agentes, aliud

simulantes perfidi, improbi, malitiosi. Nullum igitur eorum factum

potest utile esse, cum sit tot vitiis inquinatum.

[315] _dictitabat_ c, Edd.; _dictabat_ B H a b.

[316] _tempori_ B H b, Bt.^1, Ed.; _tempore_ a c; _temperi_

Fl., Bt.^2, Heine.

[317] _quaereretur_ Edd., with authority; _quaererem_ MSS.

#Concealment of truth _vs._ misrepresentation and falsehood.#

*58* XIV. If, then, they are to be blamed who suppress the truth, what

are we to think of those who actually state what is false? Gaius Canius,

a Roman knight, a man of considerable wit and literary culture, once

went to Syracuse for a vacation, as he himself used to say, and not for

business. He gave out that he had a mind to purchase a little

country-seat, where he could invite his friends and enjoy himself,

uninterrupted by troublesome visitors. When this fact was spread abroad,

one Pythius, a banker of Syracuse, informed him that he had such an

estate; that it was not for sale, however, but Canius might make himself

at home there, if he pleased; and at the same time he invited him to the

estate to dinner next day. Canius accepted. Then Pythius, who, as might

be expected of a money-lender, could command favours of all classes,

called the fishermen together and asked them to do their fishing the

next day out in front of his villa, and told them what he wished them to

do. Canius came to dinner at the appointed hour; Pythius had a sumptuous

banquet prepared; there was a whole fleet of boats before their eyes;

each fisherman brought in in turn the catch that he had made; and the

fishes were deposited at the feet of Pythius.

*59* "Pray, Pythius," said Canius thereupon, "what does this mean?--all

these fish?--all these boats?"

"No wonder," answered Pythius; "this is where all the fish in Syracuse

are; here is where the fresh water comes from; the fishermen cannot get

along without this estate."

Inflamed with desire for it, Canius insisted upon Pythius's selling it

to him. At first he demurred. To make a long story short, Canius gained

his point. The man was rich, and, in his desire to own the country-seat,

he paid for it all that Pythius asked; and he bought the entire

equipment, too. Pythius entered the amount upon his ledger and completed

the transfer. The next day Canius invited his friends; he came early

himself. Not so much as a thole-pin was in sight. He asked his next-door

neighbour whether it was a fisherman's holiday, for not a sign of them

did he see.

"Not so far as I know," said he; "but none are in the habit of fishing

here. And so I could not make out what was the matter yesterday."

#Criminal fraud.#

*60* Canius was furious; but what could he do? For not yet had my

colleague and friend, Gaius Aquilius, introduced the established forms

to apply to criminal fraud. When asked what he meant by "criminal

fraud," as specified in these forms, he would reply: "Pretending one

thing and practising another"--a very felicitous definition, as one

might expect from an expert in making them. Pythius, therefore, and all

others who do one thing while they pretend another are faithless,

dishonest, and unprincipled scoundrels. No act of theirs can be

expedient, when what they do is tainted with so many vices.

*61* XV. Quodsi Aquiliana definitio vera est, ex omni vita simulatio

dissimulatioque tollenda est. Ita, nec ut emat melius nec ut vendat,

quicquam simulabit aut dissimulabit vir bonus. Atque[318] iste dolus

malus et legibus erat vindicatus, ut tutela[319] duodecim tabulis,

circumscriptio adulescentium lege Plaetoria, et sine lege iudiciis, in

quibus additur EX FIDE BONA. Reliquorum autem iudiciorum haec verba

maxime excellunt: in arbitrio rei uxoriae MELIUS AEQUIUS, in fiducia UT

INTER BONOS BENE AGIER. Quid ergo? aut in eo, QUOD MELIUS AEQUIUS,

potest ulla pars inesse fraudis? aut, cum dicitur INTER BONOS BENE

AGIER, quicquam agi dolose aut malitiose potest? Dolus autem malus in

simulatione, ut ait Aquilius, continetur. Tollendum est igitur ex rebus

contrahendis omne mendacium; non illicitatorem[320] venditor, non, qui

contra se liceatur, emptor apponet; uterque, si ad eloquendum venerit,

non plus quam semel eloquetur. *62* Q. quidem Scaevola P. f., cum

postulasset, ut sibi fundus, cuius emptor erat, semel indicaretur idque

venditor ita fecisset, dixit se pluris aestimare; addidit centum milia.

Nemo est, qui hoc viri boni fuisse neget, sapientis negant, ut si

minoris, quam potuisset, vendidisset. Haec igitur est illa pernicies,

quod alios bonos, alios sapientes existimant. #Medea, Vahlen^2, 273# Ex

quo Ennius "nequiquam sapere sapientem, qui ipse sibi prodesse non

quiret." Vere id quidem, si, quid esset "prodesse," mihi cum Ennio

conveniret.

*63* Hecatonem quidem Rhodium, discipulum Panaeti, video in iis libris,

quos de officio scripsit Q. Tuberoni, dicere "sapientis esse nihil

contra mores, leges, instituta facientem habere rationem rei familiaris.

Neque enim solum nobis divites esse volumus, sed liberis, propinquis,

amicis maximeque rei publicae. Singulorum enim facultates et copiae

divitiae sunt civitatis." Huic[321] Scaevolae factum, de quo paulo ante

dixi, placere nullo modo potest; etenim omnino tantum se negat facturum

compendii sui causa, quod non liceat. Huic nec laus magna tribuenda nec

gratia est.

*64* Sed, sive et simulatio et dissimulatio dolus malus est, perpaucae

res sunt, in quibus non dolus malus iste versetur, sive vir bonus est

is, qui prodest, quibus potest, nocet nemini, certe[322] istum[323]

virum bonum non facile reperimus.

Numquam igitur est utile peccare, quia semper est turpe, et, quia semper

est honestum virum bonum esse, semper est utile.

[318] _Atque_ MSS., Bt.^1, Müller, Heine; _Atqui_ Manutius,

Ed., Bt.^2

[319] _ut tutela_ MSS., Bt., Müller; _ut in tutela_ Heine,

Ed.

[320] _non illicitatorem_ c (_inl._) p, Edd.; _non

licitatorem_ B H a b.

[321] _huic_ c, Edd.; _huius_ B H a b.

[322] _certe_ Lamb., Edd.; _recte_ MSS.

[323] _istum_ p c, Edd.; _iustum_ B H a b.

*61* XV. But if Aquilius's definition is correct, pretence and

concealment should be done away with in all departments of our daily

life. Then an honest man will not be guilty of either pretence or

concealment in order to buy or to sell to better advantage. #Criminal

fraud and the law.# Besides, your "criminal fraud" had previously been

prohibited by the statutes: the penalty in the matter of trusteeships,

for example, is fixed by the Twelve Tables; for the defrauding of

minors, by the Plaetorian law. The same prohibition is effective,

without statutory enactment, in equity cases, in which it is added that

the decision shall be "as good faith requires."[BL] In all other cases

in equity, moreover, the following phrases are most noteworthy: in a

case calling for arbitration in the matter of a wife's dowry: what is

"the fairer is the better"; in a suit for the restoration of a trust:

"honest dealing, as between honest parties." Pray, then, can there be

any element of fraud in what is adjusted for the "better and fairer"? Or

can anything fraudulent or unprincipled be done, when "honest dealing

between honest parties" is stipulated? But "criminal fraud," as Aquilius

says, consists in false pretence. #Criminal fraud in the light of moral

rectitude.# We must, therefore, keep misrepresentation entirely out of

business transactions: the seller will not engage a bogus bidder to run

prices up nor the buyer one to bid low against himself to keep them

down; and each, if they come to naming a price, will state once for all

what he will give or take. *62* Why, when Quintus Scaevola, the son of

Publius Scaevola, asked that the price of a farm that he desired to

purchase be definitely named and the vendor named it, he replied that

he considered it worth more, and paid him 100,000 sesterces over and

above what he asked. No one could say that this was not the act of an

honest man; but people do say that it was not the act of a worldly-wise

man, any more than if he had sold for a smaller amount than he could

have commanded. Here, then, is that mischievous idea--the world

accounting some men upright, others wise; and it is this fact that gives

Ennius occasion to say:

"In vain is the wise man wise, who cannot benefit himself."

And Ennius is quite right, if only he and I were agreed upon the meaning

of "benefit."

*63* Now I observe that Hecaton of Rhodes, a pupil of Panaetius, says in

his books on "Moral Duty" dedicated to Quintus Tubero that #The standard

of selfishness.# "it is a wise man's duty to take care of his private

interests, at the same time doing nothing contrary to the civil customs,

laws, and institutions. But that depends on our purpose in seeking

prosperity; for we do not aim to be rich for ourselves alone but for our

children, relatives, friends, and, above all, for our country. For the

private fortunes of individuals are the wealth of the state." Hecaton

could not for a moment approve of Scaevola's act, which I cited a moment

ago; for he openly avows that he will abstain from doing for his own

profit only what the law expressly forbids. Such a man deserves no great

praise nor gratitude.

*64* Be that as it may, if both pretence and concealment constitute

"criminal fraud," there are very few transactions into which "criminal

fraud" does not enter; or, if he only is a good man who helps all he

can, and harms no one, it will certainly be no easy matter for us to

find the good man as thus defined.

To conclude, then, it is never expedient to do wrong, because wrong is

always immoral; and it is always expedient to be good, because goodness

is always moral.

[BL] See § 70 below.

*65* XVI. Ac de iure quidem praediorum sanctum apud nos est iure civili,

ut in iis vendendis vitia dicerentur, quae nota essent venditori. Nam,

cum ex duodecim tabulis satis esset ea praestari, quae essent lingua

nuncupata, quae qui infitiatus esset, dupli poenam subiret, a iuris

consultis etiam reticentiae poena est constituta; quicquid enim

esset[324] in praedio vitii, id statuerunt, si venditor sciret, nisi

nominatim dictum esset, praestari oportere. *66* Ut, cum in arce

augurium augures acturi essent iussissentque Ti.[325] Claudium

Centumalum, qui aedes in Caelio monte habebat, demoliri ea, quorum

altitudo officeret auspiciis, Claudius proscripsit insulam

[vendidit],[326] emit P. Calpurnius Lanarius. Huic ab auguribus illud

idem denuntiatum est. Itaque Calpurnius cum demolitus esset cognossetque

Claudium aedes postea proscripsisse, quam esset ab auguribus demoliri

iussus, arbitrum illum adegit, QUICQUID SIBI DARE FACERE OPORTERET EX

FIDE BONA. M. Cato sententiam dixit, huius nostri Catonis pater (ut enim

ceteri ex patribus, sic hic, qui illud lumen progenuit ex filio est

nominandus)--is igitur iudex ita pronuntiavit: "cum in vendendo rem eam

scisset et non pronuntiasset, emptori damnum praestari oportere."

*67* Ergo ad fidem bonam statuit pertinere notum esse emptori vitium,

quod nosset venditor. Quod si recte iudicavit, non recte frumentarius

ille, non recte aedium pestilentium venditor tacuit. Sed huius modi

reticentiae iure civili comprehendi[327] non possunt; quae autem

possunt, diligenter tenentur. M. Marius Gratidianus, propinquus noster,

C. Sergio Oratae vendiderat aedes eas, quas ab eodem ipse paucis ante

annis emerat. Eae serviebant,[328] sed hoc in mancipio Marius non

dixerat. Adducta res in iudicium est. Oratam Crassus, Gratidianum

defendebat Antonius. Ius Crassus urguebat, "quod vitii venditor non

dixisset sciens, id oportere praestari," aequitatem Antonius, "quoniam

id vitium ignotum Sergio non fuisset, qui illas aedes vendidisset, nihil

fuisse necesse dici, nec eum esse deceptum, qui, id, quod emerat, quo

iure esset, teneret."

*68* Quorsus haec? Ut illud intellegas, non placuisse maioribus nostris

astutos.

[324] _esset_ p c, Edd.; _est_ B H a b.

[325] _Ti._ Lange, Edd.; _titum_ MSS.

[326] _vendidit_ B H a b; _et vendidit_ p c.; Edd. omit.

[327] _comprehendi_ MSS.; _omnes comprehendi_ Bt., Heine.

[328] _serviebant_ Heus., Edd.; _sergio serviebant_ B H a b;

_sergio alii serviebant_ c.

#Concealment of truth about real estate prohibited by law.#

*65* XVI. In the laws pertaining to the sale of real property it is

stipulated in our civil code that when a transfer of any real estate is

made, all its defects shall be declared as far as they are known to the

vendor. According to the laws of the Twelve Tables it used to be

sufficient that such faults as had been expressly declared should be

made good and that for any flaws which the vendor expressly denied, when

questioned, he should be assessed double damages. A like penalty for

failure to make such declaration also has now been secured by our

jurisconsults: they have decided that any defect in a piece of real

estate, if known to the vendor but not expressly stated, must be made

good by him. *66* For example, the augurs were proposing to take

observations from the citadel and they ordered Tiberius Claudius

Centumalus, who owned a house upon the Caelian Hill, to pull down such

parts of the building as obstructed the augurs' view by reason of their

height. Claudius at once advertised his block for sale, and Publius

Calpurnius Lanarius bought it. The same notice was served also upon him.

And so, when Calpurnius had pulled down those parts of the building and

discovered that Claudius had advertised it for sale only after the

augurs had ordered them to be pulled down, he summoned the former owner

before a court of equity to decide "what indemnity the owner was under

obligation 'in good faith' to pay and deliver to him." The verdict was

pronounced by Marcus Cato, the father of our Cato (for as other men

receive a distinguishing name from their fathers, so he who bestowed

upon the world so bright a luminary must have his distinguishing name

from his son); he, as I was saying, was presiding judge and pronounced

the verdict that "since the augurs' mandate was known to the vendor at

the time of making the transfer and since he had not made it known, he

was bound to make good the purchaser's loss."

#Scope of Cato's decision.#

*67* With this verdict he established the principle that it was

essential to good faith that any defect known to the vendor must be made

known to the purchaser. If his decision was right, our grain dealer and

the vendor of the unsanitary house did not do right to suppress the

facts in those cases. But the civil code cannot be made to include all

cases where facts are thus suppressed; but those cases which it does

include are summarily dealt with. Marcus Marius Gratidianus, a kinsman

of ours, sold back to Gaius Sergius Orata the house which he himself had

bought a few years before from that same Orata. It was subject to an

encumbrance, but Marius had said nothing about this fact in stating the

terms of sale. The case was carried to the courts. Crassus was counsel

for Orata; Antonius was retained by Gratidianus. Crassus pleaded the

letter of the law that "the vendor was bound to make good the defect,

for he had not declared it, although he was aware of it"; Antonius laid

stress upon the equity of the case, pleading that, "inasmuch as the

defect in question had not been unknown to Sergius (for it was the same

house that he had sold to Marius), no declaration of it was needed, and

in purchasing it back he had not been imposed upon, for he knew to what

legal liability his purchase was subject."

*68* What is the purpose of these illustrations? To let you see that our

forefathers did not countenance sharp practice.

XVII. Sed aliter leges, aliter philosophi tollunt astutias, leges,

quatenus manu tenere possunt, philosophi, quatenus ratione et

intellegentia. Ratio ergo hoc postulat, ne quid insidiose, ne quid

simulate, ne quid fallaciter. Suntne igitur insidiae tendere plagas,

etiamsi excitaturus non sis nec agitaturus? ipsae enim ferae nullo

insequente saepe incidunt. Sic tu aedes proscribas, tabulam tamquam

plagam ponas, [domum propter vitia vendas,][329] in eam aliquis incurrat

imprudens?

*69* Hoc quamquam video propter depravationem consuetudinis neque more

turpe haberi neque aut lege sanciri aut iure civili, tamen naturae lege

sanctum est. Societas est enim (quod etsi saepe dictum est, dicendum est

tamen saepius), latissime quidem quae pateat, omnium inter omnes,

interior eorum, qui eiusdem gentis sint, propior eorum, qui eiusdem

civitatis. Itaque maiores aliud ius gentium, aliud ius civile esse

voluerunt; quod civile, non idem continuo gentium, quod autem gentium,

idem civile esse debet. Sed nos veri iuris germanaeque iustitiae solidam

et expressam effigiem nullam tenemus, umbra et imaginibus utimur. Eas

ipsas utinam sequeremur! feruntur enim ex optimis naturae et veritatis

exemplis. 70* Nam quanti verba illa: UTI NE PROPTER TE FIDEMVE TUAM

CAPTUS FRAUDATUSVE SIM! quam illa aurea: UT INTER BONOS BENE AGIER

OPORTET ET SINE FRAUDATIONE! Sed, qui sint "boni," et quid sit "bene

agi," magna quaestio est.

Q. quidem Scaevola, pontifex maximus, summam vim esse dicebat in omnibus

iis arbitriis, in quibus adderetur EX FIDE BONA, fideique bonae nomen

existimabat manare latissime, idque versari in tutelis societatibus,

fiduciis mandatis, rebus emptis venditis, conductis locatis, quibus

vitae societas contineretur; in iis magni esse iudicis statuere,

praesertim cum in plerisque essent iudicia contraria, quid quemque

cuique praestare oporteret.

*71* Quocirca astutiae tollendae sunt eaque malitia, quae volt illa

quidem videri se esse prudentiam, sed abest ab ea distatque plurimum.

Prudentia est enim locata in dilectu bonorum et malorum, malitia, si

omnia, quae turpia sunt, mala sunt, mala bonis ponit ante.

Nec vero in praediis solum ius civile ductum a natura malitiam

fraudemque vindicat, sed etiam in mancipiorum venditione venditoris

fraus omnis excluditur. Qui enim scire debuit de sanitate, de fuga, de

furtis, praestat edicto aedilium. Heredum alia causa est.

*72* Ex quo intellegitur, quoniam iuris natura fons sit, hoc secundum

naturam esse, neminem id agere, ut ex alterius praedetur inscitia. Nec

ulla pernicies vitae maior inveniri potest quam in malitia simulatio

intellegentiae; ex quo ista innumerabilia nascuntur, ut utilia cum

honestis pugnare videantur. Quotus enim quisque reperietur, qui

impunitate et ignoratione omnium proposita abstinere possit iniuria?

[329] Bracketed by Unger, Edd.

#Law _vs._ philosophy in dealing with knavery.#

XVII. Now the law disposes of sharp practices in one way, philosophers

in another: the law deals with them as far as it can lay its strong arm

upon them; philosophers, as far as they can be apprehended by reason and

conscience. Now reason demands that nothing be done with unfairness,

with false pretence, or with misrepresentation. Is it not deception,

then, to set snares, even if one does not mean to start the game or to

drive it into them? Why, wild creatures often fall into snares undriven

and unpursued. Could one in the same way advertise a house for sale,

post up a notice "To be sold," like a snare, and have somebody run into

it unsuspecting?

#Civil law _vs._ moral law.#